are circumstances which leave a general no choice, but that of dying with honour such may soon be my fate; and I trust that in this respect posterity will have no cause to reproach my memory." : Then follow some remarkable predictions relative to the future of the then English colonies and Canada :-" So all these English colonists would long ago have shaken off the yoke, and each become an independent republic if the fear of seeing the French at their doors had not hindered; but when Canada comes to be conquered, and when the Canadians and these colonists form one people, do you imagine that they will remain any longer in subjection from the moment England appears to touch their interest? I am sure of what I write, and would allow no more than ten years for its accomplishment after Canada falls. See then, how, as a Frenchman, I console myself to-day, for the danger my own country now incurs, in seeing this colony lost to her." CHAPTER XXXI. PROJECTS OF DE LEVIS-WINTER OF 1759-60-SUFFERINGS OF THE GARRISON AT QUEBEC FROM DEARTH OF FUEL AND COLDGENERAL MURRAY'S POLICY TOWARDS THE INHABITANTS-PRECAUTIONS AGAINST SURPRISE-HOSTILITIES DURING THE WINTER -SICKNESS AND MORTALITY IN THE GARRISON-DE LEVIS ADVANCES AGAINST THE ENGLISH-THE INHABITANTS OF THE CITY ORDERED TO DEPART-MURRAY RECALLS HIS OUTPOSTS, AND MARCHES TO STE FOYE-BATTLE OF STE FOYE, AND DEFEAT OF MURRAY-SIEGE OF QUEBEC-ARRIVAL OF THE ENGLISH FLEETRETREAT OF DE LEVIS-PLANS OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 306. ALTHOUGH it was thought in Europe and the AngloAmerican colonies that the events of 1759 had A.D. 1759-60. substantially disabled the defenders of Canada, and that there would be no more fighting and bloodshed, yet the Chevalier De Levis resolved to prolong the contest. Governor De Vaudreuil, while he may not have participated in all the views and sanguine anticipations of the Chevalier, had much confidence in his military abilities, and supported his representations that the cause of France in America was not desperate. De Levis argued that Quebec might be retaken before the English could receive reinforcements; that, in the absence of the English fleet, the naval force at his disposal was adequate to secure the control of the St Lawrence; that he had land forces sufficient to garrison the capital, and to repel the enemy elsewhere on the frontiers, or at least to keep them at bay until a peace declared by the European powers should intervene to save the remnant of New France; and that, finally, a fleet from France, bearing succours, might arrive at Quebec earlier than the English in the spring of 1760.‡ On retiring with the defeated army, after the capitulation, De Levis left garrisons at various points, with a view to the subsequent concentration of the whole in an expedition against the capital. The stations nearest to Quebec were Pointe-aux-Trembles and the mouth of the river Jacques Cartier, with outposts in the direction of St Augustin and Cap-Rouge. The commandants at these places were instructed to cause the proceedings of the English to be * The French had in the river about a dozen small armed craft, and four frigates of from twenty-six to forty-six guns. The English naval force, left behind by the fleet, consisted of two sloops, Racehorse and Porcupine, and three small schooners-weakened afterwards, on November 24, by an accident in which Captain Miller of the Racehorse, with his lieutenant and a number of his crew, were killed. The land forces of De Levis, including regulars, colony troops, and such of the Canadian militia as could be assembled in arms at short notice, amounted to between 11,000 and 12,000; but this number would have been largely augmented by the inhabitants on perceiving, by the results of the first operations of De Levis, any fair prospect of ultimate success. De Levis placed some dependence on supplies of artillery, ammunition, &c., brought out by a French ship in the fall, and which had taken refuge in Gaspé Bay for the winter. This was known to De Vaudreuil and De Levis. observed, and to lose no opportunity of harassing them during the ensuing winter. Garrisons were also maintained at Three Rivers, Sorel, Chambly, and St John's; and there was one at Isle-aux-Noix, which formed the most remote post on the Champlain frontier, and where a new stone fort, within the old intrenchments, had been built, capable of accommodating more than 500 men. In the direction of Lake Ontario there were two French outposts—one on Isle Royale, called Fort Levis, and the other at La Galette, on the right bank of the St Lawrence, not far from the site of the modern town Ogdensburg. At La Galette, the French had established a small naval station, after the loss of Fort Frontenac, but the armament consisted of only two or three small ships employed in navigating Lake Ontario and the upper part of the St Lawrence. The French headquarters were established at Montreal, which was then surrounded by a low stone wall, the troops being lodged in barracks and citizens' dwellings, and on St Helen's Island, where there were fortified intrenchments.* These few posts were all that De Levis judged to be necessary for preserving communications within the now limited area over which the territorial jurisdiction of the French extended. On the other hand, the British at Quebec were considered to be completely isolated, as the nearest posts of their countrymen were so distant, and the intervening obstacles of such an impracticable character in winter, that * The troops quartered in the garrisons which have been mentioned in the text consisted chiefly of regulars. Others were quartered for the winter in the houses of inhabitants in the country parishes nearest to the garrisons, and these, as well as the men belonging to the militia who were allowed to retire to their homes, were required to be ready to assemble in arms at short notice. Each inhabitant was expected to find subsistence for one soldier, for which service payment was promised at a low rate. |