plaint of the injury, and when and to whom, and she may be corroborated by the person to whom she complained as to the same fact. As to whether the details, or particular facts of the complaint, can be proved, there is some conflict of authority among the decisions outside of this state, some of the most respectable courts holding that such evidence is admissible to show the nature of the complaint, and the probability of its truth. Benstine v. State, 2 Lea, 169, 31 Am. Rep. 593; Woods v. People, 55 N. Y. 515, 14 Am. Rep. 309; State v. Kinney, 44 Conn. 153, 26 Am. Rep. 436.

The rule following what is believed to be the weight of authority both in England and America, is settled the other way. When the complaint does not constitute a part of the res gesta, but is received only in corroboration of the prosecutrix's testimony, the general rule is, that the details or particulars cannot be introduced, in the first instance, by the state. This would exclude any statement made in the complaint pointing out the identity of the person accused, or explaining the injuries claimed to have been received during the alleged perpetration of the crime, or otherwise giving the minute circumstances of the event. Griffin v. State, 76 Ala. 29, and cases there cited; Hornbeck v. State, 35 Ohio St. 277, 35 Am. Rep. 608; People v. Mayes, 66 Cal. 597, 56 Am. Rep. 126; Oleson v. State, 11 Neb. 276, 38 Am. Rep. 366. But there are two cases at least where, under the authorities, the details of such complaint may be proved: (1) They may be elicited, on cross-examination, by the defendant; and where this is done only in part, the state may then proceed to prove, on the rebutting examination, the whole complaint. (2) Where the testimony of the prosecutrix is sought to be impeached, by attempting to discredit her story, it is permissible, by way of corroboration, for the state to prove such details, and, according to many of the authorities, also to prove that she told the story the same way to others, confirmatory of her first statement. Griffin v. State, 76 Ala. 29; Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624; State v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93, 20 Am. Dec. 90; State v. Laxton, 78 N. C. 564.

In prosecutions for rape, it is very proper for the jury to be exceedingly cautious how they convict a defendant on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix, especially where there is evidence tending to impeach her credibility, for the experience of the courts in modern times has amply attested the assertion of

Lord Hale, that the charge of rape is "an accusation easy to make, and hard to be proved, and harder still to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent." 1 Hale, P. C. 635. But there is no rule of law which forbids a jury to convict one charged with this crime, on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix, although she be impeached for ill-fame in chastity, or otherwise; provided they be satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the truth of her testimony. Boddie v. State, 52 Ala. 395; 2

Bishop, Crim. Proc. (3d ed.) 968. If this were not so, one of the most detestable and atrocious of all crimes known to the law might often go unpunished, as the perpetrators of this offense almost invariably seek to carry out their purpose when their victim is alone and unprotected. Barnett v. State, 83 Ala. 40.

"But the rule respecting the time that elapses before the prosecutrix complains will not apply where there is good reason for the delay, as that she was under the control or influenced by her ravisher." 3 Chitty, Crim. L. 812.

And to the same effect the law is laid down in 1 East, P. C. 435, 438, citing the case of Rex v. Russen, where the defendant was master of a charity school, and when the female assailed, one of his pupils, was deterred by his threats from making discovery of the outrage until three months after the offense was committed, and where the conviction was held good.

And in New York the court of appeals has laid down the same rule. Higgins v. People, 58 N. Y. 379; Baccio v. People, 41 N. Y. 266.

We may conclude therefore that the rule requiring immediate complaint is not inflexible. That if reasonable circumstances cause delay, the effect is simply for the jury; and their province as to that fact will not be invaded by the court. State v. Byrne, 47 Conn. 466; State v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 99, 20 Am. Dec. 90; Mallet v. People, 3 Hawley, Am. Crim. Rep. 382, and cases cited in note.

It is a general rule that the evidence of a witness can never be corroborated or confirmed by proof that the witness stated the same facts testified to in court on some occasion when not under oath. Such statements, like all hearsay evidence, are excluded as unsatisfactory and incompetent. But there is an exception to the rule in case of rape. The outrage in such a case upon a virtuous female is so great that there is a natural presumption that at the

first suitable opportunity she would make disclosure of it; and she would be so far discredited if she did not make the disclosure, for the purpose of confirming her evidence where she is a witness, such disclosure may be received. But where the disclosure is not recent, as soon as suitable opportunity is furnished, the reason for receiving it in evidence does not exist, and the principle justifying its reception does not apply.

In 1 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 632, it is said that "the complainant must make fresh discovery and pursuit of the offense and offender, otherwise it carries a presumption that her suit is but malicious and feigned."

In 1 East's Pleas of the Crown, 445, it is said that the evidence of the complainant "is confirmed if she presently discovered the offense and made pursuit for the offender," and that "her evidence is discredited if she concealed the injury for any considerable time after she had opportunity to complain." And the same language is substantially embodied in 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 214.

In Baccio v. People, 41 N. Y. 265, the defendant was indicted for rape and upon the trial the prosecution was permitted to give evidence that the complainant disclosed the crime to her mother twenty-four days after its commission; and the conviction in that case was reversed on the ground that the mother of the complainant was permitted to testify in detail on her direct examination to the statements made to her by the complainant of the time and manner of the offense. Judge Woodruff, writing the opinion, said:

"I was first inclined to say that evidence of any complaint made so long after the alleged injury, and especially when forced from the daughter, by the mother, after her daughter had once declared that her injury was due to a fall, should not have been received at all from any person; the complaint was certainly not made recently after the alleged outrage. But in a case in which the fact of complaint is admissible, it is perhaps competent to explain the want of such early complaint, by facts which show that it was impracticable, or that it was prevented by circumstances consistent with the natural impulse to complain thereof, so far at least as to destroy the presumption of falsehood derivable from concealment on the part of the female."

In the course of his opinion the same learned judge said that

the rule admitting such declarations in case of rape is an exception to the general rule excluding declarations made out of court by a person who had been or might be examined as a witness, and is properly confined within narrow limits; and he suggested that the reason for the admission of such declarations is "that it is so natural as to be almost inevitable, that a female upon whom the crime has been committed will make immediate complaint thereof to her mother, or other confidential friend, and inasmuch her failure to do so would be strong evidence that her affirmation on the subject, when examined as a witness, was false, that the prosecution may anticipate such a claim by affirmative proof that complaint was made."

In Higgins v. People, 58 N. Y. 377, the defendant was indicted for rape. In that case it appeared that the prosecutrix arrived in New York an entire stranger, and having lost her baggage she was inveigled into a basement on pretense of finding it, where she ⚫ was outraged. Upon coming out into the street she met a woman who asked her what was the matter, also a policeman who took her to a station-house. To neither of these did she state the real offense; but it appeared that as soon after arriving at the stationhouse as her excitement would admit, she stated the facts to the police captain. Upon these facts defendant's counsel requested the court to charge that "if the jury believe the prosecuting witness did not make prompt disclosure of the alleged wrong, it is a circumstance against her, casting a great discredit on her testimony, and tends strongly to disprove the truth of the accusation." This the court refused to charge, and it was held, conceding the proposition to be entirely accurate, it was an abstract one, as there was no ground for saying that the disclosure was not sufficiently prompt, and that it was not error, therefore, to refuse so to charge.

Church, Ch. J., writing the opinion, said: "The proposition (which the court was requested to charge) is, doubtless, substantially correct, although it is quite general and somewhat vague. Any considerable delay on the part of a prosecutrix to make complaint of the outrage constituting the crime of rape, is a circumstance of more or less weight, depending upon the other surrounding circumstances. There may be many reasons why a failure to make immediate or instant outcry should not discredit the witness. A want of suitable opportunity, or fear may sometimes excuse or justify a delay. There can be no iron rule on the

subject. The law expects and requires that it should be prompt; but there is, and can be, no particular time specified. The rule is founded upon the laws of human nature, which induce a female thus outraged to complain at the first opportunity. Such is the natural impulse of an honest female."

In Connecticut a more liberal rule as to disclosures made by a prosecutrix has been adopted than prevails in some other states. State v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93, 20 Am. Dec. 90; State v. Byrne,

47 Conn. 465.

There it may be proved, not only that she made disclosures of the crime, but the details of the crime as she disclosed them may also be proved. In the two cases cited the disclosures were made after a much longer time than in any other case which has come to our attention.

In Ohio, the immediateness of the complaint is essential to its admissibility. Hornbeck v. State, 35 Ohio St. 277, 35 Am. Rep. 608. In Johnson v. State, 17 Ohio, 593, it is said: "There can be no doubt, that in a case of rape the declarations of the injured female, made immediately or soon after the injury inflicted are competent testimony, provided the female herself has first been examined; competent not for the purpose of proving the commission of the offense, but as corroborative of, or contradictory to her statements made in court. If these declarations are in accordance with the testimony given in court, they tend to strengthen and give effect to that testimony, if against it, the testimony is destroyed. If such testimony were to be entirely excluded when offered on the part of the prosecution, it would be extremely difficult to convict in any case. For, as a general rule, it would be dangerous to convict, unless immediate complaint was made by the female, to her friends or others."

The same doctrine has recently been announced in Michigan, People v. Gage, 62 Mich. 271, where Champlin, J., said: "It is contended that the testimony ought not to have been received because of the lapse of time after the outrage and the statement of the mother. The lapse of time occurring after the injury, and before complaint made, is not the test of admissibility of the evidence, but it may be considered as affecting its weight; and, when complaint is not made promptly, the delay calls for explanation before the court will admit it."

§ 522. Caution as to the Admission of Uncorroborated Testimony. More than the testimony of the prosecutrix is re