to continue the aid afforded to the king of Sweden; a monarch who derived a peculiar claim to their support, from having concurred with Great Britain in the propriety of rejecting any proposal for negociation to which the government of Spain was not to be admitted as a party. Means of providing the supplies for the year, would, he trusted, be found, without any great or immediate increase of the existing burdens upon the people; and doubtless it would be satisfactory to them to learn, that notwithstanding the measures resorted to by the enemy, for the purpose of destroying the commerce and resources of the kingdom, the public revenue had continued in a state of progressive improvement. His Majesty, it was added, had called them together in perfect confidence that they were prepared cordially to support him in the prosecution of a war which there was no hope of terminating safely and honourably, except through vigorous and persevering exertion; and he especially recommended to them, that, duly weighing the immense interests which were at stake in the war then carrying on, they should proceed, with as little delay as possible, to consider of the most effectual measures for the augmentation of the regular army, in order that he might be the better enabled, without impairing the means of defence at home, to avail himself of the military power of his dominions in the great contest in which he was engaged; and to conduct that contest, under the blessing of Divine Providence, to a conclusion compatible with the honour of his crown, and with the interests of his allies, of Europe, and of the world. The address was moved by the Earl of Bridgewater. Lord Sheffield, in supporting it, observed, that there was no hope of safety but through a vigorous and persevering prosecution of the war, of which, (said he,) the great mass of this country is perfectly convinced; and it must be highly consoling to all Europe, to learn that his Majesty is determined strenuously to support the cause of Spain. It is our own cause; it is the cause of Europe and of the world. We cannot but concur in applauding the resolution of the Spaniards, to persevere to the last extremity in the contest for their liberty-a resolution worthy of that noble nation. We cannot but admire their spirit, when we reflect on the completely-disorganized state into which they were thrown by the treachery of an usurper. If they should not in every instance act according to our notions of what was expedient, or even if prejudice should prevent them from receiving assistance in the way which we might think advisable; if their communications, both among themselves and with us, should not be so prompt and perfect as might be expected from a country whose government, and every thing derived from it, had not been recently overthrown; if we should observe among them some traces of party spirit, or struggles for power, was it to be wondered at under such circumstances, or were we ourselves free from blame? Their general conduct was still to be respected and admired; and even though great reverses should take place, there would be yet no reason to despond. From our own troops we might expect every thing which could be done by men: they had the highest confidence in their general, whether he should advance or retreat; and we might be satisfied that whatever happened, a British army, so command ed, would not disgrace the character of its country. He then adverted to the state of trade: Great, he said, should be our exultation, to hear that it had not diminished. The export of certain manufactures had decreased for a time, but not very considerably, nor by any means so much as was supposed. Buonaparte threatened to subdue us, by ruining our commerce. We might thank him for having made theexperiment; it had relieved us from all apprehensions on that head; for it was now proved, that neither decrees nor embargoes could materially affect us, and that the flourishing state of our finances enabled us to carry on this expensive war without any considerable loan or new taxes. Earl St Vincent rose to oppose the address. That part of it," he said, "which declared a determined hostility to the common enemy, all must approve; but when he adverted to the manner in which our opposition to him had been conducted on the Spamish peninsula, it was wholly impossible not to perceive that it was the greatest disgrace which had befallen Great Britain since the revolution. The convention of Cintra could not be contemplated without feeling alarm, as well as astonishment and indignation; the more especially, upon observing that cold-blooded treaty, which gave up a contest with the ships of an enemy, upon a compromise so unworthy the character of England. There was a time when such old-fashioned words as sink, burn, and destroy, were understood and exercised; but now we were to negociate to be ships' husbands,-to take possession by bargain and barter, instead of by battles, by bravery, and by balls, to hold ships in trust by contract, and not in right by conquest. Great merit, it seemed, was to be attributed to ministers for the speed with which they had provided transports for conveying our army to Portugal. There was not a tittle of merit in the case: It was only going to market, and offering a little more than the market price, and transports were to be obtained in abundance." Earl St Vincent might here have represented the wasteful improvidence of employing transports, instead of embarking troops in our ships of war; a mode of conveying them infinitely preferable in every respect, and which would save lives, as well as expence to the nation. "And what," he continued, "was the important service to which these transports were eventually applied? Why, truly, it was to convey the rascally ruffians whom Junot commanded, to that part of France which was nearest the boundary of Spain, that they might as speedily as possible be again brought into action, with more effect against our own soldiers; so that, said he, they are at this moment harassing the rear of our retreating army. Meantime there had been a disgraceful delay before we sent a man of our own troops towards Spain. In fact, it appeared as if ministers had not even a geographical knowledge of the country through which they were to pass, insomuch that they ought to go again to school, to make themselves masters of it :They had sent an army to traverse a wild and inhospitable country, at the very commencement of the rainy season, to drink new wines, and to be overwhelmed with disease, as well as fatigue." One part of Earl St Vincent's speech was singularly remarkable. We had princes of the blood," he said, "all of whom were bred to arms :-For what purpose, if they were not to be employed? Why were not some of these illustrious personages, who had made the science of war their study from their childhood, appointed to lead our armies?"The ministry past over this question without reply: in fact, it was not worthy of reply. Earl St Vincent must have known, as every man in England knew, what the general feeling had been, when it was reported that the Duke of York was to have the command in Spain; he must have known that such an appointment would have been not less unpopular than improper ;—and, dis ciplinarian as he is, he ought to have known that no man should be entrusted with command, who may not be called to a strict account for misconduct in it. He asked also, why Earl Moira had not been employed; a person who possessed the confidence of the people, the love of the soldiery, and the esteem of the king. The reason, said he, was evident: it was because management prevented it. But was it to be supposed, that because a court of inquiry had deemed no farther investigation necessary into the conduct of those generals who had been employed, that therefore there ought to be no investigation? Whenever he heard of councils of war being called, he always considered them as cloaks for cowardice. So said the brave Boscawen, and from him he had imbibed the opinion, which time and experience had completely confirmed. We gained a victory at Vimiera; and in the moment when our soldiers were flushed with conquest, recourse was had to a council of war. Such a measure could only be necessary, or indeed apologized for, in the moment of defeat: and upon what principle it was resorted to on this occasion, he, for one, accustomed to other me thods, could not account:-they only who acted in it could explain. Just the same opinion he entertained of the court of inquiry:-it was a the ministers themselves; but he trustshield to ward off investigation from ed that the House would not be prevestigation of it in their own way. vented from making a scrupulous inHe knew the character of the Portugueze well: excepting the rabble of Lisbon, they were as brave a people as any upon the continent of Europe, and, under British officers, would have presented an undaunted front to the enemy. Why had not these people been called into action? Ministers ought to have known their value; and if they did not, their igHouse did its duty, they would imnorance was inexcusable. If that mediately proceed to the foot of the throne, and there tell the sovereign the bold truth, that if he did not try. These were the sentiments of remove them, he would lose the counhis heart, and he delivered them as self bound to discharge. a solemn duty, which he found himprobably the last time he should It was that," said he, "I wish your lordtrouble that assembly; "and with ships a good night." words he walked out of the house. At these lower tone, but in that spirit of canLord Sidmouth's speech was in a dour which has obtained for him the good opinion and the confidence of the people, beyond all other public men. At no period, he said, within rit, so much loyalty and zeal in the his memory, was there so much spicountry, and yet at the same time so much dissatisfaction. It was a disbulent disposition in the people, nor satisfaction not arising from a turfrom any marked reverses, nor from the pressure of the public burdens but it was produced by a feeling most honourable to them, and it was proportioned to their zeal and their expectations. It was not content either with the extent of the exertions which had been made to aid the Spaniards, nor with the manner in which they had been directed. Some statement, he trusted, would be made to allay this very laudable feeling. Without committing himself to the full extent of the address, he should give his assent to it, as concurring in that part which recommended a vigorous prosecution of the war, and which expressed a determination to assist Spain, so long as Spain should prove true to herself. This language was consistent with the uniform tenour of Lord Sidmouth's conduct; a man who in no instance has suffered party feelings to prevail over the natural fairness of his mind. Lord Grenville spoke more in the spirit of a party leader. He said, it had been the constant practice, till the present administration came into office, to refrain, both in the speech and the address, from calling upon Parliament to deliver any decided opinion in approving of past measures, the documents relating to which were not in the possession of the House; or expressing a determination "to support any future system, the details of which had not been communicated." ving thus objected to the general character of the address, he proceeded to scrutinize all the points upon which it touched, and first the affairs of Spain. "Of the base and treacherous, the atrocious and cruel invasion of the Spaniards," he said, "there was but one opinion in the country, but one opinion as to the cause in which they were fighting against the tyrant who unjustly and cruelly Ha Nor attacked them; but there had been no prospect that ought to have induced any reasonable men to send a British army into the interior of Spain. I am anxious not to be misunderstood upon this point. I do not mean to apply my observation to naval co-operation, to the mode of sending fleets with troops on board to annoy particular parts of the coast, to keep the enemy in a constant state of alarm, and obtain partial advantages, which may be of essential service. I confine myself to the policy of sending a British army into the interior of Spain; and I contend, that there was not that prospect which ought to have induced reasonable men to have so sent an army. were there any circumstances which could justify the sending a British army, large, it is true, as a British army, but small, as an army acting on the continent, to meet the whole disposable force of France, without having any of the great powers of Europe as our auxiliaries. With the Pyrenees unlocked, and the road between Paris and Madrid as open as that between Paris and Antwerp, there was nothing which could justify our sending into the interior of Spain 30 or 40,000 British men, to meet an army of 500,000. I can only compare such a measure to the far-famed march to Paris, to which it is fully equal in wildness and absurdity.". It was not a little curious to hear Lord Grenville thus sneering at the projects with which the anti-jacobine war commenced. He pursued, "it must rest with the Spanish people themselves to maintain their independence, and without that spirit among them, no army that we could send would be of any avail. The junta of Seville had arranged a plan of defence adapted to the country, and calculated to wear down an invading enemy, by a continued system of partial attack, without the risk which must necessarily attend a pitched battle with veteran soldiers. This excellent system we forced them to abandon, by sending a British army into the interior of Spain: It then became impossible for the Spaniards to leave our army to fight their battles by itself; and thus they were compelled to engage in pitched battles, with regular troops, whilst the British army, too small to cope with the great superiority brought against it by France, can only retreat. In this way, the sending a British army into Spain has been actually injurious to the cause of the patriots.-It may be said that there was a time when a British force of 30 or 40,000 men might have driven the French beyond the Pyrenees. Allowing it to be so, how had this been taken advantage of? One might have supposed that to make the proper use of so favourable a conjuncture of affairs, our troops would have been sent to the port nearest the scene of action, and from whence they might be marched in the shortest time to the spot where their services were most wanted. But instead of the nearest port, the farthest seemed to have been chosen, and the troops were sent to Lisbon. They were there employed in compelling the French to evacuate Portugal; who could not have held it if Buonaparte could not conquer Spain, and who must get possession of it if he does; and afterwards remain there for two months before they march to join the Spaniards. The moment was urgent, the occasion was pressing, every thing depended upon promptitude of action, and taking advantage of a small portion of time; and yet two months pass away before the army is even put in march to join the Spanish troops: and the general who commanded in chief, in giving an account of his conduct, says, that no arrangement was determined upon for putting the army in motion. The transports which ought to have conveyed our troops are used to convey the troops of the enemy; our army, compelled to make a long march over land, is too late for any effective purpose, and the enemy triumphs in the capital of Spain. The Spanish people may truly reproach us, You promised us protection and assistance; you induced us to engage in the dangerous warfare of pitched battles, quitting our more desultory mode of warfare, but more secure to ourselves, and more harassing to the enemy; and now the oppressor lords it in our capital, plunders our property, and puts to death our nobles, whilst not a single British musket has yet been fired.' Shame that such a reproach should truly attach to us!" Lord Grenville then proceeded to those disgraceful treaties by which the campaign in Portugal had been terminated. "The speech," he said, "had touched upon the convention of Cintra and the armistice which preceded it,-an armistice of which the House knows nothing, a convention of which the House knows nothing. It was with no small surprise I heard moved, as part of the address, an expression of our regret that such an armistice and convention should have been entered into. What! my lords, pronounce judgment before investigation! condemn a transaction before we are made acquainted with the details of it! I have now heard, for the first time, that his |