in this part of the country, he was confined to his bed, in the village of Los Hoyos. Had he been removed now, he must have died upon the road; it was, therefore, not a matter of choice but of necessity that he should remain and take his chance. Three of his clergy and some of his domestics remained with him; and a few old men took refuge under the same roof, thinking the presence of the venerable bishop would render it a safe asylum. The French entered the village, and soon took possession of the house where the old prelate lay in bed. His chaplains met them, and intreated protection for their spiritual father, and his domestics waited upon them, hoping, by their obsequiousness, to obtain favour, or at least to escape injury. But after these villains had eaten and drank what was set before them, they first began to plunder the house of every thing which could be converted to their own use, then to destroy whatever they could not carry away. Then they fell upon the unhappy people of the house, one of whom they killed, and wounded six others; lastly, they dragged the bishop from his bed, and discharged two muskets into his body.

The plans of the enemy on the side of Estremadura were effected; they who had so lately trembled for Madrid had seen the allied armies recross the Tagus, and they gave themselves credit for the fortunate issue of a campaign, in which, if it had not been for the gross misconduct of the Spanish general and the criminal neglect of the central junta, they must inevitably have been driven to the Ebro. On the side of La Mancha they were not less successful. Venegas, on the 14th of July, had received orders from the government

VOL. II. PART I.

to occupy the attention of the enemy, in order to divert them from the allied armies as much as possible, without endangering himself. In consequence of these instructions he advanced his army from El Moral, Ynfanles, Puerto Elano, and Valdepenas, to Damiel, La Solana, El Corral de Caraquel, and Manzanares, keeping his head-quarters still at Santa Cruz de Mudela, and expecting intelligence which would justify him in advancing to Consuegra and Madrilejos. At this time he supposed it was the intention of the combined armies to march to Madrid; and when the want both of provisions and means of transports rendered it not merely difficult for the British army to proceed, but actually impossible, Cuesta gave him no intelligence whatever of this, thereby exposing him to be entirely destroyed, if the French, instead of marching upon Talavera, had directed their attack against him. Cuesta's whole conduct respecting the British army was so utterly unreasonable, that it can only be accounted for by ascribing it to obstinacy and folly. The wants of the British army were palpable; he had them before his eyes, and could at any moment have satisfied himself of the truth of every complaint which he received, yet he concealed the real state of things both from his own government and Venegas, to both of whom it was of such essential importance to be accurately informed. The Spanish government received true intelligence from Mr Frere, and in consequence they dispatched a courier to Venegas, directing him to suspend his operations, and take up a defensive position.

Cuesta's neglect rendered it prudent to dispatch these orders; but in this instance one evil most unfort'ı

3 A

nately produced another in a man. ner which certainly could not have been foreseen. Two hours after the arrival of the courier, Venegas received intelligence of the victory of Talavera, which was the more unexpected, because the intruder, true to the French system, had published an extraordinary gazette, stating that he had defeated the allied armies on the 26th. Venegas ordered Te Deum to be sung in the neighbouring churches, and celebrated the victory by a general discharge; but he failed to improve it, and, instead of considering that the circumstances under which the junta had dictated his instructions were now entirely changed, he adhered strictly to those instructions, and lost the opportunity of advancing to Madrid; thus consummating the series of blunders by which a campaign so well planned, and a victory so bravely won, were rendered fruitless. Had he pushed for that city immediately, beyond all doubt he might have entered it, Sir Robert Wilson would instantly have joined him there, the resources of the city would have been secured for the allied armies, and the recovery of the capital would have raised the whole country far and near against the French. Had Albuquerque been appointed to the command of the army in La Mancha, according to the earnest wishes of Mr Frere and the recommendation of Sir Arthur, this momentous opportunity would not thus have been lost.

Venegas therefore remained with his vanguard at Aranjuez, and his head-quarters at Ocana, while another division of his army under Brig.Gen. Don Luis Lacy was employed in an idle attempt upon Toledo, which, as he did not chuse to destroy

the houses from which the enemy fired at him, because it was a Spanish town, could not possibly succeed, and therefore ought not to have been made. On the 31st, the third day after the battle, Cuesta wrote to Venegas, directing him to advance with all his force upon Madrid. "This operation," he said, "must necessarily oblige Victor to detach a large part of his force toward the capital, in which case the allied armies would pursue him to that city, and if any unforeseen accident should compel Venegas himself to retire, he would be able to retreat by Arganda and along the skirts of the mountain." This letter was written at eleven at night. Twelve hours afterwards Cuesta forwarded a second dispatch, stating that Victor's army had marched in the direction of Torrijos and Toledo. Venegas, upon receiving the first, immediately ordered his whole force to unite at Aranjuez, meaning to lose no time in reaching the capital. The contents of the second staggered him; if the enemy marched for Toledo, they would fall on his rear guard, if they went through Torrijos direct upon Madrid, they had the start of him, and would get between him and that city. He determined therefore still to collect his force in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez, and there wait for fresh orders; and he reminded Cuesta how indispensably necessary it was that their movements should be combined.

His army was collected on the night of the 3d, leaving only 600 foot and 200 horse in the neighbourhood of Toledo. The next day he received another dispatch from Cuesta, telling him of his march from Talavera to reinforce Sir Arthur. This letter was written with the most

heights adjacent to Ontigola, beginning from Mount Parnaso, and to defend the passage of the river to the utmost. Having directed these measures, he returned to his quarters, leaving Don Pedro Agustin Giron in command of the three divisions upon the Tagus. Three hours had hardly elapsed before Giron sent him word that large columns of horse and foot and artillery were marching upon Puente Largo, and that some had already crossed the Xarama; this was followed by tidings that a great dust was seen in the direction of the ford of Anover. It could not now be doubted that a serious attack was about to be made, the ford would certainly be attempted, and Venegas was apprehensive that he should be assailed in the rear at the same time by troops from Toledo. He therefore ordered Lacy immediately to cross the Queen's Bridge, and break it down, and marched his reserve from Ocana to the height on the left of the road between that town and Aranjuez, where they might be ready to resist an attack on the side of Toledo or the ford, and to support the retreat of the other three divisions, who, if they found themselves unable to guard the river, were instructed to retreat to Ocana; but their orders were to defend the passage to the utmost, and maintain every position inch by inch.

Lacy could not commence his retreat from Puente Largo soon enough to avoid an attack; a strong body of cavalry from the Cuesta de la Reyna fell upon his rear, but they resisted the enemy, and, retiring in good order over the Queen's Bridge, broke it down, and took post upon some heights which protected it: the bridge itself was defended by Don Luis Riquelme with three battalions

and four pieces of cannon, another battalion was stationed in the Plaza de S. Antonio. D. Miguel Antonio Panes, a captain of artillery, only son of the Marquis of Villa Panes, defended the broken Puente de Bar. cas with two eight-pounders and two companies. Other troops were sta tioned at the ford of the Infante Don Antonio's garden, at the Puente Verde, at the Vado Largo, or broad ford, and in the Calle de la Reyna. A reserve was placed on each side the road to Ocana, and in the walks immediately adjoining the palace, on the left of which the whole of the cavalry stood ready to charge the enemy in case they should win the passage of the river, or attack the Spaniards in the rear by a party which might have crossed at some remote point. Thus the banks of the Tagus at Aranjuez, and the gardens which it had so long been the pride and pleasure of the Spanish kings to embellish, were now made the scene of war. They are said to exceed in beauty those of any other royal residence in Europe; for, though laid out originally in the old formal style of French gardening, the groves in the growth of two cen turies concealed the insipid unifor mity of the design; and the vicious taste of the magnificent fountains, which are placed at the end of every walk, was easily forgiven for the de light which they afford in such a cli mate.

About two in the afternoon the French appeared upon the right bank of the river, and began the attack along the whole line. They opened a heavy fire on all points, but more especially upon the ford of Don Antonio's garden, and the reserve from the walks were sent to strengthen that post. Panes at the Puente de Barcas was struck by a ball, which

carried away his leg; a glance convinced him that the wound was mortal: "Comrades," said he to his men, "stand by these guns till deathI am going to heaven:" and, as they bore him from the field, the only anxiety he expressed was, that another officer should take his place without delay. Don Gaspar Hermosa succeeded him, after planting a mortar at the Puente ford in the midst of the enemy's fire. The Spanish artillery was excellently served this day, and frequently silenced that of the French. One mortar, placed in the thicket opposite the islet, made very great havock among the enemy. Lacy, perceiving that his own post was secure, and that the main attack was made upon the left, at the Puente Verde, the gardens of the prince and of Don Antonio, removed his division there without waiting for orders. The battle continued till the approach of night, when the French, baffled in all their attempts, retired. The loss of the Spaniards was between 2 and 300 men in killed and wounded; they computed that of the French at 300 killed, and about 1000 wounded. The French force consisted of 14 or 15,000, being the whole of Sebastiani's corps. They themselves carefully avoided all mention of the action, saying only that they worsted the advanced guard of Venegas, and drove it beyond the Tagus. Giron, who commanded, for Venegas was not in the field, was rewarded with the rank of camp-marshal, and the junta testified its sense of the hero ism of Panes, who died a few hours after he was wounded, by exempt ing the title in his family from the duties called lanzas and medias anatas for ever, appointing his father a gentleman of the bed-chamber, and

ordering a letter to be written to him, expressing, in the most honourable terms, the sense which the country entertained of the services rendered to it both by father and son, in order that this letter should be preserved in the archives of the family.

The French after their defeat recrossed the Xarama, and, as Venegas foresaw, prepared to attack him from the other side. According to their official statement, they thought it would be a long and difficult work to rebuild the bridges at Aranjuez, and that it would be less dangerous to force the passage of the Tagus at Toledo, where they had remained masters of the bridges. The Spanish general, therefore, disposed his troops in echellon at Aranjuez, Ocana, La Guardia, and Tembleque, ready to march, as circumstances might require, to some point where he could only be attacked in front, and might therefore be freed from the fear that the enemy would cut off his retreat by way of Toledo, and, having disabled him, penetrate to the passes of the Sierra Morena, the armies of Cuesta and Sir Arthur being too far off to prevent this. The necessity of retreating was indeed obvious, and the junta were of opinion that he had no other course left than that of abandoning La Mancha, and taking post at the pass of Despena-perros. Mr Frere was of opinion that it would be better, if La Mancha were un tenable, to occupy the passes with a part of his army only, (for it was not to be supposed that at this time the French could make any serious attempt upon Andalusia,) and march with or detach the rest upon the left of the enemy, through a country which they had never been able to occupy, Cuenca, Molina, and as far