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sary to accumulate gilded palaces, tower over tower, and pile artificial mountains around insinuated lakes, there would have been a direct contradiction between the unselfish duties and inherent desires of every individual. But no such contradiction exists in the system of divine Providence, which, leaving it open to us, if we will, as Creatures in probation, to abuse this sense like every other, and pamper it with selfish and thoughtless vanities, as we pamper the palate with deadly meats, until the appetite of tasteful cruelty is lost in its sickened satiety, incapable of pleasure unless, Caligula like, it concentrate the labour of a million of lives into the sensation of an hour, leaves it also open to us, by humble and loving ways, to make ourselves susceptible of deep delight from the meanest objects of creation, and of a delight which shall not separate us from our fellows, nor require the sacrifice of any duty or occupation, but which shall bind us closer to men and to God, and be with us always, harmonized with every action, consistent with every claim, unchanging and eternal.

beauty are by reason demon

Seeing then that these qualities of material objects which are calcu- § 14. How certain conclulated to give us this universal pleasure, are demonstrably constant in sions respecting their address to human nature, they must belong in some measure to whatever has been esteemed beautiful throughout successive ages of the strable. world (and they are also by their definition common to all the works of God). Therefore it is evident that it must be possible to reason them out, as well as to feel them out, possible to divest every object of that which makes it accidentally or temporarily pleasant, and to strip it bare of distinctive qualities, until we arrive at those which it has in common with all other beautiful things, which we may then safely affirm to be the cause of its ultimate and true delightfulness.

what liabilities

Now this process of reasoning will be that which I shall endeavour § 15. With to employ in the succeeding investigations; a safe process, so long to error. as we are sure that we are reasoning concerning objects which produce in us one and the same sensation; but not safe if the sensation produced be of a different kind, though it may be equally agreeable; for what produces a different sensation must be a different cause. And the difficulty of reasoning respecting Beauty arises chiefly from the ambiguity of the word itself, which stands in different people's minds for totally different sensations, for which there can be no common cause. When, for instance, Mr. Alison endeavours to support his position

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§ 16. The term "Beauty" how

that "no man is sensible to beauty in those objects with regard to which he has not previous ideas," by the remark that "the beauty of a theory, or of a relic of antiquity, is unintelligible to a peasant," we see at once that it is hopeless to argue with a man who, under his general term beauty, may, for anything we know, be sometimes speaking of mathematical demonstrability and sometimes of historical interest; while even if we could succeed in limiting the term to the sense of external attractiveness, there would be still room for many phases of error; for though the beauty of a snowy mountain and of a human cheek or forehead, so far as both are considered as mere matter, is the same, and traceable to certain qualities of colour and line, common to both, and by reason extricable, yet the flush of the cheek and moulding of the brow, as they express modesty, affection, or intellect, possess sources of agreeableness which are not common to the snowy mountain, the interference of whose influence we must be cautious to prevent in our examination of those which are material and universal.1

The first thing, then, that we have to do, is accurately to discriminate limitable in the and define those appearances from which we are about to reason as beoutset. Divided longing to beauty, properly so called, and to clear the ground of all the confused ideas and erroneous theories with which the misapprehension or metaphorical use of the term has encumbered it.

into Typical and Vital.

By the term Beauty, then, properly are signified two things. First, that external quality of bodies already so often spoken of, and which, whether it occur in a stone, flower, beast, or in man, is absolutely identical, which, as I have already asserted, may be shown to be in some sort typical of the Divine attributes, and which, therefore, I shall, for distinction's sake, call Typical Beauty; and, secondarily, the appearance of felicitous fulfilment of function in living things, more especially of the joyful and right exertion of perfect life in man. And this kind of beauty I shall call Vital Beauty.

Any application of the word "beautiful" to other appearances or qualities than these, is either false or metaphorical; as, for instance, to the splendour of a discovery, the fitness of a proportion, the coherence of a chain of reasoning, or the power of bestowing pleasure which objects

1 Compare Spenser. (Hymn to Beauty.)

But ah, believe me, there is more than so,

That works such wonders in the minds of men.

receive from association; a power confessedly great, and interfering, as we shall presently find, in a most embarrassing way with the attractiveness of inherent beauty.

But in order that the mind of the reader may not be biassed at the outset by what he may happen to have received of current theories respecting beauty, founded on the above metaphorical uses of the word (theories which are less to be reprobated as accounting falsely for the sensations of which they treat, than as confusing two or more pleasurable sensations together), I shall briefly glance at the four erroneous positions most frequently held upon this subject, before proceeding to examine those typical and vital properties of things, to which I conceive that all our original conceptions of beauty may be traced.

CHAPTER IV.

OF FALSE OPINIONS HELD CONCERNING BEAUTY.

§ 1. Of the I PURPOSE at present to speak only of four of the more current opinions false opinion that Truth is respecting beauty, for of the errors connected with the pleasurableness beauty, and vice of proportion and expression I shall have opportunity to treat in the succeeding chapters; (Ch. VI. Ch. XIV.)

versa.

Those erring or inconsistent positions which I would at once dismiss are, the First, that the Beautiful is the True, the Second, that the Beautiful is the Useful, the Third, that it is dependent on Custom, and the Fourth, that it is dependent on the association of ideas.

To assert that the beautiful is the true, appears, at first, like asserting that propositions are matter, and matter propositions. But allowing the best and most rational interpretation we can, and supposing the holders of this strange position to mean only that things are beautiful which appear what they indeed are, and ugly which appear what they are not, we find them instantly contradicted by each and every conclusion of experience. A stone looks as truly a stone as a rose looks a rose, and and yet is not so beautiful; a cloud may look more like a castle than a cloud, and be the more beautiful on that account. The mirage of the desert is fairer than its sands; the false image of the under heaven fairer than the sea. I am at a loss to know how any so untenable a position could ever have been advanced; but it may, perhaps, have arisen from some confusion of the beauty of art with the beauty of nature, and from an illogical expansion of the very certain truth, that nothing is beautiful in art, which, professing to be an imitation, or a statement, is not as such in some sort true.

That the beautiful is the useful, is an assertion evidently based on that limited and false sense of the latter term which I have already deprecated.

usefulness.

Compare Chap. xii. § 5.

As it is the most degrading and dangerous supposition which can be § 2. Of the false opinion advanced on the subject, so, fortunately, it is the most palpably absurd. that beauty is It is to confound admiration with hunger, love with lust, and life with sensation; it is to assert that the human creature has no ideas and no feelings, except those ultimately referable to its brutal appetites. It has not a single fact nor appearance of fact to support it, and needs no combating, at least until its advocates have obtained the consent of the majority of mankind, that the most beautiful productions of nature are seeds and roots; and of art, spades and millstones.

sults from cus

Somewhat more rational grounds appear for the assertion that the § 3. Of the false opinion sense of the beautiful arises from familiarity with the object, though that beauty reeven this could not long be maintained by a thinking person. For tom. Compare all that can be alleged in defence of such a supposition is, that fami- Chap. vi. § 1. liarity deprives some objects which at first appeared ugly, of much of their repulsiveness; whence it is as rational to conclude that familiarity is the cause of beauty, as it would be to argue that because it is possible to acquire a taste for olives, therefore custom is the cause of lusciousness in grapes. Nevertheless, there are some phenomena resulting from the tendency of our nature to be influenced by habit of which it may be well to observe the limits.

It

deadens Sensa

Custom has a two-fold operation: it deadens the frequency and 4. The twofold operation force of repeated impressions, while it endears the familiar object to of custom. the affections. Commonly, where the mind is vigorous, and the power tion, but conof sensation very perfect, it has rather the latter operation than the first; firms Affection. with meaner minds, the first takes place in the higher degree, so that they are commonly characterized by a desire of excitement, and the want of the loving, fixed, theoretic power. But both take place in some degree with all men, so that as life advances, impressions of all kinds become less rapturous owing to their repetition. It is however beneficently ordained that repulsiveness shall be diminished by custom in a far greater degree than the sensation of beauty; so that the anatomist in a little time loses all sense of horror in the torn flesh, and carious bone, while the sculptor ceases not to feel to the close of his life, the deliciousness of every line of the outward frame. So then as in that with which we are made familiar, the repulsiveness is constantly diminishing, and such claims as it may be able to put forth on the affections are daily becoming stronger, while in what is submitted to us of new or strange,

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