Opinion of the Court. tion of promissory notes and bills of exchange through the fraud, deception or mistake of those persons to whom they are entrusted by the makers, to fall on those who enable them to hold themselves out as owners of the paper jure disponendi, and not on the innocent holders who have taken it for value without notice." In Burson v. Huntington, 21 Michigan, 415, 433, it is said : "If the maker or endorser, before delivery to the payee, leave the note in the hands of a third person as an escrow, to be delivered upon certain conditions only, . and the person to whom it is thus entrusted violate the confidence reposed in him, and put the note into circulation; this, though not a valid delivery as to the original parties, must, as between a bona fide holder for value, and the maker or endorser, be treated as a delivery, rendering the note or indorsement valid in the hands of such bona fide holder." See also Vallett v. Parker, 6 Wend. 615, 620; Chase National Bank v. Faurot, 149 N.Y. 532; Graff v. Logue, 61 Iowa, 704. Within these authorities it must be held that when the trustee adjudged that the condition had been complied with and delivered the bonds the railroad company took such a title as, transferred to a bona fide holder, enabled him to recover against the county, notwithstanding the condition. had in fact not been performed. That the trustee was the agent of the county and responsible to it for the manner in which he discharged this duty is obvious from the provision in the statute that he shall give "bond, with good surety, approved by the county judge, for the faithful performance" of his duty. If in case the condition was not performed the county had a perfect defence to the bonds, even in the hands of a bona fide holder, there were little need of requiring the trustee to give any security. Another significant feature in this connection is the fact. that by statute the bonds were to be negotiable. Counsel for the county suggest that this provision of the statute can be satisfied by giving to the bonds the benefit of negotiability as between successive holders, but we know of no reason why the general significance of the word "negotiable" should be Syllabus. so limited. The third of the three peculiar and distinguishing characteristics of negotiable instruments, as stated in 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, sec. 1, is respecting the consideration, and the author says: "As between immediate parties, the true state of the case may be shown and the presumption of consideration rebutted. But when a bill of exchange or negotiable note has passed to a bona fide holder for value and before maturity, no want or failure of consideration can be shown. Its defects perish with its transfer; while, if the instrument be not a bill of exchange or negotiable note, they adhere to it in whosesoever hands it may go." To hold that by this provision the legislature intended that the quality of negotiability should inhere in the instruments only as between the successive holders, and not between the maker and any bona fide holder, cannot be justified by any reasonable construction of the language used. It follows from these considerations that these bonds in the hands of the Life and Trust Company, a bona fide holder, must be adjudged the valid obligations of the county. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed and the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. LEDBETTER v. UNITED STATES. ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA. An indictment for a violation of the provisions of section 16 of the act of February 8, 1875, c. 36, forbidding the carrying on of the business of a rectifyer, wholesale liquor dealer, etc., without first having paid the special tax required by law, which charges the offence in the language of the statute creating it, is sufficient; and it comes within the rule, well settled in this court, that where the crime is a statutory one, it must be charged with precision and certainty, and every ingredient of which it is composed must be clearly and accurately set forth, and that even in the Statement of the Case. cases of misdemeanors, the indictment must be free from all ambiguity, and leave no doubt in the minds of the accused and of the court, of the exact offence intended to be charged. Properly speaking, the indictment should state not only the county, but the township, city or other municipality within which the crime is alleged to have been committed; but the authorities in this particular are much less rigid than formerly. THIS was a writ of error to review the conviction of the plaintiff in error upon an indictment found against him by the grand jury for the Southern District of Iowa, April 28, 1896, for a violation of section 16 of the act of February 8, 1875, c. 36, 18 Stat. 307, in carrying on the business of a retail dealer in liquors without the payment of the special tax required by law. Defendant was convicted upon the first count in the indictment, which reads as follows: "The grand jurors of the United States of America duly empanelled, sworn and charged to inquire in and for the body of said Southern District of Iowa, at a term of the United States District Court begun and held at Keokuk, in said district, on the 14th day of April, A.D. 1896, in the name and by the authority of the United States of America, upon their oaths do find and present that Lewis Ledbetter, late of said district, heretofore, to wit, on the day of April, a.D. 1896, in the county of Appanoose, in the Southern District of Iowa, and within the jurisdiction of this court, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry on the business of a retail liquor dealer without having paid the special tax therefor, as required by law, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States of America." After his conviction defendant moved for an arrest of judgment upon the insufficiency of the indictment. This motion was overruled, and the defendant sentenced to pay a fine of $250 and costs of prosecution. Defendant thereupon sued out a writ of error from this court, assigning as error that the indictment did not state facts constituting an offence against the laws of the United. Opinion of the Court. States, (1) because it did not set forth that the defendant sold or offered for sale foreign or domestic spirituous or malt liquors otherwise than as provided by law; (2) that he was not informed with sufficient particularity as to the time and place and means so as to apprise him of the crime of which he was charged; and (3) that the indictment did not allege that any crime had been committed at a date prior to the finding of the indictment. Mr. II. Scott Howell and Mr. William C. Howell for plaintiff in error. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Boyd for defendants in error. MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. Defendant did not demur to the indictment, nor move to quash, nor take advantage of its alleged insufficiency upon the trial, but after conviction moved in arrest of judgment upon the ground that it failed to aver with sufficient particularity the details of the offence, and the time and place of its commission. 1. The principal alleged defect in the indictment is set forth in the third, fourth and fifth assignments of error, which charge that the indictment did not state facts which would constitute an offence against the laws; in that it did not allege that the defendant sold or offered for sale foreign or domestic distilled spirits, wines or malt liquors otherwise than as provided by law, or any of said liquors, or to whom said liquors were sold or offered for sale, and because it did not allege that defendants had sold or offered for sale any of said liquors in quantities less than five wine gallons at the same time, and because the indictment did not allege that the defendant had not paid $25, the amount of the tax provided by the statute, and generally, because the allegations of the indictment are only a legal conclusion, unsupported by Opinion of the Court. the primary and individualizing facts which constituted an offence, etc. By section 16 of the act of February 8, 1875, c. 36, 18 Stat. 307, 310, under which defendant was convicted, it is provided that "any person who shall carry on the business of a retail liquor dealer tax as required by law without having paid the special shall, for every such offence, be fined, etc.," and the first count of the indictment charged in the very words of this section that the defendant "did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carry on the business of a retail liquor dealer without having paid the special tax therefor, as required by law, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the United States of America." Defendant insists that it was not sufficient to charge him with the offence in the language of the statute, but that the indictment should have set forth the particular facts which showed that he was a retail liquor dealer, and should also have averred that he had not paid the tax of $25 provided by law. By section 18 of the same act retail dealers in liquor are required to pay a special tax of $25, and "every person who sells or offers for sale foreign or domestic distilled spirits, wines or malt liquors, otherwise than as hereinafter provided, in less quantities than five wine gallons at the same time, shall be regarded as a retail dealer in liquors." The question presented for our consideration is whether it is sufficient to charge the offence in the language of the statute creating such offence and fixing the punishment therefor, or whether it is necessary to charge it in the language of the statute defining the business of a retail liquor dealer, averring that the defendant had done the acts therein stated without payment of the special tax, and had therefore rendered himself amenable to the punishment provided by the former section. We do not undertake to say that the latter would not be a proper course, but we think an allegation in the language of the statute creating the offence is sufficient. We have no dis VOL. CLXX-39 |