· upon the subject. But, while all agree as to the expedience of offensive operations, there is great difference of opinion as to the scale, the manner, the time, the place, the object, and, strange to tell, men are not quite unanimous as to the abstract nature of those operations; for, the partizans of the ministry either believe themselves. or wish to deceive others into a belief, that the nation is at this moment carrying on a most vigorous and fortunate offensive war. To propagate this notion has been, of late, a leading object with the ministerial writers; and, indeed, the dissertation, which is here more particularly alluded to, bears every mark of official dictation. Viewing it in this light, Viewing it in this light, the sentiments it contains are of importance. The writer states, in substance, that the blame which was, in parliament, thrown upon the ministers, on account of the loss of Hanover, was without foundation; because, not being able to rouze the Northern Powers, it would have been madness to attempt the defence of the Electorate by the means of British troops: that small expeditions to the coast of France may possibly be of use; but that considerable expeditions, to any part of the Continent, 'would, at present, be useless, and would only terminate in new battles of Marengo, and in making a great addition to the fame and influence of the Consul of France: that Holland is the only weak point of the Continent; but, as Buonaparté is well aware of this, he is so strengthening himself on that side, that another attack on it would, in all probability, terminate in another Dutch expedition: that, though we cannot make, or excite, war against France upon the Continent, we must not, for that reason, conclude, that we are unable to wage offensive war against her; for, that, an offensive war may be carried on against her marine, her commerce, and her colonies; and that this is, too, the 'safest and most effectual species of offensive war that this sort of war-fare will, if no other is carried on, become of vast importance in the eyes of the world; it will be the object of universal attention; and, as it is a scene where British valour is sure to dazzle; the more powerful France is by land, the more she will be exposed to the derision and contempt of mankind, ' and the more swiftly the fame of Buonaparté will decline: and, finally, that if we place our finances, our army, and our navy, on such a footing as to be able to say to France, here we will stand for ever unless ( you yield, she must submit, she must solicit peace, or else she must lose her com merce and her colonies, and even all her commercial and colonial hopes.'--The absurdity of these sentiments would render them totally unworthy of attention, did not the source whence they come give them a fearful importance. As to Hanover, how it at all found its way into remarks of this sort appears quite unaccountable; and, if the writer was, for some reason or other unknown to all the world but himself, resolved to introduce that Electorate, he might, surely, have confined himself to those censures that were passed on ministers, relative to it, and not have put others into the mouths of their adversaries. No one, either in parliament or out of parliament, ever censured the ministers for not attempting to defend Hanover by the means of British troops; no man in his sound senses ever thought of such a thing. The charge, now that all the circumstances are known, is, their not having saved Hanover by influence with Prussia; and the charge in the House of Commons, was, their not having sent transports in time to fetch away the troops, when it appeared, that they had intended to send them: instead of being charged with not sending out a British army to Hanover, they were charged with having neglected to bring a Hanoverian army to Britain, when it was in their power so to do, when they designed to do it, and when they failed in effecting their design only because they were weak and indecisive. -With respect to the scheme of war, which is here described, it may possibly be the only one that is left us to act upon; but, if it be in itself, so excellent, it must always have been a most desirable thing, that France should have been mistress of Europe, and in proportion, therefore, that she should have been mistress of the several parts. Formerly the notion was different we thought, that every acquisition of France was an evil; but, now we find it was a great good, as contributing to, and making part of, the grand consummation, when she is to be mistress of the whole, and we are to be in possession of all the mighty means of distressing and disgracing her! But, to give a somewhat more rational turn to the argument, admit, that our warfare against the commerce and colonies of France is, in every instance, crowned with success. Will this success put an end to the war? Will it induce France to yield to terms of peace that will give us security? If the answer be in the affirmative, the next question is, why were such terms not ob tained from her at Amiens, when her com. merce was destroyed as far as it ever can be, and when she had almost forgotten that she once had colonies? These our maritime and nion, that the security of England depended, in a great measure, on the revival and increase of the commerce of France. Yet, we are now told, that our salvation is to be wrought by the capture of French colonies, and the destruction of French commerce! The pursuit of these objects it is, which we are now told to regard as constituting that offensive war, which is to recover our lost reputation, humble the pride of our enemy, and give us a lasting and honourable peace! --War is offensive, or not, according to its final object. Because we were the beginners of this war, we are not, for that reason alone, to conclude, that the world will look upon us as being engaged in an offensive war, and our enemy as being engaged in a defensive war. If our object be to change the relative situation of the two countries, to add to our own dominions, or power, or to diminish the dominions or the power of France, the war is truly an offensive war, whatever be the nature of its paval and military operations; but, if mere security be our object, if we are still content to live upon the terms of the treaty of Amiens, if we have only taken up arms to Save ourselves from subjugation, and if we are ready to lay them down, when, on that score, our apprehensions are removed, then, though we should be constantly attacking the enemy by land as well as by sea, we must still be regarded as engaged in a defensive war, and must move under all the great and numerous disadvantages attached to that situation. If such be our humble hopes, France will always be, what she now is, the assailant, even though she never attempt to invade us. Buonaparté does not, indeed, come across the Channel; but, there he stands threatening us; and we are fully occupied in preparing not to attack, but to resist him. Defence is the word of the day: all our talk is about defence: to defend ourselves seems to be the utmost stretch of our hopes; to remain free from the Gallic yoke, the pinnacle of our ambition. Can we, then, be said to be engaged in an offensive war? Will the world regard us being so engaged? And, shall we not be exposed to all that contempt, which, as this writer truly observes, belongs to a state of defensive war ?——“ If," says he, " as place our finances, our army, our navy, on such a footing as to be able to say to "France, here we will stand for ever, un"less you yield, she must submit, she must "solicit peace, or she must lose her com merce and her colonies, and even all her "commercial and colonial hopes." The alternative being prefered, the commerce more injurious to individuals. In estimating, therefore, the ability and patience of the country to support a long, inglorious, defensive war, we must always take into consideration the effect not of the taxes alone, but also of the enormous, and, in some cases, absolutely unbearable burdens, which come in another shape, and which, while they must inevitably tend to weary the people, produce a great defalcation in the taxes; and, thereby, create the necessity of new ones. For a few months, or, perhaps, for a year or two, this mode of helping out the resources of war may succeed to a certain degree; but, the time must sood arrive, when it will be defeated by the feelings of the people. Hitherto men have thought of nothing but the danger which and colonies, the commercial and colonial hopes, being willingly given up by France, as, indeed, they already have been, the ministerial scheme of compelling her to yield is, at once, rendered abortive. But, what, on the other hand, becomes of us, if we should fail in placing our finances, our navy, and our army in a situation which will enable us to "stand for ever" in a warlike attitude? If the contest be reduced to a mere trial of patience and of pecuniary resources, it is by no means difficult to determine, on which side victory will finally remain. Buonaparté has not, in consequence of the present war, imposed one penny of additional taxes upon the people; he has had recourse to no new and extraordinary means for the purpose of augmenting his army; and, if the defensive plan of minis-immediately threatens them; but, very shalrers be pursued, there is every reason for believing, that he may remain for years in his present attitude, without making any addition whatever to the expenses of the nation. How different are the circumstances, in which we are placed! New taxes, to the amount of twelve millions anBually, the Army of Reserve, an Irish Militia, three hundred thousand irregular troops: these are the first demands of the war. That the taxes must be nearly doubled, in the space of two or three years, no one can doubt, unless the system of loans be reverted to; and, will any man seriously say, that he thinks the people will patiently bear those taxes, together with the monstrous load of county and parochial rates imposed by the various laws relating to the defence of the country? Yes; they will bear all this and much more, if their prospect be enlivened with the hope of success; but, never will they bear it, unless a system of real offensive operations be resolved on and adhered to. The ministers, with those selfish short-sighted views, by which all their measures are dictated, have swelled out the militia, are raising an additional army by ballot, and, finally, are calling on the mass of the people for volunteer service. All these expedients owe their birth to the desire which ministers have to spare the Exchequer; but, in the eyes of any man of reflection, where is the difference to the country, whether the money, to defray military expenses, be raised by a general tax, or by county or parochial assessments? And, where is the difference, whether it be issued from the King's Exchequer, or from the several county treasuries or parochial vestries? The burthen to the nation is alike in both cases; but, in the latter, its weight falls more partially, and produces effects low indeed must be that minister, who expects to find, at the end of eighteen months of defensive war, the same degree of zeal that exists at this moment, more especially as the new taxes, none of which have yet begun to operate, will then have made people feel the effects of the war, and will have set them to inquire, what is its object and when it is to end; and, if no one can point out an adequate object, if no one can foretel the probable duration of the contest, is it likely, that the sacrifices, necessary to its continuation, will any longer be chearfully made? Nay, in such a state of things, after having contemplated the horrors of invasion till these horrors are become familiar, is it not to be feared, that men may make up their minds to submission, rather than bear expenses and anxiety which appear to be endless, because no visible means is made use of to put an end to, or diminish them ? One of the grounds, on which the ministers justified the peace of Amiens was, that, all Continental aid being at an end, the war such aid it was impossible for us to make campaign could not have been made at a "less expense than forty millions, and that even certain success would not have been "worth such a price." Upon ground like this was the peace justified by all the ministers; but particularly by Mr. Addington See Pail. Deb. Register, Vol. H. p. 1149. and the Lord Chancellor ; † and it was, over and over again, asserted, that the people were tired of the war, because it had no longer any object, because there was no longer any hope of effecting a diminution of the power of France. If, therefore, such were the reasons for making the peace of Amiens, why should not the same reasons operate again; and why should not the people ask for an object in this war as well as in the last, unless the present war should prove less burthensome and less vexatious? At present there is an object, the all-important object of saving ourselves from slavery; but, it is utterly incredible, that this object should, for any considerable length of time, continue to stimulate the people: it must soon grow faint in their sight, or it must entirely subdue their spirit: acting upon a defensive system, no nation ever long preserved either its power or its independence. --What, then, ought to be the object of the war? The ultimate object ought to be, to produce such a change in the relative state of Great Britain and France, as shall render a peace between them not absolutely incompatible with the security of the former; and, as this object is not to be attain ed by a commercial and colonial war, as there are, at present, no hopes of aid from the Continental powers, as very little is to be done by mere assaults of the French coast, and as France would certainly beat us in a trial of patience and of pecuniary resources, the only rational object left for us to pursue, is, the restoration of the House of Bourbon. Here success would be of real and lasting use; the enterprize would be great; it would inspire enthusiasm; it would make men chearfully bear the fatigues and the expenses of war, and, if it did not succeed quite to our wishes, it would produce great alarm in the breast of our enemy, and would, as the least possible good, effectually relieve us from the dread of invasion, and from all the tantalizing measures arising from that dread. Great was the clamour, which was raised against the Royalist part of the last war. Every guinea, expended on that account, was counted fifty times over, while millions upon millions were sunk in the commercial and colonial, that is, in the base, the selfish, and ineffectual, part of the war, without exciting the least murmur. Every thing bestowed on the Royalist war was looked upon as thrown away. It was impossible to make people perceive, that the Royalist + See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 149 and 1106 war formed a diversion in favour of Great Britain, and that one guinea expended in La Vendée saved the expenting of a hundred for the defence of this island. But, it should never be forgotten; now more especially it should be remembered, that the dread of invasion began the moment the Vendean war was put an end to. Till then, the invasion of either England or Ireland never was thought of by us, and never was talked of by the enemy; but, the moment that war was over, the moment our allies in La Vendée were subdued, and, in a great measure, by the force which our folly (to give it the mildest term), at Valenciennes had sent against them; that moment the spectre of invasion arose, that horrid spectre, which has haunted us ever since, and which will continue to haunt us, till the rebel government of France, or till the British monar hy is destroyed; and, to destroy the rebel government there is no way but that of restoring the Bourbons to their throne.--How this restoration might be effected has been clearly pointed out by a gentleman, who, under the name of Inquisitor, some time ago communicated his thoughts to the publie through the pages of this work. cautions the public, and the caution is too good and too necessary not to merit repeating; he cautions them against adopting the erroneous notion, that, in consequence of Buonaparte's failing in his attempts at invasion, he will become unpopular in France and will, finally, be overset. "As if he He were less popular on account of the en"tire failure, and of his desertion from, the "the expedition to Egypt; as if he were "less popular on account of the complete "failure (as we are told it is) of the migh ty expedition to St. Domingo, or less able "to send thither more troops, because fifty thousand have already perished "there!" These are, indeed, striking instances of the docility of the French pecple, who have, moreover, by no means verified those predictions of the London news, writers, which related to the discontents that the war would excite in France. It has excited no discontent; Buonaparté is as popular as he ever was; nor will any thing short of a war, avowedly for the restoration of the Bourbons, ever shake his power. That large British armies ought to be employed for the accomplishment of this restoration is what no one can be prepared to say; nor, indeed, is it certain, that good po licy would dictate the employing, in this enterprize, any British army at all. But, the soundness of the argument, which the partizans of ministers make use of against that sort of offensive war, must by no means be admitted. We are, according to these persons, not to invade France, lest we "should give Buonaparté opportunities of gaining other battles of Marengo." To refuse to fight your enemy is, it must be confessed, a most effectual way of preventing him from beating you in the field; but, it should be remembered, that your refusal amounts to a solemn acknowledgment of his military superiority, while, to you, no defeat could possibly be more disgraceful. The same argument would apply to an invasion of Holland, and, indeed, to every plan, the execution of which included the probability of a battle where Buonaparté would command the armies of France. Farewell, then, if the ministerial notion be adopted; farewell even to the hope of ever producing a change in the relative situation of France and England; and farewell for ever to real peace, to tranquillity, and security; for, these never can be obtained without a change in this situation, and that change never can be effected without giving to Buonaparté a chance of adding to the laurels, which he acquired at Lodi and Marengo. Adopt this notion, and Continental co-operation becomes not only useless but injurious; for, what aid can we possibly receive from the powers of the Continent, other than that of armies employed against France? And, how can armies be employed against France, without furnishing Buonaparté with an opportunity of displaying his military talents, and of supporting, if not adding to, the fame he has acquired ?--It is, indeed, but too evident, from the tendency of the arguments advanced by the partizans of ministry, that a poor tame, drawling system of warfare has been resolved on. The ministers would willingly see the Bourbous restored; they are of opinion that no real peace will ever be obtained till that restoration takes place; they would expend, in secret, a few millions for the purpose; but, openly to declare their wishes and their opinions, manfully to commit themselves and to pledge their country in this great and gloricus cause; this is what they have not the courage to do; and, without this, the present contest must, at no very distant period, end in a peace, still more ruinous and disgraceful than the last, or in the complete subjugation of this country -" The people!" The people would object to the expending of the treasures of Britain for any other than "British ob"jects." This was the opinion during the last war; this false and fatal opinion still prevails. One would think, that experience ought to have worn it away; but, such is our perverseness on this subject, that if the two hundred thousand men, who perished in the last commercial and colonial war, were to rise from the dead in order to reclaim us, we should turn a deaf ear to their admonitions. Mr. Dundas was pursuing British objects," objects truly British," for that is the phrase; these objects he was pursuing at St. Domingo and Guadaloupe. Mr. Addington, too, was pursuing objects truly "British" when he obtained Ceylon and Trinidad, at the expense of Portugal, Sardinia, and the Vendean Royalists. But, did the pursuit of those objects last war prevent Ireland from being invaded, and England from being threatened with invasion? And, have the British objects of Mr. Addington preserved us from those evils now? Have they spared us the shame of preparing to fortify London; and will they spare us the enormous expense of Barracks along the coast for lodging our troops during winter? Have any, or all, of these " truly British 66 objects" preserved the character which we formerly maintained in the world; and will the further pursuit of them tend to relieve us from our present most embarrassing, dangerous, and tormenting situation? To restore the Bourbons is an object truly Bri-, tish; because, without that restoration, Britain never can enjoy one hour's secure and honourable peace. We are, to use the words of Mr. Addington, "now at war "because we cannot be at peace." This will be followed, as before, by a peace, "because the war is without an object." To that will succeed another war "because we cannot be at peace;" and with that war will end the patience, the pecuniary means, the honour, the liberty, the independence, and he very name of Britain. People may affect to despise these predictions; they may, in the excess of their fear, assume the blustering tone of Mr. Sheridan; but, neither their affected contempt nor their affected anger will turn from its course the current of events, which, unless a vigorous system of warfare, avowedly in behalf of the Bourbons, be immediately resolved on, will most assuredly bring upon this country a fate far more hard and more disgraceful than that of Spain, Holland, or Switzerland. RUSSIA has finally given in her ultimate propositions, which have been rejected by the ministers. She was good enough to offer to take Maita into her keeping for ten years. The detail is not known, but this was the leading proposition; and, as far as men are to be commended for not |