In Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union (110 Fed. Rep., 698), the court said: Whether this picketing has been accompanied by violence or not, we need not consider. It certainly was one of the means used by this defendant organization to enforce its mandate. While picketing may not be an occasion of war, it certainly is an evidence that war exists, and the term is appropriately borrowed from the nomenclature of warfare. This system constantly kept up, in its nature leads to disturbance and has a tendency to intimidate.

In Burnham v. Dowd (217 Mass., 351), the court said:

Members of a labor union may be enjoined from refusing to handle materials sold by one who furnishes supplies to an employer of nonunion labor if they have no dispute with their employers who purchase such materials.

Members of a union who have caused a loss of business to a merchant because of an unlawful boycott of his materials, can not avoid liability to him for such damages as are capable of substantial proof, by the fact that it is impossible to determine the total amount of loss, and may be difficult to ascertain with absolute certainty the money value of even the damage that can be proved.

In the matter of Langell (144 N. W., 841), a Michigan case, the court said:

Equity may prohibit the picketing of premises of an employer against whom strike has been declared.

One who goes to the premises to do picketing, under the impression that the court had no jurisdiction to issue the injunction, is guilty of contempt.

In Railroad Co. v. Gee (139 Fed. Rep., 582), the court said:

There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching. When men want to converse or persuade they do not organize a picket line. When they only want to see who are at work they go and see, and then leave, and disturb no one, physically or mentally.

In Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union (232 Ill., 424), the court said:

The very fact of establishing a picket line is evidence of an intention to annoy, embarrass, and intimidate, whether physical violence is used or not. There have been a few cases where it was held that picketing by a labor union of a place of business is not necessarily unlawful if the pickets are peaceful and well-behaved; but if the watching and besetting of the workmen is carried to such a length as to constitute an annoyance to them or to their employers it becomes unlawful. Any picket line must result in annoyance both to the employers and to the workmen, no matter what is said or done, and to say that the court is to determine by the degree of annoyance whether it should be stopped or not, would furnish no guide, but leave the question to the individual notions or bias of the particular judge. To picket a complainants' premises was in itself an act of intimidation and an unwarrantable interference with their rights. Pickets were, in fact, guilty of actual intimidation and threats, but if they had not been, the complainants were entitled to be protected from the annoyance.

Is that true as a proposition of concrete fact as distinguished from law, or is it not? In other words, is it or is it not true that a picket line in front of a man's establishment is not only put there for the purpose of coercion, but has the effect of coercion and can not be otherwise as a proposition of common sense reasoning?

In the case of local union No. 313, Hotel Employees v. Stathakis (135 Ark., 86), the court said:

Any conduct which amounts to coercion is unlawful and should be enjoined.

I hope to read presently more at length from that case.

In the case of Pierce v. Stablemen's Union (156 Calif.) the court said:

It (picketing) tends and is designed to drive business away from the boycotted place

Is it intended to or not? We all know it is. If we are all fair to our own reasons, we can not say it is not.

Not by the legitimate methods of persuasion, but by the illegitimate means of physical intimidation and fear. Crowds naturally collect; disturbances of the peace are always imminent and of frequent occurrence. Many peaceful citizens, men and women, are always deterred by physical trepidation from entering places of business so under a boycott patrol. It is idle to split hairs upon so plain a proposition, and to say that the picket may consist of nothing more than a single individual, peacefully endeavoring by persuasion to prevent customers from entering the boycotted place. The plain facts are always at variance with such refinements of reason.

Also in Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union (168 N. W., 766), a Minnesota case, the court said:

Bannering plaintiff's place of business as unfair to organized labor and thereby deterring the public from patronizing him

Just as I showed you a moment ago, Mr. Chairman.

If done for the purpose of compelling him not to work as an operative himself in his own business, is unlawful and may be enjoined.

In Harvey v. Chapman (226 Mass., 191), the court said:

Injunction lies to restrain members of a labor union from picketing a private business to force its owner to coerce his employees to pay dues to the union or to discharge them. In Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Union, a Michigan case (reported in L. R. A. 407), the court said:

To picket the premises of a person boycotted in order to intercept his teamsters or prevent persons going there to trade is unlawful, being an act of intimidation and unwarrantable interference with the rights of free trade. Actual violence or threat of violence is not needful when intimidation and coercion are employed.

In Vegelahn v. Guntner (167 Mass., 92), the court said:

A patrol of strikers in front of a factory becomes a private nuisance when instituted for the purpose of interfering with the business. The motive of strikers to secure better wages for themselves by compelling the acceptance of their schedule of wages does not justify maintaining a patrol in front of a factory as a means of carrying out their conspiracy.

In Jensen v. Waiters' Union (39 Wash., 531, 4 L. R. A., 539) the court said:

Striking employees and the union to which they belong, and which is aiding them, may be enjoined from congregating about the entrance of the place of business of their former employer and endeavoring to persuade his customers to withhold their patronage from him.

Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union 218 (110 Fed., 698):

Whether this picketing has been accompanied with violence or not we need not consider. It certainly was one of the means used by this defendant organization to enforce its mandate. While picketing may not be an occasion of war, it certainly is an evidence that war exists, and the term is appropriately borrowed from the nomenclature of actual warfare. This system, constantly kept up, in its nature leads to disturbance and has a tendency to intimidate. It is certainly true that this system of picketing, although it may not have been accompanied by violence on the part of those who have served as pickets, has and will do injury.

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Germain v. Bakers' Union (Wash. 166 Pac., 665, 1917, F, 824): Members of a labor union may be enjoined fron maintaining pickets in front of a place of business to intimidate the proporietors of the business and patrons seeking to trade there.

53203-21-10

In Pierce v. Stablemen's Union (156 Calif., 70) the court in holding that picketing was unlawful, used this language:

The public's rights are invaded the moment the means employed are such as are calculated to and naturally do incite to crowds, riots, and disturbances of the peace. A picket in its very nature tends to accomplish, and is designed to accomplish, these very things. It tends and is designed by physical intimidation to deter other men from seeking employment. It tends and is designed to drive business away from the boycotted place, not by legitimate methods of persuasion, but by the illegitimate means of physical intimidation and fear. Crowds naturally collect; disturbances of the peace are almost imminent and of frequent occurrence. Many peaceful citizens, men and women, are always deterred by physical trepidation from entering places of business so under picket patrol. It is idle to split hairs upon so plain a proposition and to say that the picket may consist of nothing more than a single individual, peacerully endeavoring by persuasion to prevent customers from entering the picketed place. The plain facts are always at variance with such refinements of reason, says Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Hune (4 Met., 111):

"The law is not to be hoodwinked by colorable pretenses; it looks at truth and reality, through whatever disguises it may assume.

If it be said that neither threats nor intimidations are used, no man can fail to see that there may be threats, and there may be intimidations, and there may be molesting, and there may be obstructing without there being any express words used by which a man should show violent threats toward another, or any express intimidation. We think it plain that the very end to be attained by picketing, however artful may be the means to accomplish that end, is the injury of the boycotted business through physical molestation and physical fear, caused to the employer, to those whom he may have employed, or who may seek employment from him, and to the general public.

There is discernible a growing tendency to accept the view announced in re Langell (Mich. 144 N. W. 841) to the effect that there can be no such thing as peaceable picketing, and that picketing is in itself unlawful per se.

It appeared in Piece v. Stableman's Union (supra) that the picket was maintained about the place of business, so that it would appear that the court did not limit its language to a picket maintained in front of, or upon a particular place.

In York Manufacturing Co. v. Oberdick (10 Pa. Dist. Rep. 463) it is held that even peaceable picketing is unlawful. The court quoted with approval from Vigelahn v. Guntner (167 Mass. 92) and Beck v. Ry. Teamsters Union (118 Mich. 497) and said:

It is seriously contended by counsel for the respondents that they had a lawful right to approach every workman in the employ of the complainant, or others contemplating accepting employment with the complainant, and to persuade and induce them either to quit or not to accept such employment. There is no such legal right, and the cases in which picketing has been restrained are numerous.

In Geo. Jones Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Association (N. J.) (66 Atl. 593) it is said:

In its mildest form [picketing] it is a nuisance. As was well said by Judge McPher son, speaking for the United States circuit court:

"There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, no more than there can be chaste vulgarity or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching."

In Connett v. United Hatters (N. J.) (74 Atl. 188) wherein it appeared a system of picketing had been organized, it was said:

It does not need the citation of authorities to show that these acts are unlawful. In Jones v. Van Winkle, etc., Co. (131 Ga. 336) it appeared that picketing had been established near the approaches to the premises and adjoining thereto, and it was held unlawful.

Here are some of the forms of injunctions which have been issued against picketing in certain cases which have been sustained:

Franklin Union v. People (220 Ill. 355, 4-1001):

Either singly or in combination with others, collecting in and about the approaches to the factories and places of business of complainants for the purpose of picketing or patroling or guarding its streets, avenues, gates, and approaches, and places of business of the complainants.

Glass Co. v. Glass Blowers (77 N. J. Eq. 219, 419; 41-445):

From addressing persons willing to be employed by complainant against their will, and thereby causing them personal annoyance with a view to persuade them to refrain from such employment.

From loitering or picketing in the streets or on the highways or public places near the premises of complainants with intent to procure the personal molestation and annoyance of persons employed or willing to be employed by complainant, and with a view to cause persons so employed to refrain from such employment.

In Goldberg v. Stablemen's Union (Calif. 86 Pac. 806, 8-463) the injunction was:

Ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the and all and each of the defendants hereto, and each of their officers, members, agents, clerks, attorneys, and servants be, and they are hereby, enjoined and restrained from interfering with or harrassing or obstructing plaintiff in the conduct of its business at any of its said business of business No. in the city and county of San Francisco, State of California, by causing any agent or agents, representative or representatives of any picket or pickets, or any person or persons, to be stationed in front of, or in the immediate vicinity of said places of business, with a placard or transparency having on it the words and figures in the complaint herein, or any placard or transparencies (having words or figures) of similar import and form at said places of business or in front thereof, by means of pickets or otherwise, threatening or intimidating any person or persons transacting or desiring to transact business with said plaintiff, or being employed at said place or places by the plaintiff.

The injunction in the Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Blowers (77 N. J. Eq. 219):

From addressing persons willing to be employed by complainant, against their will, and thereby causing them personal annoyance, with a view to persuade them to refrain from such employment.

From loitering or picketing in the streets or on the highways or public places near the premises of complainant, with intent to procure the personal molestation and annoyance of persons employed or willing to be employed by complainant, and with a view to cause persons so employed to refrain from such employment.

I said a moment ago I would refer again to the case of Local Union 313, Hotel Employees v. Stathakis. That was the Arkansas case decided in 1918. The courts thoroughly understand the difference between so-called peaceful picketing; that, Mr. Chairman, has been exploded long ago. The distinction is well made here in this case, where the court says, and I am reading now from 6 American Law Reports, page 898:

The labor union or its representatives and employees had the right to exhibit the placards in question to the public; but it is a far different thing to say that the right to exhibit these placards to the public carried with it the right to so patrol or picket Abbellee's places of business with these placards as to interfere with his lawful business. The cases all agree that the right to carry on a lawful business without obstruction is a property right, and one which the courts have never hesitated to protect, and its protection is a proper object for the granting of an injunction.

The whole theory of the case simply elaborates the doctrine which I have been undertaking to evolve from these authorities, that two or more persons can not do any act, no matter how lawful that act is in itself alone, segregated from the purpose which may accompany it-they can not do an act which is otherwise lawful if they do it in concert, in combination, for the purpose of coercing a man in his business.

Mr. SPROUL. I think we all concede that point, and I think we have right along. I think we have conceded you are right there.

Mr. WRIGHT. The court here further said, quoting from some of these decisions I have already read from, that which I will not read again, but I do want to read this much from page 900 of the Sixth American Law Reporter:

In determining the object of the combination the courts will probe deeper than resolutions and mere professions of good will and lawful intentions. It unfortunately happens that there is seldom a case where a picket is maintained that the members of the pickets or their hangers-on do not resort to acts of violence, and to jeers, cries, epithets, and threats calculated and intended to intimidate workmen who are not members of the combination. So true is said that the very term "picket" has come to mean in the popular mind threats, violence, and intimidation. It is conceivable, however, that a picket entirely lawful might be established about a factory, but such a picket would go no further than interviews and lawful persuasion and inducement. The slightest evidence of threats, violence, or intimidation of any character ought to be sufficient to convince the court and jury of the unlawful character of the picket, under the most favorable consideration, means an interference between employer seeking employees and men seeking employment.

I said a moment ago that I would like to ask the attention of the chairman and the committee to the phraseology of the injunction which was maintained, indeed issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, in 245 U. S., on page 229. The Supreme Court of the United States in that case was at the most deliberate pains to point out that there was no act of physical violence suggested by the bill or complained of by the complainant, the coal company, anywhere throughout the case. It was simply the effort of Hughes, the organizer, to persuade the men who were working for the coal company to join the union, and they were so careful in what I believe to be a conscious effort to eliminate the idea which had prevailed in some parts of the public's mind that physical violence was necessary to unlawful interference with a man's business rights-they were so careful to draw that distinction that they said there was no evidence of any physical violence in this case, and therefore the court below should not have put the injunction on the ground of physical violence and should not have enjoined any physical violence, because none was threatened; and, said they, practically, "We will not enjoin physical violence, because there was none, and none was complained of; but this is what we will enjoin," and this is what they did enjoin, and this is the order of injunction:

INTERFERING OR ATTEMPTING TO INTERFERE WITH PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYEES FOR THE PURPOSE OF UNIONIZING PLAINTIFF'S MINE WITHOUT ITS CONSENT, ETC.

Interfering or attempting to interfere with plaintiff's employees for the purpose of unionizing plaintiff's mine without its consent, and in aid of such purpose knowingly and willfully bringing about the breaking by plaintiff's employees of contracts of service known at the time to exist with plaintiff's present and future employees. Knowingly and willfully enticing plaintiff's employees, present or future, to leave the plaintiff's service on the ground that the plaintiff does not recognize the union mine workers of America, or runs a nonunion mine.

Interfering or attempting to interfere with plaintiff's employees so as knowingly and willfully to bring about the breaking by plaintiff's employees, present and future, of their contracts, etc.

Trespassing on or entering on the grounds and premises of the plaintiff or its mines for the purpose of interfering therewith or hindering or obstructing its business, or with the purpose of compelling or inducing by threat, intimidation, or violent or abusing language or persuasion, any of plaintiff's employees to refuse or fail to perform their duties as such.