I presume it will be unnecessary to adduce more points of difference to illustrate the nature of the American government; these are, I think, sufficient

to convince you of the entire democratic tendency of the constitution of the United States, and of the error under which you have labored, in believing that but few differences, and those immaterial and unimportant, existed between our government and this. We have indeed, in common the habeas corpus and the trial by jury, the great bulwarks of civil liberty, but in almost every other particular they disagree.

The first branch of the American government, I shall consider is the executive. The president is chosen by electors in the different states composing the union, who are equal in number to the representatives in congress. His period of service is four years; but to qualify him for this station, he must be a native citizen of the United States, and at least thirty-five years of age at the time of election. This election is conducted in a manner much less complicated than that of the Doge of Venice and Genoa, which you may perceive by a glance at the constitution I send you. The president's title, says M. De La Croix, n'est ni celui de roi, ni celui de duc; ce n'est ni un monarque, ni unchef, c'est un president. His power is, I think, rather too much limited and controlled for a vigorous and energetic government. No danger, indeed, can result to the liberty of the people from this power; but much procrastination and delay in periods of extreme emergency may flow from the circumscribed nature of his authority;

liable to impeachment and dismissal from office for the commission of treason and other high crimes and misdemeanors, he may do much good, but he can do 110 essential wrong. The powers he derives from the constitution, are, in fact, mere duties, which, bya little metaphysical refinement, may be so attenuated and enlarged as to embrace almost every thing, and to afford a field for the most subtle and endless speculation. The influence and patronage of the executive are, however, still very considerable; but I do not think, they will ever be dangerous. His powers I will briefly enumerate, that you may see the affinity between the British and American executives. The president is ex officio commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the different states when called into service; but this call can only be made by congress, and the states respectively have the power of appointing the officers of the militia. He has the power to reprieve and pardon all offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. The king on the contrary, pardons in all cases whatever. The president has the power to make treaties, but it must be by and with the advice and consent of the senate, and the concurrence of two-thirds present, and these treaties become part of the supreme law of the land. The power I have just mentioned is involved in some difficulty and embarrassment. The treaty making power which is here vested in the executive and se

mate, is uncontrolled.* The senators not being considered as civil officers, are not as in England, liable to impeachment. Should the president and senate therefore conspire to make a treaty dishonorable to "the nation, and to overstep the limits of their authority, I see no constitutional possibility of obviating the evil, or of punishing the culprits. The president may indeed be impeached, but his judges are the very men who have united with him in committing the offence and they cannot but be improper judges. In addition, it may be necessary to observe, that many cases will occur, in which the constitutional powers of the house of representatives are involved. Let us suppose for example, that a treaty of alliance is entered into with a foreign power, in which supplies of money and munitions of war are to be furnished by the United States. These cannot be constitutionally appropriated, but by the concurrence of the popular branch of the national legislature; and yet, this treaty must be binding, without the consent or even the knowledge of that branch. Such are the difficulties and absurdities of this part of the constitution. The president's next power which gives him, as I have already stated, such extensive influence and patronage, is that of nominating, and with the consent of the se

* See Appendix to Tucker's Blackstone, debates on the Treaty making power, and a Review of Question, in whom has the constitution vested the Treaty making power? From this much information may be received.

nate, appointing ambassadors, ministers, consuls, judges, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are authorized by law. He also commissions these officers, and in some cases, has the sole appointment, and fills up all vacancies that may occur during the recess. Under this head much discussion has taken place. As the constitution provides, that all civil officers of the United States shall be removed on impeachment and conviction of treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors, it has been contended that the president has not the power of dismissing from office; but the question is now settled, and I believe it is generally conceded, that the power of creating in this case, necessarily implies the power of destroying, which you will perceive, is a metaphysical deduction resulting from the abstract nature of the case. The president can convene both houses of congress upon any extraordinary occasion, and adjourn them if any disagreement about the period of adjournment should arise between them. In relation to his duties, he is bound to give to congress, from time to time, information of the state of the union, and recommend such measures as he may think conducive to the public interest-he must also see that the laws be faithfully executed, and the oath which he is obliged to take before he enters upon the duties of his high and important station, compels him to "preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the United States." "The last power which I shall mention, is of a legislative