Opinion of the Court.

such things as are worn, like apparel, upon the person, or are used in connection therewith; and shortly afterwards he advised the same officer that the words "household effects," in clause 1 above, did not include carriages used abroad not less than one year and intended for personal use here. 15 Opinions, 113, 125. On this construction the department has acted. The last opinion proceeded on the ground that early and repeated decisions in England had held that books, wares, horses; &c., did not pass under bequests of "household goods and effects," and that the express mention of books, in clause 1, and the omission of other articles so determined not to be included under the general term "household effects," indicated that "carriages" were not within the exemption.

The word "effects" means "property or worldly substance." When it is accompanied, in a will, by words of narrower import, the bequest, if not residuary, may be confined to species of property ejusdem generis with those previously described. But the analogies to be derived from wills are not strictly applicable to a case like the present, and no material aid can be derived from decisions in regard to wills. The construction of the words "household effects" in a will often depends largely on the meaning of words in other provisions in the will, and upon the qualification by the word "other," as referring to specific articles before named, like the word "other" in clause 3 above. In the present case the only direct qualification of "effects" is "household."

Persons who dwell together as a family constitute a “house- › hold." In New York, a statute exempted from execution a cow "owned by any person being a householder." In Woodward v. Murray, 18 Jolíns. 400, a judgment debtor, who owned a cow, had left his wife and children, they continuing to reside in the house he had occupied. While they were on the road, removing to the house of the wife's father, with the cow and their household furniture, the cow was seized on execution. The court held that the exemption continued so long as the wife and children remained together "as a family," and that they continued to be the debtor's "household" and he the "householder."

Opinion of the Court.

The question for decision in this case is, whether the carriage of the plaintiff fell under either of these heads: (1) “household effects, in use, of a person or a family from a foreign country, used abroad by the person or the family not less than one year, and not intended for any other person or persons, nor for sale ;". (2) "personal effects (not merchandise), nor for sale, of a person arriving in the United States."

The carriage had been in use as a family carriage, abroad, by the plaintiff, as owner, for more than a year. She came from abroad after a temporary residence there of three years, and imported the carriage two weeks later for use here, and not for any other person nor for sale. Was it "household effects" or "personal effects" of the plaintiff? We think that it fell within clause 1 and was "household effects."

In the provision respecting the "household effects" of persons or families, there is an evident intention to include articles which pertain to a person as a householder or to a family as a household, which have been used abroad not less than a year, and are not intended for others nor for sale. A carriage is peculiarly a family or household article. It contributes, in a large degree, to the health, convenience, comfort and welfare of the householder or of the family. The statute is not limited to articles of household furniture, or to things whose place is necessarily within the four walls of a house. Clause 2 above uses the words "personal and household effects." This serves to show that, by the use of the words "household effects," alone, in clause 1, in the same section of the statute, something is intended different from "personal effects;" and that those words embrace articles which the words "personal effects" do not cover. So, too, if the words "other personal effects," in clause 3, should be extended to embrace articles properly covered by the words "household effects" in clause 1, such household effects would come in free, although not used abroad for a year, and the door would be opened wide for the introduction, without duty, of large numbers of articles, as "household effects," which it is intended should pay duty. We do not find it necessary, in this case, to consider any further the construction of the words "other personal effects," in clause 3, because

Opinion of the Court.

we place our decision on the ground that this carriage was "household effects" of the plaintiff.

The protest claimed that the carriage was "personal effects" in actual use, under § 2505, and, as such, free and not subject to the duty imposed on it, but did not claim it to be "household effects." The solicitor-general concedes that the objection to the protest is a "bare technicality," and that its language could hardly mislead the officers. A proper protest, as well as an appeal, are prerequisites to the right to sue. § 3011 Rev. Stat., as amended by the act of February 27, 1877, ch. 69, 19 Stat. 247. The protest must set forth "distinctly and specifically" the grounds of objection to the decision of the collector as to the rate and amount of duties. § 2931 Rev. Stat. This provision was taken from the act of June 30, 1864, ch. 171, § 14, 13 Stat. 214, and is substantially the same as that in the act of February 26, 1845, ch. 22, 5 Id. 727. A protest is not required to be made with technical precision, but is sufficient if it shows fairly that the objection. afterwards made at the trial was in the mind of the party and was brought to the knowledge of the collector, so as to secure to the government the practical advantage which the statute was designed to secure. Converse v. Burgess, 18 How. 413; Swanston v. Morton, 1 Curtis, 294; Kriesler v. Morton, Id. 413; Burgess v. Converse, 2 Id. 216; Steegman v. Maxwell, 3 Blatchford, 365; Frazee v. Moffitt, 20 Id. 267. This protest apprised the collector that the carriage was claimed to be free, under § 2505, as a carriage actually used abroad over a year. The "household effects" clause was in the mind of the party and the collector could not fail to so understand. The protest was sufficient.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Statement of Facts.

ENGLAND v. GEBHARDT.

IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY.

Submitted November 20, 1884.-Decided December 8, 1881.

No question of fact can be re-examined in this court on a writ of error, unless the evidence is brought into the record by a bill of exceptions, or some method known to the practice of courts of error for that purpose is adopted, such as, for instance, an agreed statement of facts, or a special finding in the nature of a special verdict.

Papers on file in the court below are not part of the record in the case when brought here by writ of error, unless they are put into the record by some action of the court below, as by bill of exceptions or some equivalent act. The opinion of the court below, when transmitted with the record in accordance with Rule 8, § 2, is no part of the record.

This was a writ of error brought under the act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472, to reverse an order of the Circuit Court remanding a suit at law to the State court from which it had been removed. The suit was begun by Jacob W. Gebhardt, the defendant in error, against Isaac W. England, the plaintiff in error, in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, and a summons was duly served on England. The pleadings were made up and issue joined in the State court. When that was done there was nothing in the record to show the citizenshipof the parties; but, on the 6th of September, 1883, which was in time, England filed a petition, accompanied by the neces 'sary bond for the removal of the suit to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey. The petition set forth that England was a citizen of New Jersey and Gebhardt a citizen of New York, both at the time of the commencement of the suit, and at the time of the presentation of the petition. The removal was of the citizenship of the parties. petition, the State court entered would proceed no further, and a copy of the record was filed in the Circuit Court on the 25th of September.

asked for solely on the ground Upon the presentation of the an order to the effect that it

On the 14th of March, 1884, the following order was made in the cause:

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

"This cause coming on to be heard on a motion to remand this cause, to the New Jersey Supreme Court, in the presence of Joseph A. Beecher, attorney for the plaintiff, and of A. Q. Keasbey, attorney for the defendant, and the matter having been argued by the respective attorneys, and the court having taken time to consider the same, and the court being of opinion that there is not in said cause so attempted to be removed to this court a controversy between citizens of dif ferent States, according to the true intent and meaning of the act of Congress in this behalf, it is now, on motion of Joseph A. Beecher, ordered that the said motion be, and the same is hereby, granted, and this cause is remanded to the New Jersey Supreme Court to proceed therewith according to law, and it is further ordered that the said plaintiff do recover of the said defendant, Isaac W. England, the costs of this motion to be taxed."

The motion on which this order was made was not set out in the record. There were, however, in the transcript what purported to be certain affidavits sworn to in the months. of November and December, 1883, and filed February 25, 1884, which had indorsed thereon, "Affidavits, on motion to remand," and there was also what purported to be the opinion of the judge denying the motion, from which it appeared that "the motion to remand this cause was founded upon the allegation that both the plaintiff and defendant were citizens of the State of New Jersey when the summons was issued and served and the petition for removal was filed. It was resisted by the defendant upon the ground that at both of these periods of time the plaintiff was residing in, and was a citizen of New York." There was no bill of exceptions in the record, and no authentic finding or statement of the facts on which the order to remand was made, or of the evidence submitted by the parties. Neither did the order to remand itself refer in any manner to the affidavits as the foundation of the action which was taken.

Mr. A. Q. Keasbey for plaintiff in error.-Before the act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470, an order remanding a cause to a State