and the illicit intercourse and the promise of marriage had continued down to within less than two years before indictment found, it was held that the offense could not have been committed within the two years limited by the statute before indictment found. Safford v. People, 1 Park. Crim. Rep. 474; Cook v. People, 2 Thomp. & C. 406.

The chastity of the woman is directly in issue in these cases (State v. Patterson, 88 Mo. 88, 57 Am. Rep. 374) and it is not the proper province of the court to determine the weight of the evidence.

To overcome the presumption of previous chastity, defendant must show unchastity by a preponderance of evidence. State v. Hemm, 82 Iowa, 609.

Though the law presumes that every woman is chaste and of good repute, it also presumes every one innocent of crime till proven guilty, and in prosecutions for seduction the burden is on the state to allege and prove in the first instance that the woman is of good repute. State v. McCaskey, 104 Mo. 644.

Under indictment for seduction, where the evidence showed that the prosecutrix, at the time she yielded to the defendant, was a child a few days past the age of fourteen, and of weak mental development; that before the first act of intercourse defendant, who was a man of thirty-five, not only promised to marry her, but stated to her that many other young girls of the neighborhood were in the habit of engaging in sexual intercourse-it was error for the court to refuse to permit the fullest investigation into their subsequent relations with a view of showing whether defendant entered into such contract of marriage in good faith at the time, or merely to gratify his lust. State v. Mackey, 82 Iowa, 393.

The court refused to charge that "the defendant has offered evidence of specific language and conduct on the part of the prosecutrix which, he claims, shows her to be of unchaste character at the time of the alleged seduction, and you are instructed that it was the right of the state to introduce evidence rebutting" this "testimony." Held, that as the instruction fixed no consequences to the neglect of the state to introduce such evidence, it was properly refused as misleading. State v. Hemm, 82 Iowa, 609.

Under an indictment for seduction, it is error to instruct that

the burden of showing defendant's subsequent refusal to marry the prosecutrix is upon the state, since an offer of marriage after seduction is not a bar to the prosecution, but only an actual marriage. State v. Mackey, 82 Iowa, 393.

In prosecutions for seduction, it is usually required by statute that the prosecutrix should be corroborated at least as to promise of marriage. Com. v. Walton, 2 Brewst. 487; State v. Painter, 50 Iowa, 317; State v. Curran, 51 Iowa, 112.

The prosecutrix also testified that the accused, to induce her to consent to his proposal, stated in substance that he never would marry a girl unless he was satisfied that she was a virgin, which he could ascertain only by her assenting to his proposition. But upon her expressing apprehension that he would leave her if she yielded to him, he assured her, in the strongest terms, that he would marry her. The prisoner's counsel asked the court to charge in substance that, if the promise to marry was not an existing one, but an inchoate proposition depending upon the result of illicit intercourse as furnishing evidence of virtue to complete the mutuality of the contract, the case was not within the statute. The court declined so to charge. Held (Church, Ch. J., and Rapallo, J., dissenting) no error, as there was no just foundation in the evidence to claim that the promise was to marry only in case the accused should be satisfied that the prosecutrix was a virgin; that it was to the promise and not to any test of virginity that she gave her consent.

The time of the alleged seduction was February 5, 1871, followed by subsequent intercourse down to August. It was proved, without objection, that the prosecutrix was delivered of a child February 10, 1872. The prosecution disclaimed any reliance upon this fact as corroborating the evidence of the prosecutrix; the court held the evidence immaterial.

The prisoner's counsel offered evidence that between the 5th of February and May 1st, 1871, the prosecutrix had carnal connection with another man, which was excluded. Held (Church, Ch. J., and Rapallo, J., dissenting) no error; that pregnancy was not essential to the consummation of the offense charged; that the evidence rejected could only have been material to obviate the effect of that fact as corroborative evidence, and, as that was expressly disavowed, the rejection was proper. Also, that the rejection could be sustained upon the ground that the offer was

not limited to show any illicit intercourse at a time when the child could have been begotten, and was in effect simply to show that after the alleged seduction she had been guilty of fornication with another person, which was clearly incompetent. Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644.

It is not sufficient to establish the sexual intercourse, but the plaintiff must show that defendant accomplished his purpose by some promise or artifice, or that she was induced to yield to his embrace by flattery or deception. If without being deceived, and without any false pretense, deceit or artifice, she voluntarily submitted to the connection, the law affords her no remedy. Smith v. Milburn, 17 Iowa, 30.

The prosecutrix must be supported by other evidence as to all of the elements which are necessary to contribute to the crime, before the jury can convict. If the corroborative evidence supports one or more, and yet fails to support all the necessary elements, such support is not given as the law requires to allow or sustain a conviction. See N. Y. Penal Code, § 286; People v. Plath, 100 N. Y. 590, 53 Am. Rep. 236; Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 38. In criminal trials where the fact proved or corroborated is consistent with innocence, it cannot be accepted as any proof of guilt. People v. Elliott, 106 N. Y. 288; State v. Warren, 34 Iowa, 453; People v. Josselyn, 39 Cal. 398; People v. Williams, 29 Hun,

520.

The testimony of a female seduced is sufficiently supported by proof of opportunity and confiding freedom of relations. Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 38. In all cases the sufficiency of the supporting evidence is for the jury, and it is reversible error to withdraw this question of sufficiency from their consideration. Crandall v. People, 2 Lans. 309; Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 44. Circumstantial evidence was always sufficient in supporting an accomplice, corroboration being required only as to the person of the accused; that is, testimony showing that the defendant was the party who committed the crime. Whart. Crim. Ev. § 442. In the case of an accomplice, whether evidence is sufficient is for the determination of the jury; the law is complied with if there is some other evidence fairly tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, so that his conviction will not rest entirely upon the evidence of the accomplice. People v. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 594; People v. Elliott, 106 N.

Crandall v. People,
Am. Rep. 236. No

Y. 288; People v. Jaehne, 103 N. Y. 182; supra; People v. Plath, 100 N. Y. 594, 53 corroboration is required as to previous chastity or as to the fact of being married. Armstrong v. People, supra; Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177; Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644; Jenkins v. Putnam, 106 N. Y. 272. Corroboration is required as to the promise and intercourse only, and not with respect to chastity or being unmarried. Kenyon v. People and Crandall v. People, supra. Supporting evidence was required as to two matters only, to wit, the promise of marriage and carnal connection. Kenyon v. People and Boyce v. People, supra. In prosecutions for adultery or for illicit intercourse of any class, evidence is admissible of sexual acts between the same parties prior to or when indicating continuance of illicit relations, even subsequent to the act specifically under trial. Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 111, 100 Am. Dec. 110; State v. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202, 24 Am. Rep. 124; Crandall v. People, supra. The statute requires only previous chastity. N. Y. Penal Code, § 284; Armstrong v. People, supra. The supporting evidence need not be such only as the character of the matters admits of being furnished. It was for the jury to say whether the supporting evidence was sufficient. People v. Armstrong, Crandall v. People, People v. Elliott and People v. Everhardt, supra.

§ 553. Distinction between Seduction and Rape.-The crime of seduction is not to be confounded with the higher and more atrocious crime of rape. The latter crime is defined to be the carnal knowledge of a woman by a man forcibly and unlawfully, against her will. 2 Bouvier, Law Dict. title Rape. The element of force forms a material ingredient of the offense, by which a resistance of the woman violated is overcome, or her consent induced by threats of personal violence, duress or fraud. For, unless the consent of the woman to the unlawful intercourse is freely and voluntarily given, the offense of rape is complete. But the word "seduction," when applied to the conduct of a man towards a female, is generally understood to mean the use of some influence, promise, arts, or means on his part, by which he induces the woman to surrender her chastity and virtue to his embraces. But we do not suppose that it must appear that any distinct promise was made to the female, or any subtle art or device employed. It is sufficient that the means used to accomplish the

seduction, induced the female to consent to the sexual intercourse. Perhaps the motive of fear on the mind of the female is not to be excluded—not the fear of personal violence and injury unless she consents to the connection, but the fear that the man may in some way injure her reputation or standing in society, unless she yields to his importunities. But the woman must be tempted, allured, and led astray from the path of virtue, though the violence of some means or persuasion employed by the man, until she freely consents to the sexual connection. But if the circumstances show that this consent was obtained by the use of force, and the woman's will was overcome by fear of personal injury, then the crime becomes one of a higher grade. Croghan v. State, 22 Wis. 444.

Evidence is admissible that the defendant boasted to his friends that he had had illicit intercourse with the prosecutrix, as tending to show not alone the illicit connection, but also, in view of the circumstances under which the admissions were made, the deceptive practices by which it was brought about. State v. Hill, 91 Mo. 423.

Evidence which shows that the woman lived with her father and bore his name, that she had received the addresses of the defendant for more than three years, and that a marriage agreement existed between them when the crime was committed, is sufficient to warrant the jury to find that the woman is unmarried. State v. Heatherton, 60 Iowa, 175.

554. Presumption as to Chastity, how Rebutted.— Under a statute making it indictable to seduce a female of good repute for chastity, under promise of marriage, the state must prove her good repute affirmatively; it will not be presumed. In a recent case the court below had charged the jury that the law presumes every woman to be of good repute for chastity; that this presumption must be destroyed by proof of bad repute, in the absence of which the defendant may be convicted. This, as seen by the syllabus quoted, was held to be error. The court, enumerating the elements of the offense described by the statute of New Jersey, that, 1st, the defendant must be a single man over the age of eighteen; 2d, the defendant must be a single woman; 3d, she must be under the age of twenty-one; 4th, she must be of good repute for chastity; 5th, the sexual intercourse must have been had under a promise of marriage; 6th, she must thereby become pregnant;