Though the defendant may have confessed the crime, he may show that the offense with which he is charged was not in fact committed, or that he was not the guilty agent. These are the immediate issues to be tried, and any evidence is pertinent which properly tends to prove or disprove them, and to elucidate the main inquiry. Any investigation of the truth or falsity of such admissions and declarations would raise collateral inquiries, multiply the issues, and by diverting the minds of the jury from the main inquiry, confuse their deliberations. Lang v. State, 34 Ala. 1.

315. Confessions under Intoxication. - Intoxication of the accused at the time when he may have made a confession would have affected the weight of the confession as evidence against himself, but would not go to exclude the confession from being put in evidence. Com. v. Howe, 9 Gray, 110. That degree of intoxication which leaves one capable of making a narration of past events, or stating his own participation in a crime, is not sufficient to exclude the inculpatory statement from the consideration of the jury. State v. Grear, 28 Minn. 426, 41 Am. Rep. 296; Joy, Confessions, 42; Rex v. Derrington, 2 Car. & P. 418; Rex v. Thomas, 7 Car. & P. 345; King v. State, 40 Ala. 314; Gates v. People, 14 Ill. 433; People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277; State v. Staley, 14 Minn. 105; State v. Jones, 54 Mo. 478; State v. Phelps, 74 Mo. 128; State v. Fredericks, 85 Mo. 145; State v. Rush, 95 Mo. 199; State v. Mitchell, 61 N. C. 447; Heldt v. State, 20 Neb. 492, 57 Am. Rep. 835; Com. v. Hanlon, 3 Brewst. 461.

The infirmities that attend a confession made by one under the influence of liquor equally apply to those made by one in sleep. In both instances, the absence of knowledge as to the scope, nature and effect of the statement made, is a ground for exclusion. See People v. Robinson, 19 Cal. 40.

Where, however, the confession is obtained as the result of an artful intrigue, or disingenuous practices and even gross falsehood, the confession is none the less admissible, if it sufficiently appears that, while induced by these reprehensible methods, it was still voluntarily elicited, and did not originate in threats or promises operating upon the mind of the accused. King v. State, Gates v. People, State v. Phelps, State v. Mitchell, People v. Barker, State v. Jones, State v. Rush, State v. Fredericks, Com. v. Hanlon, State v. Staley and Heldt v. State, supra.

§ 316. Confession Obtained by Improper Influence.Although an original confession may have been obtained by improper means, subsequent confessions of the same, or of like facts, may be admitted, if the court believe, from the length of time. intervening, from proper warning, or from other circumstances, that the delusive hopes or fears, under the influence of which the original confession was obtained, were entirely dispelled. A prisoner may be convicted on his own confession, when proved by legal testimony, although it is uncorroborated by any other evidence, provided the corpus delicti be proved. Corroborating circumstances, used in reference to a confession, are such as serve to strengthen it, to render it more probable, such in short, as may serve to impress a jury with a belief of its truth. State v. Guild, 10 N. J. L. 192, 18 Am. Dec. 404.

The rule may be expressed as follows: When one confession is denied admission because improperly obtained, a subsequent confession is equally incompetent as evidence, unless it should satisfactorily appear that such an interval of time had elapsed between the two confessions as to warrant the presumption, that the infirmities connected with the first confession had been effectually removed. In other words, if the inducements that prompted the first confession have disappeared, and there is reason to believe that they in no wise prompted the subsequent confession, it should be regarded as relevant testimony. Porter v. State, 55 Ala. 95; Beery v. United States, 2 Colo. 186; Bonner v. State, 55 Ala. 242; People v. Johnson, 41 Cal. 452; McAdory v. State, 62 Ala. 154; Love v. State, 22 Ark. 336; Owen v. State, 78 Ala. 425; Simon v. State, 5 Fla. 285; State v. Guild, 10 N. J. L. 192, 18 Am. Dec. 404; State v. Chambers, 39 Iowa, 179; People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277; People v. Robertson, 1 Wheel. Crim. Cas. 66; Brister v. State, 26 Ala. 129; Com. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 496, 20 Am. Dec. 491; State v. Jones, 54 Mo. 478; People v. Jim Ti, 32 Cal. 60; Com. v. Taylor, 5 Cush. 605; State v. Soper, 16 Me. 293; Com. v. Cullen, 111 Mass. 435; State v. Lowhorne, 66 N. C. 638; State v. Frazier, 6 Baxt. 539; State v. Wintzingerode, 9 Or. 153; Beggarly v. State, 8 Baxt. 520.

§ 317. New York Rule Relative to.-"A confession of a defendant, whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can be given in evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear produced by threats, or unless made

upon a stipulation of the district attorney, that he shall be prosecuted therefor." N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 395.

All a party has said, which is relevant to the question involved in the trial, is admissible in evidence against him. The exceptions to this rule are where the confession has been drawn from the prisoner by means of a threat or a promise, or where it is not voluntary, because obtained compulsorily or by improper influence. Hendrickson v. People, 10 N. Y. 21, 61 Am. Dec. 721.

No rule of evidence has probably been more sharply criticized upon ethical grounds than this, not so much as to the admissibility of confessions against persons accused of crime, but rather as regards the methods permitted for obtaining the information.

It must be admitted that in the use of this rule the moralist would find many instances where the end seems made to justify the means.

"Improper influence" was never eagerly sought under the old rule, and has no place among the limitations of the code. Accordingly it happens that officers of the law, skilled in eliciting information, and zealous (the critics say) to secure conviction in any event, are permitted to use every form of art and artifice short of the prohibition of the statute. Thus an officer may purposely ply the suspected person with liquor. Jefferds v. People, 5 Park. Crim. Rep. 522. He may resort to all manner of deception (Jefferds v. People, supra; People v. Wentz, 37 N. Y. 303) even to the length adopted in the recent Brooks murder trial at St. Louis, where the detective obtained indictment and imprisonment of himself for a feigned crime, in order to become a fellowprisoner of the accused, for the purpose of winning his confidence. State v. Brooks, 92 Mo. 542; Morrill, Competency & Privilege of Witnesses, chap. 8, p. 95.

All confessions material to the issue, voluntarily made by a party, whether oral or written, and however authenticated, are admissible as evidence against him on a trial for a criminal offense. People v. Wentz, supra.

§ 318. Demeanor of the Accused when under ArrestEffect of Silence.-The fact that a person charged with a crime is under arrest, does not render what he says or does inadmissible. People v. Wentz, 37 N. Y. 303; People v. Montgomery, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 209; People v. Long, 43 Cal. 444; Com. v. Cuffee, 108 Mass. 285; Com. v. Crocker, 108 Mass. 464. What a third person says in the presence of a person charged, is admissible against

him if he remains silent. His silence must be taken as an acquiescence in its truth. McKee v. People, 36 N. Y. 116; Hochrieter v. People, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 363; Cases in N. Y. Ct. Apps., Ct. Apps. Lib. vol. 144, case 1, pp. 10, 11; Donelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 464, 601; Rex v. Bartlett, 7 Car. & P. 832; Com. v. Kenney, 12 Met. 235, 46 Am. Dec. 672; Spencer v. State, 20 Ala. 24; Rex v. Smithies, 5 Car. & P. 332; People v. McCrea, 32 Cal. 98; Lewis v. Blair, 3 Irvine, 16; Fenno v. Weston, 31 Vt. 345; Mattocks v. Lyman, 16 Vt. 113; Liles v. State, 30 Ala. 24, 68 Am. Dec. 108; Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. 624; Martin v. State, 28 Ala. 81; Fralich v. People, 65 Barb. 48; Jewett v. Banning, 21 N. Y. 27; Phil. & Am. Ev. § 696; Joy, Confessions, 77; Best, Presumptions, § 241; Burrill, Circ. Ev. 482, 483; McDonald, Crim. L. of Scotland, 543; 2 Russell, Crimes, 866; 1 Phil. Ev. 400; 1 Taylor, Ev. (6th ed.) § 739. Statements made by the accused as a witness in exculpation of another charged with the same offense, may be proved. MacDonald, Crim. L. of Scotland, 543; Edmondston's Case, 1 Scotch L. R. 107; 2 Russell, Crimes, 865, 866. When there is a question of identity it is proper to show that a witness, unacquainted with a party, identified him shortly after the occurrence. Reg. v. Blackburn, 6 Cox, C. C. 333; Rex v. Deering, 5 Car. & P. 165. The voluntary declarations and admissions of one on trial for a criminal offense, that is, those not made under duress, or induced by menaces or promises, are always evidence against the party making them, and are more or less cogent as evidence of guilt, depending upon the circumstances under which they are made. The same principle gives great effect to the action of the accused as evidence tending to prove or disprove his guilt. Teachout v. People, 41 N. Y. 7; People v. Wentz, 37 N. Y. 303; Com. v. Cuffee, 108 Mass. 285; Com. v. Crocker, 108 Mass. 464. When the conduct of the accused, either before or after being charged with the offense, is given in evidence, it is for the jury to draw the proper inferences and determine whether it is consistent with innocence, or is indicative of a guilty mind, proving more or less conclusively the commissions by him of the particular offense charged. Roscoe, Crim. Ev. 18; People v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. 509.

Where an individual is charged with an offense, or declarations are made in his presence and hearing, touching or affecting his guilt or innocence of an alleged crime, and he remains silent when

it would be proper for him to speak, it is the province of a jury to interpret such silence, and determine whether his silence was, under the circumstances, excused or explained. At most, silence under such circumstances is but an implied acquiescence in the truth of the statements made by others. Still, it is a familiar elementary principle, that silence, when the accused is under no restraint and at full liberty to speak, may sometimes be regarded as a tacit admission. At all events all such matters are proper for the consideration of the jury. Pierce v. Goldsberry, 35 Ind. 317; Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 104.

The case of Com. v. Kenney, 12 Met. 235, 46 Am. Dec. 672, does not conflict with the general principle, but suggests important limitations in its application and in the extent of its operation. If the statement is not heard by the accused, or if being heard, he deny it, or if circumstances existed at the moment which prevented a reply or rendered a reply inexpedient or improper, the evidence certainly is of no value. Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 464.

A confession may be inferred from the conduct and demeanor of a prisoner when a statement is made in his presence affecting himself, unless such statement is made under circumstances which prevented a reply. Rex v. Bartlett, 7 Car. & P. 832; Joy, Confessions, 77; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 215; 1 Phil. & Am. Ev. 422.

In the most recent treatise on criminal law, the rule is thus stated: "Where a man, at full liberty to speak, and not in the course of a judicial inquiry, is charged with a crime, and remains silent, that is, makes no denial of the accusation by word or gesture, his silence is a circumstance which may be left to the jury." Whart. Am. Crim. L. § 696.

In civil actions the same principle prevails. What is asserted in the presence of a party to a suit, and not contradicted by him, is received on the ground that his silence is an admission of the truth of what was said. Batturs v. Sellers, 5 Harr. & J. 119; 2 Phil. Ev. (Cowen & Hill's Notes) 192, note, 191.

The degree of credit due to such tacit admissions is to be estimated by the jury under the circumstances of each case. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 215.

It is admitted that such evidence should always be received with great caution. In some cases it may be equivocal and of the lightest possible value, in others it may be entitled to much weight.