struction, and ceases to operate when the language is express, or the intention to effect both classes of contracts is plain".

His Honor Judge Peckham, in his opinion, states, in reference to this case, that the Court expressly denied the power in Congress to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts otherwise, or further, than in cases of bankruptcy. With all deference to the learned Judge, I think he has misapprehended the import of the opinion. The Court say only, "that they do not concede to Congress the power" to work the nullity of contracts, or detract anything from their obligation eo nomine. But they concede that Congress may do so, so far as the modification of obligations may result from a legitimate exercise of a delegated power.

Now, the act in question makes the treasury notes a legal tender in payment of all debts, and this necessarily applies to debts contracted before the passage of the act, as well as to those contracted subsequently. If the Court would construe the statute to be only prospective in its operation, then no weight would be given to the word "all." A debt is a sum of money arising on contract, and whether it is to be paid in future, or at once, it is a debt always, and a debt due has no other rights attached to it, except that it may be sued at onceit is and remains a chose in action.

The statute could not be made clearer than it is. If the reading were "in payment of debts, public and private,” there might be room for an interpretation, making it prospective only.

The Bankrupt Act of 1841, contained the same wording "all debts," and it was decided by all the Courts, that the word "all" made it apply to debts both incurred before and subsequent to the passing of the act. The rule of judicial construction, to interpret a law to be prospective only, ceases to operate (to use the words of Judge Cowen in the case Kunzler v. Kohans), since the language is express, and the intention to affect both classes of contracts is plain.

When, then, the respondent, like Shylock, cries, I want my bond! Give me my bond! We say, he has his bond, and he shall have his bond, and all he is entitled to by it.

But there is a law in Venice, which says, if he shed one drop

of our common country's blood, his head for it. He speaks of spasmodic patriotism on part of the appellant, but spasmodic patriotism is better than none at all. If he only wants his bond, he shall have it; we shall not be either richer or poorer for it; and we say he has had all he can claim by his bond, by the letter and spirit of it.

But besides the individual rights of the present parties, there are other considerations attending this case. The safety of the whole country depends upon it. But these are not considerations for the Court. The Courts have to decide only what the law is, uninfluenced by any other considerations.

With these remarks I submit the case to your Honors, and leave it to the further elucidation of my learned associate. I would only beg of your Honors, to read the printed argument which I submitted to the Court below, and which I have placed before you.

ARGUMENT

OF

GEORGE T. CURTIS, Esq.,

Of Counsel for Respondent,

MR. CURTIS said:

May it please your Honors,―The case of Meyer vs. Roosevelt invokes, as a point of distinct consideration, the question of the applicability of the act of Congress to contracts which were past and executed, and had become payable before it was enacted. The case which has been submitted to your Honors, in relation to banks, does not discriminate, so far as the record shows, between bills issued before the act of Congress was passed, and bills issued after. So that in deciding that case, your Honors are called upon to decide, first, the general question of the power of Congress to legislate at all upon the subject of tender, or the discharge of contracts, or what shall constitute payment of contracts; and, secondly, on their power to make the paper money of the Government discharge a contract; and, thirdly, on the power of Congress to effect the trust with which the State stands clothed to receive the payment of the bills of its banks out of a fund designated for that particular purpose.

Then, in this case, the distinct point of consideration is as to the applicability of the act of Congress to past contracts. And without going into the argument upon this subject at this late hour of the discussion, I will simply submit a very able printed

brief, prepared by the learned respondent himself, on that par. ticular question arising in his case.

And beyond that, I should not now say a single word further upon this general subject, if it were not that I perceive, by the brief that has been handed to us by my learned friend who is to close this case (MR. NOYES), that a theory in respect to this Government is about to be maintained, to which I cannot give my assent either in general or in the particulars.

It will be found, on examining that brief, that my learned friend propounds, in derogation of the argument which calls in question this alleged constitutional power, that the objection comes chiefly from a class of persons who construe the Constitution of the United States in such a way as to make it a mere temporary contract, entered into by the States and not by the People, having in itself no elements of stability, &c. And he concludes this general proposition with the statement that the position is sustained by substantially the same argument with that which leads to the doctrine of "secession."

Now, it is a little curious how one's opinions often receive a very opposite treatment in opposite quarters. It happened to me, not many months ago, to be very seriously taken to task in the Edinburgh Review, for having maintained that the cession by the People of the United States of the sovereign powers embraced in the Constitution of the United States, was an irrevocable cession, and no more capable, by virtue of the contract itself, of being reassumed at pleasure by the grantors, than the conveyance of a piece of property is, when made by an absolute deed. I mention this to illustrate the different views, under different circumstances, and for different purposes, one's opinions sometimes encounter. The criticism of the reviewer, and the criticism of my learned friend are alike, however, in this— that neither, in my judgment, is founded in a correct view of our national system. While the one deprives it of all sovereign power, the other makes it an absolute and uncontrolled despotism. I think neither of these positions is true.

There is no difference of opinion between my learned friend and myself as to the nature of the Government of the United States, so far as respects the sovereignty of the specific powers which are embraced in the Constitution. But in respect to the

limitations on that sovereignty, we are widely apart. And it is in reference to those limitations, and on those limitations, that a very large part of this controversy turns.

In the fifth proposition contained in my learned friend's brief, he lays down a doctrine which--I hope he will not deem it uncivil in me to say-seems to me one of the most extravagant positions ever maintained by a learned lawyer. It is in these words:

"By the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, in connection with section one of article two and article six, complete sovereign power in respect of all subjects of legislation, specifically enumerated and necessarily implied in the designated powers, is conferred upon Congress; and it possesses in regard thereto an omnipotence equal to that which may be exercised by the British Parliament, or any other supreme legislative body, especially as there are no prohibitions or restrictions upon its exercise."

Does my learned friend really think, that he lives under such a government as he has here described? Omnipotent with all the powers of the British Parliament! with no restrictions or prohibitions upon the exercise of those powers! Then it is in the power of that Government to strip him at any moment of the well-earned emoluments of a life of labor and distinction. Then it is in the power of that Government to put him to death by a bill of attainder without a trial by jury, or even a trial by court martial. Then he may be deprived of the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, whether there is or is not either rebellion or invasion. Then he may be taxed without the slightest reference to the proportionate population of the State in which he dwells, as ascertained by the national census. Then the exports of his State may be subjected to an export duty, and his ship, if he have one, may be excluded from the port of his domicil. Then Congress can compel him to support a national establishment of religion, prohibiting him from the free exercise of his own religion, abridge his freedom of speaking and writing, and destroy even his right of petition for a redress of his grievances. Then, in short, he has no security of person, house, papers or effects; for the "sovereign power in