them, as the Senses of the most Learned and Thinking Men: Which proves that Ideas do not enter in at the Eyes or Fingers Ends; and that the Mind has no immediate Power upon external Impressions, of making its Ideas, no more than of feeing them, without Instruction.

This, I suppose, Mr. Lock will not pretend, That our Ideas enter in from without: For he knows very well, that there are no Ideas out of a Mind; and that the external Impressions which are made from without, which can be nothing else but Motion and Figure, have nothing in them like those Ideas which are raised in our Minds: But then he thinks, that a Knowing and Reasoning Faculty, without any Connate Ideas, can form its own Ideas from such external Impressions, though they can convey no Ideas into the Mind, because they have none.

Now besides what I have already discoursed of this Matter, I must observe, That no Faculty makes its Object, but only perceives it; and then the Knowing Faculty must not make its Ideas, but only fee and know them. A Knowing Faculty supposes that there are Ideas to be known; as a Seeing Faculty supposes that there is Light and Colours to be seen; and if these Ideas cannot come from without, and the Mind can't make them, the Mind can contemplate only such Ideas as it finds in its self, and which some external Impressions do not make, but only bring into View.

I think Mr. Lock will allow it as credible and intelligible, that we should know by Innate Ideas, as that all our Senfations should be Innate Phantasms: And yet this he must allow, according to his own Principles; for he grants, that P. 59, 60, fuch Secondary Qualities, as he calls them, as Light and Colours, and Sounds, and Heat, and Gold,

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Cold, Sweet and Bitter, &c. are no real Qualities in the Things without us, but only a Power to operate in a peculiar Manner on any of our Senses. Now if there be no such Qualities as Light, or Colour, or Sounds, Heat or Cold, &c. without us, then these Ideas of Light and Colours must be Innate to the Visive Faculty, and the Ideas of all other Qualities must be Innate to our other Senses; for if they be not without us, they must be within, for we have very real and sensible Ideas of them. There is nothing in the Things without us, like those Ideas we have of Light and Colours, and other sensible Qualities, and therefore they cannot paint those Ideas and Phantasms on our Minds; the most they can do is, by the wonderful and unaccountable Order of Nature, by fome certain kind of Motions, to raise such sensible Ideas in us, of Light and Colours, &c. which they could not raife in the Soul, if they were not in it. It is the Soul only that fees, and hears, and feels, as well as understands; and as Sense is, and can be nothing else, but Innate Sensible Ideas put into Act by external Impressions; so Understanding is nothing else but the Perception of its Innate Ideas, excited also, and brought into View, by external Objects. This reprefents the Soul, as a true Microcosm, or Intellectual Image of the World, impress'd with all those Marks and Signatures, which are not actual Knowledge, but a Capacity of knowing, because they are capable of being brought into act.

Plato called Knowledge Reminiscence; for being sensible that the Soul could not get its Ideas merely from external Impressions, he supposed that it had an actual Knowledge of them in a former State, and by degrees recover'd that Knowledge again in this State, as Men recollect such Matters as they had forgot. And to bring those Ideas into Act, which were originally imprinted on the Mind, but not known before, is not unlike to Plato's Reminiscence; for it is a Discovery and Recollection of fuch Ideas as were in the Mind, but not actually perceived. It is certain, all those ancient Philofophers, who believed Præexistence, who were both the greatest Numbers, and the wisest Men, whether Jews or Heathens, could not believe that the Soul came into the World stript of all Ideas: Nor did any Philosophers of old teach this, but those who made the whole World, and the Souls of Men, nothing but Matter; and then there could be no higher Principle of Knowledge, than external Impressions. Mr. Lock will not own that all Knowledge is owing to external Impressions, butrequires a Knowing Intelligent Principle to form its Ideas; but fuch a Knowing Principle, as has no Innate Ideas, or Seeds of Knowledge: And let this be either Spirit or Matter, if it have nothing within, it must have it from without. And thus all the Objections against the Old Atheistick Hypothesis, are chargeable upon him; though I will not charge them upon him, because he disowns those Atheistick Principles, for the fake of which this Hypothesis was originally invented, and without which, it is worth nothing, and serves no End. And I am afraid our modern Atheists will own and magnify his Hypothefis; and whether he will or no, make use of his Hypothesis, or as much of it as they please, to confute those Principles of Religion and Virtue which he owns. For after all, there is not a more formidable Objection against Religion, than to teach, That Mankind is made without any Connate Natural Impreffions and Ideas of a God, and of Good and Evil: For if all the Knowledge we have of God, and of Good and Evil, be made by our selves, Atheists will easily conclude, that it is only the

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Effect of Education, and Superftitious Fears; and satisfy themselves, that they can make other Notions, more for the Eafe and Security of Life. This is certain, no Man who believes that the Ideas of God, and of Good and Evil, were originally impress'd on our Minds when they were first made, can doubt whether there be a God, or an essential Difference between Good and Evil. Those who believe thefe Notions were made, and not born with us, are more at Liberty to question their Truth. And the general Reason why Men are so zealous against these Ideas being Innate, is to deliver themselves from the Neceffity of Believing any Thing of God or Religion.

This may be thought a very long Digression, and very improper for common Readers: And I grant it is so; and those who are not accustomed to fuch Philofophical Speculations, may easily pass it by; but it was necessary to make good my prefent Argument against such Pretences. For if the Soul of Man has no Inbred Knowledge, it is in vain to talk of the Light, and Voice, and Sense of Nature; if it has, then the universal Consent of Mankind can be reasonably attributed to no other Caufe; and then the Immortality of the Soul must be the Voice and Sense of Nature. There have been indeed a great many wicked and abfurd Practices that have prevail'd in the World; such as Polytheism and Idolatry, and the idle and fabulous Stories concerning the different States of good and bad Men in the next Life. But these are manifeft Corruptions of our Natural Notions of God, and Religion, and another Life: And therefore when all the World, excepting the Jews, were Idolaters, yet they did not agree in the Gods they worshipped, nor in the Rites and Ceremo

nies of their Worship, nor in their Accounts of the other World: And therefore fuch corrupt DoCtrines and Practices cannot pretend to fuch an Universal Confent, as the Being of a God, and a Future State, and therefore cannot pretend neither, to be the Voice of Nature.

3. And now I need add but a very few Words, to prove that the Voice of Nature is a Natural Proof of Immortality. For if Nature teaches the Immortality of the Soul, that is certainly a Natural Proof. And if we believe that God made us, that he is the Author of our Nature, and of all Natural Impressions and Notions, this gives great Strength to this Argument: For we cannot believe that God, who is Eternal Truth, would deceive us, by any fuch Natural Impression, into the Belief of our Immortality, had he made us Mortal. I'm fure this ought to be a very perfuafive Argument to those who talk so much and fo highly of Natural Reafon: For if they will act agreeably with themselves, they must believe and disbelieve, chuse and refuse with Nature. To believe againft Nature, is to put off Nature; and when they cease to reason and believe as Men, it is Time to. leave difputing with them, for we have no common Principles to Reafon on.

SECT. IV.

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The Immortality of the Soul prov'd, from the Natural Defires of Immortality, and the Justice of the Divine Providence.