skirmishers, who fired upon the Canadian marksmen sent out to observe their movements. Accoutrements, weapons, baggage, and even wounded men, were found next day along the route which had been followed. Next morning General Abercrombie conducted his battalions across the lake to Fort George, within and around which the defeated army intrenched itself.

This important victory was gained by Montcalm with the sacrifice of less than five hundred men.*

The French General and officers were overjoyed at the successful issue of the conflict, and some time elapsed before they could be convinced that all was over. Montcalm had himself anticipated being expelled from his position by means of artillery brought to bear upon it in support of a flank movement, and had made some dispositions for evacuating it, as soon as he should find it untenable. On the day following, when he became assured that Abercrombie had actually retired, he expressed his regret that he had not been provided with a couple of hundred Indians to pursue the retreating army, and to serve as a vanguard to a column of one thousand chosen troops, whom he would have dispatched under M. de Levis. Remarking upon the real weakness of his position, but which had escaped the notice of his opponent, he said, "Had it devolved on me to besiege Carillon, I should have asked but for six mortars and two pieces of artillery.”

259. A review of the two preceding articles will serve to show that the two principal events of the campaign of

* A French report of the battle of Carillon, quoted by Garneau and others, makes Montcalm's loss in killed and wounded 375 men and officers. Garneau also says, that although the English admitted their loss to be under 2000, still contemporary French accounts made it amount to between 4000 and 5000. Montcalm himself, in his letter of 12th July 1758, estimated his own loss at 375, and that of the English at nearly 5000.

1758-the capture of Louisbourg and the battle of Carillon -transpired comparatively early in the season, leaving more than three months suitable for military undertakings. Colonel Bradstreet's movement upon Frontenac was ended before the close of August. It may be asked, therefore, why so long a time was suffered to pass without a renewal of warlike operations of any moment, since the campaign in progress under Forbes and M. de Ligney occupied only a small portion of the armed force of either side?

The answer is, it was now the policy of the French to act strictly on the defensive. That course was enjoined upon the authorities of the colony by the ruling powers in France, while it was also necessary on account of the comparative smallness of the number of men whom the colony could equip and maintain in the field. Moreover, the bloody repulse at Carillon had paralysed the very moderate energies and abilities of General Abercrombie. He merely intrenched himself at Fort George, while at the various French posts the troops and militia were holding themselves ready to repel attack. Abercrombie sent dispatches to hasten the arrival of General Amherst from Louisbourg; and by the time this officer joined, and could become acquainted with the precise position of affairs, it was too late in the season to resume the march northward.

The mere loss of men in the recent conflict was of small importance, because the resources of the English enabled them to repair it without difficulty.

260. In November 1758, the troops were withdrawn to their respective winter quarters. During the five following months the leaders had ample leisure to discuss the details. of operations proposed for the next season's campaign, which, both in Canada and the English colonies, it was generally believed would bring to an end the contest for

supremacy in America. On the French side disquietude and anxiety prevailed, occasioned, not merely by a knowledge of the superior numbers and resources of the enemy, but, in a great degree, by the deplorable state of internal affairs and official turpitude and mismanagement in the colony, of which mention has already been made in former pages. This subject, highly important in its connection with the downfall of the French régime in Canada, will be more fully noticed in the ensuing chapter.

CHAPTER XXVII.

STATE AND PROSPECTS OF THE COLONY MORE CRITICAL AT THE CLOSE OF 1758 THAN EVER BEFORE-CAUSES ENUMERATED-VIRTUAL ABANDONMENT OF THE COLONY BY THE MOTHER COUNTRY-ABSENCE OF HARMONY AMONG PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS AND BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE-MISMANAGEMENT BY BIGOT AND HIS ACCOMPLICES-BAD HARVESTS, EXCESSIVE PRICES AND FAMINE-SENTIMENTS OF MONTCALM AND HIS OFFICERSCENSUS AND EFFECTIVE FORCE OF THE COLONY-GENERAL PLAN OF DEFENCE.

261. In the course of this history it has been several times recorded that the colony was reduced to the very brink of ruin. Yet on each of those occasions, as we have seen, it was enabled to survive the impending crisis, either through some unforeseen occurrence beyond human control, or through the heroic counsels and actions of leaders refusing to despair of their cause while life remained and a handful of resolute men to maintain a footing on Cape Diamond.*

* Amongst the occasions referred to the following may be named :—The threatened extinction of the colony by the Iroquois in 1660, when the heroism of Dollard and his followers caused those savages to abandon their design, then on the eve of accomplishment; the disastrous position of

But since 1745, and especially in the campaigns of 1755 and subsequent years, the character of colonial warfare had been greatly modified by the introduction of considerable bodies of regular troops. Their employment, if not always successful against the operations of the native militia and savages, yet tended to afford military leaders the grounds of judging more correctly respecting the probable issue of enterprises undertaken on either side. Superior numbers and resources, together with the well-known determination of the English Government and colonists to employ these vigorously in securing the conquest of the French colony, made the case of Canada now, at the close of 1758, more truly critical than it had ever been before. This was clearly perceived by General Montcalm and his principal officers, as well as by the leading functionaries engaged in administering the civil affairs of the colony. Making every allowance for the effect of the battle of Carillon, as proving that the gallant French troops might offer a protracted resistance, yet the substantial results of the campaign of 1758 were in favour of the English. They had established their supremacy in the valley of the Ohio, and had succeeded in destroying Fort Frontenac, in consequence of which suc

affairs in 1688 and 1689, when the Lachine massacre occurred, and when Frontenac, succeeding De Denonville, resumed the governorship, and became the saviour of the country; the formidable attack upon Quebec in 1690 by the English fleet under Phipps, when that city was defended and the colony was saved by Frontenac; the naval and military expeditions against the colony in 1710 and 1711, when, in the first instance, an unexpected change in the destination of the English fleet and subsequently fearful storms and shipwrecks in the St Lawrence, as well as pestilence and divided counsels in the invading armies, saved Canada without bloodshed to her defenders. The Treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, intervened to deliver Canada from the state of alarm about her safety to which she had been continually subject, and the peace which followed, and lasted for a generation up to 1745, allowed the colonists the repose necessary for their increase in numbers and resources.

cesses a great many of the Indian tribes were induced to desert the French cause. Louisbourg had been captured, and by means of the possession of this stronghold and that of Halifax, now a considerable naval station, the English were able to turn to account their maritime superiority in such a way as to control the approaches to the St Lawrence from the Atlantic, and to render communication between Canada and France both difficult and hazardous.

262. In order to comprehend clearly the position of Canada at this time, and the course of events which led soon afterwards to the overthrow of the French régime, it is necessary to advert to other particulars, in addition to those mentioned in the preceding article.

During the autumn and winter of 1758 the English Government, in concert with the colonial authorities, formed plans on a large scale for completing the reduction of Canada. A strong military force was to resume offensive operations against the French positions on Lake Champlain and the River Richelieu, and thence to march upon Montreal. At the same time a powerful fleet and army were to move up the St Lawrence against Quebec. A third expedition was to be directed against Fort Niagara, with the view of destroying the French power in the lake regions, and of breaking up the communications between these and the French headquarters in the east. Moreover, strong detachments were to resume the principal positions south of Lake Ontario, and to capture the line of military posts extending from Lake Erie towards the Ohio.

But while such plans were being matured by the English, the Government of France, more interested in the concerns of European warfare than in the fate of its American colony, sent out from time to time the most discouraging intimations to the Governor and other officials. These were