I

DSITY

167

IFORNI

LECTURES ON LOGIC.

" a

IX.

may The dis-
and Clear and

tinction of

Distinct

Of notions

illustrated

examples.

tial, and then to descend from them to the contingent LECT.
or accidental; and this not only because we thus give
order and connection to our notions, but, likewise, be-
cause the contingent characters are frequently only to
be comprehended through the necessary.'
But before leaving this part of our subject, it
be proper to illustrate the distinction of Clear
Distinct notions by one or two concrete examples.
many things we have clear but not distinct notions. by concrete
Thus we have a clear, but not a distinct, notion of col-
ours, sounds, tastes, smells, &c. For we are fully able
to distinguish red from white, to distinguish an acute
from a grave note, the voice of a friend from that of
a stranger, the scent of roses from that of onions, the
flavour of sugar from that of vinegar; but by what
plurality of separate and enunciable characters is this
discrimination made? It is because we are unable to
do this, that we cannot describe such perceptions and
representations to others.

"If you ask of me," said St Augustin, "what is Time, I know not; if you do not ask me, I know." What does this mean? Simply that he had a clear, but not a distinct, notion of Time.

Of a triangle we have a clear notion, when we distinguish a triangle from other figures, without specially considering the characters which constitute it what it is. But when we think it as a portion of space bounded by three lines, as a figure whose three angles are equal to two right angles, &c., then we obtain of it a distinct concept.

Distinctness

We now come to the consideration of the question,- How the How does the Distinctness of a concept stand affected of a Concept

a Esser, Logik, § 47, p. 93-95.- B Confessions, xi. c. 14.—ED.

ED.

IX.

LECT. by the two quantities of a concept ?-and in reference to this point I would, in the first place, dictate to you is affected the following paragraph :

by the two
quantities of
a Concept.

Par. XXIX.
Distinctness,
Internal

and Exter

nal.

Explication.

¶ XXIX. As a concept is a plurality of characters bound up into unity, and as that plurality is contained partly in its Intensive, partly under its Extensive, quantity; its Distinctness is, in like manner, in relation to these quantities, partly an Internal or Intensive, partly an External or Extensive Distinctness."

In explanation of this, it is to be observed, that, as the distinctness of a concept is contained in the clear apprehension of the various attributes of which it is the sum, as it is the sum of these attributes in two opposite relations, which constitute, in fact, two opposite quantities or wholes, and as these wholes are severally capable of illustration by analysis, it follows, that each of these analyses will contribute its peculiar share to the general distinctness of the concept. Thus, if the distinctness of a notion bears reference to that plurality which constitutes its comprehension, in other words, to that which is contained in the concept, the distinctness is denominated an internal or intensive distinctness, or distinctness of comprehension. On the other hand, if the distinctness refers to that plurality which constitutes the extension of the notion, in other words, to what is contained under it, in that case, the distinctness is called an external or extensive distinctness, a distinctness of extension. It is only when a notion combines in it both of these species of distinctness, it is only when its parts have been analysed in a Krug, Logik, § 34; Esser, Logik, § 48.-ED.

reference to the two quantities, that it reaches the LECT. highest degree of distinctness and of perfection.

IX.

and Divi

tions admit

The Internal Distinctness of a notion is accomplished Definition by Exposition or Definition, that is, by the enumeration sion. of the characters or partial notions contained in it; the External Distinctness, again, of a notion is accomplished through Division, that is, through the enumeration of the objects which are contained under it. Thus the concept man is rendered intensively more distinct, when we declare that man is a rational animal; it is rendered extensively more distinct, when we declare that man is partly male, partly female man." In the former case, we resolve the concept man into its several characters,-into its partial or constituent attributes; in the latter, we resolve it into its subordinate concepts, or inferior genera. In simple notions, there Simple nois thus possible an extensive, but not an intensive, dis- of an extentinctness; in individual notions, there is possible an dual notions intensive, but not an extensive, distinctness. Thus sive distinctthe concepts existence, green, sweet,&c., though, as absolutely or relatively simple, their comprehension cannot be analysed into any constituent attributes, and they do not, therefore, admit of definition; still it cannot be said that they are incapable of being rendered more distinct. For do we not analyse the pluralities of which these concepts are the sum, when we say, that existence is either ideal or real, that green is a yellowish or a bluish green, that sweet is a pungent or a mawkish sweet?-and do we not, by this analysis, attain a greater degree of logical perfection than when we think them only clearly and as wholes ?? cept has, therefore, attained its highest point of dis- of Distinct

a Krug, p. 95, [Logik, § 34.-ED.] B Esser, Logik, § 48.-ED.

66

sive, indivi

of an inten

ness.

'A con- The highest point

y Krug, Logik, § 34, Anmerk., i.

pp. 95, 96.-ED.

IX.

ness of a

LECT. tinctness, when there is such a consciousness of its characters that, in rendering its comprehension disConcept. tinct, we touch on notions which, as simple, admit of no definition, and, in rendering its extension distinct, we touch on notions which, as individual, admit of no ulterior division. It is true, indeed, that a distinctness of this degree is one which is only ideal; that is, one to which we are always approximating, but which we never are able actually to reach. In order to approach as near as possible to this ideal, we must always inquire, what is contained in, and what under, a notion, and endeavour to obtain a distinct consciousness of it in both relations. What, in this research, first presents itself we must again analyse anew, with reference always both to comprehension and to extension; and descending from the higher to the lower, from the greater to the less, we ought to stop only when our process is arrested in the individual or in the simple." "

a

a Esser, Logik, § 48, p. 96.-ED.

LECTURE X.

STOICHEIOLOGY.

SECT. II.-OF THE PRODUCTS OF THOUGHT.

I. ENNOEMATIC.

IMPERFECTION OF CONCEPTS.

X.

Imperfec

It is now necessary to notice an Imperfection to which LECT. concepts are peculiarly liable, and in the exposition of which I find it necessary to employ an expression, tion of Conwhich, though it has the highest philosophical author- cepts. ity for its use, I would still, in consequence of its ambiguity in English, have avoided, if this could have been done without compromising the knowledge of what it is intended to express. The expression I mean, is intuitive, in the particular signification in which it is used by Leibnitz," and the continental philosophers in general, to denote what is common to our direct and ostensive cognition of individual objects, in Sense or Imagination, (Presentation or Representation), and in opposition to our indirect and symbolical cognition of general objects, through the use of signs or language, in the Understanding. But, on this head, I would, first of all, dictate to you the following paragraph.

Imperfec

¶ XXX. As a notion or concept is the fac- Par. XXX. titious whole or unity made up of a plurality of tion of Conattributes, a whole too often of a very complex

a Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis, Opera, ed. Erdmann, p. 80.—ED.

cepts.