of claim against defendant Charles B. Judd for the mesno profits of the lot in question, enjoyed by him. The issue joined on this suggestion was tried before Hon. Robert M. Montgomery, without a jury; and on the 3d day of Novem ber, 1884, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Judd for $73.63, and costs of suit. It is this judgment that this Court is now asked to reverse. The facts in this case are so nearly the same as those in the case of Elizabeth Noble v. James Fairs et al., ante, p. 637, decided at the present term of this Court, as to raise no questions of law not already considered and disposed of in that case, which clearly rules this; and The judgment will therefore be affirmed with costs. MATTER OF OPENING FIRST STREET, IN GRAND RAPIDS. (GRAND RAPIDS V. GRAND RAPIDS & INDIANA R. R. Co.) Street opening across railway track-Condemnation proceedings-Vicinage- 1. A street opening law is not made unconstitutional by the omission to provide that before proceedings can be taken thereunder, there must be some attempt to get the permission of the owners of property to be affected. 2. The objection that before proceedings to open a street were taken no attempt was made to obtain the consent of property owners cannot be raised on review in the Supreme Court if not made at an earlier stage. 58 641 127 222 3. The vicinage" from which a jury of freeholders in a street opening case must be drawn (Const., Art. xviii, sec. 2) may be limited by statute to the municipality instead of including the county at large; 1127 235 but in such case the whole municipality will be within it. 58 641 139 11349 4. The presumption is against the existence of any such bias on the part of a street opening jury as will make its verdict unfair. 58 MICH.-41 58 641 149 5672 58 641 e158 5612 5. The essential duty of a jury in a street opening proceeding is to pass on the necessity for the work, and not merely the necessity of taking the land for it. 6. Act 124 of 1883 for taking land for streets (1 How. Stat. pp. 12951300) is not clearly open to the objection that it does not require the necessity of the improvement to be determined by a jury. And if the provisions for special taxation districts are invalid, they do not invalidate the entire act, since a general tax is also contemplated. 7. The incompetency of some of the jurors returned by the sheriff does not affect the array if those sworn were competent. 8. The mortgagees of the franchises and easements of a railway company need not be made parties to a proceeding to condemn a right of way across its track for a street, if the track is not disturbed and the company is left in control of the road, 9. The proper amount of compensation for land taken in condemnation proceedings cannot be sworn to by witnesses, but must be found by the jury from proper data. 10. Compensation for, rather than the value of, the land taken is what should be allowed in condemnation proceedings, and includes more. 11. The damage to a railroad from opening a street across it includes the expense entailed by the crossing, and may involve outlays for making it safe. 12. How far a city is estopped from opening a street across a railway track by its previous course in inducing the railway company to lay its track on the faith that the street would not be opened;—and how such estoppel, if any, is to be pleaded-Q. Appeal from the Superior Court of Grand Rapids. (Parrish, J.) November 18, 1885.-January 6, 1886. Proceedings to open a street. The Grand Rapids & Indiana R. R. Co. appeals. Reversed. T. J. O'Brien and Jas. II. Campbell for appellant. Negotiations with property owners before taking proceedings to condemn their land are jurisdictional: C. & M. L. S. R. R. Co. v. Sanford 23 Mich. 418; M. C. & L. M. R. R. v. Clark 23 Mich. 519; Arnold v. Decatur 29 Mich. 77; Morseman v. Ionia 32 Mich. 283; Whisler v. Drain Com'r 40 Mich. 591; Laue v. Saginaw 53 Mich. 442; the oath administered to jurors in a street opening case must be co-extensive with their constitutional duty: Powers' Appeal 29 Mich. 504; Bowler v. Drain Com'r 47 Mich. 155. City Attorney J. W. Ransom for appellee. CAMPBELL, C. J. The appeal in this case is brought to review certain proceedings had under the general law and not under the charter of Grand Rapids, to open a street in extension of its original bounds. The law in question is one passed in 1883, to provide uniform methods for the appropriation of property in cities and villages, which was approved May 31, 1883, and is printed in 1 How. Stat. on pp. 12951300. On the 22d of September, 1884, the common council of Grand Rapids adopted resolutions declaring the necessity of opening First street, and widening and extending it of a uniform width of sixty-six feet from the west line of Broadway to the west boundary of the city, including in the description of the land to be taken a part of appellant's railway, thirty-three feet by sixty-six feet. The city attorney was ordered to proceed in the Superior Court of Grand Rapids, and accordingly brought these proceedings. The appellant appeared by attorney, and was represented throughout the proceedings. Upon December 30, which was the original day of hearing, various objections were made to the sufficiency of the steps taken to give jurisdiction, and also to the validity of the statute in question. A panel of twenty-four freeholders was ordered, from which six names were struck on each side. Of the remaining twelve, who were duly summoned, three were excused, and two were found not to be freeholders. Five competent talesmen were called, and the jury thus made up acted and found a verdict. Some challenges were made to jurors for remoteness. Evidence was given by appellant of a trust mortgage of its road, and all its property and franchises, to secure the payment of bonds, which was in the usual form of railway mortgages, and retained to the appellant the ordinary control of its affairs until dispossessed. Objection was then made that until the trustees were made parties the proceedings were illegal. This was overruled. Two witnesses were sworn upon the damages of appellant, and the questions asked and allowed against objection to be answered, were general as to "what amount of compensation ought to be paid to appellant, and the witnesses gave in reply each a single round sum,-one saying $300, and the other $125. The jury gave $200. The jury viewed the premises, but were charged that in fixing the compensation they must be governed by the evidence and not by their own arbitrary opinions as to what should be awarded. Some further instructions were given on the general question, which are not important as to appellant. The effect of the charge on the duty of the jury in determining necessity will be referred to, as far as required, in considering that feature of the record. After the verdict a motion for a new trial was made, based upon the legal insufficiency of the action of the common council, the disregard by the jury of the evidence, and upon a showing by affidavit that appellant was induced to maintain its track and build a station in that part of the city by an agreement made by the city in conformity with an understanding with the land-owners in the vicinity, that First street should not be continued across the railroad. This motion was also denied. As the record stands and was presented, we do not think it proper to discuss any fundamental questions not necessary to a decision. While some suggestions are made which are not lacking in force, we are not disposed to enter ourselves, without a more exhaustive argument, upon a search and comparison of all the possible provisions of law that may have a bearing on possible cases. It is the duty of courts to see that no one is wronged by proceedings to deprive him of his freehold, and to this end the appellate power given by the statute is of the broadest character. But it is quite as important to construe laws, where it can be done fairly and without violence to their terms, in such a way as to give them operation for lawful ends, if practicable. And while some statutes are purposely made complete in themselves and independent of others, nevertheless most of them form part of a system, and may be construed in that view. The present statute (No. 124 of 1883) was intended to provide a method applicable to cities and villages generally, It is a whereby lands may be condemned for public uses. modification of two successive statutes passed in 1877 and 1882, to reach the same results. It provides, after the municipality has determined upon the policy of a public improvement, for a jury of freeholders from the municipality to determine the public necessity and the proper compensation for land, taken and it purports to exclude from the consideration of the jury any allowance of benefits to set off against the value. In this respect it is fairer than its predecessors. But it is claimed that the statute is not effectively framed to secure the just results intended. It is first urged that no showing is required that attempts have been made to get private consent and failed. Many statutes have required the failure of such an attempt to be set out as a ground of jurisdiction, and it is certainly proper that proceedings in invitum should not be had unless necessary. But we are not able to find authority for holding a law unconstitutional for not expressly providing that this should be made to appear. How far it may become material in the subsequent inquiry we need not now consider. The objection was not made at an early stage of the proceedings and it cannot properly be made now. It is claimed that the Constitution requires a jury of freeholders residing in the vicinity of the property, and that this vicinity means the county at large and not a part of the county. This statute requires the jury to come from the municipality. That certainly is more definitely the vicinage, according to common-law principles, than the county would be. And we held in People v. Hurst 41 Mich. 328, that in a municipal court the venue might lawfully be municipal. During the hearing below objection was made to some jurors as living too far away, although within the city. In our opinion the city was all within the vicinage. No question is raised concerning the existence of any bias in fact which would stand in the way, of a fair verdict. It must be presumed no such difficulty appeared. A more serious question is raised by the claim that the jury were not required to find the necessity for the opening |