2. No question is presented which brings this case within the supervisory
power of this court, as the alleged invalidities of the entries and of
the patents do not arise out of any alleged misconstruction or breach
of any treaty, but out of the alleged misconduct of the officers of the
Land Office; to correct which errors, if they exist, the proper course of
the defendants was to have gone to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Budzisz v. Illinois Steel Company, 41.
3. Although the matter in dispute in this case is not sufficient to give this
court jurisdiction, it plainly appears that the validity of statutes of the
United States, and of an authority exercised under the United States
was drawn into question in the court below, and is presented for the
consideration of this court. Parsons v. District of Columbia, 45.
4. A Federal question was specifically presented in the trial of this case
both in the trial court and at the hearing in error before the Supreme
Court of the State, and the motion to dismiss cannot be allowed.
Chicago, Quincy & Burlington Railroad v. Nebraska, 57.
5. This court, when reviewing the final judgment of a state court, uphold-
ing a state law alleged to be in violation of the contract clause of the
Constitution, must determine for itself the existence or the non-exist-
ence of the contract set up, and whether its obligation has been im-
paired by the state law. Ib.
6. On a writ of error to a state court this court cannot revise the judg-
ment of its highest tribunal unless a Federal question has been erro-
neously disposed of. Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Murphy, 78.
7. When the jurisdiction of this court is invoked for the protection,
against the final judgment of the highest court of a State, of some
title, right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States, it must appear expressly or by necessary intend-
ment, from the record, that such right, title, privilege or immunity
was specially "set up or claimed" under such Constitution or laws;
as the jurisdiction of this court cannot arise in such case from infer-
ence, but only from averments so distinct and positive as to place it
beyond question that the party bringing the case up intended to assert
a federal right. Kipley v. Illinois, 182.
8. An interlocutory order of a Circuit Court for the issue of a temporary
injunction, having been taken on appeal to the Circuit Court of
Appeals, was there affirmed, and an order was issued for temporary
injunction. An appeal from this was taken to this court. Held, that
this court has no jurisdiction, and that the appeal must be dismissed.
Kirwan v. Murphy, 205.
9. It was essential, in order to confer jurisdiction on this court, in this
case, that the chief judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of
New York, or his lawful substitute, or a justice of this court, should
have allowed the writ and the citation; and as the writ was signed by
a judge as "Asso. Judge, Court of Appeals, State of New York,"
and there was nothing in the record warranting the inference that he
was, at that time, acting as Chief Judge pro tem. of that court, the
writ is dismissed. Havnor v. New York, 408.
10. In determining from the face of a pleading whether the amount really
in dispute is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a court of the
United States, it is settled that if from the nature of the case as
stated in the pleadings there could not legally be a judgment for an
amount necessary to the jurisdiction, jurisdiction cannot attach even
though the damages be laid in the declaration at a larger sum.
Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co. (No. 2), 468.
11. The courts of South Carolina having held that in an action of trover
consequential damages are not recoverable, and the damage claimed
by the plaintiff below, in this case, omitting the consequential dam-
ages, being less than the sum necessary to give the Circuit Court
jurisdiction of it, it follows that, on the face of the complaint, that
court was without jurisdiction over the action. Ib.
B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS.
The Circuit Court of the United States, held within one State, has
jurisdiction of an action brought, by a citizen and resident of an-
other State, against a foreign corporation doing business in the first
State through its regularly appointed agents, upon whom the sum-
mons is there served, for a cause of action arising in a foreign coun-
try; although the statutes of the State confer no authority upon any
court to issue process against a foreign corporation, at the suit of a
person not residing within the State, and for a cause of action not
arising therein. Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 100.
C. JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS.
The courts of a State may take cognizance of a suit brought by the State,
in its own courts, against citizens of other States, subject to the right
of the defendant to have such suit removed to the proper Circuit
Court of the United States, whenever the removal thereof is author-
ized by act of Congress, and subject also to the authority of this
court to review the final judgment of the state court, if the case be
one within its appellate jurisdiction. Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co.
v. Henderson, 511.
1. In the spring of the year 1825, when the grant of public land in con-
troversy in this suit was made, the territorial deputation of New
Mexico had no authority to make such grant. Hayes v. United States,
637.
2. After a careful examination of all the acts of the Mexican authorities
upon which the appellee claims that his title to the grant in question
in this case is founded, the court arrives at the conclusion that the
officers who made the grant had no power to make it; and the decree
of the Court of Private Land Claims establishing it is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings. United States v. Coe, 681.
1. The Supreme Court of Missouri having held that the act of the legisla-
ture of that State incorporating the Laclede Gas Light Company and
conferring upon it the sole and exclusive privilege of lighting the
streets in parts of St. Louis, though construed to include the right to
use electricity for illuminating purposes in respect to such right, was
taken subject to reasonable regulations as to its use, and that the
power to regulate had been delegated to the city of St. Louis, and that
under its general public power the city had the right to require com-
pliance with reasonable regulations as a condition to using its streets
for electric wires, this court concurs with the conclusion of the
Supreme Court that the company was subject to reasonable regula-
tions in the exercise of the police powers of the city, and holds that,
so far as that involved any Federal question, such question was cor-
rectly decided. Laclede Gas Light Co. v. Murphy, 78.
2. If the company, as it asserted, possessed the right to place electric wires
beneath the surface of the streets, that right was subject to such rea-
sonable regulations as the city deemed best to make for the public
safety and convenience, and the duty rested on the company to comply
with them. lb.
3. If requirements were exacted or duties imposed by the ordinances,
which, if enforced, would have impaired the obligations of the com-
pany's contract, this did not relieve the company from offering to do
those things which it was lawfully bound to do. Ib.
4. The exemption of the company from requirements inconsistent with its
charter could not operate to relieve it from submitting itself to such
police regulations as the city might lawfully impose; and until it had
complied, or offered to comply, with regulations to which it was bound
to conform, it was not in a position to assert that its charter rights
were invaded because of other regulations, which, though applicable to
other companies, it contended would be invalid if applied to it. lb.
5. The Supreme Court of Missouri did not feel called on to define in ad-
vance what might, or might not, be lawful requirements; and there
is nothing in this record compelling this court to do so. Ib.
6. The transactions between the county of Mercer, which resulted in the
delivery of the bonds of the county to the Railroad Company, were
had in the utmost good faith. Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Mercer
County, 593.
7. Barnum v. Okolona, 148 U. S. 395, reaffirmed to these points; "that mu-
nicipal corporations have no power to issue bonds in aid of railroads,
except by legislative permission; that the legislature, in granting per-
mission to a municipality to issue its bonds in aid of a railroad, may
impose such conditions as it may choose; and that such legislative
permission does not carry with it authority to execute negotiable bonds,
except subject to the restrictions and conditions of the enabling act."
But when the good faith of all the parties is unquestionable, the courts
will lean to that construction of the statute which will uphold the
transaction as consummated. Ib.
8. The provision in the act authorizing the issue of Mercer County bonds
to the Louisville Southern Railroad Company, when its railway should
have been so completed "through such county that a train of cars
shall have passed over the same," was fully complied with when the
railroad was so completed, from the northern line of the county to
Harrodsburg, that a train of cars passed over it; but, even if this con-
struction be incorrect, it must be held that when the trustee, in whose
hands the county bonds were placed in escrow, adjudged that the con-
dition prescribed for their delivery had been complied with, and de-
livered the bonds to the railroad company, the company took such a
title as, when the bond was transferred to a bona fide holder, would
enable him to recover against the county, even if the condition had
in fact not been performed. Ib.
NATIONAL BANK.
See JURISDICTion, A,1;
SURETY BOND.
The Boyden device for a fluid-pressure brake is not an infringement of
patent No. 360,070 issued to George Westinghouse, Jr., March 29,
1887, for a fluid-pressure automatic-brake mechanism. Westinghouse
v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 537.
1. On an appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court of a Territory,
the findings of fact are conclusive upon this court. Holloway v. Dun-
ham, 615.
2. One general exception to thirteen different instructions cannot be con-
sidered sufficient when each instruction consists of different proposi-
tions of law and fact, and many of them are clearly correct. Ib.
1. In 1869 Congress granted a quantity of land in New Mexico, in fulfil-
ment of a grant of non-mineral lands made by Mexico before its
transfer, the land to be selected by the grantees, and the surveyor
general to survey and locate the land selected, and thus determine
whether it was such as the grantees might select. The grantees made
their selection, and after considerable correspondence as to the forms
of the application and as to the evidence that the selected lands were
not mineral lands, the surveyor general, under the direction of the
Land Department, approved the selection, and made the survey and loca-
tion. The Land Department approved the survey, field notes and plat,
and the parties were notified thereof, but no patent was issued, as Con-
gress had not provided for such issue. The Land Department noted on
its maps that this tract had been segregated from the public domain,
and had become private property, and so reported to Congress, and
that body never questioned the validity of its action. The grantees
entered into possession, fenced the tract, and paid all taxes assessed
upon it as private property by the State. Held, that the action
taken by the Land Department was a finality, and that the title
passed, all having been done which was prescribed by the statute.
Shaw v. Kellogg, 312.
2. Such approval entered upon the plat in the Land Department by the
surveyor general, under the directions of that department, was in
terms "subject to the conditions and provisions of section 6 of the act
of Congress, approved June 21, 1860." Held, that such limitation was
beyond the power of executive officers to impose. Ib.
3. When an entryman goes to the public land office for the purpose of
obtaining public land, and is told by the receiver that his proofs can-
not be filed or accepted unless and until he pays the purchase price of
the land, which he thereupon does, he makes such payment to the re-
ceiver as a public officer of the United States, and not to him as the
agent of the entryman, and the payment is to be regarded as one
made to the Government and as public money, within the meaning of
the law and of any bond given for the faithful discharge of the duties
of his office by the receiver, and for his honestly accounting for all
public funds and property coming into his hands. Smith v. United
States, 372.
4. The construction and legal effect of a patent for land is matter for the
court, and evidence to aid in that construction is incompetent.
Stuart v. Easton, 383.
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