CONSTRUCT.

1. Constraint is synonymous with "compulsion" when used in reference to extrinsic force. The court said: "A voluntary act proceeds from one's own free will; done by choice or by one's own accord; unconstrained by external interference, force, or influence; not prompted or suggested by another. Worc. Dict.; Imp. Dict. Voluntarily expresses by the use of one word all the force and meaning of the phrase, ' of her own free will and accord.' Compulsion' and constraint are synonyms, when used in reference to extrinsic power, force, or influence, as when exercised by one person on another. Mrs. Hester's acknowledgment that she signed the mortgage voluntarily, without any fear, compulsion, or threats of her said husband,' is of equivalent import and meaning with the expression * of her own free will and accord, and without fear, constraints, or threats on the part of her husband." Gates v. Hester, 81 Ala. 359.

Married Women. (See also the title ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, vol. 1, p. 546. And see RESTRAINT.) - On the question of the validity of a trust deed made by a married woman, wherein the certificate of privy examination, instead of following the words of the code that she acknowledged the execution of the said deed to have been done by her freely, voluntarily, and understandingly, without compulsion or constraint from her said husband," substituted the word "restraint" for the word constraint, the court, by Cooper, Ch., after showing that while the omission of one of the words included in the form is fatal, yet the substitution of a word of similar meaning is not matter of substance, and that a prior act on the same subject actually employed the word "restraint," said: "The question is consequently narrowed down to this: Is the word 'restraint' the same word in substance as constraint, the word prescribed by the form? * * * One of the meanings which both Sheridan and Johnson give to the verb constrain is, to restrain. And all of our lexicographers give as one of the meanings of the noun 'restraint' an abridgment of liberty or hindrance of the will. It is in this sense that it was used in the form of certificate of 1833, and in that view is perhaps more appropriate than constraint, 7 C. of L.-1

which, except we give it the sense of restraint,' is identical in meaning with the word 'compulsion,' with which it is connected. The meaning of the two words, at one time identical, has been so differentiated by usage of the best writers as now to convey, when correctly used, distinct ideas. But as elements of the vulgar tongue they are still so nearly alike as to be applied without discrimination to the same purpose. To say that an act is done without constraint, or without restraint,' would convey the same meaning, namely, without any abridgment of liberty or hindrance of the will,' which is one of the recognized definitions of restraint.' I am of opinion, therefore, that, while the words are different, the sense is one, and that the certificate is valid." Edmondson v. Harris, 2 Tenn. Ch. 427.

2. Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 147, in which case it was held that the term as used in the title of an act authorizing a city or town to construct improvements had a wider meaning. The court said: " Ordinarily, the meaning of the word construct in the sense here meant would be to build or make; but to give the law any effect whatever, it must have been known to the legislature that more than the mere cost of construction involving the labor necessary would have to be implied.

*

*

*

If one should contract with another for the construction of a house, no one would suppose for a moment that the agreement to construct implied an agreement to furnish the land whereon the house must stand; but a gross contract to construct a system of water works for the city of Tacoma, with Green river as a source of supply, and turn it over ready for operation, would certainly imply that when the works were finished the perpetual right to have them remain where they were, with the waters of Green river flowing into them, should be secured to the city. Thus, under this power to construct, all but the mere labor would be accomplished by purchase in most cases, and there would seem to be no good reason why water rights, land, pipes and machinery should not be purchased, although they be already in use for a like purpose.' Build, Erect, and Construct. In La Crosse, Volume VII.

etc., R. Co. v. Vanderpool, 11 Wis. 122, it is said: "In Crabb's Synonyms, 498, cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, the most precise and accurate distinction between the words build,' erect,' and construct, seems to be stated. It says: 'What is built is employed for the purpose of receiving, retaining, or confining; what is erected is placed in an elevated position; what is constructed is put together with ingenuity.' And again: Houses are built, monuments erected, and machines constructed.' Such nice distinctions and shades of meaning should never be observed in opposition to the ordinary and common understanding of men, unless the intent of the statute manifestly required it."

re

Constructing a Street. An ordinance quired that every person who should construct a new street should provide at one end, at least, of such street an entrance of a width equal to the width of such street. It was held that the construction of a new street within this provision included the building of the houses abutting on it, and consequently the landowner could not, until an adequate entrance had been provided, erect houses abutting on the proposed new street. Hendon Local Board v. Pounce, 42 Ch. Div. 602.

1. Construction and Erection Mechanics' Liens. (See also the title MECHANICS' LIENS.) In Burke v. Brown, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 298, it is said: "As used in the law, the words erection' and construction seem to be synonymous in their meaning; and in common acceptation, when applied to a house, they mean the building of it by putting together the necessary material and raising it; but it does not require a strained sense to bring the removal of a house from the place where it has been put together, and placing it in position or setting it up in another place, within the meaning of these words as used in the law."

Alteration Mechanics' Liens. In Donnell 2. Starlight, 103 Mass. 227, it was held that labor and materials furnished in the alteration of a vessel fitted out for new uses are furnished in her construction and repairs.

As to whether construction includes alteration, see Montgomery v. Townsend, 84 Ala. 478, 22 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 424, 425.

Construction of a Railroad. (See also the title RAILROADS.) In McRae v. Toronto, etc., R. Co., 22 U. C. C. P. 1, the court said: "Where the construction of the road, or portion of road, had been already provided for, the government aid was not to be given. The fact that a company had succeeded in contracting for the grading and fencing of a portion of a road cannot in our judgment amount to a contract for the construction of such portion. A contract to construct ten or twenty miles of a railway must mean to put such portion in a state to be used as a railway, and such a contract could never be fulfilled merely by grad. ing and fencing the line."

right of way might reserve timber and use it as his own unless necessary for the purpose of construction. In Preston v. Dubuque, etc., R. Co., II Iowa 17, the court said: "Unless necessary for the purpose of construction or repairs, the proprietor may remove the timber and use it as his own; it being understood by the word construction as here used, more is meant than the mere making of the roadbed. The construction of the road implies its preparation and readiness for use; and not only so, but its use in a convenient and safe manner. Hence though such timber might not be necessary for the construction of the track, it might be necessary to remove it for the safe running of the locomotive and cars. The right to thus remove does not, however, carry with it the right to destroy, nor yet to appropriate it to the use of the company for the purpose of firewood or the like. Deaton v. Polk County, 9 Iowa 594; Henry v. Dubuque, etc., R. Co., 2 Iowa 288."

Construction Distinguished from Interpretation. - In Morris Aqueduct v. Jones, 36 N. J. L. 209, Beasley, C. J., says: Upon looking into the cases referred to, and on an examination of others standing in the same line, I find they all rest upon the common principle that the legislative will is to be ascertained not from the meaning of the text of the statute alone, but from such words interpreted in view of the general object of the particular act. The adjudications are the results, not of acts of interpretation, which is the mere finding of the true sense of the special form of words used, but of acts of construction, which Dr. Lieber, in his Hermeneutics, has properly defined as the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text conclusions which are in the spirit though not within the letter of the text.' Lieber on Political Hermeneutics, c. I." In Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. Ter. 612, it is said: Interpretation differs from construction in this, that it is used for the purpose of ascertaining the true sense of any form of words; while construction involves the drawing of conclusions regarding subjects that are not always included in the direct expression.

As Applied to Powers. (See also the title POWERS.) In Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y. 535, it is said: "We now come to another question, that is, what is the construction that the Revised Statutes put upon this power? As we have seen, the construction of it is to be governed by the provisions of those statutes. By the term construction, the revisers and the legislature meant not merely the meaning and force of the particular words used in creating the power. They had a wider notion in the use of the word, and intended by it what should be