peatedly deceived and made false statements to the plaintiff to obtain it. It is doubtful if anything is really gained in the administration of the law from the admission of such testimony, and the consequent encouragement of the courts of the practice. If it is answered that confessions are thus obtained which otherwise could not be had, it may be said, in reply, that the same is true of the rack and wheel, by means of which confessions were formerly forced from its victims, but which experience showed were entirely unreliable. So far as appears, the plaintiff confided in this man as a friend, and was betrayed by this professed benefactor. The testimony of such a man may be entitled to very little credence, yet it must be submitted to the jury. Held v. State, 20 Neb. 492, 57 Am. Rep. 835, 9 Crim. L. Mag. 248. In April, 1885, at the Southern Hotel in the city of St. Louis, Charles Arthur Preller was murdered under circumstances of exceptional atrocity. The body was dissected, packed in a trunk, and left in the room occupied by the deceased. The murderer was apprehended in New Zealand and subsequently brought to trial. With the connivance with the state's attorney, a detective under the alias of Dingfelder secured an indictment against himself from the grand jury and procured his incarceration in the same cell with Brooks, for a period of forty-seven days, the alleged murderer of Preller. While so confined, by infamous deception, he secured from Brooks what purported to be a confession; and at the subsequent trial under objection from the defense he was allowed to give evidence of this confession. Chief Justice Norton on review of the case in the appellate court makes use of the following language in regard to this testimony: "While the officers whose duty it was to prosecute criminal offenses, may, in their anxiety to ferret out the circumstances concerning the death of Preller, have overstepped the bounds of propriety in the course pursued by them, which is not to be commended, but condemned, it affords no legal reason for rejecting the evidence and not letting it go to the jury, whose peculiar province it was to pass upon the credibility of the witness who detailed the confession and give to it such weight as, under the circumstances, they believed it entitled to. It was for the court to say what evidence should be received and for the jury to say what weight it should have when received. "In Missouri the following authorities establish the proposition that an extra-judicial confession, uncorroborated and without proof aliunde that the crime has been committed, will not justify a conviction. Robinson v. State, 12 Mo. 592; State v. Scott, 39 Mo. 424; State v. German, 54 Mo. 526, 14 Am. Rep. 481; State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 695;" State v. Brooks, 10 West. Rep. 679, 92 Mo. 542. Many authorities of high repute hold that the confessions of a prisoner even when obtained by artifice, cunning, falsehood, and deception are admissible in evidence, especially where the purported confession is corroborated by other circumstances in evidence. The corollary of this proposition is, that the discredit of an accomplice does not attach to a detective who identifies himself with a criminal organization with a view to exposing it, and this even where it appears that he assisted in and apparently approved many of its councils and methods. Heldt v. State, 20 Neb. 492, 57 Am. Rep. 835; State v. Patterson, 73 Mo. 695; Campbell v. Com. 84 Pa. 187; State v. Hopkirk, 84 Mo. 278; Rex v. Despard, 28 How. St. Tr. 346; State v. Phelps, 74 Mo. 128; State v. McKean, 36 Iowa, 343, 14 Am. Rep. 530; State v. Fredericks, 85 Mo. 145; People v. Bolanger, 71 Cal. 21; Wharton, Crim. Ev. 440. The act of a detective may, perhaps, be not imputable to the defendant, as there is a want of community of motive. The one has a criminal intent, while the other is seeking the discovery and punishment of crime. State v. Jansen, 22 Kan.. 498. Where the owner learns that his property is to be stolen, he may employ detectives and decoys to catch the thief. And we can do no better than to quote again from Judge Brewer, in the case above cited, as to the relation of the acts of detectives and the thief, when a crime is alleged to have been committed by the two. He says: "Where each of the overt acts going to make up the crime charged is personally done by the defendant, and with criminal intent, his guilt is complete, no matter what motives may prompt, or what acts done by the party who is with him, and apparently assisting him. Counsel have cited and commented upon several cases in which detectives figured, and in which defendants were adjudged guiltless of the crimes charged. But this feature distinguishes them, that some act essential to the crime charged was in fact done by the detective, and not by the defendant, and this act not being imputable to the defendant, the latter's guilt was not made out. The intent and act must combine; and all the ele ments of the act must exist, and be imputable to the defendant." See State v. Hayes, 105 Mo. 76, 24 Am. St. Rep. 360. A policeman, by pretending to be an accomplice, may obtain access to a chamber where counterfeiting instruments are collected; but this does not prevent a conviction being rendered on his testimony. Wills, Circ. Ev. 117, 118. The guilty party may be induced by a trap to offer the counterfeit coin, but this does not make the offering the counterfeit coin any the less indictable. Rex v. Holden, Russ. & R. 154, 2 Taunt. 334. Now, does the fact that a detective attends unlawful meetings for the purpose of afterwards disclosing their secrets and becoming a witness against the wrong-doers make him an accomplice? Reg. v. Bernard, 1 Fost. & F. 240; Reg. v. Mullins, 3 Cox, C. C. 526; Com. v. Downing, 4 Gray, 29; Com. v. Wood, 11 Gray, 86; Com. v. Cohen, 127 Mass. 282; Campbell v. Com. 84 Pa. 187; State v. McKea, 36 lowa, 343, 14 Am. Rep. 530; People v. Farrell, 30 Cal. 316; People v. Barric, 49 Cal. 342; Williams v. State, 55 Ga. 391; Wright v. State, 7 Tex. App. 574, 32 Am. Rep. 599. One of the most nefarious and infamous conspiracies ever known in this country-that of the "Molly Maguires," in 1876, to coerce by assassination the coal proprietors of the Pennsylvania anthracite region—was exploded, and the chief perpetrators brought to justice by the sagacity and courage of a detective who attended the meetings of the conspirators and thus became possessed not only of their plans for the future but of their exploits in the past. The fact is, there is no crime that is committed under the influences of some sort of decoy, and to acquit in all cases where the offender is incited to the crime by some instigation of this kind would leave few cases in which there could be a conviction. If the decoy is not intentional it may act by the way of negligence; and if an intentional decoy is a ground for defense so should be a negligent decoy. But it is now well settled that contributory negligence, unless breaking the casual relation between the offender and the offense, is no defense. Rex v. Kow, 12 Cox, C. C. 355; Rex v. Forbes, 7 Car. & P. 224; Reg. v. Parish, 8 Car. & P. 94; Reg. v. Beard, 8 Car. & P. 143; Bates v. United States, 10 Fed. Rep. 92, note by Francis Wharton. The fact that postoffice inspectors resorted to test or decoy letters in order to bring to justice a person suspected of using the mails for the circulation of obscene literature, does not operate to discredit their testimony upon the trial of that person for that offense. United States v. Slenker, 32 Fed. Rep. 691. There is a difference between detecting and decoying, between traps and invitations, between contrivances to expose and contrivances of participation by an owner. So if the owner delivers property to the would-be thief, this is no larceny. In like manner the decoy must not himself commit any ingredient of the act which it is necessary for the criminal to commit in order to constitute the offense; as leaving the outer door open or opening it to admit the burglar. Dillon, J., observed in United States v. Whittier, 5 Dill. 35: "There is a class of cases in respect of larceny and robbery in which it is held that where one person procures, or originally induces the commission of the act by another, the person who does the act cannot be convicted of these particular crimes, although he supposed he was taking the property without the consent or against the will of the owner. The reason is obvious, viz: the taking in such cases is not against the will of the owner, which is the very essense of the offense, and hence no offense, in the eye of the law, has been committed. The offender may be as morally guilty as if the owner had not consented, but a necessary ingredient of legal guilt is wanting." Citing Rex v. Eggington, 2 Bos. & P. 508; State v. Covington, 2 Bail. L. 569; Dodge v. Brittain, Meigs, 84; Alexander v. State, 12 Tex. 540; Rex v. McDaniel, Fost. C. C. 121. CHAPTER XLII. DYING DECLARATIONS. § 330. Characteristics and Scope of. 331. Admissible only when Death is the Subject of the Charge. 332. Not Competent in Cases of Abortion. 333. Admitted on Grounds of Necessity alone. 334. An Exception to the Rule Regarding Hearsay. 335. Imminency of Death must be Apparent. 336. Infirmities of this Evidence Outlined. 337. Accused may Show Want of Belief that Death is at Hand. 338. Matters of Mere Opinion are Inadmissible. 339. Narratives of Past Occurrences are Inadmissible. 341. Illustrations of Extreme Rulings. § 330. Characteristics and Scope of.-Upon well reasoned grounds of expediency dying declarations are admissible in criminal prosecutions, where manslaughter is the gravaman of the crime alleged. This species of evidence is obviously liable to great abuse and should be received with great caution and only when a proper introduction entitles it to be received. The witness whose testimony is cast upon the record is beyond the reach of cross-examination-all opportunity for investigating the question of malice, enmity, positive identification is lost forever, and the accused whose tenure of life is hanging in the balance, has to contend with the additional disadvantage that a just indignation aroused in the minds of the triers by the mere recital of a hideous crime. Evidence of this character is universally admitted however on the ground of necessity and in order to prevent the entire frustation of justice, to impart competency to this evidence it must clearly appear that the declarant was conscious of the imminency of death-believed himself to be beyond the probabilities of recovery, and this belief must be evident by some word or act of a conclusive and unmistakable character. This conviction in the mind of the declarant that death is surely approaching is generally presumed to supply all of the impressive |