And the error respecting this faculty is, that its function is one of falsehood, that its operation is to exhibit things as they are not, and that in so doing it mends the works of God.

§ 11. Object Now, as these are the two faculties to which I shall have occasion of the present constantly to refer during that examination of the Ideas of Beauty and

section.

relation on which we are now entering, because it is only as received and treated by these, that those ideas become exalted and profitable, it becomes necessary for me, in the outset, to explain their power and define their sphere; and to vindicate, in the system of our nature, their true place for the intellectual lens and moral retina by which and on which our informing thoughts are concentrated and represented.

NOTE-The reader will probably recollect the two sonnets of Wordsworth which were published at the time when the bill for the railroad between Kendal and Bowness was laid before Parliament. His remonstrance was of course in vain; and I have since heard that there are proposals entertained for continuing this line to Whitehaven through Borrowdale. I transcribe the note prefixed by Wordsworth to the first sonnet.

"The degree and kind of attachment which many of the yeomanry feel to their "small inheritances can scarcely be over-rated. Near the house of one of them "stands a magnificent tree, which a neighbour of the owner advised him to fell "for profit's sake. 'Fell it!' exclaimed the yeoman; 'I had rather fall on my "knees and worship it.' It happens, I believe, that the intended railway would pass through this little property, and I hope that an apology for the answer "will not be thought necessary by one who enters into the strength of the feeling."

The men who thus feel will always be few and overborne by the thoughtless, avaricious crowd; but is it right, because they are a minority, that there should be no respect for them, no concession to them, that their voice should be utterly without regard in the council of the nation, and that any attempt to defend one single district from the offence and foulness of mercenary uses, on the ground of its beauty and power over men's hearts, should be met, as I doubt not it would be, by total and impenetrable scorn?

CHAPTER II.

OF THE THEORETIC FACULTY AS CONCERNED WITH PLEASURES OF SENSE.

tion of the term

I PROCEED therefore first, to examine the nature of what I have called § 1. Explanathe Theoretic faculty, and to justify my substitution of the term "Theo- "Theoretic." retic" for "Aesthetic," which is the one commonly employed with reference to it.

Now the term "aesthesis" properly signifies mere sensual perception of the outward qualities and necessary effects of bodies; in which sense only, if we would arrive at any accurate conclusions on this difficult subject, it should always be used. But I wholly deny that the impressions of beauty are in any way sensual;-they are neither sensual nor intellectual, but moral; and for the faculty receiving them, whose difference from mere perception I shall immediately endeavour to explain, no term can be more accurate or convenient than that employed by the Greeks, "Theoretic," which I pray permission, therefore, always to use, and to call the operation of the faculty itself, Theoria.

differences

of

Let us begin at the lowest point, and observe, first, what differences § 2. Of the of dignity may exist between different kinds of aesthetic or sensual plea- rank in Pleasure, properly so called.

Now it is evident that the being common to brutes, or peculiar to man, can alone be no rational test of inferiority, or dignity in pleasures. We must not assume that man is the nobler animal, and then deduce the nobleness of his delights; but we must prove the nobleness of the delights, and thence the nobleness of the animal. The dignity of affection is no way lessened because a large measure of it may be found in lower animals; neither is the vileness of gluttony and lust abated because they are common to men. It is clear, therefore, that there is a standard

sures of Sense.

§ 3. Use of the terms Tempe

perate.

of dignity in the pleasures and passions themselves, by which we also class the creatures capable of, or suffering them.

The first great distinction, we observe, is that noted by Aristotle, that rate and Intem- men are called temperate and intemperate with regard to some, and not so with respect to others, and that those, with respect to which they are so called, are, by common consent, held to be the vilest. But Aristotle, though exquisitely subtle in his notation of facts, does not frequently give us satisfactory account of, or reason for them. Content with stating the fact of these pleasures being held the lowest, he shows not why this estimation of them is just, and confuses the reader by observing casually respecting the higher pleasures, what is indeed true, but appears at first opposed to his own position, namely, that "men may be conceived, as also in these taking pleasure, either rightly, or more or less than is right." Which being so, and evident capability of excess or defect existing in pleasures of this higher order, let us consider how it happens that men are not called intemperate when they indulge in excess of this kind, and what is that difference in the nature of the pleasure which diminishes the criminality of its excess.

§ 4. Right use the term

of

Men are held intemperate, only when their desires overcome or "Intemperate." prevent the action of their reason; and they are indeed intemperate in the exact degree in which such prevention or interference takes place, and, therefore, in many instances and acts which do not lower the world's estimation of their temperance. For so long as it can be supposed that the reason has acted imperfectly owing to its own imperfection, or to the imperfection of the premises submitted to it, (as when men give an inordinate preference to their own pursuits, because they cannot, in the nature of things, have sufficiently experienced the goodness and benefit of others) and so long as it may be presumed that men have referred to reason in what they do, and have not suffered its orders to be disobeyed, through mere impulse and desire, (though those orders may be full of error owing to the reason's own feebleness) so long men are not held intemperate. But when it is palpably evident that the reason cannot have erred, but that its voice has been deadened or disobeyed, and that the reasonable creature has been dragged dead round the walls of his own citadel by mere passion,-then, and then only, men are of all held intemperate. And this is evidently the case with respect to 1 ὡς δεῖ, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν.

inordinate indulgence in pleasures of touch and taste; for these, being destructive in their continuance not only of all other pleasures but of the very sensibilities by which they themselves are received, and this penalty being actually known and experienced by those indulging in them, so that the reason cannot but pronounce right respecting their perilousness, there is no palliation of the wrong choice; and the man, as utterly incapable of Will,1 is called intemperate, or åkóλaσtos.

It would be well if the reader would for himself follow out this sub

ject, which it would be irrelevant here to pursue farther, observing how a certain degree of intemperance is suspected and attributed to men with respect to higher impulses; as, for instance, in the case of anger, or any other passion criminally indulged; and yet is not so attributed as in the case of sensual pleasures; because in anger the reason is supposed not to have had time to operate, and to be itself affected by the presence of the passion, which seizes the man involuntarily and before he is aware; whereas, in the case of the sensual pleasures, the act is deliberate, and determined on beforehand, in direct defiance of reason. Nevertheless, if no precaution be taken against immoderate anger, and the passions gain upon the man, so as to be evidently wilful and unrestrained, and admitted contrary to all reason, we begin to look upon him as, in the real sense of the word, intemperate; and assign to him, in consequence, his place, for the time, among the beasts, as definitely as if he had yielded to the pleasurable temptations of touch or taste.

which are subjects of intem

perance.

We see, then, that the primal ground of inferiority in these pleasures § 5. Grounds of inferiority in is that which proves their indulgence to be contrary to reason; namely, the pleasures their destructiveness upon prolongation, and their incapability of coexisting continually with other delights or perfections of the system. And this incapability of continuance directs us to the second cause of their inferiority; namely, that they are given to us as subservient to life, as instruments of our preservation-compelling us to seek the things necessary to our being, and that, therefore, when this their function is fully performed, they ought to have an end; and can be only artificially, and under high penalty, prolonged. But the pleasures of sight and hearing are given as gifts. They answer not any purposes of mere existence, for the distinction of all that is useful or dangerous to us might be made, and often is made, by the eye, without its receiving the slightest pleasure 'Comp. Hooker, Eccl. Pol. Book i. Chap. 8.

§ 6. Evidence of higher rank

of sight. We might have learned to distinguish fruits and grain from flowers, without having any superior pleasure in the aspect of the latter. And the ear might have learned to distinguish the sounds that communicate ideas, or to recognise intimations of elemental danger without perceiving either melody in the voice, or majesty in the thunder. And as these pleasures have no function to perform, so there is no limit to their continuance in the accomplishment of their end, for they are an end in themselves, and so may be perpetual with all of us-being in no way destructive, but rather increasing in exquisiteness by repetition.

may

Herein, then, we find very sufficient ground for the higher estimation in pleasures of of these delights; first, in their being eternal and inexhaustible, and sight and hearing. secondly, in their being evidently no means or instrument of life, but an object of life. Now, in whatever is an object of life, in whatever be infinitely and for itself desired, we may be sure there is something of divine; for God will not make anything an object of life, to his creatures which does not point to, or partake of, Himself. And so, though we were to regard the pleasures of sight merely as the highest of sensual pleasures, and though they were of rare occurrence, and, when occurring, isolated and imperfect, there would still be a supernatural character about them, owing to their self-sufficiency. But when, instead of being scattered, interrupted, or chance-distributed, they are gathered together, and so arranged to enhance each other as by chance. they could not be, there is caused by them not only a feeling of strong affection towards the object in which they exist, but a perception of purpose and adaptation of it to our desires; a perception, therefore, of the immediate operation of the Intelligence which so formed us, and so feeds us.

§ 7. How the lower pleasures

Out of which perception arise Joy, Admiration, and Gratitude.

Now the mere animal consciousness of the pleasantness I call Aesthesis; but the exulting, reverent, and grateful perception of it I call Theoria. For this, and this only, is the full comprehension and contemplation of the Beautiful as a gift of God; a gift not necessary to our being, but added to, and elevating it, and twofold; first of the desire, and secondly of the thing desired.

And that this joyfulness and reverence are a necessary part of Theoretic may be elevated pleasure is very evident when we consider that, by the presence of these feelings, even the lower and more sensual pleasures may be rendered

in rank.