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and 7th, the evidence of the female must be corroborated to the extent required in case of indictment for perjury, says: "These are essential elements of the offense; the presence of each and all of them is necessary to conviction, and the absence of any of them is fatal to the case of the state. The burden rests upon the state to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore each of these facts must be established. Good repute for chastity is a quality which may or may not exist. in the prosecutrix; women are not all chaste; the statute itself recognizes two classes, those of good repute and those not of good repute. With the former class only can the statutory crime possibly be committed.

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"A woman who comes into court with a bastard child in her arms, is not a representative of her sex; happily she represents a very insignificant portion of it. The fact that she has sacrificed that virtue which was her glittering crown, casts such a shadow upon her, that in the most charitable view of the case, it should be left without presumption either way, to be determined by competent evidence what her prior repute has been. Her immoral conduct, unless mitigating circumstances are shown, classes her with the vicious and disreputable, and, as to her, negatives the presumption of purity, so universally accorded to her sex. The question is, not whether the vast majority of females are of good repute, but whether in this case it shall be presumed as a fact against the defendant that the woman with whom the crime is alleged to have been committed, and who carries with her the evidence of her shame, is of good repute. The rule, if well founded, must be of universal application, and involves the broad proposition that of the entire class of women who bear illegitimate children, it must be presumed that every one who prefers a charge of this kind is of good repute for chastity. It will be more reasonable to reverse the proposition.

"She has avowedly participated with the defendant in a violation of the criminal law, and she must be regarded as in pari delicto until those material facts (of which her good repute is one) are shown to exist which aggravate the character of the delictum and make the defendant alone amenable to the higher statutory crime. To assert that a woman establishes a claim before the law to the presumption of good repute for chastity, when she admits her dereliction, seems contrary to reason and propriety, and places

her upon the same plane with those whose lives have been blameless." Zabriskie v. State, 43 N. J. L. 641, 39 Am. Rep. 610. See 3 Crim. L. Mag. 338.

§ 555. Corroboration Required as to Promise and Intercourse.-Corroboration is required as to the promise and intercourse only, and not with respect to chastity or being unmarried. Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177; Crandall v. People, 2 Lans. 309. Circumstantial evidence was always sufficient in supporting an accomplice, corroboration being required only as to the person of the accused; that is, testimony showing that the defendant was the party who committed the crime. Whart. Crim. Ev. § 442. In the case of an accomplice; whether evidence is sufficient is for the determination of the jury, the law is complied with if there is some other evidence fairly tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, so that his conviction will not rest entirely upon the evidence of his accomplice. People v. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 294; People v. Elliott, 106 N. Y. 292; People v. Jaehne, 103 N. Y. 182; Crandall v. People, supra; People v. Plath, 100 N. Y. 594, 53 Am. Rep. 236. The supporting evidence need be such only as the character of the matters admits of being furnished. It was for the jury to say whether the supporting evidence was sufficient. Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 44; Crandall v. People, People v. Elliott and People v. Everhardt, supra. In prosecutions for adultery or for illicit intercourse of any class, evidence is admissible of sexual acts between the same parties prior to or when indicating continuance of illicit relations, even subsequent to the act specifically under trial. Whart. Crim. Ev. (8th ed.) § 35; Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 111, 100 Am. Dec. 110; State v. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202, 24 Am. Rep. 124; Crandall v. People, supra. The statute requires only previous chastity. N. Y. Penal Code, § 284; Armstrong v. People, supra. No corroboration is required as to previous chastity or as to the fact of being unmarried. Armstrong v. People and Kenyon v. People, supra; Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644; Jenkins v. Putnam, 106 N. Y. 272; People v. Kearney, 110 N. Y. 190.

Under the New York act to punish seduction as a crime (Laws of 1848, chap. 111) it is sufficient that the defendant effected his object by a conditional promise that, if the girl would permit his illicit connection, he would marry her.

The submitting to his embraces upon this proposition is, it seems, a promise to marry on her part.

Evidence of general reputation of the girl's want of chastity is inadmissible. Previous chaste character, in this statute, means actual personal virtue-not reputation; and can be impeached only by specific proof of lewdness.

The corroboration of the seduced female, required by the statute, relates to the promise and the intercourse; it is not necessary in respect to her chastity or to her being unmarried.

The evidence of the seduced female is admissible that the promise of marriage was the inducement to the illicit intercourse.

It is unnecessary that the promise should be a valid one, or that the defendant be of full age. It is sufficient that he has arrived at the age of puberty. Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177.

On a prosecution for seduction of a girl with whom defendant had previously had illicit intercourse, but who had again become of chaste character, evidence of other witnesses that defendant resumed his visits as a suitor, and continued them for several months, the same as persons contemplating marriage usually do, sufficiently corroborates the testimony of the prosecutrix to the principal facts. State v. Gnagy (Iowa) Dec. 18, 1891.

The defendant was convicted of seduction, under section 4015 of the Alabama Code, 1886, which declares: "No indictment or conviction shall be had under this section, on the uncorroborated testimony of the woman upon whom the seduction is charged." This clause of the statute was fully considered in Cunningham v. State, 73 Ala. 51. It was then construed as not requiring that other witnesses shall testify to every fact testified to by the woman; but that its requirements are met, when the corroboration is of some matter which is an element of the offense, and its effect is to satisfy the jury that the corroborated witness has testified truly. The true rule is stated as follows: "That the corroboration shall be such as to convince the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the witness swore truly, but, to produce this conviction it must be in a matter material to the issue, and must tend to connect the defendant with that material matter, and the matter itself must not be in its nature formal, indifferent, or harmless." This instruction was re-affirmed in Wilson v. State, 73 Ala. 527, at a subsequent term of the court. The corroborating evidence

consisted of the defendant's frequent visits to the female for whose seduction he was indicted, his escorting her to church, parties, and other social gatherings, and his admission of an engagement and intention to marry her, made about the time of the alleged seduction. A promise of marriage is one of the alternative elements of the offense denounced by the statute. The corroboration was as to this act, with which the evidence connected defendant. His admissions were properly received in evidence. The phraseology of the charge of the court on this subject may be objectionable, as importing to the jury that the corroborating testimony was sufficient. Evidence may be sufficient to meet the statutory requirement as to corroboration, and yet not sufficient to satisfy the jury that the woman swore truly.

§ 556. Time not Material.-The exact time is never material. Although the prosecutrix may be quite positive in this respect, she is not infallible, and may be mistaken; and it is not material that the seduction occurred on the particular day named by the prosecutrix. It is therefore, not essential that she should be corroborated as to the exact day. In this connection we deem it proper to say that the instructions of the court, that if the seduction was accomplished about or near the time named in the indictment, and fixed by the prosecutrix in her evidence, it was sufficient, are correct. State v. Bell, 49 Iowa, 440; State v. McClintic, 73 Iowa, 663.

As to further evidence necessary to sustain an action for seduction, see Wood v. State, 48 Ga. 192, 15 Am. Rep. 664; Wilson v. State, 58 Ga. 328. On evidence to impeach the chastity of the female, see White v. Murtland, 71 Ill. 250, 22 Am. Rep. 100; Love v. Masoner, 6 Baxt. 24, 32 Am. Rep. 522. Where the offense charged is the last of several similar acts, the jury may consider them as the elements of one wrong. Haymond v. Saucer, 84 Ind. 3.

It is not necessary that the promise should be a valid and binding one between the parties. The offense consists in seducing and having illicit connection with an unmarried female under promise of marriage. It is enough that a promise is made which is a consideration for or inducement to the intercourse. Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177. This case is approved in Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644. In that case the promise was one conditioned upon a consent to illicit connection. That con

sent, based upon such a promise was within the law. It was held, in Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 38, that the question was not presented by the case.

Any line of conduct on the part of a parent, from which there may be justly inferred an assent to, or connivance at the illicit intercourse, will deprive him of all right to maintain an action for the seduction of his daughter. Such conduct, even if not amounting to an absolute assent, but showing want of due care on his part, may be taken into account in measuring the damages. It is no excuse for the parent that such conduct was in conformity with the customs of the community in which he lived. Graham v. Smith, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 267.

The chastity of the woman, at the time of the criminal connection, is an essential ingredient of the offense. The statute provides, "No conviction shall be had, if on the trial it is proved that such woman was, at the time of the alleged offense, unchaste." Munkers v. State, 87 Ala. 94.

In Cook v. People, 2 Thomp. & C. 404, the prosecutrix was asked, "and would you have consented to it (the connection) in the absence of a promise?" Held, inadmissible as calling for a merely speculative answer.

But the female may testify to the fact that she consented to the intercourse because of the promise. State v. Brinkhaus, 34 Minn. 285, 7 Crim. L. Mag. 343.

Evidence that defendant, subsequent to the seduction, had refused to marry the prosecutrix is inadmissible. Cook v. People, 2 Thomp. & C. 404. See Callahan v. State, 63 Ind. 198, 30 Am. Rep. 211; People v. DeFore, 64 Mich. 693, 8 Am. St. Rep. 868; State v. Prizer, 49 Iowa, 531, 31 Am. Rep. 155; Zabriskie v. State, 43 N. J. L. 640, 39 Am. Rep. 610; Oliver v. Com. 101 Pa. 215, 47 Am. Rep. 704; People v. Roderigas, 49 Cal. 9; Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 482, 48 Am. Rep. 17; People v. Squires, 49 Mich. 487; Wood v. State, 48 Ga. 192, 15 Am. Rep. 664; State v. Higdon, 32 Iowa, 262.

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