Another section provides that all corporations not paying a specific tax shall be assessed the same as natural persons, and their residence shall be deemed to be where their principal office for the transaction of business in this State is located.

The defendant claims that the personal property of the plaintiff which was assessed in the township of Manistique was properly and legally assessable there, and not elsewhere, for three reasons, specified in the statute above quoted, namely:

First. It hires and occupies a place for the storage of its lumber in Manistique township.

Second. It has a place for sale of property in that township; and

Third. The plaintiff, or person having control of its personalty, has an office in the township of Manistique.

The contract for sawing the logs which plaintiff runs down the Manistique river, and for piling the lumber on the docks, and the testimony relative to the disposition of the lumber so piled, strongly impresses me with the correctness of the first position taken. In the first place, in regard to the logs, which constituted a portion of the property assessed. They had reached their destination when delivered into the store booins of the Weston Lumber Company. They were then in control of the Weston Lumber Company, to be manufac tured under the contract, and it occupied these booms as a place of storage, and used it as such in connection with the logs. I think, while these logs were stored in the booms of the Weston Lumber Company, they were legally assessable as the personal property of the plaintiff in that town. course, it is understood that I allude to such logs as were delivered to the Weston Lumber Company, and were stored in its booms, at the time the law requires property to be assessed for taxation, in the township of Manistique. As to the lumber there piled on the docks, the case is much clearer in favor of the legality of the assessment. By express stipulation between the parties to the contract, "the $3 per thousand feet saw bill, before mentioned, to cover costs of piling

Of

lumber, use of dock, and all other charges upon said lumber; the Manistique Lumbering Company to take said lumber from the piles hereinbefore mentioned." Here, by the contemplation and intent of the parties, the lumber was to be stored upon the dock where piled, and compensation for the use of the dock for that purpose was included in the three dollars called the saw bill. It was piled upon the dock, and was to remain there until seasoned and fitted for market, precisely the same as it would be had plaintiffs rented or occupied a distinct and separate mill-yard for the same purpose. They sold the whole cut of their logs to A. Weston & Sons, of Tonawanda, but plaintiffs were to deliver the lumber to them at Manistique, on board their vessels, and from these piles. Weston & Sons directed as to the manufacture of the lumber, and they selected from the lumber so piled the kind and particular lumber to be delivered, under orders which they drew as they desired, in just the same manner as they would in making purchases from any other lumber-yard. The law required the supervisor to assess all property to the owner on the second Monday of April of the year in which the assessment is made. The proofs showed that lumber not sufficiently seasoned for shipment at the close of navigation was stored in piles on the docks until the next season of navigation opened. The lumber, therefore, which the supervisor found to assess had been upon the docks at least six months. During all the time it remained on the docks the title and possession of the lumber remained in the plaintiffs. It did not pass to A. Weston & Sons until delivery on board their vessels. The Chicago Lumbering Company acted for the plaintiffs in making such delivery. It received the orders from A. Weston & Sons; caused the lumber to be shipped according to those orders, at plaintiff's expense; furnished to plaintiffs and to A. Weston & Sons a bill of lading or statement, showing the quality, kind and price. It entered every transaction upon its books, which were the recognized source of information to all parties concerned in the lumbering business at that point. The number of the piles of lumber, and

the time when each was capped or completed, was made and kept, in form of a chart, by the Chicago Lumbering Company. In all these things the Chicago Lumbering Company acted as the agent of the Manistique Lumbering Company.

The facts appearing in the record are abundant to show that the Chicago Lumbering Company was the agent of the Manistique Lumbering Company, and, aside from making contracts for sawing and sale of lumber, its business was carried on through its agent at Manistique. This portion of its business was local in its character, and permanent in duration, so long as the business is or shall be carried on under existing arrangements.

These facts plainly distinguish this case from the former decisions of this Court, which are relied upon by the counsel for the plaintiff as sustaining its claim that the assessment upon which the tax was levied was illegal; and calls for a decision contrary to those. By so holding, no injustice is done to the corporation plaintiff. It is not denied that it owned the property assessed. Neither is any claim made that its property was overvalued. It was assessable therefor either at Detroit or Manistique; and it was not assessed in Detroit. We refrain from passing at this time upon the question as to whether this is the appropriate or even permissible remedy under the statute regulating the action of replevin, as no point is made upon it, and the parties have stated in their stipulation that it is their desire to litigate only the question of the liability of the plaintiff to be taxed in said township upon logs and lumber.

Under the facts disclosed in the record we hold that the plaintiff is liable for the tax assessed in the township of Manistique, and therefore

Reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and order a

new trial.

CAMPBELL, C. J. and MORSE, J. concurred. SHERWOOD, J. concurred in the result.

MANISTIQUE LUMBERING Co. v. FRANCIS H. GRISWOLD.

Error to Schoolcraft. (Steere, J.) Nov. 13.—Jan. 6.
Reversed.

REPLEVIN. Defendant brings error.

J. F. Carey and F. O. Clark for appellant.

Charles R. Brown for appellec.

CHAMPLIN, J. This case only differs from the case of the same plaintiff against John L. Witter, ante, p. 625, in the fact that the Chicago Lumbering Company had no office in the township of Hiawatha, which, under the facts, we think is immaterial. In all other respects the records in the two cases are the same, and the decision in that case necessarily rules this. For the reasons stated in the opinion in that case, the judgment of the circuit court is

Reversed, and a new trial ordered.

The other Justices concurred.

GEO. D. SISSON, FRANCIS LILLEY, HARVEY C. TAFT AND JNO. VERCADE V. EDWIN R. HOLCOMB AND WM. S. MOORE.

Builder's lien.

A builder's lien will not attach to any interest in real estate which defendant did not have when materials began to be furnished (How. Stat. §8377); nor will filing notice of the lien operate retrospectively the licn will not, as against bona fide purchasers, attach to property that has been transferred to them before the filing of notice. Appeal from Kent. (Montgomery, J.) Nov. 18.-Jan. 6. BILL to enforce lien. Complainants appeal. Affirmed.

Birney Hoyt for complainants. A builder's lien may be good where title is obtained after the building began: Mountain City Market House v. Kearns 103 Penn. St. 403; Bell

v. Cooper 26 Miss. 650; Rollin v. Cross 45 N. Y. 766; the lien relates back to delivery of material if notice of the intent to claim it was filed: Dunklee v. Crane 103 Mass. 470 ; Gale v. Blaikie 126 Mass. 274; Morse v. Dole 73 Me. 351; Goble v. Gale 7 Blackf. 218; Chadbourn v. Williams 71 N. C. 444; unless otherwise provided by statute: Cotton v. Holden 1 McArthur 463; Ritchey v. Risley 3 Or. 184; In re Hoyt 3 Biss. 436; purchasers subsequent to the beginning of building must take notice of the rights of those who furnish materials: Reading v. Hopson 90 Penn. St. 497; Miller v. Kauffman 14 Md. 173; Mellor v. Valentine 3 Col. 258.

Stuart & Sweet for defendant Moore.

CAMPBELL, C. J. This was a proceeding under the lien law, to establish a lien on a lot in Grand Rapids for lumber furnished defendant Holcomb, to be used in a house to be built on that lot. The building contract was made with a firm known as Bennett, Osburn & Co., and Holcomb agreed with them to furnish the lumber to be used by them The lot was owned by Edwin F. Sweet and between them there was a mere verbal understanding which never took written shape until December 27, 1883, when Sweet conveyed to Holcomb and took back a purchase-money mortgage for $1800, which included $1150 which he was to advance to help pay for the building. These papers were to be retained by Sweet to secure the completion of the work. No money was paid to Sweet, the whole purchase money being left on credit. In January, 1884, Holcomb desired to sell, and Sweet made a sale for him to defendant Moore, for $1000 over and above the mortgage, for which sum the property was to be taken with the building completed. To secure this, $338.50 was retained until adjustment, and on April 4, 1884, the whole balances were adjusted, and the business closed up. On the same day the deeds and mortgage were recorded. After the money had all been paid, and papers delivered, Sweet was first informed that complainants set up a claim for lumber furnished. On the same day complainants filed their notice of claim of lien, but this was done after the other papers were recorded.