Opinion of the Court.

pel them to do so. In neither State has there been granted such a remedy for the enforcement of the contracts of the sovereignty as may not, under the Constitution of the United States, be taken away."

The statute of North Carolina which we now consider, and which gave the courts of that State power to examine and recommend claims against it to the legislature, is much more restrictive than were the statutes of Tennessee and Alabama passed on in the cases just cited. Applying to this case the reasoning of this court in those cases expressed, it becomes clear that the authority given by the State of North Carolina to its court not being a part of the contract on which the plaintiff in error had a right to rely, its repeal did not impair the obligations of his contract in the sense conveyed by those words when used in the Constitution of the United States. This proposition so necessarily results from the authorities and is so self-evident in reason that it was not denied in the discussion at bar. Indeed, it was frankly conceded that the exercise by a State of the power to repeal a grant of authority to its courts to audit claims against itself, would not in any manner violate the obligations of contracts which had been entered into by the State at a time when the power existed. Yet, whilst this concession was made, it was asserted that the impairment of the obligation of the contract, here claimed to have been accomplished, arises from the fact that the state court erroneously held that the amendment to the state constitution repealed the court's authority to examine and recommend the claim presented to it, when in fact such repeal had not taken place. In other words, it was argued that although the right to have the claim examined and recommended was existing and unrepealed, the state court had impaired the obligations of the contract by holding that such right was nonexisting because repealed by a subsequent provision of the state constitution. But this is mere reasoning in a vicious circle, for the concession that the right could be taken away without violating the contract clause of the Constitution, necessarily implied that the decision of the state court as to repeal vel non in no way involved rights protected from impairment

Counsel for Parties.

under the Constitution of the United States. It is apparent that no rights under the Constitution of the United States arose in favor of the claimant from the provision conferring on the courts of the State the authority to examine and recommend, since all the benefits resulting therefrom could admittedly be withdrawn without violating the contract. To give effect to the contention of the plaintiff in error, we should be obliged to announce the contradictory proposition that where there were no rights under the Constitution of the United States to be impaired, yet a decision of the state court had impaired such rights. We should also be obliged to hold that although the State could at its will take away the right without impairing the contract, yet a decision by the court of last resort, of the State, that the right had been taken away was an impairment of the contract. The fallacy contained in the argument results from overlooking the fact that the moment it is admitted that the repeal of the right to have the claim examined and recommended is no impairment of the obligation of the contract secured under the Constitution of the United States, the question whether or not such right has been repealed becomes purely a question of state law to be determined by the state courts.

Judgment affirmed.

BALTZER AND TAAKS v. NORTH CAROLINA.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NORTH

CAROLINA.

No. 52. Argued February 8, 4, 1896. Decided March 2, 1896.

Baltzer v. North Carolina, ante 240, followed,

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Simon Sterne for plaintiff in error.

Mr. James E. Shepherd and Mr. Charles M. Busbee, (with whom was Mr. F. I. Osborne on the brief,) for defendant in

error.

Statement of the Case.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The claim presented in this case to the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina differs somewhat from that relied on in that court in the case of Hermann R. Baltzer v. The State of North Carolina, No. 93 of the docket of this court. The question of the power in the state court to give the relief prayed for was by it decided adversely to the plaintiffs in error upon grounds identical with those considered by us in the case just decided. Our reasons for affirmance there expressed are conclusive of the issues here, and consequently the judgment is

Affirmed.

Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, affirmed to the point that the duty of determining unsettled questions respecting title to real estate is local in its nature, to be discharged in such mode as may be provided by the State in which the land is situated, when such mode does not conflict with some special prohibition of the Constitution, or is not against natural justice.

Applying that doctrine to this case it is held that the decree in the equity cause of Pippert v. English was not void for want of personal service on English and his wife, as the laws relating to the District of Columbia permit service by publication upon absent defendants. And further, as the evidence shows that Pippert had no knowledge of the attempt by Mrs. English to incumber the land in question by a deed of trust, the recording of the instrument did not give him constructive notice of it, as the formalities required by law to authorize the recording were not complied with.

That deed of trust was inoperative as a legal instrument.

There being no actual notice, and the recording of the defective deed not operating as constructive notice, the alleged equitable lien is wholly inoperative against those holding under the decree below.

THE complainant below was Christeina Murphy, who sued

Statement of the Case.

in her own right and as executrix and trustee under the will of Peter Pippert, her deceased father. By her bill, complainant sought the cancellation of a deed of trust upon certain land in the city of Washington, devised by her father to complainant and to two of the defendants named in the bill, or, in the alternative, the reinstatement of a deed of trust for the benefit of said Pippert which had been cancelled by a judicial decree as hereinafter stated. The deed of trust attacked by the bill purported to have been executed in August, 1874, by Elizabeth English, to one Bean, to secure payment of four notes for $1000 each, payable to the order of James Lynch. It was averred, in substance, that at the time of the execution of the deed of trust the legal title to the land was in Elizabeth English and Andrew Schwartz, Sr., by virtue of a conveyance from Pippert, made July 27, 1874, and the land which it embraced was incumbered by a deed of trust to Pippert given to secure the unpaid purchase money, $10,390.42. It was also alleged that the deed from Pippert to English and Schwartz was annulled by a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a suit instituted by Pippert to cancel his conveyance on the ground of alleged fraud practised upon him in the transaction. At the time of the institution of said suit the Bean deed of trust had been placed by Mrs. English on her three-fourth interest in the property, bought by herself and Schwartz from Pippert, and it was on the land records of the District of Columbia. Neither Lynch nor his trustee Bean were made parties to the suit.

Relief was sought as to the Bean deed of trust upon the ground that it was executed on behalf of Mrs. English by her husband, who had no proper or competent authority in law to execute the same; and it was urged at the trial, among other objections, that the power of attorney under which English assumed to execute the deed of trust was defective and was not entitled to record, because of the absence therefrom of a certificate of the official character of the officer before whom, in Michigan, Mrs. English acknowledged the instrument. It was further urged in the bill as ground of relief that the notes to Lynch were made without consideration,

Statement of the Case.

and that the transaction was part and parcel of a scheme by which English attempted to defraud Pippert, as alleged in the suit of Pippert herein before referred to, and that the defendant Jane Lynch, claiming to be the owner of the notes secured by said deed of trust, and the heirs at law of Bean, the deceased trustee, were threatening to enforce the deed of trust by advertising the premises for sale thereunder.

The controversy in this court being confined to the question of the validity of the apparent deed of trust to Bean, numerous allegations contained in the bill are unnecessary to be referred to.

Of the pleadings filed on behalf of the various defendants only that of Jane Lynch requires notice. In her answer she set up her ownership of the notes referred to in the Bean deed of trust, claiming that she received them from her husband on the day the notes bore date. She denied any knowledge of the suit to cancel Pippert's conveyance to Mrs. English and Schwartz, and averred that she had no knowledge of the decree in Pippert's suit until very recently, and further averred that her deceased husband parted with full consideration for the notes, and that the transaction was not fraudulent.

While averring that English did have proper and competent authority in law to execute the said deed of trust as the agent of his wife, Mrs. Lynch coupled such averment with the claim that the property purchased from Pippert was in fact paid for by the money of Alexander English, who kept his property in his wife's name so as to be out of the reach of his creditors, and that said English was the real principal, and in giving the deed of trust for the benefit of Lynch he was pledging his own property, though in the name of his wife, for a debt due by him and for which he received the consideration. We quote the following statements in the answer:

"Defendant further says that she is advised and believes, and, therefore, charges, that while the said deed of trust is not technically sufficient in law to constitute a valid deed of trust, yet that it was on the part of said English a pledge of property of which he was the real and equitable owner for a just debt which he owed the said James Lynch, and that the