statement in defense of one's own character and interests, or to enforce the rules of a society, or to aid in the exposure or detection of crime, or to protect the public or a friend from being swindled or otherwise injured. Such communications, although to some extent false, are privileged if made without malice and for justifiable ends." Browne, Crim. L. 78, citing Wright v. Woodgate, 2 Cromp. M. & R. 573. The mere theoretical discussion of abstract propositions relating to the science of government, or to questions of political economy or individual rights are beyond the pale of criminal cognizance. It is only where such discussion assumes an intemperate or inflammatory aspect, directly menaces the peace and good order of society, or incites the populace to riot and revolution that restraint may be imposed in the way of criminal indictment. The great Homestead riot cases in Pennsylvania during the summer of 1892 afford instructive reading as elucidative of this topic, also of the far wider questions involved in the crime of treason. § 573. Rule as to Editors and Reporters.-"A prosecution for libel cannot be maintained against a reporter, editor, publisher, or proprietor of a newspaper, for the publication therein, of a fair and true report of any judicial, legislative or other public and official proceeding, or of any statement, speech, argument or debate in the course of the same, without proving actual malice in making the report. "Every editor, or proprietor of a book, newspaper or serial, and every manager of a partnership or incorporated association, by which a book, newspaper or serial is issued, is chargeable with the publication of any matter contained in such book, newspaper or serial. But in every prosecution for libel the defendant may show in his defense that the matter complained of was published without his knowledge or fault and against his wishes, by another who had no authority from him to make the publication, and whose act was disavowed by him so soon as known." N. Y. Penal Code, S$ 246, 247. These provisions, although cited from a New York statute, are quite general throughout the American Union. 574. Miscellaneous Authorities on the Subject.-In criminal prosecutions for libel, the reasonable doctrine is, that some connection must be shown between the publication complained of, and the publications admitted in evidence to prove actual malice; but if these tend to show ill will toward the person concerning whom the publication complained of is made, and are of such a nature as to indicate a persistent disposition of hatred or ill will toward him, or if they appear to be a part of a settled purpose to bring him into public hatred, contempt or ridicule, and are sufficiently near in time to afford a natural inference that the same state of mind existed when the publication complained of was made, they are admissible, although they are subsequent to the publication complained of, and do not expressly refer to it. Eldridge v. State, 27 Fla. 162. The publisher of a libel cannot escape liability by veiling a calumny under artful or ambiguous phrases, or by indirectly charging that which would be slanderous, if imputed in direct and undisguised language. Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 401, 6 Am. Rep. 105. "Where the terms of the communication are indirect, the imputation of an act committed may be inferred, where the defendant expresses a suspicion or opinion, or institutes a comparison, or delivers the words as matter of hearsay, or by way of interrogation or answer, or exclamation, or uses di junctive or adjective words, or speaks ironically; or, in general, where the statement virtually includes or assumes the commission of the principal act, or a strong suspicion of it." 1 Stark. Slander & Libel, 63. "But where the name of the plaintiff is not stated, or where a portion only of his name is stated, then if the application of the matter to the plaintiff is denied, the burden is upon him to show its application. To do this he must prove facts which show such application; he cannot prove the application directly, by asking a witness who has read the application whom he understood to be intended." Townshend, Slander & Libel, § 375 a. Section 724 of Moore's Criminal Law, contains many illustrations of what the courts construe as criminal libel. Obviously, any evidence calculated to establish the publication of any of the enumerated acts should be regarded as relevant. The section referred to, is as follows: "An indictment lies for publishing words which contain that sort of imputation which is calculated to vilify a man and bring him into hatred, contempt or ridicule, though the words impute no punishable crime." Archb. Crim. Pr. & Pl. 204; State v. Farley, 4 McCord, L. 317; Com. v. Chap man, 13 Met. 68; State v. Henderson, 1 Rich. L. 179; Rex v. Pownell, 1 W. Kel. 58; Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 214. Thus to write that a man is a swindler or a hypocrite, or an itchy old toad (2 Archb. Crim. Pr. & Pl. 204; Thorley v. Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355) or a drunkard (Giles v. State, 6 Ga. 276) or a cuckold and a story (Giles v. State, supra) or is insane (Rex v. Harvey, 2 Barn. & C. 257; Southworth v. Stevens, 10 Johns. 443) or that a woman has been guilty of fornication (Reg. v. Langley, 3 Salk. 190; Rex v. Weltje, 2 Campb. 142; and see State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 267, 18 Am. Dec. 105) is libelous and indictable. Barbour, Crim. L. 232. So it is indictable to charge a man with a gross want of feeling (Weaver v. Lloyd, 4 Dowl. & R. 230) or with wanting discretion (2 Archb. Crim. Pr. & Pl. 204) or with having committed any crime. Whart. Am. Crim. L. § 2527; State v. White, 29 N. C. 180; Hillhouse v. Dunning, 6 Conn. 391; Walker v. Winn, 8 Mass. 248. It is libelous to write concerning a man, 'I look upon him as a rascal and have watched him for many years' (Williams v. Karnes, 4 Humph. 9) or that he is thought no more of than a thief or a counterfeiter.' Nelson v. Musgrave, 10 Mo. 648." CHAPTER LXIV. CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY. § 575. What Constitutes Conspiracy. 576. One Member of the Confederacy may be Convicted. 578. Declarations of Co-conspirators Competent. a. New York Decisions in Reference to. b. The Wisconsin Rule. c. Views of Mr. Roscoe. d. Other Sustaining Authorities. 579. Defendant's Guilt must be Established by Evidence of his own Acts. 580. Rule as to Criminal Intent. 581. When Proof of Conspiracy must First be Shown. § 575. What Constitutes Conspiracy.-"If two or more persons conspire, either "1. To commit a crime; or "2. Falsely and maliciously to indict another for a crime, or to procure another to be complained of or arrested for a crime; or "3. Falsely to institute or maintain an action or special procceding; or "4. To cheat and defraud another out of property, by any means which are in themselves criminal, or which, if executed, would amount to a cheat, or to obtain money or any other property by false pretenses; or "5. To prevent another from exercising a lawful trade or calling or doing any other lawful act, by force, threats, intimidation, or by interfering or threatening to interfere with tools, implements, or property belonging to or used by another, or with the use or employment thereof; or "6. To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade or commerce, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice, or of the due administration of the laws. "Each of them is guilty of a misdemeanor." N. Y. Penal Code, chap. 8, § 168. There are strong indications that originally the definition of conspiracy did not include anything more than confederacies to charge falsely a person with criminality. Thus Lord Coke describes the offense as "a consultation and agreement between two or more, to appeal or indict an innocent person falsely and maliciously, whom accordingly they cause to be indicted or appealed; and afterwards the party is lawfully acquitted by the verdict of twelve men." Blackstone also seems to regard the offense to be confined to a malicious accusation. 4 Bl. Com. 136. There are several cases in the Year Books that favor the same limitation. And, in fact, this species of indictment was the remedy for the same wrong, considered in its criminal aspect, for which an action for a malicious prosecution was the remedy, considered in its civil aspect. It is much in this light that the subject is treated in Jacob's Law Dictionary, title Conspiracy, and in 1 Hawk. P. C. chap. 72, § 2. But the doctrine was soon expanded beyond its limit, and, among other cases, it was held that although no indictment had been found, or even though no complaint had been laid before a magistrate, and the only object appearing was to destroy the reputation of an individual, a prosecution for conspiracy could be maintained. This was the ruling by Lord Mansfield in the case of Rex v. Parsons, 1 W. Bl. 392; State v. Hickling, 41 N. J. L. 208. A conspiracy being an agreement to commit a criminal or unlawful act, the criminality must exist either in the principal act (the end) or the means by which it is to be accomplished. The information must therefore set out directly, and not by way of inference, the criminal or unlawful act, either in the end or means. State v. Keach, 40 Vt. 113; State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 271, 22 Am. Rep. 719; Com. v. Shedd, 7 Cush. 514; State v. Jones, 13 Iowa, 270; 1 Bennett & Heard, Lead. Crim. Cas. 264 and notes; Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush. 189, 48 Am. Dec. 596; State v. Roberts, 34 Me. 320; State v. Hewitt, 31 Me. 396; Wark v. Willard, 15 N. H. 396; Lambert v. People, 9 Cow. 578; Hartman v. Com. 5 Barr. 60; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542-558, 23 L. ed. 588-593; 1 Archb. Crim. Pr. & Pl. 283, note 1; State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 504. At first to bring popular leaders to the block, the law of con |