co-owners, unless ratified or authorized by them.' The same rule applies to contracts made in regard to the common property. Neither cotenant can enlarge, vary, or renew the contract, or continue it in force after a forfeiture has been incurred. A note was given for the amount of the price agreed to be paid for certain land. On payment of this note, a conveyance of the land was to be made. When the note became due, payment thereof was demanded, and the demand was accompanied by the tender of a deed. The maker of the note declared himself unable to make payment, and stated that he would have to give up his contract. Some three years later, payment of the note was tendered to one of the part owners, who refused to accept it. The tender was then made to, and the money accepted by, the other owner. This acceptance was held to be binding on him who received it; and the purchaser's bill for specific performance was dismissed as to the cotenant who had refused to waive the forfeiture.2 173. When Cotenant affected by Refusal of his Companion to Act.-While no act of a cotenant, unless authorized or ratified, can ordinarily have any effect against his companions, a refusal to act may sometimes affect those who do not participate in nor sanction the refusal. Thus, if the cotenants are jointly bound to make a conveyance, and, upon demand, one of them refuses to do so, a good cause of action at once arises against all bound by the agreement. The reason of this is, that the party demanding has a right to a conveyance of the whole title. If one of the parties positively refuses, the rights of the beneficiary under the contract can only be enforced by suit. Therefore, he is excused from making any further demand, since no act on the part of the others could avert the necessity of a proceeding against them in connection with their cotenant, who, on his part, declines to fulfil the joint engagement.3 ? 174. Bound by Beneficial Acts.—“Every act done by one joint-tenant which is for the benefit of his companions will bind them; but those acts which prejudice his com Jackson v. Moore, 6 Cow. 723. 2 Pearis v. Covillaud, 6 Cal. 620. panions in estate will not bind them; and if the benefit be doubtful, two joint-tenants have no right to elect for a third."1 The general proposition of law, as above quoted, is well sustained by the common law authorities. But it is evident that many distressing questions may arise as to what acts are necessarily presumed to be so beneficial as to authorize either jointtenant to bind the others. Upon this subject, the reports furnish no rules of general application. They, however, contain adjudications in a variety of cases, by which cotenants were held to be affected by acts of their companions. It is doubtful whether these adjudications can be referred to any one general principle. Some of them proceed upon the theory that the act was binding because for the common benefit; others, upon the theory that for certain purposes, and under certain circumstances, one cotenant has necessarily the right to act on behalf of the others; and still other cases proceed upon the assumption that, in certain instances, cotenants or co-obligees may be treated in law as one person; and that a payment to, or a release by, one must therefore be regarded as a satisfaction to all. One of the instances in which an act sanctioned by less than the whole number has been considered the act of all, because presumed to be beneficial to all, is distraining for rent. Whenever two or more claim by one and the same title, whether as joint-tenants, parceners by common law, or parceners by custom, either of them may distrain for the rent due to all." This rule does not appear to be dependent upon any presumption that one is, for this purpose, the agent of the other; for it prevails, notwithstanding the conceded fact that one of the cotenants refused to sanction the distress.3 175. Acts to Preserve Common Property.-It has been determined, where property owned by several as tenants in common, was in such imminent peril that some active measures were essential to its protection, that one of the part owners present on the ground at the point of danger, "had the right 1 Addison on Contracts, 334. "Leigh v. Shepherd, 5 Moore, 297; 2 Bro. & B. 465; Robinson v. Hofman, 4 Bing. 562; Pullen v. Palmer, 5 Mod. 72; Page v. Stedman, Carth. 364. * Robinson v. Hofman, 6 L. J. Rep. C. P. 113; 4 Bing. 562; 3 Car. & P. 234. to adopt such means for its protection from injuries by the flood as the exigencies of the time seemed to require. Therefore, any person who acted in such circumstances under directions from one of the cotenants, in an attempt to preserve the property, "ought not to be, and cannot on any just principle be, rendered liable in damages for the injuries that followed."i 176. Redemption of Lands.-One of the acts that either part owner may do, without special authority from the others, is to redeem the whole property from a prior sale made in solido for the gross amount of taxes due thereon.' While the other cotenants may participate in the benefit of the redemption, the act of their companion is not binding on them so far as to impose upon them a personal obligation to reimburse him for their proportion of the amount necessarily expended in effecting the redemption. The amount thus expended may, no doubt, be asserted as a lien against the joint property. But beyond this, the cotenant has no means of enforcing contribution; because the other cotenants had the right to abandon their interest in the lands, and to forfeit all claims to it, by non-payment of the tax liens against it. But in California, under a statute permitting a minor to make his redemption within six months after attaining his majority, it has been decided that such minor had no right to redeem beyond the extent of his own interest, when he was tenant in common with others who were not under any disability, but had permitted their time for redeeming to expire. The general rule is that, "If the equity of redemption be the property of several persons as joint-tenants, or tenants in common, one of them may redeem; each as against an incumbrance, and subject to account with his cotenant, being entitled to possession and receipt of the whole of the rents." "But it seems one cannot redeem his moiety only; for this would be directly contrary to the principle that a mortgage is to be redeemed entirely, or not at all." Crary v. Campbell, 24 Cal. 637. "Loomis v. Pingree, 43 Me. 299; Haisey v. Blood, 29 Pa. St. 322. 3 Watkins v. Eaton, 30 Me. 534. Quinn v. Kenney, Oct. Term, 1873. See also Kirkham v. Dupont, 14 Cal. 559. 5 Fisher on Morts. 526; Waugh v. Land, G. Coop. 130; Wynne v. Styan, 2 Ph. 306. 6 Fisher on Morts. 526. 2177. Authority of one to receive Payment of Rent.In a case which came before Lord Kenyon, involving the determination of the question whether the lessee of several tenants in common might pay the whole rent to one, after notice requiring him not to do so, his Lordship said: “In order to maintain plaintiff's case, it was necessary for him to prove that a terre tenant may pay the whole rent to one tenant in common, not only without the concurrence of both, but contrary to express notice of the other. But no case, no resolution in the books, has been cited to warrant such a position, and all the analogous cases are the other way. Therefore, the justice of the case, and the argument of analogous cases, being with the avowant, and the payment having been made after notice and against conscience, I am of opinion that the avowant is entitled to judgment." This case upheld the right of a tenant in common to distrain for his moiety of the rent after it had, contrary to his expressed wish, been paid to a cotenant. So far as we can ascertain, this opinion of Lord Kenyon's has never been directly called in question. In fact, no precisely similar case seems to have either before or since found its way into the reports. But in the absence of express notice not to do so, it seems clear that a lessee holding under a joint lease may pay the whole of the rent to either of his lessors, and that such payment will be a full discharge of the claims of each and all of such lessors, by whatever cotenancy their title may be held.2 178. Authority to receive Payment of Joint Demand. -As between bankers and their customers, the rule of law is, that if a deposit be made by two or more jointly, the bank is not authorized to allow a withdrawal of any part thereof, without the joint order of the depositors. With this exception, a debt, demand, or other personal obligation due jointly to two or more persons may be released by payment to 1 Harrison v. Barnby, 5 T. R. 249. 3 *Decker v. Johnson, 15 Johns. 481; Sherman v. Ballou, 8 Cow. 308; Grossman v. Lauber, 29 Ind. 621; Griffin v. Clark, 33 Barb. 46. As to joint-tenants, see Robinson v. Hoffman, 4 Bing. 562; 3 Car. & P. 234; 1 Moore & P. 474; Husband v. Davis, 10 Com. B. 645; Webb v. Ledsam, 19 Jur. 775; 1 Kay & J. 385. Innes r. Stephenson. 1 Moody & R. 145. either.' It may also be discharged by an accord and satisfaction with one of the joint payees, by which he has accepted part payment in coin, and allowed a set-off against himself for the balance. Upon the death of a joint payee, the entire debt survives to the other. If payment to one were not a discharge of the entire debt, then it might happen that he who had received the debt might, by virtue of his right as survivor, recover the whole again. If the debt is secured by a mortgage, either of the mortgagees may receive payment, and discharge the whole lien.2 "So far as the mortgagor is concerned, all the mortgagees are to be regarded as one person, and he has a right to deal with each as representing all. By accepting a joint mortgage, each mortgagee gives to every other the power which this principle implies, as each member of a copartnership clothes each of his copartners with power to bind him in all matters within the scope of their joint business. Except for the purpose of receiving payment and acknowledging satisfaction, the powers of an ordinary joint obligee over the obligation would not probably correspond with those of a partner; but to that extent, they must be identical, otherwise the obligor could never safely pay to one of the several obligees. The certificate of one mortgagee, therefore, was sufficient to entitle the mortgagor to a discharge of his mortgage on the record." 2179. Release.-The general rule, sanctioned at least by all the early and most of the late authorities, is that whenever the cause of action existing in favor of any number of cotenants is joint, the release by one bars an action by the others.' And it seems that in all personal actions "tenants in common may have such actions personal joyntly in all their names, as of trespasse, or of offences which concern their tenements in common, as for breaking their houses, breaking their closes, Wallace v. Kelsall, 7 Mees. & W. 264; Husband v. Davis. 10 Com. B. 645; Jones v. Yates, 9 Barn. & C. 532; Fitch v. Forman, 14 Johns. 174; Pierson v. Hooker, 3 Johns. 68; 2 Cowen's Treatise, 2d ed. 772; Bulkley v. Dayton, 14 Johns. 387. The People v. Keyser, 28 N. Y. 228; Bowes v. Seeger, 8 Watts & S. 222. 3 Selden, J. in The People v. Keyser, 28 N. Y. 235. Ruddock's Case, 6 Co. 25 a; Razing v. Ruddock Cro. Eliz. 648; Pierson v. Hooker, |