must ultimately be imputed to him or not. Blame must be imputed somewhere, either upon the officers or upon the ministers. The Court of Inquiry was a tribunal very lit tle competent to this purpose. The true conception of a Court of Inquiry was, that of a set of persons delegated to inquire into the circumstances of any transaction, for the purpose afterwards of advising his Majesty confidentially, whether there was ground for submitting the matter to an inquiry of a more judicial nature. They were a set of advisers, and not of judges; or, if judges, judges who were to judge of nothing but whether the matter ought to be submitted to judgment. As a secret tribunal, they were to determine whether they would advise his Majesty to try his officers. But what the ministers wanted was, that, as a public tribunal, they should determine whether the country ought to acquit his ministers. They pervert, therefore, the whole nature of the tribunal, and have produced out of it such a strange, anomalous, and inconsistent proceeding, as was never known in the laws of this, or of any country. It is a trial and no trial. It can neither condemn, so as to inflict punishment on the guilty, nor acquit, so as to protect the innocent from further prosecution. In the mean while, witnesses are to be pledged, impressions made, and facts prematurely disclosed, so as to render a fair trial before a regular tribunal no longer practicable. The cause of all this is to be found in the sinister purposes of the ministers on one side, and in their fears on the other. They wanted to hush up the business, so as to prevent that full disclosure which a trial would bring out, and which might involve statements

not so convenient to themselves. For this purpose, either no inquiry at all, or an inquiry in the regular mode, with shut doors, would have been most convenient. But that the impatience of the public would not readily acquiesce in. To that the terrors of the newspapers were opposed. They therefore conceived and brought forth that monstrous production, unknown to our laws and our usages, an open Court of Inquiry, of which the only effect has been, to throw dust in the eyes of the people, by a show of trial without the reality, and by making them believe that what, after all, is said only of the officers, was to be applied to the ministers.-But even supposing the establishment of this court and its decision to be perfectly justifiable, the declaration, that none of the officers concerned ought to be put upon their trial, could be no justification of government. The Board of Inquiry broadly stated, that the want of means prevented the victory of Vimiera from being followed up: the acquittal of the officers, therefore, was the condemnation of the government. Sir Arthur Wellesley said, that the advantages which resulted from the evacuation of Portugal by the enemy, and the time gained thereby, were equivalent to all that might have been lost in other respects.' This he could not admit, because any time that might be necessary for the reduction of the enemy would have been amply repaid. by its consequences. But nothing could be more completely unfortunate than the argument now urged in defence of the convention, that it had the effect of getting the French out of Portugal sooner than could otherwise have been done: For, first, it is not true. The speediest way would undoubtedly have been ta

have conquered them in the first instance, as the honourable gencral would have done, with the troops that he had, and as the other generals do not deny that they could have done with a sufficiency of cavalry next, it is not at all clear that, even when that opportunity was lost, the expulsion of the enemy by subsequent operations would not have been quite as speedy, and a good deal more satisfactory, than the method of convention. But lastly, of what advantage was it to the honourable gentlemen, thus to endeavour to accelerate the evacuation, when, as it was, it came upon them before they were prepared for it? They are arguing, therefore, against themselves, when they give, as a reason for adopting the convention, that it sooner left them at liberty to transfer the army to Spain. Why make such sacrifices for an object which, when they had got, they were not in a state to make use of?-These points, therefore, are established against them: 1st. That they are answerable for the convention, good or bad as it may be, inasmuch as it is admitted on all hands, that it was from the want of means, which they ought to have provided, that it became, or was thought necessary: 2dly. That when they had got this God-send, they were not at all prepared to profit by it; and that therefore, 3dly, If the honourable gene. ral's success had been completed in the way that he had proposed, they would still less have been prepared, and have made it still more evident that they had sent the troops into Portugal in the most headlong, blundering manner, without the least idea of what they were to do, or what plan was to be pursued in different results that might be supposed.

"The noble lord had stated, that it

would have been improper to send out a large army under an inferior general; that a large force required, as it were, a large general; but surely it did not follow from that position, that a small army must be sent out with a small general. It was not necessary that the general and the army should fit with such exactness. There was not the same danger in making the general too big as in making him too little. Why should they not put their best foot forward at once? Why not send out, in the first instance, the proper general, with a small army, especially when that small army was to be immediately increased to a large one? It was from the neglect of this principle that the rapid supercession of the generals, and all the calamitous consequences of the campaign, had arisen. He could not conceive a more perfect recipe for exciting dissension and jealousy in an army; for sweeping away all cordiality and union from among its members; and destroying every prospect of the prosperous issue of a campaign. Sir Arthur Wellesley had stated, that, from the first moment of their arrival, he perceived he could not flatter himself that he possessed the confidence of either of his successors in the command. This was the natural consequence of the rapid supercession in which general succeeded general; they followed each other as wave succeeded wave, rising, some of them, as it were, literally out of the sea; they were assembled upon the stage like persons at the end of a comedy, with all the happiest effects of surprise; some from one part of the world, and some from another; one from Syracuse, and another from Ephesus; bringing with them their various views and prejudices, and marring whatever was to be done, by their total ignorance of

all that had preceded.-It had been declared, from the highest authority in the state, that the convention of Cintra had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the nation. Had ministers changed their mind? Did they entertain a different opinion with respect to that transaction now and at the time they caused the guns to be fired? Did they at that moment really think the news was good; or were they only endeavouring, by noise and clamour, by a bold and confident show of exultation, by firings at midnight and puffs in the morning, to confound the sense of the country, and, as sometimes happens in other theatres, to force, as excellent, down the throats of the public, what they knew in their own minds to be most execrable stuff? He should really be curious to know in which way the honourable gentlemen meant to take it; whether they meant to describe themselves as dupes upon that occasion, or as only intending to dupe the nation? Among their friends, perhaps, they will prefer the latter description; but as they can hardly venture to profess this publicly, they must be content to be set down as persons who were unable to discover that this convention was a bad measure, till it had received the comment of the public voice, till the knowledge of its merits was forced upon them by the universal cry of the country, by the groans and murmurs, and hissings and cat-calls, and cries of off, off,' which assailed them on every side, and from every rank or order of people-from pit, boxes, and gallery. One merit, however, may be allowed them. They did not, like many authors, set themselves obstinately to resist the general judgment, but, after the hints they had received, appeared willing at length to withdraw

VOL. II. PART I.

their piece, and to confess that it was, to be sure, a most wretched performance.

"There was another and a weightier ground of accusation against the right honourable gentlemen, founded upon their total want of foresight in all their military measures, and the culpable absence of any general or comprehensive plan. His Majesty's ministers never seemed to know what to do. They sent out troops before they knew where they would be received; they sent them in a state of equipment inadequate to the object for which they were destined; and when these troops had at length been brought to act upon the great theatre of war, the occasion had gone by, when they could be of any effectual use.-Junot and his corps could not be better placed any where than as they were, cut off from all communication with their countrymen, pressed upon all sides by the accumulating force of the Portugueze nation, and condemned either to shut themselves up in the fortresses of that country, or, by taking the field, to expose themselves to the destruction which the vengeance of an irritated and insulted people was prepared to inflict. In this state of things, the question was, Whether it was good policy to make any attack upon Junot, with a view to destroy his force? But if that were not good policy, it was still less so, to attack him with a view to grant him such terms as would send him into Spain, from which, whilst in Portugal, he was effectually cut off. Unless ministers were prepared to say that they had been successful before their time, they had no way of accounting for the interval that elapsed before the army proceeded to Spain; and if they rested their defence upon that ground, they must stand self

D

convicted of a criminal want of foresight, and were deeply responsible for all the losses which resulted from that unfortunate expedition to Spain having been undertaken too late. But how would the case have stood if Junot's force had been destroyed or made prisoners of war? What would have been the inevitable consequences of such a result, in the impression it would have made upon our allies, upon our enemies, upon ourselves, and upon all Europe, as to the comparative character of British and French troops? This impression alone was equivalent to most of the objects that campaigns the most successful are able in general to give. Those who think otherwise, must know but little of the state of the world, particularly at the moment in which we live, or of the feelings and judgments of mankind on other occasions. What had we gained at Maida? In point of territory, nothing in point of acquisition of any pecuniary value, nothing: but we had gained glory, military glory; and this single circumstance was sufficient to render the battle of Maida one of the most useful, as well as most honourable, of any that had ever been fought for the country. Our army had fought as well at Vimiera as at Maida, but unfortunately the same credit will not be given for its conduct. The troops with whom our force had come to blows would remember their superiority, but the people of France would not be inclined to admit it upon our statement. Whenever we should claim this superiority, they would quote the convention against us. They would ask, What have you gained? What have

you to show for your victory? Have you brought home the game? What have you bagged? Have you taken General Junot? On the contrary, is he not now at the head of his division in Spain? Have you made his corps prisoners of war? On the contrary, are they not fighting against you and your allies at this moment in Spain?' It was this loss of glory, this deplorable neglect of the opportunity to make an indelible impression upon the French themselves, and the Spanish nation, as to the striking superiority of the British army, that were most to be regretted in the unfortunate result of the campaign in Portugal. Nothing could compensate the loss of so precious an object, of such a golden opportunity. His Majesty's ministers, from their want of diligence, from the absence of all the ordinary official activity, from their total want of all general plan, and from the blind inconsiderate way in which they had conducted the whole of the campaign, stood, even upon their own shewing, condemned before their country."

Mr Perceval, in replying to this speech, had recourse to recrimination. "Perhaps," he said, "Mr Windham might speak feelingly on the subject of superseding officers, from having experienced the inconvenience of it. He had employed a junior officer (Brigadier-General Crawford) to go with 4000 men, by the Antipodes, to Botany Bay, from whence they were to proceed to Chili, which they were to conquer. This done, a line of posts was to be established across the Andes to Buenos Ayres, to secure the possession of that

settlement. Surely the right honourable gentleman could not have forgotten this; for such an idea, when it once entered the mind of a man, could not be got out of it again. General Crawfurd, however, was, after a long voyage, recalled, in order to be placed under the command of General Whitlocke, at Buenos Ayres." In the same spirit Lord Castlereagh had observed, that "the expedition to Sweden, and that preparing at Cork, were fully as beneficial, in their effects to the country, as those which had been sent to Egypt or the Dardanelles." The weakness of such a mode of defence was perceived by Mr Whitbread, though it isprecisely by such arguments that he uniformly apologizes for the crimes of Buonaparte. "Was it," he asked, "a justification for all the evils which the misconduct of ministers had occasioned, that their opponents, four years ago, had evinced similar, if not greater, imbecility and ignorance? Was that any apology to the country for the disappointment of its hopes, and the degradation of its character? In the name of truth, if both had been proved guilty of blunders the most criminal, let that be a reason for punishing them both together; but never let it be advanced as an extenuation for every future act of disgraceful mismanagement."

The defence of ministers was closed by Mr Canning. "He felt himself justified," he said, "in concurring with Lord Castlereagh and Mr Perceval in the same vote, but he differ ed with them in some points: These were rather political than military, -beyond military competency to execute, or military tribunals to decide upon. He objected in principle to the practice of stipulating conditions respecting which we had no

right nor power to act: nor could he deny that it was the open, undisguised opinion of every man, that the convention of Cintra had disappointed the hopes and expectations of the country. Having thus delivered his feelings upon this subject, he defended the mode of inquiry which had been adopted, because a court martial presumed the existence of a charge of some specific crime; and it would have been a harsh measure, while so strong a feeling pervaded the nation upon these transactions, to have sent any officer to trial with the weight of that clamour upon his head. And whom could they have selected for such a trial? If Sir Hew Dalrymple, would not ministers have been accused of partiality, in sending to trial an officer who had to plead his scanty information of the state of things on his arrival in Portugal, and who had no time to acquire any? If Sir Harry Burrard, he had the command only for four-and-twenty hours, and had scarcely interfered in the operations. It was only on military principles that he could have been selected, and this was what govern. ment were anxious to deliver no opinion upon, feeling it impossible for men in civil offices to decide on mat. ters of that sort. Should, then, Sir Arthur Wellesley have been selected! He could only be accused of having excited those proud hopes which were afterwards unfortunately disappointed. What mode, then, remained to be adopted but that of an inquiry, when there was brought forward no distinct accusation or specific charge against any of the commanders?"

The choice and change of commanders remained to be defended. "In the appointment of Sir Hew Dalrymple," Mr Canning said, "all his col