mean, that in every successive state in which it is, the mind is essentially and constantly active. When, therefore, it has come into the condition which he denominates E, or any other, it is at once at work; modifying, by means of its own inherent qualities, the impressions it has received, and with the combined power which it thus gains, modifying also incessantly the passive influences of the outward world. It thus is perpetually occupied in gathering up strength, and gently, but effectually, goes forward to that ascendancy over 'circumstances' which is its peculiar birthright. In fact, as I have already intimated,circumstances' are not influences, till they are received and felt by the mind, and then they rise or sink in importance, and take that bent and color which the mind is fitted to give them. They influence it, I admit, again and again-but in the main, they are mastered and controlled. In fact, to employ an illustration, circumstances are not the parent river, but a tributary stream. Finally, let us try the great social discovery, the grand revolutionary maxim, by an application of it to a few cases, where we are in no danger of misunderstanding ourselves or others. What, then, are those things of which it may be truly affirmed? Our garments are made for and not by us.' Our houses are made ‘for and not by us.' Is their condition the same as that of our characters? Who does not feel the incongruity of asserting the same thing of his character as of his clothing? Again;-of the animal creation, it may, in a qualified sense, be said, their condition is formed for them and not by them.' Is there, then, no difference between the process by which the condition of the animal and that by which the character of man is produced? Yet their condition partakes of the compound influence of organization and circumstances. We are, then, to believe that the process is identically the same. Does such a conclusion, however, agree with your experience-your observation-your convictions? If not, where is the essential difference? What distinguishes the one process from the other? What new element intervenes between the formation of a coat and the formation of character-between the production of a well-fed bullock and the creation of a wise and benevolent man? It is reason-an active principle, a self-acting and spontaneous power, a power of self-government, a power of control over outward influences, a power capable of comparing ideas, adjudicating betwixt rival influences, of forming judgments respecting moral and physical qualities-of approving, condemning, electing, and casting away. And of a being possessed of such a power, can it with any propriety be said that his character or his destiny is formed for and not by him?' Change the ordinary meaning of the words you employ to embody the essence of your doctrine, you may be right-retain them, speak so as not to mislead, so as to be understood, so as to meet the customary apprehensions of men,-you must be wrong, you are condemned at the bar of public opi nion. And did I not know how much the baneful influence of false ideas is frequently counteracted by the better feelings of our nature, by those instincts and impulses which men may becloud but cannot destroy, I should entertain a very lively fear that a doctrine which assimilates the formation of character to a 'chemical action,' and reduces it to a level with the process pursued in preparing flocks and herds for the shambles, would end in lowering its adherents to the grossness of a mere animal and physical condition. Certainly so far as the influence of this degrading aphorism extends, it can of itself produce no distinguished excellence, and for myself I see not how you could well persuade men of a more injurious doctrine than that which, by affirming that their characters are formed for and not by them,' teaches that in ourselves we have no power of self-control -no power of control over the external world-but, like moats in the sunbeam, are borne hither and thither-of a necessity, an irresistible necessity borne hither and thither, by every gust within our bosoms, and every gust without. To complete the demoralizing tendency of this doctrine, there needed but the addition, that man is irresponsible for his actions, and perishes in the hour that he draws his last earthly breath. LECTURE VI. WERE there any room for doubt whether Socialism, as professed by Mr. Owen and his followers, goes to the enormous lengths which my last Lecture implies, all hesitation would be at once removed by the fact, that another of its avowed fundamental teachings is the unqualified denial of all responsibility on the part of man. This denial is set forth as a necessary consequence of the maxim, that‘Man's character is formed for and not by him.' The language of the sect is in brief as follows:'Every part of the character of man is formed for him by circumstances pre-existing to the will, which decides his actions; and he is therefore irresponsible for the character formed for him, whatever it may be.'* 'Man is not to be made a being of superior order by teaching him that he is responsible for his will and his actions. This is putting the most formidable obstacle in the way of attaining the most valuable knowledge that man can acquire; it is the direct method to prevent him from knowing himself; and it teaches him to believe himself another kind of being from that which he really is; and, in consequence, to err in all his thoughts and actions respecting his own nature and human nature generally.'+ 'That greatest of all errors, that individuals form their own character; this hydra of human calamity; this immolator of every principle of rationality; this monster, which hitherto has effectually guarded every avenue that can lead to true benevolence and active kindness.' 'As + Ibid, page 20. *Book of the New Moral World, page 20. L I write, my blood is chilled at the horrid effects arising from the principle of human responsibility.' Man is made by a being unknown to himself, and without his consent; and therefore cannot, with any degree of justice or of common sense, be made accountable for the qualities of his nature, or for what he himself has been made to be ;-to make him accountable for them, must engender all the bad passions, keep men ignorant, produce poverty, crime, disease, and misery continually, and make man an inconsistent and irrational being.'† These statements are beyond a question sufficiently explicit. We cannot mistake their meaning; as little can we exaggerate their tenor. Man is produced by a power unknown to him, and without his consent; and is, in consequence, irresponsible. He is entirely the creature of circumstances; and is, in consequence, irresponsible. Here we see that Atheism is an essential part of the Social system. The power that produced man is unknown to him; and, consequently, he is irresponsible. The constructor of Socialism felt, that if he admitted an intelligent First Cause, he could not, with any show of truth, put a negative on the responsibility of the being whom, in creating him, God made in his own likeness, and thereby endowed with a power of self-control; and with this feeling, in order to do away with man's responsibility, he first disowned a primary Intelligence. I also remark, in passing into the subject, that we have in these statements another instance of that absence of evidence to which I had occasion to allude in the preceding lecture. The only show of argument we find is in the attempt which is made to connect together the several propositions which combine to make up the Socialist theory. This apart, the rest of the assertions are * Clarke, page 8. + Book of the New Moral World, page 34. |