word " they" as to give much force to the idea that the legislators intended by the use of that word that a statute prevented from running by the joint or common disability of all, should continue in abeyance until such disability was removed from all. The construction of one of these statutes, and the reasoning therefor, were thus given by the Supreme Court of Tennessee: "If one of several, entitled to a joint action, be over the age of twenty-one years at the time the action accrues, the statute runs against all, although the others are infants; because 'they' who are entitled to the action were not under the age of twenty-one years, seeing one of them was not, and therefore none of them are within the saving. But if all the persons entitled to a joint action are within the age of twenty-one years at the time such action accrues, then the action is within the saving, until 'they' who are entitled to it shall become of full age. As the word 'they' in the former case includes all those entitled to the joint action, and one of them not being within the age of twenty-one, all of them are excluded by the saving; so in the latter case, if all are within the age of twenty-one when the action accrues, and so are within the saving, all must continue within the saving so long as one of them remains under the age of twenty-one, for until then, 'they' have not attained their' full age." | יי 8 377. Suit by a Cotenant under Disability.—We shall now consider actions of the second class, namely, those brought by the person under disability, without joining any of his cotenants. It appears from the authorities already considered that if the cause of action be a joint one-such a one that the failure to unite all the cotenants would prove fatal, if taken advantage of by proper plea-then such cause is either entirely barred by or entirely saved from the operation of the statute. In such cases therefore the cotenant under disability has nothing to gain by suing alone; for unless he can recover in conjunction with his cotenants he cannot recover at all. But in some States, a cotenant entitled to sue 1 Shute v. Wade, 5 Yerg. 9; Masters v. Dunn, 30 Miss. 268; Heron v. Marshall, 5 Humph. 443; Wells v. Raglan, 1 Swan, 501; Jones v. Henry, 3 Litt. 48; Riggs e. Dooley, 7 B. Monr. 240; Clay's Heirs v. Miller. 3 Monr. 146; Seay v. Bacon, 4 Sneed, 102. 2 See sec. 375. without joining his cotenants, may ordinarily, as against a stranger to the cotenancy, recover possession of the whole of the common property. The question frequently arises, does the disability under which a cotenant has labored protect him from the statute as to his moiety alone, or does it secure him in the right which he ordinarily has to recover from a stranger the possession of all the lands of the cotenancy? The answer must be that except as to his own moiety his cause of action is lost. So far, the effect of the statute upon his cotenants operates also against him.' Where one of two coparceners was under a disability, and entered within twenty years after the removal of such disability, it was held that her entry could not operate in favor of the other coparcener who had not been under any disability. The rule that a cotenant saved from the operation of the statute cannot recover the whole of the lands of the cotenancy "is founded on the proposition that when the statute has fully run, and has become effectual to bar and adverse title, the disseizor acquires a new title founded on disseizin. He does not acquire or succeed to the title and estate of the disseizee, but is vested with a new title and estate, founded on and springing from the disseizin; and the title of the disseizee, if not wholly extinguished, has at least become inoperative in law, and is without a remedy to enforce it. The new title thus acquired by the disseizor must of necessity correspond with that on which the disseizin operated, as he could not acquire by disseizin a greater estate than that held by the disseizee. If the latter held only an undivided interest as tenant in common with another, the disseizor would acquire by disseizin a similar undivided interest; for it was only that on which the disseizin operated and took effect. The disseizor of one of several tenants in common acquiring a title by disseizin, therefore, becomes himself a tenant in common with the other cotenants; and hence in an action by one or more of them against him for the possession, the recovery is limited to the particular interest of the plaintiff, and does not include the whole property.' As the title "3 1 Pendergrast v. Gullatt, 10 Geo. 224; Bowyer v. Judge, 11 East, 287; Bryan v. Hinman, 5 Day, 218. 2 Roe on dem. Langdon v. Rowlston, 2 Taunt. 445. 3 Williams v. Sutton, 43 Cal. 73. of the cotenants not under any disability is extinguished by the operation of the statute, it follows that the cotenant not under disability cannot obtain any rights by a deed from them, nor through a partition to which they are parties. In some instances, an attempt has been made to evade the force of the statute by means of a suit in partition in which lands adversely held for a period sufficient for the acquisition of title by prescription were set off to a cotenant whose minority saved him from the bar of the statute. But these attempts proved futile; and the cotenant was, in his recovery, confined to the moiety to which he was entitled independent of the partition.' 2378. Joinder of Cotenant barred by the Statutes, when fatal.-While the state of the authorities is such as to admit of grave doubt as to whether in case of joint actions the disability of one cotenant operates for the benefit of all, or whether the want of disability in one operates to the detriment of all, yet this seems certain: that, in the absence of peculiar statutory provisions, whenever the rights of cotenants may be secured by separate actions, and adequate means of redress are therefore within the reach of each, a cotenant not under any disability cannot avail himself of the disability of any of his cotenants.2 But the cause of action or the nature of the cotenancy may be such that the cotenants could have either joined or severed in the prosecution of their remedies. In such case, while it is generally and we believe universally conceded that the cotenants not under disability shall not derive any benefit from the disability of the minor cotenants, more doubt must be felt, after an examination of the authorities, upon the question whether, if a joint action be brought, a judgment may be entered against those barred by the statute and in favor of those against whom the statute has not run. But we think that a considerable majority of the authorities upon this question assert that, by electing to participate in a joint action, the plaintiff not barred by the statute has involved himself in a common fate with his coplaintiffs; and Wade v. Johnson, 5 Humph. 118; Bronson v. Adams, 10 Ohio, 135. * Williams v. First Presbyterian Church, 1 Ohio St. 495; Bronson v. Adams, 10 Ohio, 136. therefore that a judgment must be entered against all.' But in Tennessee, upon a joint demise by tenants in common, although some of them are barred by the statute, the others may recover judgment for their moieties. In Vermont, an administrator brought an action of ejectment for the benefit of several heirs. It appeared that some of these heirs were barred by the statute and others were not. And thereupon the Court said that "as this is not a case of joint-tenancy-in which all must join in bringing suit-the rights of some may be barred and not those of others: as some might have conveyed their interests by deed, or be barred by estoppel; so also by the statute of limitations."3 1 Sanford v. Button, 4 Day, 312; Keeton v. Keeton, 20 Mo. 544; Walker v. Bacon, 32 Mo. 159; Thomas v. Machir, 4 Bibb, 412; Dickey v. Armstrong, 1 A. K. Marsh. 39; Moore v. Armstrong, 10 Ohio, 17. "Barrow's Lessee v. Navee, 2 Yerg. 227. 3 McFarland v. Stone, 17 Vt. 175. CHAPTER XVII. PART OWNERS OF SHIPS. Part Owners are Tenants in Common, § 379. Number of Shares into which a Ship may be divided, § 380. Difference between Part Owners and other Tenants in Common, § 381. Cause of this difference, § 382. Relations of Part Owners, inter sese, § 383, Power of Part Owner to bind his Co-owners, § 384. Rights, Remedies, and Liabilities, inter sese, § 385. Lien of Part Owner, § 386. Actions against Third Persons, § 387. Liability to Third Persons, § 388. Disagreement as to employment of Ship, § 389. Security for Safe Return of Ship, § 390. Compulsory Sale, denied in England, § 391. Compulsory Sale, when ordered in United States, § 392 2379. Part Owners are Tenants in Common.--Property in a ship, whether acquired by two or more persons by a joint building, or by a joint purchase, or by whatsoever means acquired, is, unless the acquisition was made by them as partners or with the intention of holding it as partnership property, held by a tenancy in common. Notwithstanding the early preference of the common law for joint-tenancies, the case of property acquired in merchandizing or in the business of commerce and navigation always formed an exception to the general rule; and if, for any purpose whatever, part owners of ships were ever regarded as joint-tenants, no instance has ever been brought to our attention in which the jus accrescendi was allowed between them.1 So while part owners may fre 1 Flanders on Shipping, sec. 363; Montell v. The Rutan. 1 Int. R. Rec. 125; Mumford v. Nicoll, 20 Johns. 621; Maude & Pollock on Merchant Shipping, 72; Revans v. Lewis, 2 Paine C. C. 202; Buckman v. Brett, 22 How. Pr. 233; Wright v. Marshall, 3 Daly, 331; Lee's Law of Shipping, 42; Bulkley v. Barber, 6 Exch. 164; S. C. 1 Eng. L. & E. 506; Sheehan v. Dalrymple, 19 Mich. 241; Magruder v. Bowie, 2 Cr. C. C. 577. The law as stated in the text, and supported by the foregoing authorities, is not nniversally admitted. The most unqualified denial of the rule that part owners of ships |