rest of the passengers, was safe enough, but I knew that if recognised I should not get far. Arrived at Kaffir Zyat, I made out that I was suddenly so overcome with a painful complaint I must return for special medical advice to Alexandria; but when K., who remained to help the invalid, inquired about the exact time our train would leave, it was decidedly unpleasant to find that our expected return train had been taken off, and that there was but one more train to come that evening. It was the last run by the European administration, and brought the few remaining English from Cairo. I thought it advisable to keep out of sight as much as possible until the train arrived, and got a couch in a room in the station-master's house. Having plenty of cigarettes, I was comfortable enough, but I knew my chief would be in a great state of anxiety at my not returning at the expected time. How to communicate my situation to him over the Egyptian wires was the difficulty, until a happy thought struck me; so I got the following message sent to the P. and O. agent, who had given me the through ticket, "Inform head of firm train taken off, but will send cotton by the next." C., the agent, was very puzzled, but the meaning of the message suddenly flashed on him, and he was quietly able to relieve the admiral's anxiety. When the train came in I saw one of the Europeans recognised me, but a quick sign was sufficient. The invalid and his companion had a carriage to themselves.

Arabi's people soon heard about my little trip. Seven days afterwards a fair-complexioned Syrian was noticed in the train at Kaffir Zyat: he was taken out of the train under the impression that

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he was a European doing my work, and his throat cut on the platform. I doubt if Sir G. ever knew the risk I ran to get and wire him the information he required.

Arabi now made little concealment of his work on the batteries, the men in which were constantly at drill, sighting their guns on the ships in the harbour. We should, if this were allowed to go on, very possibly have met with the fate of Admiral Duckworth's squadron at Constantinople in the old French war, which had to leave rapidly and fight its way past the Dardanelles forts. The Mex fort and battery, with its Armstrong 12- and 18-ton guns and huge smooth-bores, just opposite the passage through the bar reef, would have been our Dardanelles. There were in addition to this armament no less than nine 12-ton Armstrong guns outside the gate of the fort when I examined it in March, the carriages and slides being inside the fort; and I knew there was a large store of torpedo mines there which might add to the difficulty. I was also aware of the scheme to sink boats laden with stones in the passage through this reef barrier: large boats were all ready for this at Mex. Arabi thought he would be strong enough to overpower and capture the inshore squadron. A gunboat was told off to creep for wires at night off Mex and prevent the channel being blocked, which was about all that could be done. Owing to the absence of any high building, I was unable to get a look with my glasses inside that fort, but I managed it as regards the others, although my having done so, I heard afterwards, became known next day.

The tension of the situation was well known to

the authorities at home, with whom we were in direct telegraphic communication, who seemed at last to have made up their minds we should have to engage the forts, apparently being under the extraordinary delusion that the destruction of the forts would bring Arabi and his friends on their knees. The scheme for the capture of Alexandria, with which both the Admiralty and War Office were thoroughly acquainted, would, according to the revelations in the life of the late Mr Childers, have been considered "an act of war," whereas smashing a fort and its garrison was merely a "military operation." The protection of the Canal, for which a brigade of infantry at Cyprus was ready, was certainly a matter of great consequence unfortunately those who had the affairs of the nation in their keeping could not bring themselves to see that an act of war in the landing of 3000 men at Ramleh to capture Alexandria and the Egyptian chiefs, whilst the fleet engaged the forts, was of very much more importance, and would have been the most certain way of protecting the Canal. Had that scheme been carried out, the destruction of Alexandria, for which Egypt had to pay an indemnity of five millions, would have been avoided, and also the loss of life on both sides in the subsequent campaign, to say nothing of the cost of it, which had to be borne by England. The correspondence in Mr Childers' memoirs indicates very clearly who was to blame for the terrible mistake.

During the whole of this critical time there was one individual for whose personal safety we could not help being very anxious. That was the Khedive, who was to all intents a prisoner in Arabi's hands at Ras-el-Tin. It was confidentially suggested to him

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that I should land at night with a picked lot of men, and bring him on board for his own safety: this he at once rejected. It was an unpleasant feeling that very possibly the first shot would mean his death: however, that must now be risked, and the time for action had arrived. Notwithstanding Arabi's promises to the contrary, he continued to strengthen his works and mount more guns. The first time the searchlight was turned on the Egyptian working-parties, who were as thick as bees on the parapets, there was a great scare amongst them, the light probably being considered as a new form of projectile, some in their fright even cutting at it. Matters had now come to such a head that the admiral was obliged to send in an ultimatum demanding the surrender of one of the forts in which guns had been mounted. Arabi offered to dismount three guns; he was informed the time was past for considering such a proposal. To atone for the construction and arming of works which so seriously imperilled the safety of the ships in harbour by dismounting three guns which could be back in their carriages in less than an hour, was rather too much. Arabi, or rather the colonels, were evidently of opinion that they were strong enough to beat off the fleet. An answer was therefore returned, that if the fort in question was not surrendered by a certain hour, the fleet would open fire and destroy the forts.

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CHAPTER XX.

ALEXANDRIA FORTS.

BEFORE the ultimatum was sent in it was ascertained that all Europeans able and willing to do so had come down to Alexandria and got on board ship: a few still remained in Cairo, and some even in Alexandria. Instructions for the fleet had also been prepared, so that when the ultimatum was sent in there was little left to do except to order all the mercantile steamers out of harbour to a position outside, where they would be safe. To our great regret, our friends of the French navy were instructed by their Government to avoid taking any part in the coming fight. We were quite strong enough to do without them, but we could not help sympathising strongly with our old allies in their vexation at being ordered by their authorities in Paris to abstain from helping us. The American man-of-war, whose crew were very keen to join in, had also, as a neutral, to go; but after we had landed and were rather hard pressed, then, in Egypt, as old Tatnall had done at the Peiho, the American blue-jackets were ashore and alongside

ours.

The inshore squadron, consisting of the Invincible (flagship), Monarch, and Penelope, cleared for action.