60. In the course of that opinion he says: To make one criminal act evidence of another, a connection must have existed between them in the mind of the actor, linking them together for some purpose he intended to accomplish; or it must be necessary to identify the person of the actor, by a connection which shows that he who committed the one must have done the other.' The case was one which did not render such evidence material in ascertaining the intent of the party accused. "Hence it is to be observed that he treats the question as if the attempt was made by the nisi court to make one criminal act evidence of another.' In such case, there can be no question but there should be such a connection between the two acts or offenses as to link them together in the mind of the actors, so as to make one follow the other as a means to an end. This was the state of The limitation of the case in State v. Greemwade, 72 Mo. 298. the rule as applied by Agnew, J., supra, was proper, because there was no question, essentially, of guilty knowledge or intent, for as it said in the statement of the case: The evidence tended to show that she died of poison, and the principal question was whether the poison had been administered by the defendant.' "In the case at bar the very gist of the offense charged is the criminal intent with which the act was done, and the burden of proof rests upon the state. Anable v. Com. 24 Gratt. 563. It must be shown affirmatively that the defendant's purpose was to defraud. Such intent is not a presumption of law, but is a fact to be found by the jury. Trogdon v. Com. 31 Gratt. 862. It has been held by the highest authority in this class of cases, that even the admission of the accused that the act was done with the criminal intent cannot preclude the state from proving it by any other competent testimony, for the jury are the sole judges of the evidence. Com. v. McCarthy, 119 Mass. 354; Priest v. Groton, 103 Mass. 530. Under the facts of this case it was for the jury to say whether the act of the prisoner was a criminal act, done with a fraudulent intent to obtain the money of the clerk, or whether it was a mistake of effort merely to practice upon him a joke. The jury, without violence to reason, under an instruction to give the prisoner the benefit of every reasonable doubt, have convicted him. The prosecuting attorney, as suggested by Staples, J., supra, and by Roscoe in his Criminal Evidence, p. 91, had the right to anticipate an obvious defense of the prisoner that it was a mistake or without criminal intent, and put in, in the first instance, all his evidence bearing on the issue. The evidence further showed that the prisoner started out on that day with the perpetration of the several acts linked together in his mind. His purpose was, to employ his own vulgar but suggestive terms, 'to do the town.' He did 'beat' the unwary out of $10 by the same attempted 'trick."" State v. Myers, 82 Mo. 562. CHAPTER XXXVIII. CORPUS DELICTI 293. The Term Defined. 294. Full Proof of not Required. 295. What must be Shown. 296. Cannot be Proved by Uncorroborated Confessions. 298. Recent Legislation on this Subject. 299. Intent of the Rule Requiring Proof of. 293. The Term Defined.-The corpus delicti comprehends the essential elements of an offense-the fact that the particular crime alleged has been actually committed. The corpus delicti must be proved like any other fact, that is, beyond a reasonable doubt, and that doubt is for the jury. A confession alone is not regarded as sufficient proof. The state must first produce sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury and the jury are first to be satisfied, from that evidence, that the crime has been committed. The doctrine applies to other crimes, as, larceny. The possession of the fruits of a crime may do away with direct proof of the corpus delicti. See Anderson, Law Dict. title Corpus Delicti, citing, inter alia, Gray v. Com. 101 Pa. 386, 47 Am. Rep. 733; Miltenberger v. Logansport, C. & S. W. R. Co. 106 U. S. 311, 27 L. ed. 125; Udderzook v. Com. 76 Pa. 340; Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 480, 482; United States v. Williams, 1 Cliff. 25; Johnson v. Com. 85 Ky. 377, 4 Crim. L. Mag. 902, 912. It is a general rule not to convict unless the corpus delicti can be established, that is, until the fact that the crime has been actually perpetrated has been first proved. Hence, on a charge of homicide the accused should not be convicted unless the death be first distinctly proved, either by direct evidence of the fact or by inspection of the body. Best, Presumptions, 201; 1 Stark. Ev. 575. See Rex v. Yend, 6 Car. & P. 176; 2 Hale, P. C. 290. Instances have occurred of a person being convicted of having killed another, who, after the supposed criminal has been put to death for the supposed offense, has made his appearance alive. The wis 1 dom of the rule is apparent; but it has been questioned whether, in extreme cases it may not be competent to prove the basis of the corpus delicti, by presumptive evidence. 3 Bentham, Judicial Ev. 234; Wills, Circ. Ev. 105; Best, Presumptions, 204. See 1 Bouvier, Law Dict. title Corpus Delicti. The corpus delicti consists. not merely of an objective crime, but of the defendant's agency of the crime; and it is well settled that, unless the corpus delicti in both these respects is proved, a confession even is not by itself enough to sustain a conviction. It must be corroborated. This can seldom be done by direct or positive testimony, but it may as well be shown by circumstantial evidence. Willard v. State, 27 Tex. App. 386. 294. Full Proof of not Required.-"Full proof," said Nelson, Ch. J., in People v. Badgley, 16 Wend. 59, "of the body of the crime, the corpus delicti, independently of the confession, is not required by any of the cases, and in many of them slight corroborating facts were held sufficient." Nor is it necessary that the corpus delicti should be proved by direct and positive evidence; it would be most unreasonable to require such evidence. Crimes, and especially those of the worst kinds, are naturally committed at chosen times, and in darkness and secrecy; and human tribunals must act upon such indications as the circumstances of the case present or admit, or society must be broken up. Nor is it very often that adequate evidence is not afforded by the attendant and surrounding facts, to remove all mystery, and to afford such a reasonable degree of certainty as men are daily accustomed to regard as sufficient in the most important concerns of life; to expect more would be equally needless and absurd. While direct evidence of the corpus delicti is always desirable, it should not be held indispensable. To so hold would, in many cases, give immunity to crime, especially in the class of cases to which this belongs. There is some conflict of authority; but we regard this as a better doctrine. If, however, circumstantial evidence is relied upon for this purpose, it should be such as to exclude all reasonable doubt. 1 Bishop, Crim. Proc. § 1071; Rob erts v. People, 11 Colo. 213. § 295. What must be Shown.-Every allegation of the commission of legal crime involves the establishment of two distinct propositions; namely, that an act has been committed from which legal responsibility arises, and that the guilt of such act attaches to a particular individual, though the evidence is not always separable into distinct parts, or applicable to each of those propositions. Such a complication of difficulties occasionally attends the proof of crime, and so many cases have occurred of convictions for alleged offenses which have never existed, that it is a fundamental and inflexible rule of legal procedure, of universal obligation, that no person shall be required to answer, or be involved in the consequences of guilt without satisfactory proof of the corpus delicti, either by direct evidence, or by cogent and irresistible grounds of presumption. Rex v. Burdett, 4 Barn. & Ald. 123. If it be objected that rigorous proof of the corpus delicti is sometimes unattainable, and that the effect of exacting it must be that crime will occasionally pass unpunished, it must be admitted that such may possibly be the result; but it is answered that, where there is no proof, or, which is the same thing, no sufficient legal proof of crime, there can be no legal criminality. In penal jurisdiction there can be no middle term; that the party must be absolutely and unconditionally guilty or not guilty. Burrill, in his work on Circumstantial Evidence, page 682, lays down the correct rule. He says: "A dead body or its remains having been discovered and identified as that of the person charged to have been slain, and the basis of the corpus delicti being thus fully established, the next step in the process, and the one which seems to complete the proof of that indispensable preliminary fact, is to show that the death has been occasioned by the criminal act or agency of another person. This may always be done by means of circumstantial evidence, including that of the presumptive kind; and, for this purpose, a much wider range of inquiry is allowed than in regard to the fundamental fact of death; and all the circumstances of the case, including facts of conduct on the part of the accused, may be taken into consideration." § 296. Cannot be Proved by Uncorroborated Confessions.There is abundant authority and little dissent to the proposition that extra-judicial confessions alone, uncorroborated by other evidence, are inadequate to establish corpus delicti. Brown v. State, 32 Miss. 433; People v. Badgley, 16 Wend. 53; State v. Scott, 39 Mo. 424; Jenkins v. State, 41 Miss. 582; People v. Jones, 31 Cal. 565; Stringfellow v. State, 26 Miss. 157, 59 Am. Dec. 247; |