power and majesty the world is governed, nor to suffer unlearned persons to be enticed by fraud, lest their simplicity should become a prey and a booty to the artful. Therefore it is worthy of philosophy to have undertaken the office of reviving the worship of the gods, and leading men, by laying aside their pertinacious obstinacy, to avoid the tortures of their body, so that they might not be willing to bear in vain the bitter laceration of their members; nor could the piety and foresight of princes be more brightly distinguished than in defending the religion of the gods, putting down an impious and foolish superstition, and requiring all men to devote themselves to the sacred rites.'*

It would be easy to show, in detail, that even in modern times, philosophy has not been free from a persecuting spirit, and has advanced doctrines which breathe the essence of bigotry and intolerance. What was the bearing towards each other of the rival sectaries among the schoolmen of the middle ages? Differences of opinion begat hostility, hostility degenerated into rancor, rancor led to violence. Nay, it requires no profound knowledge of the writings of the French philosophers of the last century to know, that some of those who were chief among them, indulged in such a bitterness of spirit and severity of language against Christianity and its professors, that if there is such a thing as persecution in words, their advocates will find some difficulty in exonerating them from the charge. Nor can I be easily induced to think that the latitude of contempt, ridicule, and rancor with which they wrote against the religion of their country, had but a small effect in the rage which, a few years after their death, levelled all its institutions and interests with the dust, and for a time set up, in the person of an abandoned woman, the goddess of reason as the idol of the national homage.

It must be even more obvious to every impartial stu* Bayle.

dent of history that ambition, state policy, and political power have, in all ages, waged the bitterest and most destructive conflicts of rivalry; nor do I think it would be hard to prove that, where religious error has slain its thousands, they have immolated their myriads. Even the most disgraceful persecution of modern times, the massacre of St. Bartholomew, was a political atrocity veiled under a religious guise. Indeed, the intimation of an ancient historian* in regard to the rulers of one country contains a general truth, that statesmen aim at power, and use religion and religious animosities as their instruments.

So much, then, for the allegation that Christianity introduced persecution into the world. In relation to the Christians of the fourth, and immediately subsequent ages, the fact seems to be, that in regard to persecution, while they repeated the lesson which former masters had taught them, they proved themselves but imperfect scholars in the unholy task. And it certainly is, in itself, a very extenuating circumstance that, so far from being first to display intolerance, they did but too naturally- yet most wrongfully-return a less evil for a greater. I repeat, I offer no apology for bigotry. I only wish the truth to be known, and the verdict to be according to the evidence. With this desire I must then add, that the first decree which issued from any monarch in favour of entire and universal liberty of conscience, was the work of the first Christian Emperor, Constantine; and although it must, in truth, be said that he did not himself remain faithful to his own avowed wishes, yet neither did he indulge in intolerance to the extent of preceding heathen Emperors, nor to the extent with which the enemies of Christianity have charged against him; and the most impartial of all chroniclers, as well as the most industrious,+ has satisfactorily shown that long after the establishment of

Christianity in power, Heathenism was tolerated in no small degree, and allowed some share of the dignities and emoluments of social life. Whence, too, I would

ask, but from the bosom of Christianity itself, has, in more modern days, proceeded the voice which has demanded and eventually gained-in no mean degreethe restoration of the rights of conscience. At the period of the Reformation it was not philosophy, but the religion of Jesus, which not only struck a fatal blow at the Papal tyranny, but, by the mouth of eminent Unitarian writers, threw out principles of religious liberty which, when fully realized, will secure all that its most ardent friend could wish; and the standard, the imperishable writings-the master pieces in which the rights of conscience find a vindication, and by which they have been in part, at least, effectually gained-the writings which impregnated the mind of modern Europe both with just conceptions of religious liberty, and the deep resolve to secure its attainment, came from no school of mere philosophy, from no cabinet of politicians, but from men who regarded the religion of Jesus as their own hope, and the hope of the world,-from Milton, Bishop Taylor, and from Locke. Nor do I fear to affirm, that the great battle of liberty which has been won in this country, has, from the days of the eighth Henry to the fourth George, been fought on the field of religion. The highest rights which she has, England owes to the faithful, costly, but successful vindication of their principles, which the Dissenters from her Established Church have so honourably achieved.

These remarks furnish us with the means of confirming the view I have given of the nature of persecution. Analyse the complex idea represented by the word persecution, or intolerance. Is it the infliction of injury? Yes; but not merely so, for war does that. Is it a manifestation of selfishness? Yes; but something more, for trade is the pursuit of self-interest. Is it a fond attach

ment to one's own ideas?

Yes; but not exclusively,

for such conceit attaches to persons in all ranks of life. Seek, then, for the idea in the union of these qualities. Persecution consists of an undue self-estimation, called into violent action by mistaken views of self-interest, and carried out into active injuries against dissidents, by means of the association with itself of social power. Its origin is in mental pride, its immediate parent is a false sense of wrong, of wounded self-esteem, at the prevalence of diversity of opinion; and its arms are the opprobrious tongue, the prison, and the sword. The free-thinker and the moral innovator offend my self-love, and endanger my interests: he thus kindles the strongest passions of my breast, and, according to my opportunity, I seek my revenge, and attempt to arrest the evil by compulsion. Pride, selfishness, and violence are, then, the constituent qualities of intolerance. In other words, it is the infliction of evil, as I have before observed, on account of diversity of opinion. Will it, then, be maintained that it is peculiar to religion? Did not Voltaire persecute Christians, when he loaded them with names of ridicule and opprobrium? Was Christianity its author? Christianity suffered all manner of evil before it inflicted any. What then? Are we to lay the charge on religion and philosophy alike? By no means; they aim to remedy the very evil of which they are wrongfully accused. Where, then, does the burden lie? On the lower passions of our nature. Pride and selfishness engender intolerance and persecution. These are passions which are of universal prevalence, and when they are excited by opposition and armed with power, they prompt to persecution. Look at the Christian Church. So long as it was depressed, it was tolerant; seated by the side of the Cæsars, it became intolerant. The Church of England first suffered, and then, becoming dominant, had récourse to persecution. The possession of social power

E

is the circumstance which has let loose the animosities of rival religionists and rival sectaries of all kinds; and the only sure guarantee we can as yet possess for the security of mental liberty, is in preventing the accumulation of unrestrained power in the hands of any associated body of men. Some opinions, undoubtedly, tend more than others to encourage persecution—but I would trust philosophy, I would trust religion; I would not trust human passions, I would not trust false views of human interests, I would not place my rights of conscience within the reach of social power. And here, I am naturally led to utter a word of warning. This is the day of Associations. Men associate for objects of all kinds, and, curious enough, they associate to formas if at a blow, 'A New Moral World.' It will be well, if, in the midst of these associations, individual rights are not sacrificed. Association implies the concentration of power in a few hands. This is one secret of its efficiency. And the power thus accumulated may be used for harm as well as for good; to establish an oligarchy and a despotism, which, however benevolent they may appear, will be sure to invade the rights of individuals, and perhaps the dearest rights of conscience. And, except I am mistaken, I have observed the working of passions in connexion with Socialism, which show that the leaven of unrighteousness, the love of power, and the consequent intolerance of rivalry, is not idle within the Community.' At present, indeed, its very constitution seems to be the government of the few; and in the hands of the few, whatever power and property the sect possesses is to be found. Nor can I understand how, in the passage from the actual state of society into the land of promise, the liberty of individuals and of the body should fail to be endangered, when of necessity the working out of the change, the admission of members, and, in a word, the whole machinery, is in