on the persuasion of the most perfect good faith on the part of England, and that it is particularly important to confirm it more and more by testimonies of mutual confidence, and by cautiously avoiding the slightest appearance of distrust between government and government."

One other point Mr Frere adverted to, which, though less important, was however of great weight. The precariousness of commerce, occasioned by the supposed insecurity of Cadiz, was infinitely prejudicial to the finances of Spain. There was no longer a place in the peninsula where British goods could be deposited; and the government was therefore under the necessity of cutting off all mercantile intercourse between the colonies and the rest of the civilized world, or of affording to foreign commerce a security which it could not find in the sole protection of a Spanish garrison. On this head he appealed to the custom-house registers, and to the applications made by neutrals for permission to unship goods, which they did not deem any longer safe. A note was transFeb. 17. mitted in reply to this, say. ing, that the junta would dispatch an extraordinary courier to London, and entreat their minister there to settle a point of so much interest and importance in a manner agreeable to the interests of both nations. Meantime, the English troops which were at present in the bay, and those which should arrive there, might disembark at Cadiz, for the purpose of proceeding to Port St Mary, San Lucar, Xeres, and the other places proposed for their cantonment, where every preparation had been made for their reception. No misfortune which could happen to the Spanish cause could prevent

the English from falling back on Gibraltar and Cadiz; and this step would prevent the inconvenience and perhaps sickness to which they might be exposed by remaining on board ship or in Cadiz, the appointed stations being in a country the most beautiful and healthy in the world.

Having thus considered the convenience of the troops, the junta adverted to the best means of availing themselves of the assistance of the English, and they submitted two propositions to Mr Frere, the only person, they said, alluding to Sir George Smith's interference, whom they acknowledged as the representative of the British nation. First, that the British troops should proceed to the coast of Catalonia, and garrison the maritime ports of that principapality, thus enabling the Spanish army in that quarter to march to the relief of Zaragoza, a measure of such urgent importance. Secondly, that they should co-operate with Cuesta; that general was threatened by a force not very superior in number to his own, the assistance of the English might give him the superiority; thus Cadiz would be secured, and time given to set on foot the troops who were now only waiting for muskets from England. The note concluded by expressing a feeling of honourable pain in the junta, that England should distrust the safety of Cadiz unless it were garrisoned by English troops. With justifiable pride they asserted, that the constancy and valour of the Spanish nation, manifested in this ar duous struggle, entitled it to the respect of Europe; and, gently hinting at what had passed in Galicia, they requested that a veil might be drawn over it. Cadiz was not situated like, Coruna, the same events therefore could not possibly occur there,

Upon the receipt of this Feb. 18. note, Mr Frere requested to be admitted to a conference with the members of the central junta, who had been commissioned to draw it up. At this conference they proposed to him that he should name a governor for Cadiz. Hereplied, that it was a responsibility with which he would not charge himself for all the world. Four months ago he should have chosen Morla, Espeleta six months before that: both these had been found wanting in the day of trial, though neither of them had been placed in a situation so trying to their fidelity as that of a governor holding out in the last remain ing garrison. Then replying to the argument, that the junta could not act against the popular opinion, "it must likewise be recollected," he said, "that the British government could not proceed in opposition to an opinion equally decided in England; and it only remained to examine which of the two pretensions was the most just. England was willing to expose an English army to any hazard which resulted absolutely from the nature of things, but England would not consent that that danger should be aggravated in the slightest degree, out of deference to the caprice of popular opinion, or suspicions which were unworthy of either country. England required of Spain that it should place confidence in the British government, binding itself by the most formal engagements; Spain of fered the choice of a governor and the chance of his fidelity. Our proposal was in every respect the fairest and the most rational, and it could not be expected that we should depart from a demand of right, for the sake of conferring a favour. Mr Frere offered to propose to General

1

Mackenzie, that he should leave 1000 men in Cadiz, and proceed with the rest to act in concert with Cuesta for the protection of Seville, and that when General Sherbrooke arrived, 3000 should proceed to the same direction, and he should content himself with garrisoning Cadiz with 2000 men, and proceed with or forward the remainder of his own force to General Mackenzie. To this proposition the junta had so nearly acceded, that the agreement was only broken off by their insisting that the public mind could not be reconciled to the admission of 2000 troops into Cadiz, and offering to admit half the num ber, a force which Mr Frere judged altogether inadequate to a purpose for which his own government allotted four times that amount.

The conference, which was conducted on both sides with perfect moderation and good temper, concluded with a fair avowal from the junta, that they were fully convinced of the good faith of the British government, and of the advantage that would result to Spain from the admission of British troops into Cadiz, if that was to be the indispensable condition of their co-operation. But that their own existence as a govern ment depended upon popular opinion; and the English ambassador could not be ignorant of the numerous and active enemies who were endeavouring to undermine them. The junta of Seville, who gave themselves great credit for resisting the introduction of the English into Cadiz last year when the French were advanced as far as Ecija, were upon the watch now, and calling the attention of the people to the conduct of the central junta in the present instance. Mr Frere made answer, that he could not of course expect his opinion should

be submitted to upon a subject on which their existence as a government and their personal security (for such in fact was the case,) were involved. But he advised them seriously to consider, whether the responsibility to which they exposed them. selves in the other alternative was not equally dangerous, and whether their enemies would not be as ready and as able to make a handle of the rejection of British assistance as of its acceptance. They thought, however, that their opponents had taken their line so decidedly, that it was not possible for them at once to slip round to an opposite direction.

Mr Frere was aware that the uppermost feeling in the minds of some of the junta was the apprehension of the resentment which Cuesta might entertain against them, convinced as that general must have been of their weakness by the manner of his ap-. pointment. Being desirous, therefore, of obtaining his opinion in favour of the measure which the British government proposed, or at least in such terms as would remove all fear of his declaring himself in opposition to it, he wrote to him, explain ing what Great Britain was willing to do in aid of Spain, and what condition was required. That condition, he said, was to be considered as indispensable, not only in the opinion of government, but in that of the nation, the individuals of which did not at that moment consider Cadiz as sufficiently secure even for a place of disposal for their merchandize, so that they were daily soliciting permission to re-export it, a fact which might well show what was the general opinion, and it might easily be judged whether the nation would risk its army upon an assurance which individuals did not consider as sufficient

for their woollen and cotton. Nor was it easy to understand upon what ground of jealousy their condition was opposed. Lisbon had twice been garrisoned by British troops, without the smallest inconvenience to the Por tugueze government. Madeira had in like manner been garrisoned: the Portugueze knew us by long experience; they knew also the internal state of England; knew that the English government never entertained a thought of abusing the confidence of its allies; and the state of public opinion is such in England, that it could not do this, even though it wished it. Under the present circumstances, the political question came before General Cuesta, both as a commander and a patriot, who, as he must be interested in any thing that might appear to injure the honour and independence of his country, so also he could not regard with indifference any thing that might derange the military plans of his government, and perhaps its political relations, by repeated acts of mistrust and mutual displeasure. 2800 good British troops might at this time march to co-operate with him upon the frontier of Estremadura, they would be followed by 1500 more as soon as General Sherbrooke arrived, and the auxiliary army would be delayed no longer than was necessary to dispose of its wounded and prisoners, and to be re-equipped. The question therefore was, whether General Cuesta could dispense with the present reinforcement of 4300 men, and whether Spain could dispense with the aid of an auxiliary army; for these were the points to be decided by the resolu tion which the junta should take of admitting, or immediately sending back the British troops, such being the alternative in which those troops

were placed by the orders under which they left Lisbon.

Cuesta returned a reply in terms of proper respect, both for the British government and his own. He did not, he said, discover any difficulty in the actual state of things which should prevent the British troops from garrisoning Cadiz, but he was far from supposing that the central junta could be without good ground for their objections, and that they should have objections was sufficient to prevent him from giving any opinion on so important a subject, unless they consulted him. With regard to the 4300 men, there could be no doubt but that he stood in need of them; and he hoped that England, convinced as it must be of the importance of preserving Estremadura, would lend him much greater assistance, particularly if from any change of circumstances the central junta should no longer appear repugnant to the condition which the British government required. This reply did not alter the determination which Mr Frere had made, of sending the troops back to Lisbon, considering Seville as comparatively safe, and conceiving that the principle which the English ministry had originally laid down, of not attaching small corps of British troops to a Spanish army, was one he should not be justified in depart ing from, for any object less important than the security of Cadiz or the capital. Accordingly, he communicated this determination to Don Martin de Garay, alledging that the information which he had lately received from Lisbon rendered such a measure necessary. In fact, Mr Frere had no other wish at this time than to conclude the subject without compromising either himself or others; and he was not displeased that the

VOL. II. PART 1.

proposals which he had made were not accepted, because General Mackenzie, though willing to submit to any inconvenience for the public service, had expressed some apprehension, that unpleasant results might arise if he were to act in conjunction with a man of the peculiar humour of General Cuesta.

Don Martin de Garay's answer closed the discussion. It was meant to be at the same time conciliatory, and capable of being produced for the exculpation of the junta. He represented, "that if the present state of affairs was so unfavourable that any immediate attack upon Cadiz was to be feared,-if the Spanish forces were incapable of defending that point, if there were no others of the greatest importance where the enemy might be opposed with advantage, the supreme junta would not fear to hurt the public feeling by admitting foreign troops into that fortress, because the public feeling would then be actuated by the existing state of things. But no such emergency existed; the armies were strengthening themselves in points very distant from Cadiz; even were things worse than there was any cause for expecting them to be, still the enemy had much ground to pass, and many difficulties to conquer, before he could threaten Cadiz; time could never be wanted to fall back upon that fortress; it was easy to be defended,-it was to be considered as a last point of retreat, and extreme points ought to be defended in advance, never in themselves, except in cases of extreme urgency. The army of Estremadura defended Andalusia on that side, those of the centre and La Carolina at the Sierra Morena ; the enemy for some time past had not been able to make any progress, 2 M

and there, if superior forces could be collected against him, a decisive blow might be struck. On the other hand, Catalonia was bravely defending itself, and Zaragoza still resisted the repeated attacks of an obstinate and persevering besieger." It is remarkable that the junta should have so little considered the disproportion between that heroic city and the force which was brought against it, and have been so ill informed of the progress of the siege, as to suppose that Zaragoza would still hold out, when it had at this time been eight days in possession of the French.

"Either in Estremadura, or with the central army or in Catalonia," Don Martin de Garay pursued, "the, assistance of Great Britain would be of infinite service. This was the opinion of the supreme junta; this was the opinion of the whole nation, and would doubtless be that of every one who impartially contemplated the true state of things. If the auxiliary troops already in the bay, or on their passage, should disembark in the neighbourhood of Cadiz, and proceed to reinforce General Cuesta, they would always find a safe retreat in Cadiz in case of any reverse; but should a body of troops, already very small, leave part of its force in Cadiz, in order to secure a retreat at such a distance, the English ambassador himself must surely acknowledge that such assistance could inspire the Spaniards with very little confidence, particularly after the events in Galicia. But it appeared to Mr Frere that the presence of these troops was necessary at Lisbon, and therefore he had given orders for their return. Of this measure the same might be said as of the proposed one for securing Cadiz. Lisbon was not the point where Portugal could be de

fended; the greatest possible number of troops ought to be employed in those advanced lines where the ene my was posted, and where he might be routed decisively. For all these reasons the supreme junta were per suaded, that if the British government should determine that its troops should not act in union with theirs, except on the expressed condition, this non-co-operation could never be imputed to them. The junta must on all occasions, and particularly under the present circumstances, act in such a manner, that if it should be necessary to manifest to the nation, and to all Europe, the motives of their conduct, it might be done with that security, and with that foundation, that should conciliate to them the public opinion, which was the first and main spring of their power."

Thus terminated the discussion concerning the admission of English troops into Cadiz. Mr Frere seri ously warned the junta of the ill consequences which must result to Spain, if it should appear that the efforts and offers which the King of England had made, should have the effect of producing embarrassment to his government at home. It appears, in deed, as if both governments acted more with reference to their enemies at home, than from any real importance which they could attach to the point in dispute. With the Spanish government this was confessedly the case; they didnot, and could not, possibly suspect the good faith of Eng. land,-between Spain and England, the honourable character of one country is at all times sufficient security for the other; but they stood equally in fear of the bolder patriots, who were dissatisfied with their tardy and indecisive measures, and of Morla and the other traitors, whose aim was to