used are convey, or procure or cause to be conveyed. Inchoate Dower. (See also the title Dower.) In Nickell v. Tomlinson, 27 W. Va. 720, a statute provided that a writing signed by husband and wife purporting to convey real estate, when admitted to record as to the husband as well as to the wife, should operate to convey from the wife her right of dower in the real estate embraced therein. It was held that the effect of a wife uniting with her husband in a deed conveying land, under this statute, is not to vest in the grantee any estate separate and distinct from her husband, but simply to relinquish a contingent right of dower. The court said:" The language now used is: shall operate to convey from the wife her right of dower in the real estate embraced in the deed.' Now convey means transfer the title of land from one person or class of persons to another. (See Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. I, p. 399.) Clearly, an inchoate dower-interest is no title to land. It is no estate present or future, vested or contingent, and the term convey can be properly used only when the transfer of some estate in land' is spoken of. It would then, it seems to me, be entirely improper to seize hold of this word convey in this statute so inappropriately used, as we are asked to do by the counsel for the appellees, to give meaning to the statute, and from it draw the inference, that a wife in this mode could sell her contingent dower-interest. The language used in the statute, such writing shall operate to convey to the grantee the wife's right of dower,' seems to me to clearly indicate that no change was intended to be made in the power of the wife over her inchoate dowerinterest. For by levying with her husband a fine she could release her inchoate right of dower, but could not sell or convey it to a grantee separately. It could pass from her, but not to the grantee separated from her husband's estate. All that he got goes from the husband, but he got the land free from the incumbrance of the wife's inchoate dowerinterest."

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Indenture to Lead to the Uses of a Common Recovery. In Dudley v. Sumner, 5 Mass. 438, 472, it was held that an indenture to lead to the uses of a common recovery was a conveyance within the meaning of the recording acts, and that where that part of such an indenture which was executed by the recoverer was acknowledged and recorded, it was not necessary that the part signed and sealed by the recoveree should be acknowledged and recorded, Sedgwick, J., said: "As 'grantor' is the most comprehensive word to signify one who conveys lands, so conveyance is the common statute word to intend the deed, the act or instrument, by which property in real estate is transferred.' Lien of Judgment. In Wilcoxson v. Miller, 49 Cal. 193, it was held that a lien of a judgment was not a conveyance within the meaning of the California Registry Act.

Quit-Claim Deed. - Within the Wisconsin Recording Act a quit-claim deed has been held a conveyance. Cutler v. James, 64 Wis. 178. 1. Brown v. Fitz, 13 N. H. 285. Water Conveyed. - Where an agreement reserved the privilege of using all the water of a spring as formerly conveyed, it was held that the word conveyed meant the manner of conducting the water, and did not refer to the conveyance of the right; the court, by Black, J., saying: "The judge of the common pleas thought that the agreement of 1836 established a privilege to use the water as it had been used previously. The plaintiff contends that it created a right limited and defined by the terms of the old grant. We are of opinion that the court below was right. The main argument of the plaintiff in error is, that the word convey must be taken in its technical sense. It is true that a term of art in the law, when used in a written contract, is always understood by the courts according to the meaning which they have agreed to impress upon it, unless very strong reasons can be adduced to show that the parties meant something else by it; for instance, 'heirs' and' heirs of his body' have a certain legal meaning, which will adhere to them until the contrary intent be clearly established, though it is well known that many, perhaps most unprofessional persons, use them synonymous with children.' But it often happens that we have one and the same word for two ideas totally different. Of such a word we can never know the meaning, except by reference to the context. There is no better example of this than the word convey, which may mean to conduct water from place to place, or to transfer title from one person to another. Assuming that in the latter sense it is a term of art (which it is not), we are still bound to receive it in its other meaning, if water was the subject-matter spoken of, since it would be absurd to speak of conveying water,' in a technical sense, from a spring to a paper-mill. Now, it was water that the agreement said should be conveyed 'as it has formerly been conveyed.' The grammatical structure of the sentence leaves this in no doubt. The right or title is not referred to. The pronoun 'it' can have no antecedent except water." Edelman v. Yeakel, 27 Pa. St. 26.

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Furnish Distinguished from Convey-Escape. (See also the title ESCAPE.) A statute made it a criminal offense to convey into a jail any instruments or other things useful to aid a prisoner in escaping. An indictment charged that the accused did furnish a person confined

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in a jail with certain instruments. This was held a fatal variance. The court said: "The words are to be understood according to their usual meaning in ordinary language. Code Crim. Pro., art. 397.Furnish' and convey are words of widely different meaning. furnish a thing and to convey it signify very different acts. To furnish is to provide or supply anything wanted by another; to convey is to bear, carry, or transport the thing to another person or place. A person at a distance may furnish the article desired, upon request by letter or otherwise, and another may convey it to the person for whom it is intended. One may furnish, provide, or supply a person confined in jail with food, which another may 'convey into any jail to the person therein confined. Therefore, to furnish a person who is confined in jail with anything, may and ordinarily does mean quite a different act from what we understand by the words shall convey into any jail' anything.' Francis v. State, 21 Tex. 285.

Send Distinguished from Convey. A statute provided that it should be a criminal offense to send or convey an insulting or obscene letter to a female. It was held that an indictment charging that the accused did send and convey was technically defective, as send" and conrey import a different kind of transmission. Larison v. State, 49 N. J. L. 259.

Accident Insurance Public or Private Conveyance. (See also the title ACCIDENT INSURANCE, vol. I, p. 305. And see PRIVATE; PUBLIC.) Where an insurance company issued insurance tickets against death "caused by accident while traveling by public or private conveyance provided for the transportation of passengers," in two forms or classes, one known as the travelers' risk," the other as the " general accident," the latter being sold for the highest price, and an engineer holding the ticket" general accident" was killed while on a railroad locomotive, it was held that the deceased was insured against all accidents, without regard to the capacity in which he was acting; that the ticket was intended to cover the accident by which he met his death, and that the insurance company was liable. Brown v. Railway Pass. Assur. Co., 45 Mo. 221.

Under a similar policy, a passenger injured while walking a short distance between a connecting steamboat and railway line, even though cabs were standing for hire, which might have been used, was held entitled to recover on the policy. Northrup v. Railway Pass. Assur. Co., 43 N. Y. 516.

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was not traveling by either public or private conveyance. It was argued by counsel that "In Northrup v. Railway Pass. Assur. Co., 43 N. Y. 516, the contract was against accident while traveling by public or private conveyance provided for the transportation of its passengers. Yet the company was held liable though the death was caused while the party was walking from a steamboat landing to a railway station, a distance of seventy rods. The case regards the walking as part of the original journey in the public or private conveyance, and wisely; for few persons on a long journey are all the time in the rail carriages. The case does but carry out the injunction given by Cockburn, C. J., in Trew v. Railway Pass. Ins. Co., 30 L. J. Exch. 317: We ought not to give to these policies a construction which will defeat the protection of the assured in a large class of cases.' But independently of this, the words private conveyance' reasonably, and ex vi termini, include the case of a person pursuing a journey, or traveling, by means of his own personal powers of locomotion; his limbs with their muscles and tendons, bones and joints the primitive, universal private conveyance' of man. Conveyance is the instrument or means of carrying or transferring anything from place to place. It is derived from con (with, by, along) and via (the way). used in this sense in the Scriptures, where it is said that the Saviour had conveyed himself away. And so in ordinary language, and in every-day life. Should a court direct its officer to convey the prisoner to jail,' no one will doubt that the prisoner's walking to the place designated would be a literal and exact compliance with the order. If one were to say to an intruder, Convey yourself away,' the speaker would have no idea but that the party should walk off; nor would the party himself expect that anything else was meant." But the court, by Chase, C. J., said: "That the deceased was traveling is clear enough; but was traveling on foot, traveling by public or private conveyance? The contract must receive the construction which the language used fairly warrants. What was the understanding of the parties, or, rather, what understanding must naturally have been derived from the language used? It seems to us that walking would not naturally be presented to the mind as a means of public or private conveyance. Public conveyance' naturally suggests a vessel or vehicle employed in the general conveyance of passengers. 'Private conveyance suggests a vehicle belonging to a private individual. If this was the sense in which the language was understood by the parties, the deceased was not, when injured, traveling, within the terms of the policy. There is nothing to show that it was not. Ripley v. Railway Pass. Assur. Co., 16 Wall. (U. S.) 336.

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that a man is said convict before he hath judgment, as if a man be a convict by confession, verdict, or recreancie. And when he hath his judgment upon the verdict, confession, etc., then he is said to be attaint.' It is further said: By a conviction of a felon his goods and chattels are forfeited; but by attainder, that is by judgment given, his lands and tenements are forfeited and his blood corrupted, and not before.' So in Jacob's Law Dictionary (Attainted) it is said: Attainder of a criminal is larger than conviction; a man is convicted when he is found guilty or confesses the crime before judgment had, but not attainted till judgment is passed upon him.' This shows the technical, common-law definition of the word convict or convicted; a felon was convicted by the verdict of a jury; he was attainted by the judgment rendered on the verdict." See also U. S. v. Watkinds, 6 Fed. Rep. 158: Green . Shumway, 39 N. Y. 430; Cozens v. Long, 3 N. J. L. 331.

Equivalent to Verdict of Guilty. In Ex p. Brown, 68 Cal. 180, 7 Crim. L. Mag. 328, it was held that the ordinary meaning of the word conviction is a finding by the jury of a verdict that the accused is guilty; and accordingly it was held that the defendant was not admissible to bail as of right after verdict. See the title BAIL AND RECOGNIZANCES, Vol. 3, p. 673. See, on the same point, People v. McGarigle, 19 Chicago Leg. N. 347.

Same - Suit on Bond. (See also the title INTOXICATING LIQUORS.) In Quintard v. Knoedler, 53 Conn. 485, a verdict of guilty was held a conviction, although no sentence or judgment had been pronounced, under a statute providing for suit on a liquor dealer's bond whenever he should be convicted, etc.

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Same Costs. (See also the title Costs, 5 ENCYC. OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE, p. 100.) In York County v. Dalhousen, 45 Pa. St. 372, it was held, when a statute provided that in all cases of conviction where the party had been discharged according to law, without payment of costs, the county should pay them, that the term conviction applied to the verdict of the jury; and therefore, where the defendant had been convicted by the jury, and before sentence pleaded pardon, the county was held liable for the costs. See also Agnew v. Cumberland County, 12 S. & R. (Pa.) 94.

Former Conviction. (See the title JEOPARDY; and see ENCYC. OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE, vol. 9, p. 630.) — In U. S. v. Gibert, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 40, Mr. Justice Story said that conviction does not mean the judgment passed upon the verdict; and in that case it was held that a plea of autrefois convict may be sustained by a confession or verdict, even where there has been no judgment. See, to the same effect, People v. Goldstein, 32 Cal. 432; Shepherd v. People, 25 N. Y. 406.

In Stevens v. People, I Hill (N. Y.) 261, it was held sufficient, in an indictment for a second larceny, to allege a prior conviction of the defendant, without averring that there was any judgment or sentence pronounced against him;

but the contrary appears to have been held in Smith v. Com., 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 69.

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Same Reward. In a United States case, in which certain claims were made for a reward offered for information which should lead to the forfeiture of any distillery, and to the conviction of the person engaged in operating it, it appeared that the persons said to have been convicted were found guilty by the jury, but that judgment on the verdict was suspended at the instance of the district attorney. It was held that the conditions of the offer were complied with; the court, by Nott, J., saying: "The counsel for the defendants has also argued that the term conviction in the offer of reward is to be construed as meaning 'trial and punishment.' We are of the same opinion, but draw from it a different inference, which is, that the statute enlarges rather than restricts the intent of the word conviction. The informer's information led to an indictment, to a trial, and to a verdict of guilty. It also led to punishment - not to a punishment by fine or imprisonment on the judgment of the court, but to a lesser, modified punishment, inflicted at the instance of the prosecuting officer, who deemed it best to hold the judgment in suspense over the heads of offenders as security for their future good behavior." Williams's Case, 12 Ct. of Cl. 192.

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A reward offered for the prosecution and conviction of a person is earned by procuring the prosecution followed by a plea of guilty. Wilmoth v. Hensel, 151 Pa. St. 209. See, generally, the title REWARDS.

Same Appeal. A statute provided that an appeal might be claimed in a convenient time before the rising of the court before which conviction should be had. It was held that the appeal must be claimed before the end of the term at which the verdict was returned. Shaw, C. J., said: "In general, the legal meaning of conviction is, that legal proceeding of record, which ascertains the guilt of the party, and upon which the sentence or judgment is founded, as a verdict, a plea of guilty, an outlawry, and the like. The law implies that there must be a conviction before punishment. I Hawk. P. C., c. 10, $ 9. Judgment amounts to conviction, though it doth not follow that every one who is convict is adjudged. I Hawk. P. C., c. 10; Jacob's Law Dict., verb. Conviction. Conviction may accrue two ways, either by his confessing the offense and pleading guilty, or by his being found so by the verdict of his country. 4 Blackst. Com. 362. After trial and conviction the judgment of the court regularly follows, unless suspended or arrested, etc. Ibid, 365." Com. v. Richards, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 296.

1. Pardon. (See also the title PARDON.) - In State v. Alexander, 76 N. Car. 231, it was held that the term conviction, as used in the Constitution of North Carolina, conferring the pardoning power upon the governor after conviction, denoted a verdict of guilty rendered by a jury. Therefore, when the defendant, after verdict and judgment in the court below.