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in the hearing of B., and he made a statement in answer:-Held, that, on the trial of the action for false imprisonment, these depositions, and the plaintiff's statement in answer, were receivable in evidence for the defendant, as being matters stated in the hearing of the plaintiff, to which he made an answer, but that the depositions were no proof of any fact therein stated. Jones v. Morrell, 266

11. In trespass for taking the plaintiff's goods, with a plea of not possessed, it was proposed to shew that the goods were not his, by shewing, inter alia, that he was not twentyone. To shew this, it was proved, that, by the custom of the law of the Jews, children are circumcised on the eighth day from their birth, and that it was the duty of the chief rabbi to perform this rite, and make an entry of it in a book. It was proposed to give in evidence the entry in this book of the plaintiff's circumcision, the entry being in the handwriting of a chief rabbi, who was dead: — Held, that the entry was not receivable in evidence. Davis v. Lloyd, 275

12. In case for running down the plaintiff's ship, a nautical witness may be asked, whether, having heard the evidence, and admitting the facts proved by the plaintiff to be true, he is of opinion that the collision could have been avoided by proper care on the part of the defendant's servants. Fenwick v. Bell,

312

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14. The editor of a newspaper swore that A. was the writer of a certain article which had appeared in that paper many years before, and that the MS. had been lost. A. stated that he had been in the habit of writing such articles for the newspaper in question, but that he had no recollection of having sent the particular article now referred to. He swore, however, that all the statements made in the articles he did send were true:Held, that the newspaper might be put into A.'s hand, in order to refresh his memory; and that he might be asked, whether, looking at the article, he had any doubt that the fact was as therein stated. Ibid.

15. In an action by a sheriff for his poundage, proof that he has acted as sheriff is sufficient evidence of his being so without proof of his appointment. Bunbury v. Matthews,

380

16. In an action for sheriff's poundage, the sheriff's officer produced the sheriff's warrant under which he had acted, which concluded, "given under the seal at my office." The only seal to it was a small piece of blue paper wafered to it and stamped with a wafer stamp. The officer stated that he did not know this to be the seal of the sheriff or his office, but stated that he had received the warrant from Mr. B., who acted as the plaintiff's undersheriff, and that it was precisely similar to all the other warrants on which he had acted:-Held, sufficient proof of the seal. Ibid.

17. On an indictment against accessaries before the fact to the forgery of an administration bond on administration granted of the effects of J. S: -Held, 1st, that a session-clerk from Scotland had no right to look at a kirk session book to learn the writing of a clergyman to enable him to swear to the writing of a certificate found, on the death of J. S., among his papers.

2ndly, That such book was not evidence itself, and, not being so, could not be looked at for any purpose whatever. 3rdly, That the certificate in question, which was a certificate purporting to have been given by the minister and elders to J. S. on leaving the kirk, would not be evidence, even if the minister's writing were proved. 4thly, That the proof that the certificate was found among papers indorsed on the outside in J. S.'s handwriting, which papers were delivered, after his death, by a servant to J. S.'s master, who produced them at the trial, was no proof that the certificate had been in J. S.'s possession, the servant not being called as a witness; that the indorsement only shewed that that one paper had been in Stewart's presence, and the statement in his writing was not evidence. Reg. v. Barber, 434

18. In cross-examining the master of J. S., the prisoner's counsel asked whether he did not put the age (sixtyfive) on the tombstone from the best information he could get; and he said he put it there in consequence of what J. S. told him. Ibid.

19. The counsel for the prosecucution asked what it was that J. S. told him:-Held, that this question could not be put. Ibid.

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20. An indictment for perjury in an affidavit stated the affidavit to have been sworn "before one R. G. W., then and there being a commissioner duly authorized and empowered to take affidavits in the said county of Gloucester in or concerning any cause depending in her said Majesty's Court of Exchequer at Westminster." was proved by Mr. R. G. W. that he had acted as a commissioner for taking affidavits in the Exchequer for ten years, but had never seen his commission, and that ten years ago he applied to his agent to procure for him a commission to take affidavits in the Exchequer, and that his agent had told him

that he had done so:-Held, that the proof of Mr. R. G. W.'s acting as a commissioner was primâ facie evidence that he was so. Reg. v. Newton,

469

21. T. occupied lands from 1790 to 1815, but had ceased to occupy them before the time of his death. At T.'s death, among his papers were found a series of receipts for the rent of this land from 1790 to 1804, signed by M. P. sen., who died in 1806, and a similar series of receipts for rent from 1806 to 1815, signed by M. P. jun., (the daughter of M. P. sen.), who died in 1826:-Held, in ejectment for these lands, that these receipts were receivable as evidence of the seisin of M. P. sen., and M. P. jun. Doe d. Blayney v. Savage, 487

22. An examined copy of an entry in a parish register of marriages is receivable in evidence to prove a marriage, although the entry in the register purport to be attested by one witness only, the words "In the presence of" in the entry being followed by one name only. Ibid.

23. In an action for use and occupation by the assignees of a bankrupt, it was proved that the defendant had said that he had been served with a writ for rent by the attorney for the assignees, but that the bankrupt was his landlord, and his attorney had sent an indemnification for the bankrupt to sign, which the bankrupt had signed:-Held, that the assignees were entitled to give in evidence statements made by the bankrupt, without any further proof of the nature or extent of the indemnity. Arkle v. Wakeman,

516

24. A., by an agreement in writing, agreed to win stones, &c., "for the purpose of building" certain cottages: -Held, that parol evidence could not be given, to explain the sense in which the word "building" was used. Charlton v. Gibson, 541

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26. In an action for goods sold and delivered upon the credit of the defendant, a question as to the amount of the defendant's income cannot be put, if the evidence be tendered with a view to shew the improbability of authority having been given to purchase the goods. Rowe v. Polkinghorne, 618

27. Where, however, an action was brought against a widow for dresses ordered and worn by her daughter, who was about to be married: -Held, that evidence of the amount of the defendant's income was admissible, as tending to shew that the dresses were not supplied upon her credit, but upon the credit of her daughter's future husband. Ibid.

28. It was proposed on the part of a plaintiff to give in evidence a letter written by the defendant's attorney, which purported to be an answer to a letter written to him by the plaintiff's attornies: Held, that, if the plaintiff's counsel put in this letter of the defendant's attorney, he should also call for and put in the letter to which it was an answer, and not leave it to the defendant to put in the letter of the plaintiff's attornies as his evidence. Walson v. Moore, 626

29. On the trial of an issue directed by the Court of Chancery to try whether a deed of assignment was fraudulent or not, a witness was called to prove that another deed, which bore date more than three years before the trial, was not executed on the day on which it bore date, but was executed by one party on the day after, and by the

other three days after. The witness stated, that he could not recollect how this was, but stated that he had been examined on this subject before commissioners of bankrupt within a fortnight of the time when the matters occurred, and when the facts were fresh in his memory. He stated that his examination before the commissioners was not in his own handwriting, but he had signed it. The witwas allowed to look at his examination, to refresh his memory. Wood v. Cooper, 645

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30. In covenant on a lost deed with non est factum pleaded, it was proved that, on search, the deed, which by the date was sixty years old, could not be found in the muniment-room of the plaintiff, but that there was found there a paper which purported to be an attested copy of it. It was proved that both the persons whose signatures were to it as attesting the copy were dead; and the handwriting of one of them was proved; and it was also proved that persons of the same names as those who had attested the original deed were also dead:Held, that upon this proof, this paper was not receivable as secondary evidence of the deed. Brindley v. Woodhouse, 647

31. In an action against a sheriff for a false return to a fi. fa., office copies of the fi. fa. and return which are not proved to have been examined copies, are not receivable in evidence, even where the original cause was in the same court as the action against the sheriff. Pitcher v. King, 655

32. On the trial of an indictment for a conspiracy, the answers in Chancery of the defendants, made on oath by them in a suit instituted against them by the prosecutor, are receivable in evidence on the part of the prosecution. Reg. v. Goldshede, 657

33. An information was filed by the Attorney-General, under the stat. 33

776 EXECUTOR DE SON TORT.

Geo. 3, c. 52, s. 62, against an officer of the East India Company, for receiving gifts in India. A mandamus was granted under the stat. 13 Geo. 3, c. 63, s. 40, for the examination of witnesses in the Supreme Court at Madras. One of the witnesses there gave in evidence certain original accounts, copies of which were returned to the Court of Queen's Bench by the Supreme Court at Madras, with the examinations: -Held, that on the trial of the information in the Court of Queen's Bench, these copies were not receivable in evidence, and that the Court at Madras should have transmitted the original accounts to the Court of Queen's Bench. Reg. v. Douglas, 670

EXCISE OFFICERS.
See TRESPASS, 5, 6.

EXECUTION.

See BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

EXECUTOR DE SON TORT.

1. A. had ordered a pair of boots of B., and had paid B. for them. The boots had never been delivered to A., and being in the hands of the journeyman who made them, A. was obliged to pay the journeyman the price of making them before he could get possession of them. A. being sued as executor de son tort of B.:-Held, that he was liable for the value of the boots as executor de son tort, but that he was entitled to be allowed the sum to be paid the journeyman. Hobby v. Ruell, 716

2. A., after the death of B., obtained possession of the cattle of B. from C. with whom at the death of B. they were agisted; A. paying C. for the agisting, A. being sued as executor de son tort of B.:-Held, that he was not entitled to be allowed

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EXECUTORS AND ADMINI-
STRATORS.

See EXECUTOR DE SON TORT.-
FORGERY, 5. — LANDLORD AND
TENANT, 1.

1. A. had his goods distrained on for rent (no rent being due) and was obliged to pay a sum of 97. 138. to procure the distress to be withdrawn. A. died, and his executrix brought trespass for the taking of the goods, and the declaration stated that the goods were detained till A. paid 91. 138., whereby his personal estate was diminished:-Held, that on this declaration the executrix could only recover damages to the amount of 97. 13s.; and semble, that the executrix could not have recovered any greater amount if the declaration had been in any other form. Lockier v. Paterson,

271

2. On a plea of plene administravit, it was proved, on the part of the plaintiffs, that, at the time of the death of the intestate, there were crops on his farm, but that there had been an auction on the premises about a month before, at which these crops were put up for sale:-Held, that, as the crops remained on the premises at the time of the death of the intestate, it lay on the defendant, as administrator, to shew that these crops had not come to his hands. Stroud v. Dandridge,

445

3. On a plea of plene administravit, it appeared that the intestate, six months before his death, had assigned all his effects to trustees for the benefit of such of his creditors as should execute the deed of assignment. The deed was executed by himself and the trustees, but not by any other creditor:-Held, that the administrator might give in evidence advertisements

FALSE DECLARATION.

published soon after the execution of the deed, stating where the deed lay for execution by the creditors, and calling a meeting of creditors as to the sale of the effects, and also a resolution of that meeting, that the effects should be sold, as this evidence went to shew that the deed was acted upon, and was a bona fide and not a fraudulent deed. Ibid.

4. In an action on a promissory note, payable "to the executors of the late Mr. W. B." the proper proof that the plaintiffs are the executors of Mr. W. B. is the production of the probate of his will, and the reading in evidence so much of it as shews that he appointed the plaintiffs his executors, and the giving in evidence the grant of administration (annexed to the probate) is not sufficient for this purpose. Hamilton v. Aston, 679

FALSE DECLARATION, UNDER THE STAT. 5 & 6 WILL. 4, c. 62.

1. An indictment on the stat. 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 62, s. 13, for making a false declaration before a magistrate, stated, that, by the rules of a benefit society, any full free member of it who sustained a loss by an accidental fire was to be indemnified to the extent of £15, on making a declaration before a magistrate verifying his loss, and that the defendant was a full free member of the society, and had made a false declaration before a magistrate, that he had sustained a loss by fire.. On the trial, the rules of the society could not be proved. But held, that the allegations in the indictment respecting the rules might be rejected as surplusage, as the offence of the defendant, in making the false declaration as to the fire, would be an offence within the statute, if no such benefit society had ever existed. Reg. v. Boynes,

65

FALSE IMPRISONMENT. 777

2. The 18th section of the stat. 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 62, which enables magistrates to receive voluntary declarations instead of oaths, extends to declarations generally, and is not confined to declarations with respect to the confirmation of written instruments, or allegations, or proofs of debts or of the execution of deeds, or other matters ejusdem generis. Ibid.

3. Where a person is indicted for having made a false declaration as to a fire having taken place at his house, evidence may be given, that, with the declaration, he sent a certificate, which stated the fire to have occurred, and that the signatures to that certificate are all forgeries, as this evidence may go to shew that the declaration was wilfully false. Ibid.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

See EVIDENCE, 10.

1. If a magistrate commits a person to prison in a case in which he has no jurisdiction, he is liable for all the circumstances that usually attend the execution of a warrant of commitment, such as the party being handcuffed, having his hair cut short at the prison, and his being put in a bath there; but not for any violence or excess of the officers. Mason v. Barker, 100

2. If a party is taken into custody by a constable, on a warrant, the signature of which is proved to be of the handwriting of the defendant, a magistrate, this is primâ facie evidence against the defendant in an action for false imprisonment, without further proof that the warrant was issued by him. Ibid.

3. Where a party is committed for non-payment of a penalty, in a case where the magistrate has no jurisdiction, and, after a part of the imprisonment, he is discharged on the penalty

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