tained his ground against superior numbers while he sent to require support. Albuquerque had requested that his division might be the first sent to support the vanguard, either in case of its attacking the enemy or being attacked. While Cuesta made arrangements for the retreat of the whole army beyond the Alberche, he advanced time enough to save Zayas from a complete rout, and the army from the utter defeat which would have resulted from it. The vanguard was flying at the moment when he arrived; he charged the enemy, checked them, and gave the van time to form again, and fall back in good order. But for this timely success, the whole army would have been dispersed, for all the artillery and baggage were in the streets of St Olalla, carts of bread were there also blocking up the way, the commissaries had taken flight, and the men, catching that panic which want of order in an army never fails to occasion on the first approach of danger, had begun to throw away their arms, that they might neither be encumbered with them in running away, nor supposed to be soldiers if they were overtaken.

Albuquerque would have pursued his success, had he not been compelled to retreat by repeated orders from the commander-in-chief, at the moment when he was about to attack a disheartened enemy, with troops confident in their own courage and in the skill of their leaders, and heated by the advantage which they had gained. He had, however, done much in saving the army, for never were the movements of an army conducted in a more wretched and disorderly manner; like a rabble upon a pilgrimage, such was Albuquerque's

description, they proceeded without any regard to distance, order, or me. thod, and with the whole park of artillery; they had neither provisions, staff, nor settled plan, and they stopt upon their marches to repose like flocks of sheep, without taking up any position, so that, if the French knew the condition they were in, a defeat must have been inevitable whenever they were unexpectedly attacked. Saved from that total dispersion which must have ensued, had not Albuquerque checked the French in their career, the Spanish army retreated twenty miles from St Olalla to the Alberche unmolested, and crossed the river, thus again forming a junction with the British. Cuesta thought it very unlikely that the enemy would venture to attack them here: there was a report that they had detached 15,000 men towards Madrid, and this strengthened his opinion. In fact, had Venegas performed his part of the concerted operations, either this must have been done by the French, or Madrid would have fallen into the hands of the patriots. But though this gene ral was under Cuesta's orders, and had been instructed how to act in pursuance of the plan arranged with Sir Arthur Wellesley, counter orders were sent him by the supreme junta; and he, obeying these orders, disconcerted the whole arrangement by employing himself in a useless cannonade of Toledo; thus leaving Madrid to the enemy, and permit ting the French to bring their whole force against the allies. This grievous misconduct, which frustrated all their views, could not possibly have been foreseen either by the British or Spanish commander, and but for this it is highly probable, that, in spite of Cuesta's manifold blunders,

the Spaniards must have recovered their capital.

Sir Arthur, as soon as the Spaniards fell back to the Alberche, expected a general action, and immediately prepared for it, recalling General Sherbrooke from Casalegas to his station in the line. The position which he chose extended something more than two miles. The British army was on the left; here the ground was open, and commanded by a height upon which a division of infantry was stationed under Major General Hill. Still farther upon the left was a range of mountains separated from the height by a valley about 300 fathoms wide, and here a ravine running from N. to S. covered the left and centre of the position, and terminated at the begin-ning of the olive grounds on the right, The valley was not occupied, because it was commanded by the height, and because the mountains were thought too distant to be of any consequence in the expected battle. The right, consisting of Spaniards, extended immediately in front of Talavera down to the Ta

gus: : this part of the ground was covered by olive trees, and much intersected by banks and ditches. The high road leading from the town to the bridge of Alberche was defended by a heavy battery in front of the Ermida, or chapel of Nuestra Senora del Prado, which was occupied by Spanish infantry. All the avenues to the town were defended in like manner; the town itself was occupied, and the remainder of the Spanish foot formed in two lines behind the banks, on the road which led to the position of the British. In the centre between the allied armies was a commanding spot, on which the British had begun to con

struct a redoubt. Brigadier General Alexander Campbell was posted here with a division of infantry, and General Cotton's brigade of dragoons, with some Spanish cavalry, in the open ground in his rear.

When General Sherbrooke was recalled from Casalegas, General Mackenzie was left with a division of infantry and a brigade of horse as an advanced post near Casa de Salinas, in a wood on the right of the Alberche, which covered the left of the British army. About two in the afternoon of the 27th, the enemy appeared in strength on the left bank; Victor forded the Alberche, and before General Mackenzie's division could be withdrawn, it was attacked by very superior forces under Generals La Pisse and Chaudron Rousseau. The British suffered considerably, but they withdrew in perfect order, and took their place in the line. Meantime the other divisions of the French crossed the Alberche, and advanced within cannon-shot of the allied army. They cannonaded the left of the British position, and they attacked the Spanish infantry with their horse, hoping to break through and win the town; but they were bravely withstood and finally repulsed. The action ceased a little before nine at night. Victor had marked the height on which General Hill was posted; this he considered to be the key of the position, and thought that, if he could beat the English from thence, it would be impossible for them to maintain the field afterwards. This might best be done during the night. He, therefore, ordered Ruffin to attack the hill with three regiments, Vilatte to support him, and La Pisse to make a feint upon the centre of the allied armies, which might

serve as a diversion. The attack was made soon after night had closed; for a moment it was successful, and the enemy got possession of the height; they were unable to maintain it. General Hill instantly at tacked them with the bayonet, and recovered the post. At midnight the attempt was repeated, and failed again. According to the French account, one of the regiments destined for this service lost its way, owing to the darkness, and another was impeded by the ravine. Both sides suffered considerably at this well-contested point. The armies lay upon the field, the cavalry with their horses' bridles round their arms, but there was little rest during the night; both sides were on the alert and alarm, and in different parts of the field the videttes of each army were sometimes fired on by their own countrymen, being mistaken for enemies. Whole battalions of the enemy got into the English line, some crying that they were Spaniards, some that they were German deserters: the trick was soon discovered, and, in the reception which they met with, it is not unlikely that many a poor German, who really intended to desert, lost his life. These night-engagements were carried on with the most determined fury; the men, after they had discharged their muskets, frequently closed, and beat out each other's brains with the butt-end.

The French had ascertained in the course of the evening, that any attack upon the town, posted as the Spaniards were, was hopeless; that the centre also was very strong, both from the rugged ground and the olive yards which covered it, and the works which had been thrown up there. The left was the most practicable point of attack, and the diffi

culty of carrying that they had severely experienced. Here, however, they made a third attempt at day-break, with three regiments under General Ruffin advancing in close columns. The enemy proceed. ed triumphantly, as they supposed, nearly to the summit; there they were again charged and again beaten back, but they fell back in good order. Sir Arthur, for the farther security of this post, now sent two brigades of horse into the valley on the left. Albuquerque had at this time been ordered by the Spanish commander to go with his cavalry to a place near the town, where it was not only impossible for them to act, but there was not even room for them, the ground being thick ly wooded. That able general ventured on this occasion to act from his own judgement; observing that the English cavalry were charged by very superior numbers, he has tened to support them, and his opportune arrival enabled them to occupy the position. Cuesta perceived the advantage of this movement, and suffered the duke to chuse his own ground, who accordingly took the post of danger with the English horse. To annoy this body, the French sent their riflemen to the heights on the left of the valley; this occupying the ground which Sir Arthur had supposed beyond the bounds to which the action would extend. It proved of no advantage to them, for Cuesta, marking the movement, dispatched Camp-Marshal Don Luis Bassecourt against them with the fifth division of Spanish infantry, and dislodged them with great loss.

About eleven, the enemy having been baffled in all their attempts, intermitted the attack, rested their

troops, and, it is said, cooked their dinners upon the field. Wine and a little bread were served out to the British troops. A brook which flows into the Tagus separated the French and English in one part of the field, and during this pause, men of both armies s went there to drink, as if a truce had been established. Their muskets were laid down and their helmets put off while they stooped to the stream, and when they had quenched their thirst, they rested on the brink, looking at each other. The heat and exasperation of battle was suspended; they felt that mutual respect which proofs of mutual courage had inspired, and some of them shook hands across the brook, in token that although they were met to shed each other's blood, brave men knew how to value a brave enemy. At such a moment it was natural for Englishmen to have no other feeling the atrocities by which Buonaparte's soldiers in the peninsula have disgraced their profession, their country, and their nature, were for time forgotten. About noon, Victor ordered a general attack along the whole of the line. His own three divisions were to attack the hill once more. Sebastiani was to form his first division in two lines on the left of La Pisse; Leval, with a brigade just then arriving from Aranjuez, to be stationed to the left of the first division, a little in the rear; still further to the left, Milhaud, with his division of dragoons, was to observe Talavera; Latour Maubourg's division of infantry and Merlin's division of light-horse formed in the rear of Victor to support his corps, and advance into the open ground now occupied by him, as soon as he should have won the hill. The re

serve was placed in a third line behind Sebastiani's corps.

From the moment this general attack commenced, the firing of musketry was heard on all sides like the roll of a drum, with scarcely a mơment's interruption during the remainder of the day, and the deeper sound of a heavy cannonade rising above it like thunder. The operations of the French were deranged by a blunder of Leval's division, which they attribute to the ruggedness of the ground, and the impossibility of preserving the line among the olivetrees and vines. Instead of forming in echellon in the rear, it advanced to the front, and before it had finishcd deploying it was attacked. Leval, say the French, formed a square, and in his turn attacked the enemy with such success, that a whole English regiment surrendered and grounded its arms, when the colonel of the regiment to which it had surrendered was unhappily killed; his men made a retrograde movement, and the English found themselves at liberty, with the loss of only 100 prisoners. The truth contained in this ridiculous story is, that Leval's division was beaten from its station. Sebastiani sent a brigade to its support, and it fell back to the ground which it was designed to occupy. This occasioned some delay. When the fine was formed, Sebastiani's corps waited till Victor's had begun the attack. La Pisse first crossed the ravine, supported by Latour Maubourg's cavalry, and by two batteries, each of eight pieces of cannon. Vilatte threatened the hills and covered the valley, and Ruffin, skirting the great chain of mountains to

left endeavoured to turn the flank of the British army. The at9113 ne 2007

tack upon the hill was exceedingly formidable, but, like all the former, it failed. La Pisse was mortally wounded, his men were driven back, and Victor himself rallied them, and brought them once more to the contested point; their retrograde movement had exposed Sebastiani's right, and there also the French suffered considerably.

While Victor led his troops once more to the foot of that hill which had so often been fatal to the assailants, Vilatte with the columns in the valley advanced to his support. General Anson's brigade, consisting of the 1st German light dragoons and the 23d dragoons, with General Fane's brigade of heavy cavalry, were ordered to charge them. The French formed in two solid, squares; they were protected by a deep ditch, which was not seen till the horses were close to it, and they kept up a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry. This was the most destructive part of the whole action; numbers of men and horses fell into the ditch,-numbers were mown down, still these regiments advanced, and made a desperate charge upon the solid and impenetrable squares of the enemy. They suffered dreadfully in this attack, the 22d especially, which was almost annihilated. The heavy brigade advanced to their support, and brought off the remnant who survived. They failed in breaking the enemy; but the matchless resolution with which they had advanced upon almost certain destruction, and the shock which their charge had given, effectually impeded the enemy's plans, and no farther attempt was made upon the hill, which was now covered with dead, dying, wounded, and exhausted troops.

The attack upon the centre was made at the same time. Here General Campbell was supported by the Spanish Generals Eguia and Henestrosa, and by a regiment of Spanish horse; the allies repulsed the ene my, and while the Spaniards turned their flank, the English took their cannon. The attack upon General Sherbrooke was repulsed by a charge with bayonets from the whole division; but the brigade of guards advanced too far, and laid themselves open on the left flank both to the fire of the enemy's batteries and of their retiring columns. The enemy seized the advantage, and it was of such importance, that at that moment the fate of the day appeared worse than doubtful. On this occasion, the foresight of Sir Arthur Wellesley secured the victory, which had been so long and so nobly contested. Seeing them advance, and apprehending the consequence, he moved a battalion of the 48th from the heights to their sup port, and this timely succour, with the assistance of the 2d line of Ge neral Cotton's brigade of cavalry, enabled the guards to return under cover. During this action, the same circumstance occurred as at the battle of Wagram. The shrubs caught fire, and many of the wounded were burnt.

When the day closed the enemy had been repulsed at all points; and it appears, by the official account of the French themselves, as well as by their unequivocal movements after the battle, that they were effectually defeated. They affirm, that the line which the allies occupied at the beginning of the action was in a great measure at its close in possession of the intruder's army. There were, however, two essential points in