suing their occupation. Rather, by the contract, they seem to have sought a means of extending the field of their operations, and not of restricting them. In the light of the authorities, the rule and the reasons therefor, and the facts, we are clearly of the opinion that the contract was not in restraint of trade and not void. It was simply a contract, for a consideration, for the enlistment of the services of an agent for the plaintiffs in their business. Mont. Sup. Ct., Feb. 4, 1890. Newell v. Meyendorff. Opinion by DeWitt, J. - ORIMINAL LAW LARCENY - VALUE OF GOODS.Where the testimony showed that property stolen consisted almost wholly of ready-made clothing, which had been worn on Sundays by the owner for about seven months, and that he could not testify to its actual value, an instruction that "as to the wearing apparel, you will find its real value to the owner at the time of its being stolen" is erroneous. Under the rule announced, a witness smarting under the loss of his property might swear that a handkerchief costing fifty cents was worth $50 to him, or a hat which cost $3 was worth to him $300. Such a rule practically nullifies the statute which makes the stealing of goods of the value of $35 a felony. In Eugster v. State, 11 Neb. 539, 66 on the concurred in by Judge Cobb, it was held, trial of one E. for receiving stolen goods, the statute making the receiving of such goods of the value of $35 and upward a felony, that it devolved on the State to prove by competent testimony that the value of such goods was at least $35." A witness before he is competent to testify as to the value of property must show by his testimony that he has knowledge of the value of such property. The rule announced in that case is based on justice, and should be adhered to unless there are good reasons for overturning it, which should be stated in the opinion. In the brief of the attorneygeneral it is said: "It is not the policy of the law to "to discount the value, or give rebates or special rates the thief. That is true. But neither has a court any right or authority, except mere force, to declare that a felony which the proof fails to show is such under the statutes. It is the duty of courts to administer the law, and it is a reproach upon any tribunal to allow a fictitious value to be placed upon stolen property in order to convict the accused of an offense higher than the facts will justify. How can it be said that such a tribunal is impartial, holding the scales of justice even between the accused and the State? Had the Legislature intended to change the rule in regard to the mode of proving values in cases of this kind, no doubt it would explicitly have so declared. The precise question here presented was before this court in Engster v. State, supra, and it said: "A party who is permitted to testify as to the value of property must show by his testimony that he possesses knowledge as to such value, otherwise his testimony is mere conjecture, and is wholly unreliable. In an indictment where the value of the property must exceed $35 to constitute a felony, such value must be proved, like any other fact upon which a conviction depends, beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a material fact, without proof of which the prosecution must fail." In that case one Signor was called as a witness on behalf of the State, and testified: “Question. Are you a judge of clothing? AnAnd showing no other swer. Yes, sir; of mine." knowledge, he was held not qualified to testify as to values. The proof in this case clearly shows that the real value of the stolen goods was much less than $35, and the conviction of a felony was wrong, and is set aside, and the cause remanded to the District Court. Neb. Sup. Ct., Dec. 31, 1889. Brooks v. State. Opinion by Maxwell, J. Reese, C. J., dissenting, said: The question presented in this case is, to my mind, not free from doubt. Upon the subject here presented there is a dearth of authorities. The usual rule, and that declared by the opinion in this case, does not seem CONFIDENTIAL EVIDENCE -HUSBAND AND WIFECOMMUNICATION.-In an action for criminal conversation, plaintiff testified that he had previously had an altercation with the defendant in consequence of the latter's intimacy with his wife; that after that affair some papers were drawn; that a note was written by his wife the same day the papers were drawn; that he took the original from her bosom, copied it, and gave it back to her. In one of the papers mentioned, defendant promised that he would have nothing to do with plaintiff's wife, or communicate with her in the future. The note which plaintiff's wife had written "For God's sake! why did you promwas as follows: ise him any such thing? He wanted me to promise him, but I would not promise him nothing." The note had not been sent to the defendant, nor to any one, and there was no evidence that any one ever saw it before the trial except the wife and husband. Held, that it was inadmissible in evidence, under the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin, section 4072, which provides that a husband or wife shall not be allowed to disclose a confidential communication made by one to the other, during their marriage, without the consent of the other. In an action for criminal conversation the plaintiff's wife is a competent witness for the defendant as to any matter in controversy, except as aforesaid." Wis. Sup. Ct., Jan. 7, 1890. Smith v. Merrill. Opinion by Cassoday, J. As a NUISANCE POWDER MAGAZINES. (1) A powder magazine maintained within the limits of an incorporated town, in violation of its ordinances, is a nuisance per se. The powder magazine kept by the defendant upon its premises was so situated with reference to the dwelling-house of the plaintiff that it was liable to inflict serious injury upon her person or her property in case of an explosion. It was a private nuisance, and therefore the defendant was liable, whether the powder was carefully kept or not. general rule the question of care or want of care is not involved in an action for injuries resulting from a nuisance. If actual injury results from the keeping of gunpowder, the person keeping it will be liable therefor, even though the explosion is not chargeable to his personal negligence. 1 Wood Nuis., $$ 73, 115, 130, 142; Heeg v. Licht, 80 N. Y. 579; Cheatham v. Shearon, 1 Swan, 213; Stout v. McAdams, 2 Scam. 67; Gas-Light Co. v. Thompson, 39 Ill. 600; Nevins v. City of Peoria, 41 id. 502; Cooper v. Randall, 53 id. 24; Myers v. Malcolm, 6 Hill, 262; Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159; Phinizy v. Augusta, 47 Ga. 263; Burton v. McClellan, 2 Scam. 434; Wier's Appeal, 74 Penn. St. 230. The ordinance absolutely prohibited any powder magazine from being kept within the town, unless the lot upon which it was located should be of a certain size. The defendant kept its magazine within the town upon a smaller lot than the law required. Its magazine was in the town in violation of the law. The keeping of gunpowder in the town was an illegal act. "If an illegal act be done, the party doing or causing the act to be done is responsible for all consequences resulting from the act." Burton v. McClellan, supra. The cases referred to by counsel as holding a contrary doctrine have no application here. In those cases it is held that where the plaintiff's right of recovery depends upon his own exercise of due care, as well as upon the defendant's negligence, the failure of the defendant to comply with some statutory requirement, such as ringing a bell, or blowing a whistle, or erecting a sign-board, will not of itself authorize a recovery, in the absence of such care on the part of the plaintiff. There the injury is attributable to the plaintiff's want of ordinary care, and the defendant's neglect of a statutory requirement cannot be set up as an excuse. Here there is no question of the exercise of care by the plaintiff, nor is it a mere matter of non-feasance on the part of the defendant. In keeping a powder magazine in the town without complying with the condition named in the ordinance, the defendant was guilty of malfeasance. Its offense is similar to that of bringing diseased cattle into the State in violation of the act of the Legislature on that subject, as discussed in Somerville v. Marks, 58 Ill. 371, and Distilling Co. v. Young, 77 id. 197. (2) In an action for injuries to adjoining property caused by the explosion of such a magazine, it is no defense that plaintiff knew of the existence of the magazine when he bought his property, and that he was interested in some similar magazines in the same neighborhood. If a servant enters the employment of his master knowing it to be dan gerous and unsafe, he assumes the risks attendant upon such employment, and waives all claim for damages against his employer in case of injury. In such cases the risks are a part of the contract or service. 2 Thomp. Neg. 1008. But in the present case it is not pretended that either the plaintiff or her hus band had ever been employed by the defendant, or had ever had any interest in defendant's powder magazine or business, or that there had ever been any relations of any kind between her husband and the defendant. In Cooper v. Randall, 53 Ill. 24, which was an action to recover damages for the erection, on a lot adjacent to plaintiff's dwelling-house, of a flouring. mill, which threw chaff, dust, smut and dirt into plaintiff's house, the defendants sought to prove that another house in the same neighborhood, owned and rented by the plaintiff, was a disreputable house. The evidence was held to be inadmissible, because wholly foreign to the issue. "The issue was whether the mill was an injury to this property, and no light could be shed upon that question by evidence in regard to the occupancy of another house in the neighborhood." In Wier's Appeal, 74 Penn. St. 230, supra, it was said: Carrying on an offensive trade for any number of years in a place remote from buildings and public roads does not entitle the owner to continue it in the same place after houses have been built and roads laid out in the neighborhood, to the occupants of which. and travellers upon which, it is a nuisance. As the city extends, such nuisances should be removed to the vacant grounds beyond the immediate neighborhood of the residences of the citizens. This, public policy, as well as the health and comfort of the population of the city, demand. ill. Sup. Ct., Jan. 21, 1890. LaflinRand Powder Co. v. Tearney. Opinion by Magruder, J. PARDON CONDITIONS — VIOLATION. A pardon, granted by the governor to a convict on condition that he leave the State within forty-eight hours, never to return, is authorized by the Constitution of South Carolina, article 3, section 11, which provides that the governor may grant pardons after conviction, except in cases of impeachment, "in such mauner, on such terms, and under such restrictions as he shall think proper. It will not be necessary to look further for his authority to grant a conditional pardon, though it seems to be well settled that such a pardon could be granted in that country from whence we derive a large part of our legal principles. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 773; 1 Bish. Crim. Law (6th ed.). § 914. These authorities show that a pardon may be granted either upon a precedent or a subsequent condition. If the former then the pardon does not take effect until the condition has been performed; but if the latter, then the pardon takes effect at once, but becomes void whenever the condition is violated, and the offender may be again brought to the bar, and remanded to suffer his original sentence. But while this is conceded, it is contended that a pardon granted upon a condition subsequent which is illegal, immoral or impossible to be performed, becomes an absolute pardon, such a condition being absolutely void; and the contention in this case is that the condition upon which the pardon here was granted -to leave the State, never to return-was illegal, inasmuch as there is no such punishment known to our laws as that of banishment or transportation for life, or a period of years. Inasmuch as we think it quite clear that the condition annexed to the pardon granted in this case was neither illegal, iminoral nor impos sible to be performed, we need not consider what would be the effect of annexing such a condition to a pardon. It is not pretended that the condition here in question was either immoral or impossible to be performed; and the fact that our laws do not prescribe banishment from the State, or transportation for life or for a period of years, as the punishment for any offense, cannot have the effect of making the condition imposed in this case illegal. There is no law, So far as we are informed, which forbids the executive from annexing, as a condition of a pardon granted by him, a provision that the offender shall leave the State and never return; and in the absence of any such law, we do not see how the condition upon which the pardon was granted in this case can be regarded as illegal. So far from there being any law forbidding the imposition of such a condition as was annexed to the pardon granted in this case, we find that its legality has been frequently recognized in this State. State v. Fuller, 1 McCord, 178; State v. Smith, 1 Bailey, 283. Again in State v. Addington, 2 id. 516; State v. Chancellor, 1 Strob. 347. S. C. Sup. Ct., Jan. 7, 1890. State v. Barnes. Opiuion by McIver, J. SLANDER-CHASTITY-EVIDENCE. A woman who has had illicit intercourse with a man, but has since repented and become virtuous, is an "innocent Woman " within the Code of North Carolina, section 1113, which provides that any person who shall atto destroy tempt, in a wanton and malicious mauner, the reputation of an innocent woman, by words amounting to a charge of incontinency, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. We think the more accurate and "' is just definition of the words "innocent women that given by Ashe, J., in State v. Aldridge, 86 N. C. 680, in which he defines the meaning to be "chaste and virtuous woman." If the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the words were spoken, and at the time of the trial, the prosecutrix was a chaste, virtuous woman, exemplary as to virtue in life and conduct, and that the defendant, in a wanton and malicious manner, by false charges of incontinency, endeavored to destroy her reputation, she is entitled to the protection intended to be given by this law. Evidence offered to show a slip from virtue at some former period by a woman who has since been altogether exemplary would be competent as tending to shake the testimony of her subsequent good character. In State v. Davis, 92 N. C. 764, the court affirmed, for the first time, a charge of the judge below, in which he defined an "innocent woman" as one "who has never had actual In doing so illicit sexual intercourse with any man." the court intimates strongly that this rule was too stringent for the prosecutrix, but says "the defendant has no cause to complain that is, that while a woman who has never had illicit sexual intercourse with any man is an innocent woman, still one who has had such intercourse, but who has repented thereof, and has become exemplary, chaste and virtuous, might also be an "innocent woman" within the meaning of the statute. The definition of an "innocent woman given in State v. Davis, has been approved since in State v. Brown, 100 N. C. 519, and State v. Hinson, 103 id. 374, but in both instances the objection to that definition came from the defendant. All these cases therefore are simply authority that no conduct less than actual illicit sexual intercourse will deprive a woman of being an innocent woman" within the meaning of the statute. Equally with State v. Davis do the two supporting cases leave open the question whether a woman who falls short of the rule by hav ing at some time had such intercourse, but who has "innocent now come within the definition of an woman," laid down in State v. Aldridge, supra, i. e., a "chaste and virtuous woman," is entitled to the protection of law against attempts to destroy her reputation by false imputations of unchastity, wantonly and maliciously made. We assent to the strong intimation given in State v. Davis, supra, and do not think it was meant to exclude from the protection of the law every woman who has at some time of her life made a slip in her virtue. Every man in the course of his life must have had instances brought to his knowledge of unfortunate females who have at some period in their lives been led from the path of virtue by the wiles of a seducer, who have afterward reformed, and by a course of exemplary conduct established for themselves a character for chastity above all reproach. Shall it be said that these unfortunates are not to be allowed a locus penitentiæ, and are to be subject forever to the vile tongue of the maligner and slanderer? His honor's charge in this case presents this point for decision for the first time. As given, it was not in conflict with any precedent in this court, and we think he was correct in instructing the jury that if the prosecutrix had been a virtuous woman since the illicit intercourse, prior to her marriage with one who has since become her husband, she was an "innocent woman within the purview of the statute. and not subject to have her peace and reputation destroyed with impunity by false charges, if wantonly and maliciously made, of present unchastity. N. C. Sup. Ct., Jan. 14, 1890. State v. Grigg. Opinion by Clark, J. SUNDAY-RIDING FOR EXERCISE.-Riding upon Sunday for exercise, and for no other purpose, is not a violation of the statute in relation to the observation of the Lord's day. In O'Connell v. Lewiston, 65 Me. 34, and Davidson v. Portland, 69 id. 116, it was held that walking out in the open air upon the Sabbath for exercise is not a violation of the statute. In other jurisdictions, also, it has been held not to be unlawful to ride to a funeral (Horne v. Meakin, 115 Mass. 326); walking to prepare medicine for a sick child (Gorman v. Lowell, 117 id. 65); riding to visit a sick sister (Cronan v. Boston, 136 id. 384); travelling to visit a sick friend (Doyle v. Railroad Co., 118 id. 195); a servant riding to prepare needful food for her employer (King v. Savage, 121 id. 303); a father riding to visit his two boys (McClary v. Lowell, 44 Vt. 116); walking for exercise (Hamilton v. Bosto, 14 Allen, 475); and walking partly for exercise and partly to make a social call (Barker v. Worcester, 139 Mass. 74). The statute was never intended as an arbitrary interference with the comfort and conduct of individuals, when necessary to the promotion of health, in walking or riding in the open air for exercise. The prohibition is against unnecessary walking or riding. As a general rule, the jury, under proper instructions from the conrt, must determine this question from the circumstances presented to them. Me. Sup. Jud. Ct., Dec. 28, 1889. Sullivan v. Maine Cent. R. Co. Opinion by Foster, J. SUNDAY TRAVELLING.-The plaintiff, a passenger on the defendant's railway train, received an injury in leaving the depot grounds at the place of her destination, through the defendant's negligence. In a suit to recover damages for this injury, held, that the fact that the plaintiff was travelling on Sunday, in violation of the act concerning vice and immorality (Revision, 1227), did not preclude her from maintaining the action. In Massachusetts, Maine and Vermont it has been held adversely to the legal proposition adopted by the trial judge. In the Federal courts, and in the courts of other sister States, the decisions have been in accordance with the ruling of the trial judge. A contract to carry made on Sunday or to be performed on Sunday, is by force of the statute illegal and void. No action could be maintained for the breach of such a contract, nor for services performed under it, where the right of action rests exclusively upon a contract, express or implied. Reeves v. Butcher, 31 N. J. Law, 224. It is also clear that a plaintiff will fail where, to make a cause of action, he is compelled to rely upon an illegal contract. But the duty of persons engaged in these public employments to safely and securely carry is independent of contract. It is a duty imposed by law from considerations of public policy, and arises from the fact that persons or property are received in the course of the business of such employments. Marshall v. Railroad Co., 11 C. B. 655; Martin v. Railroad Co., L. R., 3 Exch. 9; Gladwell v. Steggall, 5 Bing. N. C. 733; Pippin v. Sheppard, 11 Price, 400; Carroll v. Railroad Co., 58 N. Y. 126. In Austin v. Railroad Co., L. R., 2 Q. B. Div. 442, a suit was brought against a railroad company by a child three years and two months old. The plaintiff's mother, carrying the plaintiff in her arms, took a ticket for herself, but not for the child, for passage on the defendant's railway. In the course of the journey an accident happened and the plaintiff's leg was broken. In a suit for this injury the defendants contended that they were under no contract with the plaintiff, and that they carried the plaintiff without any hire or fare paid for carrying him. The action was held to be maintainable. Blackburn, J., said that "the right which a passenger by railway has to be carried safely does not depend on his having made a contract, but the fact of his being a passenger casts a duty on the company to carry him safely." The English cases to this effect are cited and commented on in Foulkes v. Railroad Co., 5 C. P. Div. 157-169. The rule may be considered as settled that a railroad company, having accepted a passenger, is under an obligation to take due and reasonable care for his safety, and that that obligation arises by implication of law, independent of contract. To give the plaintiff a standing in court to sue for the injury, she has no need of the aid of a contract which was illegal. Nor was the plaintiff's violation of the Sunday law, in a legal sense, the cause of her injury. It was only the occasion for an injury by the defendant's wrongful act, and hence her wrong-doing did not contribute to the injury in such a sense as to deprive her of her right of action. It was merely a condition, and not a contributory cause, of the injury. Thus in White v. Lang, 128 Mass. 598, it was held that if a person, while unlawfully travelling on Sunday, is injured by the assault of a dog, the act of travelling was not a contributory cause of the injury, and that he could, notwithstanding his own violation of the law, maintain his action against the owner of the dog. In sustaining the suit, the court said: "If a person who is at the time acting in violation of law receives an injury caused by the wrongful or negligent act of another, he may recover therefor if his own illegal act was merely a condition, and not a contributory cause, of the injury. * * * It is true, that if he were not travelling, he would not have received the injury; but the act of travelling is a condition and not a contributory cause, of the injury." N. J. Ct. Err. & App., Feb. 20, 1890. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Trautwein. Opinion by Depue, J. TORT ABATEMENT-DEATH OF PARTY-HUSBAND AND WIFE. A suit for a tort, begun against a husband and wife, may proceed against the wife alone, if her husband dies during its pendency. We think it is set. tled by the preponderance of authority that at common law an action against two in tort, as in trespass, ejectment, trover, conspiracy and the like, is not abated by the death of one of them, but may be prosecuted against the survivor, each being answerable in solido for the wrong. 1 Com. Dig. 125; Spenser v. Earl of Rutland, Yel. 209; Hill v. Tempest, Cro. Eliz. 145; Bennion v. Watson, id. 625; Rigley v. Lee, Cro. Juc. 356; Sumner v. Tileston, 4 Pick. 308; Hendrickson v. Herbert, 38 N. J. Law, 296; King v. Bell, 13 Neb. 409; Treat v. Dwinel, 59 Me. 341. We see no reason why the rule should not apply when the two are husband and wife. It is true that where husband and wife join in committing a tort the presumption is that she acts under marital coercion; but this presumption is prima facie only, and may be rebutted by proof that she acted of her own free will. Cooley Torts, 115, 116; Simmons v. Brown, 5 R. I. 299; Marshall v. Oakes, 51 Me. 308; Handy v. Foley, 121 Mass. 258; Cassin v. Delany, 38 N. Y. 178. It is also true that a married woman cannot be sued separately from her husband for a tort com. mitted by them jointly, so long as she is under cov erture; but this is not because the tort is joint, but because the law requires the joinder by reason of the coverture. There is nothing to prevent her being sued alone for such a tort after her husband dies, the same as if she were originally discovert; and, this being so, we see no reason why a suit for such tort, began against her and her husband, should not proceed against her alone, if her husband dies during its pendency. And so the law has been laid down. In Rigley v. Lee, Cro. Jac. 356, the action was ejectment against husband and wife. The husband died after verdict; and the question was whether the action should abate or stand against the wife. The court decided that because it was in the nature of an action of trespass, and the wife was charged for her own fault, the judgment should be entered against her alone. It was suggested at the bar that the tort was really committed by the wife alone, the husband being joined in the action for couformity. The declaration does not show this; but, if it did, we think the ruling of the court below would nevertheless have been erroneous. Cooley Torts, 115; Capel v. Powell, 17 C. B. (N. S.)744; Estill v. Fort, 2 Dana, 237; Douge v. Pearce, 13 Ala. 127, 129. R. I. Sup. Ct., Nov. 2, 1889. Baker v. Braslin. Opinion by Durfee, C. J. M° NOTES. [OST people, we fancy, have rather a hazy notion as to the limit to the number of impressions which are printed from a plate and honored with the title of "artist's proofs." To judge by the evidence in a case heard before his honor Judge Bayley in the Westminster County Court on the 23d inst., this limit is capable of rather astonishing extension. The plaintiffs in the case in question were the well-known picture dealers, Messrs. Tooth & Son of the Haymarket, and they claimed the sum of eight guineas from Mr. Muir, a cement merchant, of Fenchurch street, as the price of an artist's proof of Sir John Millais' celebrated picture "Bubbles." The plaintiffs had paid Sir John Millais 2,000 guineas for the picture and copyright. In 1887 the defendant visited the plaintiff's gallery and agreed to purchase a proof copy of the picture for eight guin eas, and signed a book to that effect. Five hundred artist's proofs were printed at eight guineas, and five hundred letter proofs at two guineas. The proof was delivered to the defendant, but he subsequently returned it. In giving evidence the defendant said that he was informed on signing the book that the picture was entirely in the hands of the plaintiffs, and that only a few copies would be printed, but he shortly af terward discovered that they had printed a thousand impressions, and that the picture had been reproduced as an advertisement and placarded everywhere, and the value of the picture had been thus destroyed. He also expressed his opinion that a picture of which there were nine hundred and ninety-nine fac-similies could not be called an artist's proof. Mr. Fagan, the print keeper of the British Museum, said that, in his opinion, no copy after the first nine or ten was entitled to be called an artist's proof, and that to sell five hundred copies as artist's proofs was unfair trading. In the opinion of another witness, Mr. Stevens, an art critic, two hundred and fifty was the utmost limit to the number of impressions which could be termed artist's proofs. The plaintiffs urged that they were obliged to print a large number in order to recoup themselves, the engraving having cost £500. The County Court judge however decided that the engraving could not be called an artist's proof if there were a thousand im pressions, and gave judgment for the defendant with costs. There is no doubt, as was revealed in the evidence, that an astonishing number of proofs, sometimes as many as two or three thousand, are frequently issued by dealers, and that the practice is a growing one, which it is to be hoped this decision will help to check.-London Law Times. The Albany Law Journal. MR. ALBANY, JUNE 7, 1890. CURRENT TOPICS. 66 R. SYDNEY G. FISHER has published a suggestive essay on The Cause of the Increase of Divorce." He attributes the increase to the modern disbelief in the "Middle-age idea of the indissolubility of marriage," which was exclusively the idea of the church and of ecclesiastics. He traces the development of this opposition with a good deal of learning, and shows that the clerical notion in practice was fraught with a vast amount of indecency and licentiousness and sexual infidelity. It is not difficult to coincide with Mr. Fisher's theory, for after all, it amounts simply to this: people get divorces now more frequently than formerly because they want them. But there is one point made by Mr. Fisher which is very striking. We have been accustomed to say that divorces have increased because the divorce laws have become lax. Mr. Fisher says not so. He says that legislation has had little to do with it; that people have simply taken advantage of the old laws. IIe observes: "One of the most remarkable facts about the present increase of divorces is that the increase is due, not so much to more liberal laws, as to the willingness of people to take advantage of the laws. Of course very liberal laws will, to a certain extent, increase divorces by encouraging the separation of light-minded people who would not otherwise attempt it. But there is no doubt of the fact, that thirty years ago, when there were comparatively few divorces, there were nevertheless plenty of laws allowing divorce for all sorts of causes. Thus in Pennsylvania divorces have been allowed for adultery, desertion, cruelty and indignities to the person ever since the year 1815, and yet very few people took advantage of these laws until within the last ten or fifteen years. The number of divorces in Pennsylvania is now enormous; but nearly every one of them could have been obtained with equal ease seventy years ago, when the law was practically as liberal as it is now. In the government statistics there is an interesting chapter, in which the laws of all the States and Territories are considered, and in only nine out of the forty-five can it be discovered that legislation has had any effect on the number of divorces. In five of the nine-Maine, Vermont, Connecticut, Utah and Delaware- the laws appear to have had some effect in lessening the number of divorces. In the other four divorces have increased apparently as the result of more liberal laws, and yet in several instances the effect of the laws is so slight as hardly to be worth mentioning. But in the remaining thirty-six States and Territories divorces have steadily increased for the last twenty years more rapidly than the population, and without any apparent assistance from new laws. Thus Illinois had 1,071 divorces in 1867, and 2,606 in 1886, and yet in the meantime there had been no change in the law which would account for the increase. About three-quarters of all the divorces now obtained in the United States are for adultery, desertion and cruelty. Desertion gives 38 per cent, adultery 20 per cent, and crulty 16 per cent, making 74 per cent in all. But these three causes had been on the statute books of most of our States for many years before the great increase in divorces began." VOL. 41-- No. 23. Mr. Fisher also argues that it has not yet been demonstrated that easy divorce is evil. But on this point we shall disagree with him. It seems to us a self-evident proposition that 328,000 divorces in this country in the last twenty years is an evil. Divorce in itself is not wrong, but easy and common divorce must inevitably be an evil. But it is worth while to listen to Mr. Fisher on this point. He says: "Ten or twelve years ago the cause of the increase of divorce was without hesitation ascribed to human wickedness. Divorces, it was said, were asked for because people were bad; the existence of divorces was a sign of moral decay, and the Roman Empire was cited. But within the last two or three years this view of the subject has to a great extent passed away. We have been driven from it by facts and statistics. It has been discovered that the majority of people who apply for divorces are by no means degraded or corrupt; that they lived moral lives before the divorce, and that they lived moral lives afterward. Many of them remarry. Most of them are women; that is to say, the statistics show that of all the divorces in the United States within the last twenty years 65.8 per cent were granted to wives, and certainly there are no signs of general immorality among American women. Their standard of morals is usually believed to be very high, higher indeed than in most other countries of the world. People of distinguished reputation and unimpeachable integrity have come out in favor of divorce, and of remarriage after divorce. Many people who once vehemently opposed divorce are now in doubt,and hardly know what to think. The Rev. Dr. Dike, who has given the subject more earnest attention than perhaps any other man in the country, says he is opposed to calling a convention or taking decided action until we have made a more careful investigation of the facts. The convention of the Episcopal Church, held a few months ago in New York, was urged to deal with the question, but refused on the ground that no pathway through difficulty could be seen. They would wait, they said, for more light. In other words, ten years ago divorce was denounced as a disgraceful evil about which no decent man could have a doubt. To-day the same people who denounced it are withholding their judgment and collecting statistics. The increase of divorce is not confined to the United States, but spreads itself over Europe. * The fact that among the applicants for divorce the women far outnumber the men is, I think, not without significance. We are apt to forget what a change has taken place in the position of women. The agitation about women's rights has had its ridiculous side, but it has accomplished actual and serious results, and I think we see some of them in the increase of divorce. As some one bluntly said, women will not put up with what they once would. * If we intend to stop divorce we must invent new arguments. * * We must show by actual proof that divorce is an evil in its practical results. The statistician must take the place of the priest. Probably all that we shall be able to show will be that certain causes of divorce are evil in their results." ** * * Exactly so. These "certain causes" are the twenty or thirty trivial and insufficient causes for which the great mass of the divorces are granted, and the existence of sufficient causes to an insufficient extent. In a report by Rev. Mr. Dike on this subject we find some significant statements. For example, that the increase of divorce has been remarkable in the South. That nearly the same rate of increase has been |