Argument for the appellant. On the transcript just mentioned, from the State court, French got a judgment against Hay, in the local court at Philadelphia, March 21st, 1871; and Hay at once* took the case on error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, where he had it now pending. Before the other side could get that court to proceed in the case, Hayt filed a bill-the present bill-in the court belowthe Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Virginia-into which he bad, before this time and with a view of vacating all that had been done there, removed the case from the County Court of Alexandria, in which French as trustee had got the decree against him for rents, and was about proceeding for the furniture. And in his said now bill prayed for and at once obtained, a preliminary injunction to restrain French from proceeding further in Pennsylvania or elsewhere to collect his decree in the County Court of Alexandria on the transcript. And the said Circuit Court having at a later date annulled that decree and dismissed the bill on which it was founded (a course of action which this court in the last preceding case approved and affirmed) proceeded now,§ after answer put in and testimony taken, to make perpetual the preliminary injunction which it had previously granted restraining French from suing in Pennsylvania or elsewhere on the transcript of the decree so ultimately, with the affirmance of this court, annulled as aforesaid. From this its action French took this appeal. Mr. W. W. Willoughby, for the appellant: 1. When the case of French, Trustee, v. Hay et al. was removed from the Alexandria County Court into the Circuit Court of the United States, Hay, if he meant to restrain the use of the transcript, could have filed a cross-bill; and that would have been the proper way. What we now have is an original bill, asking the Circuit Court of the United States for Virginia to take jurisdiction of things in the State of Pennsylvania. This sort of bill was unallowable. 2. But there was a graver objection to the decree from which we appeal. Its effect is to restrain the proceedings of a State court. * April 5th, 1871. † June 1st, 1871. Opinion of the court. The Circuit Court of the United States for Virginia is asked to and does restrain the party from prosecuting a suit or enforcing a judgment which he has in the court of the State of Pennsylvania. Now, the Judiciary Act enacts:* "Nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a State." It is of no pertinence to argue that though the court itself could not be enjoined, yet that a party suing in it may be. This would do indirectly what the statute says shall not be done at all. In Peck v. Jenness† the court say: "The fact that injunction issues only to the parties before the court, and not to the court, is no evasion of the difficulties that are a necessary result of an attempt to exercise that power over a party who is a litigant in another independent forum.” Even though a State court might enjoin a party from using or enforcing a judgment in another State, the Federal court cannot enjoin proceedings in any State court. The act of Congress has no effect upon the State court, but it has upon a Federal court, and says such court shall not enjoin proceedings in a State court. Messrs. H. H. Wells and G. W. Puschall, contra. Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court. A stronger equity can hardly exist than that which is developed in favor of the appellee in the case before us. The order of the court below, annulling the decree upon which the suit at law in Pennsylvania was founded, was fatal to that action, and entitled Hay to a perpetual injunction, without reference to the final result of the prior case. The This bill is not an original one. It is auxiliary and dependent in its character, as much so as if it were a bill of review. court having jurisdiction in personam had power to require the defendant to do or to refrain from doing anything beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction which it might have required * 1 Stat. at Large, 334. 7 Howard, 625. ‡ Logan v. Patrick, 5 Cranch, 288; Dunn v. Clark, 8 Peters, 1; Dunlap v. Stetson, 4 Mason, 349, 360; Clark v. Mathewson, 12 Peters, 164. Opinion of the court. to be done or omitted within the limits of such territory.* Having the possession and jurisdiction of the case, that jurisdiction embraced everything in the case, and every question arising which could be determined in it until it reached its termination and the jurisdiction was exhausted. While the jurisdiction lasted it was exclusive, and could not be trenched upon. by any other tribunal. The court below might, upon a crossbill, and, perhaps, upon motion, have given the relief which was given by the interlocutory and the final decree in the case before us. If it could not be given in this case the result would have shown the existence of a great defect in our Federal jurisprudence, and have been a reproach upon the administration of justice. In that event the payment of the annulled decree may be enforced in Pennsylvania, and Hay, notwithstanding the final decree in that case, and in this case, would find himself in exactly the same situation he would have been if those decrees had been against him instead of being in his favor. They would. be nullities as regards any protection they could have given him. Instead of terminating the strife between him and his adversary, they would leave him under the necessity of engaging in a new conflict elsewhere. This would be contrary to the plainest principles of reason and justice. The prohibition in the Judiciary Act against the granting of injunctions by the courts of the United States touching proceedings in State courts has no application here. The prior jurisdiction of the court below took the case out of the operation of that provision. If the State courts should persist in proceeding-a thing not to be expected the wrong will be on the part of those tribunals and not of the court below. DECREE AFFIRMED. * Watts v. Waddle, 6 Peters, 391; Lewis v. Darling, 1 Howard, 1. Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Peters, 400; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 Howard, 484; Freeman How, 24 Id. 450; Taylor v. Tainter, 16 Wallace, 370. Statement of the case. CONNOYER ET AL. v. SCHAEFFER. 1. Under proceedings before the boards of commissioners appointed under the act of March 2d, 1805, for ascertaining and adjusting the claims to land embraced in the Louisiana purchase, and the several subsequent acts on the same subject, where a claimant presents not only the evidence of original concession, but that also which purports to be the evidences of title to himself, the confirmation, though made to the original grantee (or "concessionee," as he is sometimes styled), "and his legal representatives," operates as a grant to the claimant, although the name of the claimant be omitted in the form of confirmation. Bissell v. Penrose (8 Howard, 317) decides this, and that case is here affirmed. 2. In a suit for recovery of land, under the act of Congress of July 4th, 1836, the plaintiff offered in evidence a written request to the recorder of lands in and for the Territory of Missouri, to record all registered concessions found in certain books named, then in his office. But it did not appear that those under whom the plaintiff claimed, had any agency in giving the notice, nor that any signer of the paper was interested in the lands in question, nor that any of them represented those who were or professed to be so interested. The notice named no claimant, and described no land, and did not intimate that any one was in fact claiming under the concessions referred to. Held, that the paper was not such notice of the claim as the act contemplated. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Missouri; the case being thus: An act of the 24 March, 1805,* for enabling claimants of land in the territory acquired by us from France in the year 1803 (within which territory the present State of Missouri is included), to have their incomplete titles to lands confirmed and perfected, enacts that the claimant of such land shall file within a certain time, with the register or recorder of land titles of the district, his notice in writing, together with every grant, "order of survey, deed, conveyance, or other written evidence of his claim," and that unless he shall so file "such written evidence," all his right shall be void. "Nor shall any grant, . . . deed of conveyance, or other written evidence," says the act, "which shall not be so recorded, as above directed, ever be considered or admitted in evidence * 2 Stat. at Large, 326. Statement of the case. in any court of the United States, against any grant derived from the United States." The act then provides for the appointment of commissioners, who were to hear and decide in a summary manner "all matters respecting such claims." By a subsequent act, one of 21st April, 1806,* the time for filing the "notices in writing and written evidences of claims" was extended, but with a similar provision, as to all claims not so presented being barred, and the evidence of them not admitted in evidence if not so filed. The act enacts that oral testimony may be heard in support of or opposition to such claims. Under these acts many old French and Spanish titles in Missouri were examined and confirmed. But the acts expired before all that were filed could be disposed of. Accordingly new acts were passed; one July 9th, 1832, and one March 24, 1833,† providing "for the final adjustment of land claims in Missouri." These acts provided for a board of commissioners to "examine all unconfirmed claims to lands in that State heretofore filed in the office of said recorder according to law;" and enacted that in examining these claims heretofore filed, they "shall proceed in the examination in a summary manner, with or without any new application of claimants." Under these acts, therefore, no new claim could be filed before the board; the commissioners were only to pass upon the claims already filed. These statutes being on the statute-book, Louis Labeaume, on the 27th of June, 1808, gave notice to the old board of commissioners that is to say, the board proceeding under the acts of 1805 and 1807-of his claim to a lot of land-a common field lot-in the city of St. Louis. The tract had been conceded in 1772 by the acting lieutenant-governor of the Spanish government to a certain Françoise, widow Dodier; Labeaume, of course, claiming by conveyances under her. The conveyance to Labeaume, as filed before the boards. * 2 Stat. at Large, 391. 4 Stat. at Large, pp. 565-661. |