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CYNTHIA W. CRAWFORD V. HERMAN HOEFT, FRANCIS CRAW-
FORD, JAMES D. TURNBULL, ADMINISTRATOR FOR FRANCIS

CRAWFORD, ANNA M. CRAWFORD, EDWIN HADLEY,
CHAS. R. MILLER AND JOSIAH C. ROWLEY.

Forgery-Burden of proof of good faith-Laches-Release.

1. In determining the existence of a forgery it is proper to consider the relationship of the parties who profit and suffer by it, and the age and mental condition of the latter.

2. Where a mother whose mind is weakened by age has dealings in reference to her property with a son who has control of it, and relies upon his integrity not to mislead her, the dealings must be characterized by perfect good faith, and the burden of establishing its fairness is on those whose claims are based on these dealings.

3. A son obtained apparent control of his mother's property by means of a forged deed, but she prevailed on him to convey it back to her, which he did under certain conditions by deed in escrow; but at the same time, without her knowledge, he conveyed away and mortgaged portions of the property. Held, that she was justified in repudiating the settlement, not only because of the fraud upon her, but because the settlement gave her nothing of value.

4. The long form warranty deed on paper folding like legal cap and with the description on one leaf and the attestation clause and acknowledgment on the other, is criticized as affording unusual facilities for fraud.

5. Rights are not lost by laches as against persons claiming under a forged deed.

6 Innocent purchasers under a forged deed are in no better position as to title than if they had purchased with notice.

7. Land exchanged in consideration of the conveyance of other land by a forged deed may be recovered back, even from subsequent pur

chasers.

108 536

*Continued from Vol. 57.

58 MICH.-1

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8. A release by the party defrauded by a forgery, of rights set up under a forged deed by subsequent purchasers, may be effectual and valid. 9. The Supreme Court has power to issue any writ necessary to the enforcement of its decrees; but it may also leave it to the court below to issue such writ, where the lower court has power to do so, if the record has been remanded to that court.

10. A person in possession under a forged deed can claim no rights; and even if he has made improvements, ejectment need not be resorted to for the purpose of recovering possession from him after a decrce requiring him to give it up; a writ of restitution is enough.

Appeal from Presque Isle (Emerick, J.) October 23, 1884.-April 9, 1885. Re-heard, June 2-3.--September 29. BILL to cancel deed. Complainant appeals. Reversed.

George W. Bates and Alfred Russell for complainant. As to the conclusiveness of a notary's certificate upon the fact of signing: Hourtienne v. Schnoor 33 Mich. 274; Johnson v. Van Velsor 43 Mich. 219; see also Cameron v. Culkins 44 Mich. 533; Camp v. Carpenter 52 Mich. 375; Matter of Wool 36 Mich. 299; Blair v. Compton 33 Mich. 453; for cases in which deeds have been set aside for fraud on the grantor and other reasons see Case v. Case 26 Mich. 492; Wartemberg v. Spiegel 3 Mich. 402; Seeley v. Price 14 Mich. 547; Thorn v. Thorn 51 Mich. 167; Wright v. Wright 37 Mich. 57; Savery v. King 5 H. L. Cas. 626; Allore v. Jewell 94 U. S. 506; Kempson v. Ashbee L. R. 10 Ch. App. 15: 11 Eng. 401; there can be no bona fide purchase after a forgery: Austin v. Dean 40 Mich. 388; Kerr on Fraud, 314; and an attorney's knowledge is that of his client: Larzelere v. Starkweather 38 Mich. 107; May v. Le Claire 11Wall. 217; Smith v. Ayer 101 U. S. 325; the want of notice necessary to a bona fide purchase must exist at the time of payment as well as of purchase: Warner v. Whittaker 6 Mich. 135; Dixon v. Hill 5 Mich. 404; Blanchard v. Tyler 12 Mich. 339; Stone v. Welling 14 Mich. 514; Kohl v. Lynn 34 Mich. 360; Thomas v. Stone Wal. Ch. 117; Palmer v. Williams 24 Mich. 328; Battershall v. Stephens 34 Mich. 75; Matson v. Melchor 42 Mich. 481; Smith v. Williams 44 Mich. 241; Borheimer v. Gunn 24 Mich. 372; Chadwick v. Broadwell 27 Mich. 6; Haescig v. Brown 34 Mich. 503; an agent's knowledge is also that of his principal: Russell v. Sweezey 22 Mich. 235; Sanford v. Nyman 23 Mich. 326; Emerson v. Aiwater 7 Mich. 12; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. § 408; those who

are not bona fide purchasers take subject to existing claims; Smithers v. Heather 25 Mich. 447; delay in seeking relief against fraud affects the complainant only after he has the means of knowledge thereof: Browne v. McKlintock L. R. 6 H. L. 456: 8 Eng. 54; Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Iurd L. R. 5 P. C. 221: 8 Eng. 180; see Hatch v. Hatch 9 Ves. 292; Wollaston v. Tribe L. R. 9 Eq. 44; for cases upon forgery of signature to deed see In re Cooper L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 627; 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. 416.

Turnbull & Dafoe (for defendants Hoeft and Turnbull) and C. R. Miller and Millard, Weaver & Weaver (for defendants Rowley and Miller) for appellees. A sealed instrument is conclusively presumed to be on good consideration, unless it is impeached for fraud: Best on Evidence §§ 220, 429; a scaled release cannot be qualified by parol: 2 Pars. Cont. 713, 715; an executed release will be enforced, though voluntary, as it requires no further act to give it effect: Story's Eq. Jur. § 793 a; one who has long neglected to protect others from dealing with a person who has obtained interests by fraud, is estopped from claiming anything against such others. Id. §§ 1533-51.

COOLEY, C. J. This case came before us with a voluminous. record, containing a great deal of conflicting evidence, and has given us no little trouble. The purpose of the bill was to obtain an adjudication that a deed purporting to be made. by complainant to her son was a forgery by the son, and that subsequent conveyances and mortgages by the son were therefore void.

The argument of the case left me somewhat impressed with complainant's view of the facts, but on a careful reading of the testimony afterwards I found this impression substantially effaced. And the more I have reflected upon the case since, the more convinced I have become that the deed in question was made by complainant, who weakly suffered herself to be misled and defrauded by her worthless son. This conclusion would dispose of the case and entitle the defendants to protection.

I therefore think the decree should be affirmed. But in affirming it I should deem it proper to provide that if, pending this suit, any of the defendants holding incumbrances

from which the complainant would be entitled to redeem have taken proceedings in foreclosure, such proceedings should be held subject to redemption still, and on settlement of the decree time should be fixed for that purpose, if not agreed upon.

CHAMPLIN and SHERWOOD, JJ., concurred.

CAMPBELL, J. Although the case is one which is not at all satisfactory in many respects, my opinion is that the deed complained of was not a genuine instrument.

Motion for rehearing. Granted.

Bates and Russell for the motion. Where proof of forgery is in harmony with the general purpose of a bill to cancel a deed for fraud, relief is proper: Story's Eq. Pl. (Redf. ed.) 40; Hobson v. M'Arthur 16 Pet. 195; Scudder v. Young 25 Me. 153; and a court that has once acquired jurisdiction of the parties will retain it for any purpose within the scope of the equities to be enforced: Mason v. Hartf., Prov. & F. R. R. R. Co. 19 Fed. Rep. 55; Ober v. Gallagher 93 U. S. 199; Ward v. Todd 103 U. S. 327; and will make the relief sufficient to dispose of the case: Miller v. Stepper 32 Mich. 203; Carroll v. Rice Walk. Ch. 374; Brown v. Gardner Har. Ch. 291; Whipple v. Farrar 3 Mich. 436; Hawkins v. Clermont 15 Mich. 511; Folkerts v. Power 42 Mich. 283; leave should at least be granted to amend the bill if the amended case is sustained by the proofs: Church v. Holcomb 45 Mich. 39; Smith v. Sherman 52 Mich. 637; Parrill v. McKinley 9 Grat. 1; Hewett v. Adams 50 Me. 371; Whelan v. Sullivan 102 Mass. 204; Neale v. Neale 9 Wal. 1.

Turnbull against.

The motion was granted. The case was again heard June 2-3, 1885, and was decided September 29.

Bates and Russell for complainants.

Turnbull, Shields & Dafoe, Chas. R. Miller and Millard, Weaver & Weaver for defendants.

CHAMPLIN, J. This is a suit to cancel a conveyance of lands in the county of Presque Isle, purporting to have been made by the complainant to her son Leonard C. Crawford on the 10th day of August, 1878, and also to set aside a deed made by Crawford to defendant Hoeft, and also a mortgage executed by Crawford to Edwin Hadley and by him assigned to the defendants Miller and Rowley, as encumbrances upon the property. Leonard C. Crawford died in 1881, leaving no children. Defendant Francis Crawford is the father of Leonard; defendant Turnbull, the administrator of his estate; and Anna M. Crawford is his widow.

The bill of complaint was filed on the 15th day of August, 1882, and alleges that on and prior to August 10th, 1878, the complainant Cynthia W. Crawford, owned the property in suit, consisting of several thousand acres of land in Presque Isle county, upon which was a village called Crawford's Quarry, a saw-mill, store and a valuable stone quarry; that in September, 1873, for the purpose of starting business at Crawford's Quarry, she leased a part of these lands to her son Leonard C. Crawford, he agreeing to pay her five hundred dollars a year for her support, and pay the taxes on her property in that county; that he did business there under this lease until some time prior to August 10th, 1878, when, the lease having expired, he requested an indefinite continuation of such lease, and proposed that she deed him, during his life, the quarry lands, covering the lake front and mill property, to be used by him during his life, and on his death to revert to her, as a means of providing for him against any reverses that might happen to her; that she consented, but expressly reserved section twelve, the town plat, and the old homestead, and with the understanding that this deed was not to be recorded but simply should be held by him as the evience of his life-lease in said land, with no right of sale, and on the further understanding that Leonard should comply with all the terms of the old lease, and especially as to the payment of the taxes and of five hundred dollars annually to herself, said deed being intended to simply extend said lease during the life of said Leonard and subject to the same con

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