from referring to the fourth plea, because that plea is not only set forth in the Nisi Prius record, but the present jury are to try the issues found on that record, and also "to inquire what damages the plaintiff hath sustained on occasion of the premises whereof the Court hath given judgment for the said plaintiff," which is on this very plea. Talfourd, Serjt., further addressed the jury, and contended that the reason why the plaintiff was hissed was not from any conspiracy of the defendants, but because the feeling of the whole audience was against him on account of the libellous character of the articles in the Satiri st newspaper. TINDAL, C. J., (in summing up).-This action is brought against the defendants for having conspired together in order to prevent the appearance of the plaintiff as an actor at Covent Garden Theatre; and in the declaration, two overt acts are stated, the first, that the defendants hired a number of other persons to engage in the same design, and, by their hissing and hooting, produced the effect intended by themselves in the conspiracy-the second, that the defendants joined in the hooting themselves. You will say whether upon the evidence you are satisfied that the defendants are guilty of the conspiracy charged, and, if you are, what amount of damages the plaintiff has sustained. The law on this subject lies in a narrow compass. There is no doubt that the public who go to a theatre have the right to express their free and unbiassed opinions of the merits of the performers who appear upon the stage, and I believe that no persons are more anxious that the public should have that right than the actors themselves, for if it were aid down that persons who exercised their free judgments would be subject to actions for damages, not only would it be fatal to the actors on the stage, but it would prevent persons from frequenting the theatre at all. At the same time parties have no right to go to the theatre 1843. GREGORY v. DUKE OF BRUNSWICK. 1843. GREGORY v. DUKE OF BRUNSWICK. by a preconcerted plan to make such a noise that an actor, without any judgment being formed on his performance, should be driven from the stage by such a scheme, probably concocted for an unworthy purpose; and therefore it is only, if you can see by the evidence that has been given, that the two defendants had laid a preconcerted plan to deprive Mr. Gregory of the benefits which he expected to result from his appearance on the stage, that you ought to find a verdict against them. A distinction has been taken as to the right of the public to express their feelings as to an actor's private character when on the stage. It is not necessary that I should give any opinion on that point, as the question here is, whether these parties went to the theatre according to a scheme that had been laid to prevent an actor from appearing. I, therefore, reserve to myself the free exercise of my opinion on the other point, and I will state it whenever it shall become necessary. Verdict for the defendants. Shee, and Byles, Serjts., and Montagu Chambers, for the plaintiff. Talfourd, Serjt., Humfrey and Wordsworth, for the defendants. [Attornies-H. Wickens, and Vallance.] IN the ensuing Term, Shee, Serjt., applied for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, inasmuch as the Lord Chief Justice, in his summing up, had not directed the jury that they might find a verdict against one defendant only, and also on the ground that the verdict was a verdict. against evidence. He also applied for a venire de novo, on the ground that the jury had not assessed damages on that part of the record to which the demurrer applied. The Court, after taking time to consider, refused the rule as to the alleged misdirection, and as to the venire de novo; but granted a rule to shew cause, on the ground only of the verdict being against evidence, which was, after argument, discharged. 1843. GREGORY v. DUKE OF BRUNSWICK. Sitting in London in Michaelmas Term, 1843. BEFORE MR. JUSTICE CRESSWELL. BEDFORD V. FORBES and Others. ISSUE directed by the Court of Common Pleas, under the stat. 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58, s. 1, to try the right of a vendor to recover back a deposit on the purchase of certain real property sold by auction. It appeared that the plaintiff had attended the auction at which the estate in question was sold, and it having been knocked down to him, he paid the deposit into the hands of the auctioneer, and signed the usual contract; and that after that, an abstract of the title having been sent to him, several objections were made to the title, one of which was, that there was an outstanding docketed judgment for £1500 against the vendor; but this judgment had not been registered in pursuance of the provisions of the stats. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, sect. 19, and 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, ss. 2 and 3. It did not appear what the precise date of the judgment was, but it was assumed by the vendee, and not denied by the vendor, that the date was before the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110 came into operation. On this ground (with others) the vendee claimed to rescind the contract, and demanded a return of the deposit from the auctioneer, which being refused, the vendee brought an VOL. I. Ꭰ NP.. 1843. BEDFORD v. FORBES. action against the auctioneer for money had and received, and he having applied to the Court under the stat. 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 58, the present issue was directed to be tried, in order to determine whether the vendee was entitled to rescind the contract, and receive back his deposit (a). CRESSWELL, J., (in summing up).—I am of opinion that the outstanding judgment in question was not a valid objection to the title, as it had not been registered in pursuance of the provisions of the statutes which have been cited. There was another objection to the title, which turned entirely on matters of fact, which were left by his Lordship to the jury. Verdict for the plaintiff. Shee, Serjt., and E. James, for the plaintiff. Dowling, Serjt., and Bramwell, for the defendant. [Attornies-James, and Teague.] (a) By the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13, it is enacted, that " a judgment already entered up or to be hereafter entered up against any person in any of her Majesty's superior courts at Westminster, shall operate as a charge upon all lands," &c.; but, by sect. 19 of the same statute, it is provided, that no such judgment shall, by virtue of that act, affect any lands, &c., until it be registered in the manner therein mentioned; and by the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 11, s. 2, it is enacted, "that no judgment already docketed and entered" under the stat. 4 & 5 Will. & M. c. 20, shall, upon the 1st of August, 1841, affect any lands, &c., until it is registered in the manner prescribed by the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110; and by sect. 3 & 4 of the stat. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, the date of the registering is to be inserted in the book kept for that purpose, and all judgments must be re-registered every five years. COURT OF EXCHEQUER. First Sitting in London in Hilary Term, 1843. 1843. WAITHMAN v. ELSEE. Jan. 19. ASSUMPSIT for money lent, with a count upon an ac- A paper, signed count stated. Plea, non assumpsit. The cause was undefended, and Bramwell, for the plaintiff, offered in evidence an I. O. U., signed by the defendant, but not addressed to any one, which was in the following form: "I. O. U. £85, to be paid May 5. It was not stamped. by the defendant, was in the following form: -"I. O. U. £85, to be paid May 5:"Held, that this was a promissory note, and required a stamp. "WM. ELSEE." ROLFE, B.-This is a promissory note. I cannot allow it to be read in evidence, as it is unstamped (a). The I. O. U. was not given in evidence, and other evidence was given. Bramwell, for the plaintiff. Verdict for the plaintiff. [Attornies-Walters, and Leigh.]. (a) Baron Bayley lays down, (Bay. on Bills, ch. 1, s. 2), "No particular words are necessary to make a bill or note, but it must be a written order or promise, which, from the time of making it, cannot be complied with or performed without payment of money. Thus, an order or promise to de liver, or that I. S. shall receive |