fundamental truth. I will first take Socialism on its own ground. The cause of the universe is known or unknown. Say it is unknown;-you go at once, as I have proved, into palpable Atheism. But you reply— 'We admit a cause, though an unknown cause.' You admit a cause-What has led you to that admission ?— what is your evidence? The fact of the existence of the world and its inhabitants? But why? Is it because every effect must have a cause? Then it is no less true that every effect must have an adequate cause ; and by consequence, that which made the world must be equal to the work he made. If so, the maker is known by his works. In the admission of an adequate cause you have admitted an intelligent Deity, for the effects you have to account for require for their production no less the operation of intelligence than they require a cause at all. In ascending from any effects to their admitted cause, you, by the very act, affirm that the cause is equal to the effects produced; in other words, you know something of the cause to which you ascend, otherwise you refer the effects to nothing, and use words without meaning.

Take the other branch of the alternative;-say the cause is known, that some of its qualities are known. Whence this knowledge? From the effects produced? Then what are the qualities, the attributes to which the effects point? This the effects themselves will enable us to answer. What, then, is their character? I have no need to descend to any minuteness. What impress do they obviously bear? Is it not of intelligence? The making of a watch you refer to man; for the rounding of a pebble, the action of flowing water is accounted sufficient. The influence of matter is assigned as the cause of the one; for the other, you cannot rest satisfied till you have referred it to the action of mind. If you look at the mere polish of its cover, the idea of in

telligence is not forced on your thoughts; but the moment you mark its structure, and the concurrence of its parts to one and a useful result, you think of the skill of the master-mind which designed and constructed the mechanism. What hinders a similar conclusion in regard to the maker of the mind which made the watch? And having ascended from the mechanism of the watch to its maker, and ascribed to him that degree of intelligence which the structure of the several parts implies, can you go from the maker of the watch to its maker, and fail to refer any qualities to Him? In both cases, you must admit, at least, the operation of mind; and I see not why you should not in the case of the maker of the man, as well as the maker of the watch, admit-I see not how you can avoid admitting-so much mind, mind of such quality and power, as the effects in each case are found to indicate. And, indeed, whatever mystery an atheistical philosophy may gather up out of its own mists to throw around the existence of Deity, common sense, which, by the mere force of the association of ideas, by the fundamental principles of human reasoning, cannot avoid referring all effects to adequate causes -common sense will lead men infallibly to see evidences of an intelligent Deity in the works of nature, as much as traces of the operation of mind in works of human skill. It is in vain to tell me you never saw a world made. If you had, you would not need the evidence of analogy. Nor have you, in all probability, nor one human being in a million, ever seen a watch made. General principles are your guide in both cases; and they are as trust-worthy in one instance as they are in the other. It is a necessity of your nature-a necessity, bred, if not born, with you to refer all that you see to some adequate cause, the universe as much as the pin. And in the word 'adequate' is, in each case, an impli

cation of qualities,-of qualities equal to the effect. In regard, therefore, to the universe, you know something of its author; you know not only that he possesses intelligence, but intelligence of such a nature and extent as would be competent to create and sustain this complicated, boundless, and harmonious whole. On both branches of the alternative, therefore, we are brought to the admission of an intelligent cause.

Again ;-Socialism, as every system must which aspires to the character of a philosophy-Socialism is incessantly occupied in forming and pronouncing judgments respecting human character; in other words, respecting mind as variously possessed by man. Its great conclusion, that a new moral world' is imperatively demanded, and the instrumentality which it proposes to employ, are grounded on the supposition that you have accurate knowledge of the condition and workings of the human mind. This knowledge is either trust-worthy, or it is not. If undeserving confidence, Socialism is but a dream. If it is worthy of trust, then tell me how you have acquired it? Is it not by watching the manifestations of mind ?-in other words, by taking note of effects, of outward appearances, and proceeding from them to internal qualities? You see a man slay a brother-man; and you ascribe to him at once, wrath, if not malice, and go back to the melancholy circumstances under which he was trained. You read a well-composed treatise; your mind is enlightened, your heart is softened and lifted up; and just as are the qualities which the writing exhibits, are the qualities also which you ascribe to its author. You not only know that the book must have had a cause, but a cause of a certain kind,— you refer it to a mind gifted with high and noble And yet you affirm that the facts are not known which declare what attributes are possessed by the power'

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which endowed that mind with its capacities. If so, then, to be consistent, you must renounce your belief in any mental or moral qualities whatever. They are all the result of inference; and to say the least, the inference is as good and cogent in respect of the author of the universe, as in respect of the author of the book.

It has been replied, that you see the one but do not see the other. In the case of the author, what do you see? Not the producing mind, but the outside covering of a being endowed with speech and motion. In general, indeed, you see not so much. It is the work, and not the author you see; and few are they who have either made a book, or seen a book made. And if even you, an individual, have seen the process, how do you know that all books are the work of man? Will you leap from one instance to a universal conclusion? What authority have you for this, but in that general principle which most men receive without distinct evidence, that like effects spring from like causes? I admit the principle; but then, how, after acting on it in regard to some things, can you set it aside in regard to others; and if it enables you to know a human author by his works, how can you consistently refuse to infer the attributes of the power which produced the universe, from the qualities which the universe displays? But I recur to the fact;-you see in a fellow-man, not his mind, but its manifestations; and from those manifestations you unhesitatingly and securely infer the qualities of his mind. Are there not manifestations of mind in the outward universe? As then are they, so at least must be its author. In fact, the argument for the existence of the Divine mind is the same in kind (but immeasurably stronger in degree) as that by which we human beings are led to acknowledge the existence of mind in each other. And I cannot conceive what better evidence any

man can need of the existence and attributes of Deity, than he possesses of the existence and qualities of the mind of his friend, his partner, or his child.

Nor is the argument invalidated by the circumstance, that in the case of man there is a certain form, a certain visible organisation. This form does not enter into the argument at all; it is a mere accident in the case. In the author of the book, no organisation is seen by the bulk of men. If one is inferred, that is a simple act of the reason; and what reason infers in one case, it may, on evidence, infer or not infer in the other. That the form in the case of man is a mere accident, may be learnt from looking at other instances where qualities are learned from seen effects. The needle points to the pole, hence you infer qualities which constitute what men have agreed to designate magnetism. Has magnetism any outward form? The atmosphere is troubled with tempest, and lightning, and thunder; and the application of your knuckle to a piece of glass in a certain state, draws forth sparks, and communicates a shock to your whole frame. You call the cause of both these effects, electricity. Does electricity present itself in any organised form? Yet the inferences from these effects you not only receive without hesitation, but, to show the certainty and trust-worthiness of your conclusions, you dignify them with the name of science; and having systematised the conceptions of your own mind, proceed to construct heaven and earth thereout, and propound your 'electrical theory of the universe.' Yes, it is out of the mere inferences and ideas of your own minds that you make a world, and set aside the world's maker; and yet you blame us, in no polite nor measured terms, for thinking our conclusions as well-founded and far more competent than yours. One of two things, therefore, must you do; either renounce the disclosures