Opinion of the Court.

duty imposed by the law, independently of contract or of consideration, and is therefore founded in tort. Philadelphia & Reading Railroad v. Derby, 14 How. 468, 485; Atlantic & Pacific Railroad v. Laird, 164 U. S. 393.

In Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104, 122, Mr. Justice Bradley, referring to Maclachlan on Shipping, (1st ed.) 598, laid down these general propositions: "Liens for reparation. for wrong done are superior to any prior liens for money borrowed, wages, pilotage, etc. But they stand on an equality with regard to each other if they arise from the same cause.' Although these propositions went beyond what was required for the decision of that case, which was one of a collision between two vessels, owing to the fault of one of them, causing the loss of her cargo, as well as of the other vessel and her cargo, yet the very point adjudged was that the lien on the offending vessel for the loss of her own cargo was a lien for reparation of damage, and therefore was upon an equality with the lien upon her for the loss of the other vessel and her cargo.

This court, more than once, has directly affirmed that a suit by the owner of a tow against her tug, to recover for an injury to the tow by negligence on the part of the tug, is a suit ex delicto and not ex contractu.

In The Quickstep, 9 Wall. 665, 670, a libel by the owner of a tow against her tug set forth a contract with the tug, for a stipulated price, to tow directly, and a deviation and unreasonable delay in its performance, and that the tug negligently backed into the tow and injured her. An objection that the libel could not be maintained, because the contract alleged was not proved, was overruled by this court. Mr. Justice Davis, in delivering judgment, said: "The libel was not filed to recover damages for the breach of a contract, as is contended, but to obtain compensation for the commission of a tort. It is true it asserts a contract of towage, but this is done by way of inducement to the real grievance complained of, which is the wrong suffered by the libellant in the destruction of his boat by the carelessness and mismanagement of the captain of the Quickstep."

Opinion of the Court.

Again, in The Syracuse, 12 Wall. 167, 171, which was a libel by a tug against her tow for negligently bringing her into collision with a vessel at anchor, the court, speaking by the same justice, said: "It is unnecessary to consider the evidence relating to the alleged contract of towage, because, if it be true, as the appellant says, that by special agreement the canal boat was being towed at her own risk, nevertheless the steamer is liable, if, through the negligence of those in charge of her, the canal boat suffered loss. Although the policy of the law has not imposed on the towing boat the obligation resting on a common carrier, it does require, on the part of the persons engaged in her management, the exercise of reasonable care, caution and maritime skill, and if these are neglected, and disaster occurs, the towing boat must be visited with the consequences." And see The J. P. Donaldson, 167 U. S. 599, 603.

The essential likeness between the ordinary case of a collision between two ships, and the liability of a tug to her tow for damages caused to the latter by a collision with a third vessel, is exemplified by the familiar practice in admiralty, (followed in the very proceeding in which the question now before us arose,) which allows the owner of a tow, injured by a collision caused by the conduct of her tug and of another vessel, to sue both in one libel, and to recover against either or both, according to the proof at the hearing. The Alabama & The Gamecock, 92 U. S. 695; The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302; The L. P. Dayton, 120 U. S. 337; The R. S. Carter & The John G. Stevens, 38 Fed. Rep. 515, and 40 Fed. Rep. 331.

The result of applying to the case at bar the principles of the maritime law of the United States, as heretofore declared by this court, is that the lien for the damages occasioned by negligent towage must be preferred to the previous lien for supplies.

In the argument of this case, copious references were made to foreign codes and commentaries, which we have not thought it important to consider, because they differ among themselves as to the comparative rank of various maritime liens, and because the general maritime law is in force in this country,

Opinion of the Court.

or in any other, so far only as administered in its courts, or adopted by its own laws and usages. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 572; The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 369; Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 444; Ralli v. Troop, 157 U. S. 386, 407.

Question certified answered in the affirmative.

LOUISVILLE WATER COMPANY v. KENTUCKY.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.

On the authority of Louisville Water Company v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1, which is affirmed, it is held that the exemption from taxation acquired by the Louisville Water Company under the act of Kentucky of April 22, 1882, c. 1349, was not withdrawn except from the day on which the act of May 17, 1886, known as the Hewitt Act, took effect; and the company cannot be held for taxes which were assessed and became due prior to September 14, 1886, when that act took effect.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. T. L. Burnett for plaintiff in error.

Mr. James P. Helm for defendant in error. Mr. Helm Bruce was with him on the brief.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was brought by the Commonwealth of Kentucky to enforce a lien in its favor upon certain real and personal property of the Louisville Water Company, a Kentucky corporation; which lien, it was alleged, was for taxes amounting to $12,875 for the year 1886. The property upon which the State claimed this lien included the pipes, mains, buildings, reservoirs, engines, pumping stations, etc., belonging to the Water Company.

The company denied its liability to state taxation for the year 1886 or for any year subsequent to the 22d day of April,

Opinion of the Court.

1882, the date of the passage of an act to which we will presently refer.

In the court of original jurisdiction a judgment was rendered for the Commonwealth, and that judgment was affirmed in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

The history of the legislation in Kentucky in reference to this company appears in Louisville Water Company v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1, a suit involving the question of the liability of the company for state and county taxes for the year 1887.

The Water Company was incorporated in 1854 without any exemption of its property from taxation. But, as stated in that case, it was made its duty to furnish water to the city for the extinguishment of fires and the cleansing of streets, upon such terms "as might be agreed between itself and the municipal authorities;" and, the latter assenting, "the Water Company was to have the exclusive right to furnish water to the inhabitants of Louisville, by means of pipes and aqueducts, upon such terms and for such time as might be stipulated between it and the city." Act of March 6, 1854, c. 507, Sess. Acts, 1853-4, vol. 2, p. 121.

By an act approved February 14, 1856, it was provided that "all charters and grants of, or to corporations, or amendments thereof, and all other statutes, shall be subject to amendment or repeal at the will of the legislature, unless a contrary intent be therein plainly expressed: Provided, That whilst privileges and franchises so granted may be changed or repealed, no amendment or repeal shall impair other rights previously vested." 2 Rev. Stats. Kentucky, 1860, 121.

Subsequently, by an act approved April 22, 1882, which took effect from its passage, it was made "the duty of the Louisville Water Company to furnish water to the public fire cisterns and public fire plugs or hydrants of the city of Louisville for fire protection, free of charge." But the same act provided: "The sinking fund of the city of Louisville being the owner of the stock of the Louisville Water Company, and said Water Company by virtue thereof is the property of the city of Louisville, therefore the Louisville Water Company is hereby exempt from the payment of taxes of all kinds, of

Opinion of the Court.

whatever character, state, municipal or special." Sess. Acts, 1882, vol. 2, p. 915, c. 1349.

On the 17th of May, 1886, the general assembly of Kentucky passed a general revenue statute - commonly known as the Hewitt statute-which did not take effect until September 14, 1886, after taxes were assessed for 1886. It was conceded in the case of Louisville Water Company v. Clark, above cited, that the property of the Water Company was subject to taxation under that statute, unless it was exempted from taxation by the above act of April 22, 1882.

The contention of the Water Company was that the exemption from taxation given by the act of 1882 could not be withdrawn by subsequent legislation without violating the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States. This contention made it necessary to inquire whether that exemption was in fact withdrawn, and if so, whether the statute withdrawing it impaired the obligation of any contract the company had with the State by the act of 1882.

This court held that the exemption allowed by the act of 1882 was withdrawn by the revenue statute of 1886; and that, as the Water Company's exemption was acquired in 1882 subject to the power of amendment or repeal reserved by the above act of 1856- which saved, whenever that power was exerted, all rights previously vested—the State could, as it did by the revenue statute of 1886, withdraw the exemption given in 1882.

But the question remained whether the withdrawal of the exemption could take effect while the company was under an obligation imposed upon it by the act of 1882, to furnish water to the public fire cisterns and public fire plugs or hydrants of the city of Louisville for fire protection, "free of charge." The court was of opinion that the contention of the Water Company, that the general statute of 1886 impaired the obligation of its alleged contract, could not be fully disposed of without determining the question just stated. It therefore said:

"It is, however, contended that the exemption from taxation could not be withdrawn while the Water Company

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