censure which now, by the cruel asperity of men, they are forced to undergo: for do we not accuse men for things that are no faults? Do we not exaggerate the guilt of petty faults? Do we not insult over great miscarriages with too unmerciful severity, as if they were incorrigible and unpardonable?

Seeing then few of us, according to those reasonable qualifications and conditions, are capable of being judges; seeing, if those equal rules were observed, most censures would be discarded; seeing hard it is for any man either warrantably to undertake, or uprightly to discharge this office; great reason there is for this precept, most fit it is that we should be forbidden to judge.

So much for the part explicative and directive; now for the persuasive; and for inducing us to eschew this practice, let us briefly declare the pravity and vanity of it; the performing which will, I suppose, be sufficient to dissuade and deter us from it. Be pleased only first to note that some considerations which we shall propound will be applicable to some kind of bad censure, some to another, according to the several defects and incapacities we have to judge lawfully, on the grounds already touched.

1. Censuring is an impious practice in regard to God.

By taking on ourselves to judge unduly, without authority, or beyond it, we do invade God's office, setting up ourselves as judges in his room: we usurp his right, exercising jurisdiction over his subjects, without order and licence from him: it is St. Paul's argument, 'Who art thou that judgest another's servant?' that is, how intolerably bold and arrogant, how sacrilegiously injurious and profane art thou, to climb up into God's tribunal, and thence to pronounce doom on his subjects?

By rash judgment in matters not subject to our cognisance, (as when we pronounce concerning the secret thoughts and intentions of men,) we proudly and perversely do arrogate to ourselves the incommunicable perfections of God, who alone can know such things, and determine rightly in such cases; who therefore hath reserved them to himself, commanding us to judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come.'

By passing sentence about the state of our neighbor, we do

anticipate God's judgment, and by prejudging strive to frustrate it. We take on us to purge his floor,' to sever the chaff from the corn, and the tares from the wheat, to discriminate the goats from the sheep; which to perform will be the work of God's infinite wisdom and justice at the great day.'

By censuring our brethren causelessly, for not complying with our conceits, humors, or practices, we lay hold on and appropriate to ourselves God's legislative power; we subject his law to our fancy and pleasure; we in effect condemn his law of error and imperfection; we do at least make ourselves sharers with him in the enacting laws, and dispensing justice. He,' saith St. James, that speaketh against his brother, and judgeth his brother, speaketh against the law, and judgeth the law: that is, he opprobriously doth imply the law to be defective, until he doth complete or correct it; making it a guilt not to satisfy his will or conceit, beside the plain intent of the law; the dispensation of justice is not sufficient, unless he partake therein, taxing whom and why he pleaseth; God without him is not a perfect lawgiver or judge.

We are also very ingrateful in not being favorable towards our brethren in judgment; when as God is in his judgment so benign, patient, and merciful toward us, who is not 'extreme to mark what we do amiss;' is not forward to seek or find faults, but rather waiteth to be gracious,' hideth his face from our sins,' and 'passeth by our transgressions;' doth not aggravate our offences, but rather doth excuse them, 'remembering that we are flesh;' is not glad of occasion to punish, but delighteth in mercy,' and' doth not afflict willingly, or grieve the children of men ;' is not severe, but 'punisheth us less than our iniquities deserve,' and 'in his wrath remembereth mercy.' And are we not impious if we do so ill requite him, and so little resemble him, in being rigorous and harsh toward our brethren, when they offend, or seem to do so?

In fine, censuring is impious, as involving the violation of those great commandments, of exercising in all our demeanor and dealing, humility, meekness, pity, and mercy toward our brethren; of pursuing and promoting peace among them.

2. Censuring, in respect to our neighbor, is an unjust practice. It is unjust to meddle in affairs with which we have no

thing to do; to draw those persons under our jurisdiction who are not subject to it, but are liable to render their account at another bar; to punish those in their reputation or interest, over whom we have no just authority, who have their own master, to whom they must stand or fall.'

It is most unjust to judge any man without competent means of knowing, or skill to determine his case; to condemn him without diligent trial, without certain proof, without full conviction of his fault; to'punish him without just cause, or beyond due measure.

It is very unjust to usurp an interest in the goods which are to our neighbor most proper and dear, his credit and concernments depend thereon, disposing of them as we please, to his disadvantage and prejudice.

It is also very unjust, whenas we do need the candid judgment, the forbearance and pardon of others for many things faulty and offensive that we commit, to refuse the like to others.

3. Censuring is also a very uncharitable practice, and so contrary to the principal duty of our religion: it is so eminently in all cases wherein it is unjust; for charity doth virtually contain justice, and transcendeth it; it is so peculiarly whenever it is harsh or rigorous, when it is affected, when it is needless or unprofitable; for charity disposeth us to be gentle, meek, patient, and merciful in all our dealings; it engages us to hide and smother, to diminish and excuse, to pass by and pardon offences: Charity seeketh no evil,' it 'covereth all things,' it beareth all things;' it tendereth our neighbor's good and advantage of all kinds, (his credit, his interest, his convenience, and pleasure ;) it therefore will inflict no more evil than reason and necessity shall indispensably require.

A censurer is indeed unjust and uncharitable, not only toward those whom he censureth, but also toward those into whom thereby he doth infuse ill opinion and ill will toward their neighbor he is guilty of their injustice and uncharitableness, a mischief more irreparable than his own.

4. Censuring is a very foolish and vain practice in manifold respects; as arguing great ignorance and inconsiderateness, as

producing grievous inconveniences and mischiefs, especially to the practiser of it.

It signifieth that we do not well understand or not well consider the natural impotency and frailty of mankind; how liable others are to mistake and slip, and how prone we ourselves are thereto; how, as St. James saith, in many things we offend all;' did we observe, or would weigh this, we should not be so forward to censure, or so vehement and bitter in it; we should see failing and tripping in many things to be a common case, rather demanding commiseration than censure.

It implieth also that we little consider how our escaping any faults, which our neighbor slippeth into, is nowise imputable to any worth or virtue in us, so much as the good providence and merciful grace of God, guarding or rescuing us from them; if we did apprehend and reflect on this, it would appear our duty rather to bless God for our being protected from miscarriages, than censoriously to insult over those who seem to fall into them. It signifieth we have no sight or sense of our own defects; for did we clearly see, did we humbly resent them, that would damp our heat and earnestness to censure. It declares a fond self-conceit, that we deem ourselves superior to our neighbor in wisdom, and less obnoxious to blame, and therefore fit to be his judges; whereas, according to a sober esteem of ourselves, we should appear more fit to stand at the bar than to sit on the bench; and should thence more dread the one than affect the other.

. It showeth likewise that we do not rightly conceive the nature, or worthily esteem the consequences of this practice: we know not, or regard not, the value of our neighbor's reputation, which by censure we do mean to ruin or impair: we perhaps by no means would rob him of his substance, or of his life; yet we scruple not by grievous censure to bereave him of his good name; which he, the best prizer of his own goods, may esteem beyond his estate or his life itself: we think it nothing, or a slight matter to carp at him; but he feeleth it very painful, and deeply resenteth it.

It argueth in us an untamed fierceness of mind and discomposedness of passion, which can never consist or cohabit with

wisdom; for a well-ordered, calm, and free mind will be slow in conceiving offence or dislike, moderate in estimating things, reserved in expressing its sentiments, not easily transported into extremity or excess; it consequently hardly will suffer a man to break forth into rash or harsh censure. So many signs and arguments of incogitancy and blindness this practice doth involve.

5. Farthermore, this practice will produce many great inconveniences and mischiefs to us.

1. We do thereby provoke, and in a sort authorise others to requite us in the same kind: for nothing more doth excite the indignation, doth inflame the anger, doth ingender the hatred of men toward us, than being pragmatical in finding fault, and hasty to censure their doings causelessly or immoderately; nothing seeming to them a more certain argument that we bear them ill will, or do contemn them; and if we so vex them, they will in requital be as ready, by finding or making faults in us, to vex and trouble us; it engageth their care, and quickeneth their industry, and whetteth their invention to observe or devise matter of recrimination. Men think it not only lawful, but even needful for them, in their own defence, to disparage the censurer, that his judgment may have the less weight to their prejudice: so that it will infallibly come on us, as our Lord warneth, using it as an argument to dissuade us from this practice, that, with what judgment we judge, we shall be judged; and with what measure we mete, it shall be measured to us again.' Men take it for allowable to retaliate in this way to the height, and stoutly to load the censorious man with

censure.

2. We do by this practice not only expose ourselves to censure, but implicitly, and according to ready consequence, do pass it on ourselves, seeing we seldom, in kind or equivalently, are ourselves clear of that which we charge on others; with our own weapon of sharp censure, we through another's side do imprudently wound ourselves; and often, as David did in his parley with Nathan, adjudge ourselves to capital punishment; so that to any censorious person it may be said, in St. Paul's words, Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself; for thou that judgest doest the same things.'

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