Opinion of the Court.

admissible. Smith v. United States, 161 U. S. 85. But, as the record stood, the character of the captain could have no legal bearing on the issue of the guilt of the accused of the murder of the mate.

8. Various instructions were asked on behalf of the defendant, as well as on behalf of the Government, which were, respectively, refused by the court, except so far as included in the instructions given. But the only ruling in this regard pressed on our attention is the alleged error of the court in instructing the jury as follows: "The other felonious homicide to which I called your attention, manslaughter, is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, either express or implied. I find it to be my duty, gentlemen of the jury, to say to you that if the defendant has committed a felonious homicide, of which you are the only judges, there is nothing before you that reduces it below the grade of murder."

This instruction was similar to that given by Mr. Justice McKenna, then Circuit Judge, which was reviewed and approved in Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 63. That case is decisive of this, for the evidence disclosed no ground whatever upon which the jury could properly have reached the conclusion that the defendant was only guilty of an offence included in the one charged, or of a mere attempt to commit the offence charged. The testimony of the accused did not develop the existence of any facts which operated in law to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter.

The law, in recognition of the frailty of human nature, regards a homicide committed under the influence of sudden passion, or in hot blood produced by adequate cause, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool, as an offence of a less heinous character than murder. But if there be sufficient time for the passions to subside, and shaken reason to resume its sway, no such distinction can be entertained. And if the circumstances show a killing "with deliberate mind and formed design," with comprehension of the act and determination to perform it, the elements of self defence being wanting, the act is murder. Nor is the

Counsel for Parties.

presumption of malice negatived by previous provocation, having no causal connection with the murderous act, or separated from it by such an interval of time as gives reasonable opportunity for the access of fury to moderate. Kerr on Homicide, § 68, et seq.; 2 Bishop New Cr. L. § 673, et seq.; Whar. Cr. L. § 455, et seq.; and cases cited.

There is nothing in Stevenson's case, 162 U. S. 313, to the contrary. The doctrine of Sparf's case is there reaffirmed, that "the jury would not be justified in finding a verdict of manslaughter if there were no evidence upon which to base such a finding, and in that event the court would have the right to instruct the jury to that effect."

No other error assigned requires notice.

The courts of a State may take cognizance of a suit brought by the State, in its own courts, against citizens of other States, subject to the right of the defendant to have such suit removed to the proper Circuit Court of the United States, whenever the removal thereof is authorized by act of Congress, and subject also to the authority of this court to review the final judgment of the state court, if the case be one within its appellate jurisdiction.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Duane E. Fox for appellant. Mr. J. Ward Gurley was on his brief.

Mr. Victor Leovy for appellees. Mr. Henry J. Leovy, Mr.

Opinion of the Court.

Joseph Paxton Blair and Mr. Alexander Porter Morse were on his brief.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was commenced February 11, 1895, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana by the Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Company, a New Jersey corporation, against the defendants in error William Henderson and Henry J. Leovy, citizens of Louisiana.

It is, in effect, a suit to quiet the title of the plaintiff to certain lands in the Parish of Plaquemines in the State, and to restrain the defendants from committing trespasses thereon.

The defendants filed a joint and several plea, in which it was averred: That in 1892 a suit was instituted by the State of Louisiana in the Civil District Court of the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana, against the Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Company, Charles C. Buck the vice president of that company and a citizen of Maryland, and others, in which suit the State sought a decree adjudging it to be the owner of certain lands within its limits; in which action, the defendants having appeared, it was found by the verdict of a jury, and in accordance with the verdict it was adjudged by the court, that the lands here in question belonged to the State, and that the Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Company and Buck had no title thereto; that such judgment, upon the appeal of the company and Buck, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana; that a writ of error sued out by the same defendants to this court was dismissed; that the lands the title to which is involved in this suit are part of those the title to which was involved in that action; that Henderson and Leovy acquired title from the State after the above judgment obtained by it had become final; and that such judgment remained unreversed and unmodified.

The defendants Henderson and Leovy pleaded the above proceedings and the judgment obtained by the State in bar of the present suit.

At the hearing below, the plaintiff having admitted the

Opinion of the Court.

correctness in point of fact of the defendants' plea in bar, it was adjudged that the plea was sufficient. The bill was accordingly dismissed.

The contention of the appellant is that the Civil District Court of the Parish of Orleans could not, consistently with the Constitution of the United States, take cognizance of any suit brought by the State of Louisiana against citizens of other States, and, consequently, its judgment, now pleaded in bar, was null and void. If that contention be overruled the judg ment below must be affirmed; otherwise it must be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to hold the plea insufficient.

The appellant, in support of its contention, insists that the entire judicial power surrendered to the United States by the people of the several States vested absolutely in the United States under the Constitution; that by that instrument the nation acquired certain portions of the judicial power naturally inherent in sovereignty; that thereafter a state court could not, without the expressed consent of the United States, take cognizance of a case embraced in such cession of judicial power; and that the judicial power of the United States, not distributed by the Constitution itself, cannot be so distributed that a state court may take cognizance of a case or controversy to which that power is extended, if its determination thereof is not made by Congress subject to reëxamination by some court of the United States.

These propositions applied to the case before us mean that the Civil District Court of the Parish of Orleans was without jurisdiction to render judgment in the above suit instituted by the State, because there was no provision in the acts of Congress whereby its judgment could be reviewed by some court of the United States.

The Constitution provides

"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress. may from time to time ordain and establish. III, Sec. 1.

." Art.

"The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and

VOL. CLXX-33

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equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. Art. III, Sec. 2.

"In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.” Ib. Do the words, "the judicial power shall extend controversies

to

between a State and citizens of other States," and the words "in all cases in which a State shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction," necessarily manifest a purpose to exclude all such controversies from cognizance by the courts of the several States? Was it intended that the Constitution should, by its own force, without legislation by Congress, divest the courts of the States of jurisdiction of cases or controversies to which the judicial power of the United States was extended?

These questions were the subject of earnest consideration while the Constitution was before the people of the United States for acceptance or rejection. It was contended by some who recommended its rejection that the proposed Constitution, without legislation by Congress, would give to the one Supreme Court established by it, and to such other courts as Congress should from time to time create, exclusive jurisdiction in all such cases or controversies. That interpretation was disputed, and Hamilton in the Federalist said: "The principles established in a former paper teach us that the State will retain all preexisting authorities, which may not be exclusively delegated