State and continued so until his death. In 1866 the judgment was re-
vived by scire facias, process being served on F. only. In 1871 it was
in like manner revived. In 1880 O. proceeded on the judgment against
H. in the courts of Louisiana, where a judgment is barred by prescrip-
tion in ten years from its rendition. Being compelled to elect upon
which judgment he relied, he elected to stand upon the scire facias
judgment of 1871. Held, that, viewed as a new judgment rendered as
in an action of debt, the judgment had no binding force in Louisiana,
as H. had not been served with process or voluntarily appeared; and
considered as in continuation of the prior action and a revival of the
original judgment for purposes of execution, it operated merely to
keep in force the local lien, and, for the same reason, it could not be
availed of as removing the statutory bar of the lex fori. Owens v.
Henry, 642.
See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 4.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. As the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States was in-
voked throughout this litigation upon the ground of diverse citizen-
ship, and as this bill must be regarded as ancillary, auxiliary or
supplemental to the suit for the foreclosure of the mortgage, or, as
it were, in continuation thereof, the decree of the Circuit Court
of Appeals in that suit being made final by section 6 of the act of
March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, no appeal lies to this court. Carey
v. Houston & Texas Central Railway Co., 115.
2. The decision by the Supreme Court of the State that the exemption
from taxation applies to new stock in the bank, created and issued
since the adoption of the constitution of 1870, being in favor of the
exemption claimed by the bank, cannot be reviewed by this court.
Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 134.
3. As a claim of invention, made in an application for a patent, is a right
incapable of being ascertained and valued in money, no appeal lies to
this court from a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of the Dis-
trict that the applicant was not entitled to a decree, under Rev. Stat.
§ 4915, authorizing the Commissioner of Patents to issue a patent to
him for his alleged invention. Durham v. Seymour, 235.
4. When, in a case appealed from a Circuit Court, the record discloses
that the defendants below appealed upon the express ground that
the court erred in taking jurisdiction of the bill and in not dismiss-
ing the bill for want of jurisdiction, and prayed that their appeal
should be allowed, and the question of jurisdiction be certified to the
Supreme Court, and that said appeal was allowed, and the certificate
further states that there is sent a true copy of so much of the record
as is necessary for the determination of the question of jurisdiction,
and as part of the record so certified is the opinion of the court
below, in accordance with which defendants' motion to dismiss the
cause for want of jurisdiction was denied, it sufficiently shows that
the appeal was granted solely upon the question of jurisdiction.
Smith v. McKay, 355.
5. When the requisite citizenship of the parties appears, and the subject-
matter is such that the Circuit Court is competent to deal with it,
the jurisdiction of that court attaches, and whether the court sustains
the complainant's prayer for equitable relief, or dismisses the bill
with leave to bring an action at law, either is a valid exercise of
jurisdiction; and if any error be committed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction, it can only be remedied by an appeal to the Circuit
Court of Appeals. Ib.
6. An interlocutory order or decree of the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia at special term may be reviewed by the general term on
appeal, without awaiting a final determination of the cause; and, on
appeal to this court from the final decree at general term, the entire
record is brought up for review. Spalding v. Mason, 375.
7. This court cannot pass upon a refusal of a motion to instruct gen-
erally in defendant's favor when the record contains only a part
of the evidence. Hansen v. Boyd, 397.
8. The appellees were brought before a Circuit Court commissioner in the
Western District of Texas, charged by the Mexican consul with the
commission, in Mexico, of a crime extraditable under the treaty of
June 20, 1862. The commissioner found the evidence sufficient to
warrant their commitment for extradition. On the application of the
prisoners a writ of habeas corpus was issued by the United States Dis-
trict Judge, directed to the marshal of the district. The judge, after
hearing, decided that the offences charged were political offences, and
not extraditable, and ordered the prisoners discharged. From this
judgment the consul appealed to this court. Held, that as his gov-
ernment was the real party interested, the appeal was properly prose-
cuted by him; and as the construction of the treaty was drawn in
question, it was properly taken to this court. Ornelas v. Ruiz, 502.
9. In an appeal from a judgment of a territorial court, with no exceptions
to rulings of the court on the admission or rejection of testimony,
this court is limited in its review to a determination of the ques-
tion whether the facts found are sufficient to sustain the judgment
rendered. Gildersleeve v. New Mexico Mining Co., 573.
See JURISDICTION, B;
TAX AND TAXATION, 6.
B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT Courts of Appeal.
The decrees and judgments of Circuit Courts of Appeal are made final
by section 6 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, where the juris-
diction of the Circuit Court over the intervenor's petition, the decree
on which is appealed from, was referable to its jurisdiction of an
equity suit which depended wholly upon diverse citizenship. Rouse
v. Hornsby, 588.
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. A Circuit Court of the United States has no jurisdiction of a bill to
enjoin the collection of separate county taxes by separate county
officers, in the State of Arkansas, against the Western Union Tele-
graph Company, (a corporation which has accepted the provisions of
the Statute now codified in the Revised Statutes as Section 5263 to
Section 5269,) on its line in each of said counties in that State, when
the amount of the tax in no one of the counties reaches the sum of
two thousand dollars; and this result is not affected by the fact that
if the county assessments were aggregated they would exceed two
thousand dollars, as the several county clerks or tax collectors cannot
be joined in a single suit in a Federal court, and the jurisdiction
sustained on the ground that the total amount involved exceeds the
jurisdictional limitation; nor by the fact that the railroad commis-
sioners of the State, who had already acted in the matter, were made
parties defendant to the suit. Fishback v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 96.
2. A bill in equity by a corporation, or by the stockholders of a corpora-
tion, in a Circuit Court of the United States, to set aside a final
decree of that court against the corporation in a foreclosure suit, upon
the ground that the decree was obtained by collusion and fraud and
that the court had no jurisdiction to make it, is an ancillary suit and
a continuation of the main suit so far as the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court as a court of the United States is concerned. Carey v.
Houston Central Texas Railway Co., 115.
D. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNited States.
Under the act of July 12, 1894, c. 132, enacting that "all criminal pro-
ceedings instituted for the trial of offences against the laws of the
United States arising in the District of Minnesota shall be brought,
had and prosecuted in the division of said district in which such
offences were committed," the court has no jurisdiction of an indict-
ment afterwards presented by the grand jury for the district in one
division, for an offence committed in another division before the
passage of the act, and for which no complaint has been made against
the defendant; although the witnesses whose names are endorsed
upon the indictment were summoned before the grand jury and were
in actual attendance upon the court before the passage of the act.
Post v. United States, 583.
E. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
1. When a petition filed in the Court of Claims alleges that a depredation
was committed by an Indian or Indians belonging to a tribe in
amity with the United States, it becomes the duty of that court to
inquire as to the truth of that allegation, and its truth is not deter-
mined by the mere existence of a treaty between the United States
and the tribe, or by the fact that such treaty has never been formally
abrogated by a declaration of war on the part of either, but the
inquiry is whether, as a matter of fact, the tribe was at the time, as a
tribe, in a state of actual peace with the United States: and if it
appears that the depredation was committed by a single individual,
or a few individuals without the consent and against the knowledge
of the tribe, the court may proceed to investigate the amount of the
loss, and render judgment therefor; but if, on the other hand, the
tribe, as a tribe, was engaged in actual hostilities with the United
States, the judgment of the Court of Claims must be that the allega-
tion of the petition is not sustained, and that the claim is not one.
within its province to adjudicate. Marks v. United States, 297.
2. Johnson v. United States, 160 U. S. 546, affirmed to the point that, by
clause 2 of section 1 of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 538, 26 Stat. 851,
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was limited to claims which,
on March 3, 1885, had either been examined and allowed by the
Department of the Interior, or were then pending therein for exam-
ination. Ib.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
The court bases its conclusion in this case upon the fact that the record
exhibits such gross laches on the part of complainant, or those with
whom he is in privity, and upon whose rights his own must depend,
as to effectually debar him from a right to the relief which he seeks.
Gildersleeve v. New Mexico Mining Co., 573.
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.
See BANKRUPTCY, 1.
1. In Alabama a judgment in itself imposes no lien upon the property of
the judgment debtor, but the issue of an execution and its delivery to
the officer are necessary to create a lien. Beebe v. United States, 104.
2. According to the settled rule in Alabama, when an execution comes to
the hands of the sheriff the lien attaches and continues from term to
term, provided alias and pluries writs are duly issued and delivered,
and while it is so kept alive the lien is, upon levy and sale, paramount
to any intermediate conveyance by the debtor; and as, in this case,
the facts show that valid executions were issued and delivered to the
marshal as early as January 23, 1877, and on return alias executions
were duly issued and duly levied, the subsequent sale related back to
the original issue, and took the legal title out of the plaintiff in error
prior to his deed of March 22, 1877. Ib.
3. When it appears by a memorandum on judgment records that "by
consent execution is stayed until” a date named, and execution issues
before that date, it will be presumed, nothing appearing to the con-
trary, that it was rightly issued, and that either the agreement lacked
consideration, or was not authorized, or had been by mutual assent
annulled, or that the terms of the agreement had not been complied
with by defendant. lb.
4. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, affirmed to the point that the duty of
determining unsettled questions respecting title to real estate is local
in its nature, to be discharged in such mode as may be provided by
the State in which the land is situated, when such mode does not
conflict with some special prohibition of the Constitution, or is not
against natural justice. Lynch v. Murphy, 247.
5. Upon proceedings under the statute of Texas of March 20, 1848, c. 145,
for the escheat of land of a person who is dead, in which the petition
describes the land, gives his name, and alleges that he died intestate
and without heirs, that no letters of administration upon his estate
had been granted, that there is no tenant or person in actual or con-
structive possession of the land, nor any person, known to the peti-
tioner, claiming an estate therein, and that the land has escheated to
the State of Texas; and an order of notice to all persons interested in
the estate has been published, as required by the statute; and, after a
hearing of all who appear and plead, judgment is entered, describing
the land, and declaring that it has escheated to the State; the judg-
ment is conclusive evidence of the State's title in the land, not only
against any tenants or claimants having had actual notice by scire
facias, or having appeared and pleaded, but also against all other per-
sons interested in the estate and having had constructive notice by
publication. Hamilton v. Brown, 256.
6. The constitution of Texas of 1869, art. 4, sect. 20, declaring it to be the
duty of the comptroller of public accounts to "take charge of all
escheated property," did not affect pending proceedings for escheat
under the statute of March 20, 1848, c. 145, so far as concerned the
vesting of the title to the land in the State, even if it should be held
to repeal the provisions for a subsequent sale of the land by the
sheriff. lb.
7. The constitution of Texas of 1869, art. 10, sect. 6, forbidding the legis
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