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humiliation of Major Shee, and the triumph | of "the gentlemen," were each of them so complete in their kind, that, without any additional circumstance, they have indelibly stamped the character of the Volunteercorps.The words, imputed to Major -Shee, were not necessary: were not proper: were not decorous; because cursing never can be so. But, it is, nevertheless, true, that phrases of this sort are made use of, and very frequently made use of, by the officers in the army and the navy; nay, by all the officers in the army and the navy, some half-score, perhaps, excepted. I will venture to say, that there is not a commandant in the regular service, nor a captain in the fleet, who has not, ten thousand times, addressed soldiers or sailors under the appellation, made use of by Major Shee; and yet we have never yet heard of mutinies, either in the army or the navy, upon any such miserable pretext. It is very easy for persons, who have never exercised any command except over their wives and children, to moralize on the military vocabulary; but, were those same persons to be placed at the head of a body of soldiers, for whose appearance, punctuality, expertness, and even docility, they were rendered responsible, they would soon cease to wonder at the passion which they observe in, and the harsh language they hear from, military commanders. Besides, it is not passion from which the harsh expressions (I do not say cursing) of an officer always proceed: the use of such expressions is often dictated by cool reflection; for, it is not to be questioned, that there are certain natures not to be wrought upon by gentleness; and, therefore, a judicious officer will always suit his language to the persons, on whom it is intended to operate. In the regular service indiscriminating harshness, whether in words or in actions, is always accounted a fault, both in officers and non-commissioned officers; but, in estimating their merits, while their severity is remembered, their zeal is never forgotten; and, this latter is a quality so indispensably necessary, and so naturally productive of severity towards the men, that, amongst the non-commissioned officers, all of whom are selected for their real military merit, a considerable degree of austerity and harshness is ever regarded as the proof of excellence. Upon the same principle Adjutants and other active officers are selected; and, we find, that, in the instance before us, the zeal and excellent military qualities of the viajor were, on all hands, readily allowed. The truth is, my Lord, that, if an officer knows the duties of his corps,

his anger at those who neglect them will ever be in an exact proportion to his zeal for the welfare and honour of that corps; and, as anger will vent itself in angry expressions, zealous officers never will be able to exist, where there is no law to suppress mutiny and clamour; and, therefore, if it were possible, that the mass of the officers, now appointed to the Volunteer-corps, should ever become what one would wish officers to be, they would certainly, as in the case of Major Shee, have no men to command.- -The transaction at Dover affords a striking proof of what has been so frequently urged against the Volunteercorps, that is, that they would either not march at all on actual service, or, marching, would introduce indiscipline and mutiny into the ranks of the army. The day, on which Major Shee's corps was called out, was a sort of review day: General Dundas, Lord Chatham, and Mr. Pitt, went to Dover, we are told, by appointment, to view this corps. One would have thought, that, upon such an occasion, considering, too, the local situation of Dover, and the fatal effect which a mutiny there might have; one would have thought that any one of these considerations would have been sufficiently powerful to produce a suspension of animosity for twenty-four hours, at least. No to say the truth, one would not have thought so. It was a fine opportunity for the corps to humble their commandant, an object which they preferred very far before their reputation as military men, and which they would have preferred still farther before fighting the French. And, this is the description of men, whom, even to the exclusion of the regulars and the militia, we honour with the name of " our defenders!" This is the sort of force, the establishment of which, according to the Commander in Chief's opinion, enables us to hurl back ' on our enemies the threats which they "have presumed to vent against us!" That men's demands will rise with the rise in the value of their services is a fact too evident to be disputed: every day's observation proves that this is a truth holding good in all situations of life; and, those who have paid even the slightest attention to military concerns, will not be at a loss for numerous instances to shew, that, amongst soldiers in particular, disobedience, if ever it makes its appearance at all, is sure to rise to its highest pitch in times of the greatest need. What reliance, then, if the enemy were to land, are we to place on men, who could not restrain their mutinous disposition till after a review? The review was the

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volunteer-corps under martial law; for, it would be the height of folly to suppose, that the mere proclaiming of that law would work any very great change in the temper and dispositions of the volunteers. Besides, here comes the application of the remark, which I made in my last letter, that to subject the corps to martial law would be perfectly useless, unless persons could be found duly and strictly to execure that law. It was observed, that the officers of the volunteercorps, selected from amongst the tradesmen of the parishes, to which the corps severally belong, would never inflict punishment upon their equals, their friends, neighbours, and customers; but would, on the contrary, be much more disposed to participate in the feelings and discontents of, and to make common cause with the men; an observation, which has already been fully verified by the corps at Dover, where we find, amongst the mutinous absentees," the

adjutant and many of the officers." What, then, my lord, could have been done, if this case had happened at Shorne-Cliff? A regimental court-martial could not have been held in the Dover corps; betore a general

time they chose for their purpose. said they, the Major will be mortified at our absence; now is the time when he wants us to appear; and, therefore, now is the time to keep away, now is the time to reduce him to our terms.' How Mr. Pitt came to advise, or to sanction, the concession, the humiliating and degrading concession, made by the Major, I am at a loss to devine; for, I think, he could not fail to perceive, that the supporting of the commander, at the risk, or even with the certainty, of breaking up his corps, would have been infinitely less mischievous than the encouragement, which the concession will in evitably give to all those who may be mutinously disposed, in every volunteer-corps in the kingdom. The proceedings at Dover will serve as a precedent for officers as well as for men; for, if Mr. Pitt yields, who will think himself bound to resist ?--To form a judgment of the effects, which the volunteer system is likely to produce upon the army, were the volunteers to be called out on actual service, we have only, for a moment, to suppose, that, the corps of Major Shee had been in camp, or in barracks, along with the regiments of the line or of the militia, in-court-martial the officers of the corps would stead of being at Dover, living in their own houses, separate even from each other. The ground, my lord, on which they claim an exemption from harsh language, and on which they found their right of demanding the dismission of their commandant for having used such language towards them, is, that they are" British soldiers, assembled in "defence of their King and country;" and your lordship will, I am sure, readily allow, that the same pretensions may, and with much more propriety, be set up and maintained by every regular regiment, as mell as every regiment of militia, now lying at Shorne-Cliff camp. If, therefore, the Dover "defenders" had been, or, (which God forbid!) if they were hereafter to be encamped at Shorn-Cliff; if they were again to refuse to attend their duty, unless their commandant was dismissed; if General Moore were to imitate, in this respect, the conduct of Mr. Pitt, and if Major Shee also were to be prevailed on, or even permitted, to re act his submissive and humiliating scene of concession; if this shocking spectacle of indiscipline were thus to be exhibited, can it be imagined my lord, that all subor dination would not almost instantly cease, in every regiment in the camp? Nor can I allow, that the existence of cases, such as I have here supposed, would be rendered impossible, or even improbable, by placing the

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not have brought their men; orders for that purpose might have been issued, but such orders would not have been obeyed; and, therefore, no mode of punishment, no means of putting an end to the mutiny, and to stop its contagious progress, would have remained, except that of drawing out the other regiments of the camp, surrounding the encampment of the Dover" defenders," and either making them prisoners, or shooting them; a dreadful remedy certainly, but the only one, by which the evil could possibly have been cured. And, my lord, at what a moment should we have to apprehend dangers like this! At the moment when the enemy would be upon the coast, and, in force "upon the coast," too; for, until then the volunteers are not to be put under martial-law, and are not to be marched from their homes; so that, the only source of consolation that remains, is the hope that these assemblages of citizen-soldiers will stay away from the scenes of real service, a hope which, thank God, there is, at present, every reason to confide in ;

For, in that universal call,
Few Volunteers will be guard mounters;
They'll cry, "ye shops upon us fall!
Conceal and cover us, ye counters!"

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--If, however, contrary to all reasonable expectation, the ministers should hold this miserable system together, and should so far persevere and succeed in it as to drive twenty or thirty thousand of the volunteers into the camps, or quarters of the army, I sineerely believe, that the country will, if the French invade us with a great force, be overrun; that the monarchy and the church will be destroyed, and that we, or what remains of us, shall become the most wretched slaves that ever were suffered to disgrace the human shape. Believing thus, my lord, it is very natural, that I should use my utmost endeavours to produce such a change of system as will give us, in lieu of this sèmblance of soldiery, a real and effective military force; a force which shall not only place us in perfect security against invasion, both now and at all future times, but that shall, in an offensive point of view, render us constantly formidable to the enemy. Before, however, I enter on this last and most important branch of the subject, it will be necessary to take a slight view, at least, of the other parts of our present defensive system, of the other joints and rivets of that coat of mail, which is now weighing us down to the earth, and, to say the truth, in which we do, figuratively speaking, bear no very distant resemblance to the mercenary pageant, who, as it were to burlesque and libel the profession of arms, is, at this moment, gracing the shop-keeping procession to Guild-hall.The people of this country, my lord, are deceived in many things relating to their situation, but in nothing so completely as in respect to the strength of the army, by which they are to be defended. The army estimates stated the regular army to consist of about 130 or 140 thousand men; and, as people know, that since these estimates were laid before Parliament, the ministers have repeatedly declared, that the recruiting service went on more successfully than ever; they suppose, especially when they take into the account the 50,000 men of the army of reserve, that we have an immense disciplined regular army; and that, therefore, though the volunteer-system should prove to be a thing of mere show, and should fall to pieces upon the first attempt to put it in motion, we are still secure behind the great and solid rampart of the regular army. What, then, will these deluded people say, when they are told, that there is not, in the whole of his Majesty's European dominions, 50,000 disciplined regular infantry? Fifty thousand, I repeat, in words, lest the incredibility of the fact should induce a belief of some error in

the figures; and, when I say fifty thousand, I stretch the numbers to the utmost, wel knowing, and positively asserting, that, of the sort of troops I have here described, there is not now, in the whole island of Great Britain, twenty-five thousand! Of the army of reserve there have been collected about 33,000 men; but, that these men cannot be, as yet, fit to meet an enemy need not be stated. They would, however, be of some service. They would guard prisoners, if we were to have the good fortune to take any; they would escort baggage waggons; they would, with some assistance, defend field fortifications; they would perform all the fatigue duties of the army; and, therefore, though a considerable part of the 33,000 have, as yet, scarcely left the recruiting dépôts, their effective force may, probably, be estimated at that of 8,000 men. The mili tia, which is not more than two thirds full, consisting as it does almost entirely of raw recruits, and being, from the very nature of its establishment, a force, which, at best, is very far indeed inferior to the line, cannot be regarded as containing a power of combat more than equal to that of 25,000 effective regular infantry. Of our cavalry, I, in this calculation, take no notice; because, it is evident that, by infantry we shall be attacked, if we are attacked at all; and, to the attack of infantry, infantry alone can be opposed. Artillery, indeed, will be of great importance; and, in this respect, we are, thanks to the care of the last ministry, tolerably well supplied; but, still, to fight infantry there must be infantry: artillery not well guarded and supported is nothing, and cavalry are of no use against the body of an unbroken army. Those, then, who are of opinion with me, that the volunteers can never be employed on actual service, will clearly perceive, that the whole infantry force, wherewith we have to defend the island of Great Britain, consists of fifty eight thousand men, scattered along the coast of Hampshire, Sussex, Kent, and Essex; for, as to the rest of the island, it is left in a state perfectly defenceless. Precisely where these troops are stationed it is unnecessary to state; it is evident that 25,000 of them could not, even after two days' notice, be assembled together at any one point; and, therefore, if we admit the probability of the French effecting a landing of fifty, or forty, or thirty, or twenty, or even ten thousand men, how utterly inadequate is our force to the objects, which the ministers have in view?--It will be urged in reply, that it is impossible to have an army on every part of the coast; that to

line a coast of five or six hundred miles would take more than the whole population of the island, supposing there to Le as many soldiers as there are souls. This is certainly true: it is a truth which your lordship, long ago, endeavoured to impress upon the minds of the House of Commons. Most.assuredly, it is impossible to provide a particular force for the defence of every particular part of the coast; and, it was under the conviction of this impossibility, that your lordship so strongly disapproved of the defensive system; but, those who have, in spite of every remonstrance, persisted in that system, can certainly have no right to plead the impossibility of rendering it complete.-We ought to have, exclusive of a militia, which, kept within proper bounds, might be rendered a very useful auxiliary force, an army, a regu lar army of 200,000 men, 120,000 in Great Britain, 50,000 in Ireland, and 30,000 in the colonies; and, why we have not, with all our immense "capital, credit, and con"fidence," such an army, out of a population of fifteen millions of souls, is surely a question, which may be asked by those, who are continually bid to hope for deliverance from the poverty and misery of France, and who are, nevertheless, told, that France has an army of five hundred thousand men, one half of whom are destined for the invasion of England. But, my lord, before we inquire how it is that a larger army has not been raised, in consequence of our present dangers, it appears to be necessary to examine a little into the reasons why the army that we had, at the close of the last war, was, in considerable part, disbanded. The late Secretary at War, Mr. Yorke, in answer to what was, on this subject, urged against the ministry, at the opening of the last session of parliament, made a defence, which, besides its being but fair to cite it on this occasion, is, from its intrinsic curiousness, well worthy of your lordship's attention. "will," said he, " now proceed to show, "that these charges" [charges of having hastily, improvidently, and, of course, unwisely, reduced the armed force of the country] "were without foundation. On the 1st "of October, 1901, when the preliminaries "of peace were signed, there were, under

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arms 250 000 men of all descriptions, vo"lunteer and yeomanry corps excepted; of "these, 123,343 men, of all descriptions "have been reduced. FIRST; the cavalry "amounted, at that time, to 25,000 men; a torce not thought necessary; and, for that reason, as well as because it was the most Expensive, the reduction commenced with

"it, and 10,439 men of that description "were reduced. SECONDLY; the militia "of Great Britain and Ireland, amounting "to 71,000 men, were discharged. It is "understood, that the militia is always to be "called out, at the commencement of a

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war, and discharged on the conclusion of 66 peace; but, THIRDLY, the fencible regi(6 ments came more strictly under this description, and were, therefore, immediately "disbanded, to the number of 20,679. "FOURTHLY, the invalids, to the nuniber "of 5,172 were reduced, because it had "been resolved to form the out pensioners "into a more effectual force. FIFTHLY,

the foreign corps, to the number of "8945 men, were reduced, because this was a "force, which we were giad to spare, and "which, when any reduction was necessary,

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we thought it most politic to reduce, for, "when British troops were disbanded, who "would think of maintaining foreigners, "unless they were in situations, where we "could not dismiss them? SIXTHLY, all "other descriptions of men dismissed "amounted to 7,025."——Mr. Secretary Yorke is a good honest English gentleman, my lord; but, as your lordship may have frequently had occasion to observe, he is by no means the happiest at an argument, and particularly at a defence. He sets out, in the present instance, with a promise to show, that the charge, advanced against ministers by Mr. Windham and others, of having unwisely reduced the armed force of the country, is without foundation; and, in order to make good this promise, he acknowledges that the ministers did, instantly upon the signing of the peace, reduce the army, from 250,000 to 126.000 men; that is to say, that, while, as it now appears by the official correspondence, they had every possible proof of the hostile disposition of the enemy, they actually reduced the army to one haif of its numbers. But, the reasons, on which this reduction is justified forms the most curious part of the speech of Mr. Yorke. FIRST, says he, we reduced the cavalry from 25,000 to 14,000 men, because so large a force as 25,000 was not thonght necessary by the ministers! Nobody ever had asserted the contrary; nobody ever hinted, that the ministers did think so large a force necessary. The charge preferred against them was, that they had reduced the army hastily, impro

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vidently, and unwisely;" and not that they had reduced it, at the same time that they thought it ought not to be reduced, and, of course, had reduced it wickedly and traitorously. SECONDLY, 71,000 hilitia wore

instantly discharged, because it was understood that militia are always to be discharged at the conclusion of a peace. But, by whom was it so understood? There was no law enjoining an instantaneous discharge. It was matter of discretion; and, therefore, as in the former case, the charge against ministers remains invalidated.--THIRDLY, he tells us, that upon the same principle, of vague construction, the fencible regiments were immediately disbanded, to the number of 20,679 men, a fact, with which his accusers were but too weli acquainted, but which, most assuredly, they never expected to hear stated as matter to disprove their allegation.

-FOURTHLY, the invalids to the amount of 5,172 were reduced, because it had been resolved to form them into a more effective force; and, it is true, that this formation has now actually taken place; but it had not taken place when the charge of hasty and improvident reduction was made against ministers; nor, if the war had not forced the measure upon them, would it have taken place to this hour, as is very evident from the circumstance of the persons composing these corps having been suffered to retire to their several counties, parishes, and homes, whence they were, upon the near approach of the rupture, called in to the several garri. sons, at a considerable expense to the public, and at an immense inconvenience and loss to themselves, some of them, officers as well as men, being thereby reduced from a comfortable state to perfect beggary.--FIFTHLY, says the Secretary, we dismissed 8,945 foreign troops, because this was a force, which we were glad to spare, and which we thought it most politic to reduce, because it would have been wrong to maintain foreigners, when it was necessary to disband British troops!

I dearly love this mode of reasoning, my lord. It is so softly, so sweetly childish, that one would almost imagine that the orator had yet his mother's milk within his lips. First, he should have obtained, from his accusers, an acknowledgment, that it was “ necessary "to disband British troops," on the negative of which very assertion their accusation was founded. They never said, that the ministers were not glad to spare the 9,000 foreign troops; they never said or insinuated, that the ministers did not think it politic to reduce these excellent corps, for which we would now almost give our eyes; they only said, that they themselves would not have spared the foreign troops, that they did not think it politic to reduce them; and, that, therefore, they charged the ministers with making, in this respect, a hasty, an

improvident, and unwise reduction.-SIXTHLY, Mr. Yorke acknowledges, that, besides. the foregoing numbers, 7,025 infantry were dismissed, without having an undeniable claim to their discharge; and, of course, they could be reduced from no other motive, or, at least, no other good motive, than that of economy. Thus, then, my lord, allowing, for a moment, that the ministers were compelled instantly to discharge all the militia and the fencibles, and that they were wise in dispersing over the kingdom the men belonging to the corps of invalids, still there remain, Of cavalry, Of Foreign corps,

10,493 8.945

Of other infantry, 7,025 men.

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Making a total of 26,463 regular dis ciplined soldiers, whom no law or usage fur nished an excuse for discharging, who had not the shadow of a title to their discharge, and the far greater part of whom even wished to remain in the service. This number, my lord, surpasses that of the total of the re-, gular infantry now in Great Britain; it is nearly equal to that of the raw men, who have been collected together by the Army of Reserve law, and who, by the time that 26,000 of them have been inlisted for general service, will have cost the country, 1,300,000l. at the least farthing, to say no-r thing of the plague and vexation of the bals lot, and to pass over, for the present, the more serious considerations of their vast inferiority, in point of discipline, to the 20,000 men discharged, the shocking drunkenness and debauchery, which their high bounties must' inevitably introduce into the camps and garrisons of the kingdom, and the vast injury, indeed the total stagnation, which those enor mous bount es have produced in the regular recruiting for the regiments of the line. And, my lord, what were the reasons, the weighty reasons, for dismissing these 26,000 men? Why, the 10,493 men of the cavalry were "not thought necessary," and were, besides, of the most expensive part of the army. Economy was certainly the real and only immediate motive; but, if a horse and man be more expensive, as they undoubtedly are, than a man alone, the corps could have been dismounted, and the horses sold, a step which has frequently been taken, both in war and in peace. For discharging the 7,025 regular British infantry there seems to be no reason alleged. In the disbanding of the foreign corps the humour of the Corresponding Society and of the rabble in general, the London news-printers inclusive, might, in

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