register as required by the Act of Congress (Comp. St. 1916, § 1254); Agnew v. United of May 18, 1917 (Public Act No. 12, 65th Con- States, 165 U. S. 36, 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 235, 41 gress, c. 15, 40 Stat. 76), known as the L. Ed. 624; United States v. Wan Lee Selective Draft Law, and in the same indict- | (D. C.) 44 Fed. 707; United States v. Ayment it was charged that Ruthenberg, Wag- res (D. C.) 46 Fed. 651; United States enknecht and Baker, the plaintiffs in error v. Peuschel (D. C.) 116 Fed. 642, 646; Clement "did aid, abet, counsel, command and induce" v. United States, 149 Fed. 305, 79 C. C. A. Schue in failing to register "and procure 243; Spencer v. United States, 169 Fed. 562, him to commit the offense involved in his so 565, 566, 95 C. C. A. 60; United States v. doing." Schue pleaded guilty and the other Merchants', etc., Co. (C. C.) 187 Fed. 355, three defendants were tried, found guilty 359, 362. and sentenced. Because of objections raised to the constitutionality of the act this direct writ of error was prosecuted.

[4] It is argued that the court below erred in refusing to quash the indictment on the ground that it had been found "without a sworn charge previously made." It is settled that such a charge is unnecessary.* Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160, 163, 15 Sup. Ct. 586, 39 L. Ed. 657; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 59, 60, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652.

As every contention made in this case concerning the unconstitutionality of the Selective Draft Law was urged in Arver v. United States, 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159, 62 L. Ed. and held to be without merit, that subject may be put out of view. The remaining assignments of error are to say the least [5] Further, it is said, the indictment was highly technical and require only the brief-insufficient because it did not allege that est notice. Schue, who it was charged refused to register, was a citizen of the United States or was a person not an alien enemy who had declared his intention to become such citizen. But this overlooks the fact that although only the persons described were subject to military duty under the terms of the act, by section 5 "all male persons between the ages of 21 and 30 both inclusive" (with certain exceptions not here material) were required to register. It was sufficient to charge, therefore, as the indictment did, that Schue was a male person between the designated ages.

[1] The want of merit in the proposition that constitutional or statutory rights were denied the plaintiffs in error, who were Socialists, because the grand and trial juries were composed exclusively of members of other political parties and of property own ers, is demonstrated by previous adverse rulings upon similar contentions urged by negro defendants indicted and tried by juries composed of white men. Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 318, 320, 321, 26 Sup. Ct. 338, 50 L. Ed. 497; Thomas v. Texas, 212 U. S. 278, 282, 29 Sup. Ct. 393, 53 L. Ed. 512.

[2] A further objection that plaintiffs in error were prejudiced by the refusal of the court below to permit them in examining the jurors to inquire whether they distinguished between socialists and anarchists is likewise disposed of by previous decisions. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, 8 Sup. Ct. 22, 31 L. Ed. 80; Thiede v. Utah Territory, 159 U. S. 510, 16 Sup. Ct. 62, 40 L. Ed. 237; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 248, 31 Sup. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 20 Ann. Cas. 1138.

[6, 7] The contention that more than one offense was charged in the same indictment is without merit. Section 332 of the Criminal Code provides that:

"Whoever directly commits any act constituting an offense defined in any law of the United duces or procures its commission, is a princiStates, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, inpal."

The indictment, therefore, charged but one offense-the refusal of Schue to registerplaintiffs in error being charged as principals in procuring such refusal. And this also disposes of a further contention based upon the same misconception that as at common law there could be no accessory to a misdemeanor, no offense was charged in the indictment.

[3] It is contended that plaintiffs in error were not tried by a jury of the state and district in which the crime was committed, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, be 1 cause the jurors were drawn not from the entire district but only from one division thereof. The proposition disregards the Other errors are assigned but we do not explain text of the Sixth Amendment, the con- pressly notice them, some because they are temporary construction placed upon it by not urged in argument, others because they the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 73, 88, c. are so unsubstantial as not to require even 20, 29) expressly authorizing the drawing statement, and we content ourselves with sayof a jury from a part of the district, and ing that after a careful examination of the the continuous legislative and judicial prac- whole record we find no error and the judgtice from the beginning. Section 802, Re-ment is vised Statutes; section 277, Judicial Code Affirmed.

(245 U. S. 493)
ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. v. PUBLIC UTILI-
TIES COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS et al.
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF IL-
LINOIS et al. v. UNITED STATES et al.
(Argued Oct. 8 and 9, 1917. Decided Jan. 14,
1918.)

Nos. 416, 448.

1. COURTS 268 — FEDERAL COURTS - DIS-
TRICT IN WHICH SUIT MUST BE BROUGHT
"SUIT TO ENFORCE, SUSPEND OR SET ASIDE
ORDER OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIS-
SION."

A cross-bill to set aside such an order could not be filed in a suit pending in a district other than that of the residence of the petitioners, since, while in some cases a cross-bill against an ordinary suitor may be considered and dealt with by virtue of the jurisdiction over the principal suit, even though an original bill could not be entertained, it is otherwise where the cross-bill is against the United States, as no suit against it can be brought without its consent given by law, and its immunity from suit recognizes no distinction between cross-bills and original bills, or between ancillary suits and original suits, but extends to suits of every class. 6. COMMERCE 93 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION-SETTING ASIDE ORDERS-PABA cross-bill to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission could not be retained as to other defendants after its dismissal as to the United States, since under Judicial Code, §§ 208, 211, the United States is made a necessary party to such a suit. 7. COMMERCE 85

TIES.

COMMISSION-POWERS.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE

The Interstate Commerce Commission had

power to deal with discrimination in rates arisstate rates, and to authorize or require the reing out of a disparity in interstate and intraremoval of such discrimination by increasing the

Interstate Commerce Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, § 16, 24 Stat. 384, as amended by Act June 18, 1910. c. 309, § 13, 36 Stat. 554 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8584), provides that, if an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission respecting transportation be not obeyed by the carrier, it may be enforced at the suit of the Commission, an injured party, or the United States, by an appropriate writ or process restraining further disobedience and enjoining due compliance with the order. Act Oct. 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 219,1 provides, that suits to enforce, suspend, or set aside in whole or in part an order of the Commission relating to transportation, and made upon petition, may be brought only in the district in which the petitioners or one of them sides. Held, that where the Commission on petition of residents of Missouri ordered carriers to cease discriminating between St. Louis, Mo., Keokuk, Iowa, and Illinois points respecting rates between such points and other Illinois points, and the carriers thereupon raised the Illinois intrastate rates and sued to enjoin the state authorities from interfering with the establishment and maintenance of the increased rates, the suit was not one to enforce, suspend, or set aside an order of the Commission, and might be brought in the Northern district of Illinois.

ACTIONS TO ENFORCE

2. COMMERCE 92
ORDERS JURISDICTION.
Such action properly came within the pro-
visions of Act June 18, 1910, c. 309, § 1, 36
Stat. 539, repeated in Judicial Code (Act
March 3, 1911, c. 231) § 207, 36 Stat. 1148
(Comp. St. 1916, § 993), which, in defining the
jurisdiction of the Commerce Court, preserved
and continued the general jurisdiction of the
District Courts over cases and proceedings not
therein enumerated.
3. COMMERCE 93
DERS-PARTIES.
There being no statute making the United
States or the Interstate Commerce Commission
a necessary party to such suit, and the relief
sought not being such as rendered their presence
essential under the rules applicable to suits in
equity, they were not necessary parties.
4. COURTS 268 INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION-SETTING ASIDE ORDERS JU-

RISDICTION.

ENFORCEMENT OF OR

intrastate rates.

The Interstate Commerce Commission filed a report in which it found that the maintenance of passenger rates between East St. Louis, Hamilton, and other points on the east bank of the Mississippi river, on the one hand, and other points in Illinois, on the other, on a lower basis than those maintained between St. Louis and Keokuk, Iowa, and such points in Illinois, subjected St. Louis and Keokuk and interstate pasSenger traffic to and from those cities to an unreasonable disadvantage, and in which it also sonable between the points in question. It then found that a certain rate per mile would be reamade an order forbidding the charging of rates between St. Louis and Keokuk and such Illinois points upon a basis higher than the rates found raneously charged between East St. Louis and reasonable, or higher than the rates contempoHamilton and such Illinois points, or fares up on a higher basis per mile than those charged between intermediate points and points in Illi nois, or between Chicago and points in Illinois, and required that rates be put in effect not higher than those charged between St. Louis, Hamilton, and intermediate points, and points in Illinois, or between Chicago and points in Illinois. It also ordered the carriers to abstain from the undue preferences and disadvantages found in the report to result from the contemporaneous maintenance between Illinois points of passenger fares which, in combination with other fares required or permitted thereby, would produce the discrimination or undue preferences condemned in its report. Held, that the order was not intended to require or authorize a readresi-justment of all intrastate rates, but only to command the removal of the discrimination against St. Louis and Keokuk, and it was so indefinite and uncertain as to the territory or points to and from which the intrastate rates must or might be adjusted as to render it inoperative and of no effect as to intrastate rates established and maintained under a law of the state.

Under Act Oct. 22, 1913, requiring suits to enforce, suspend, or set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission made upon petition to be brought in the district of the dence of the parties upon whose petition the order was made, and Judicial Code, 88 208, 211 (Comp. St. 1916, §§ 997, 1004), requiring such suits to be brought against the United States, a suit to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission made on the petition of residents of Missouri could not be maintained in the Northern district of Illinois, as the United States, being suable only by its consent, could not be sued in a district not within the consent given.

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

1 Comp. St. 1916, § 994.

Suit by the Illinois Central Railroad Com- | nois, the Public Utilities Commission of that pany against the Public Utilities Commis- state, an association representing interests sion of Illinois and others, in which the Pub- in Chicago and another association reprelic Utilities Commission of Illinois and senting interests in East St. Louis, also interothers filed a cross-bill against the United vened and opposed any action contemplating States and others. From a decree dismiss- or requiring an increase in intrastate rates. ing the bill, complainant appeals; and from After a hearing, in which all the parties and a decree dismissing the cross-bill, the Pub-intervenors participated, the Interstate Comlic Utilities Commission and others appeal. Affirmed.

merce Commission filed a report (41 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 13) finding that the existing bridge tolls at St. Louis and Keokuk were unobjectionable, that rates between either of those cities and points in Illinois were reasonable when not in excess of 2.4 cents per mile, plus bridge tolls, and that the service, equipment and accommodations provided for intrastate passengers to and from East St. Louis, Hamilton, and Chicago, were the same as those provided for interstate passengers to and from St. Louis and Keokuk. In that report the Commission also found that the contemporaneous maintenance between East St. Louis1 and Hamilton2 respectively, and other points in Illinois, of rates on a lower basis than those maintained via the same routes between St. Louis and Keokuk, respectively, and the same points in Illinois, bridge tolls excepted, gave an undue preference to East St. Louis and Hamilton and to intrastate passenger traffic to and from the latter points and subjected St. Louis and Keokuk and interstate passenger traffic to and from those cities to an unreasonable disadvantage; that the existing disparity in interstate and intrastate rates worked an unjust discrimination against St. Louis and in favor of Chicago in so far as the rates between St. Louis and points in Illinois approximately equidistant from those cities exceeded, by more than the bridge toll, the rates between Chicago and the same points; that the disparity worked a like discrimination against Keokuk and in favor of Chicago; and that the existence on the reasonably direct lines of the carriers in the territory between Chicago on the one hand and St. Louis and Keokuk on the other of intrastate rates on a lower basis per mile than the rates between that territory and St. Louis and Keokuk, bridge tolls excepted, operated to subject interstate traffic to an unreasonable disadvantage.

*These cross-appeals present a controversy over the validity, scope and effect of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission dealing with discrimination found to result from a disparity in interstate and intrastate passenger rates. The facts and proceedings to be considered are these: The Mississippi river forms the boundary between the states of Missouri and Iowa on the west and the state of Illinois on the east. East St. Louis, in southwestern Illinois, is directly across the river from St. Louis, Mo., and Hamilton, in western Illinois, is directly across the river from Keokuk, Iowa. At both places the river is spanned by railroad bridges whereby the lines of railroad on one side are connected with those on the other. For some years prior to December 1, 1914, interstate passenger rates between St. Louis and Keokuk on the one hand and points in Illinois on the other were on a substantial parity with intrastate rates between East St. Louis and Hamilton, respectively, and points in Illinois. All were on a basis of 2 cents per mile, save that the rates to and from St. Louis and Keokuk included a bridge toll over the river. All other rates between points in Illinois were also on the same basis, any intrastate rate in excess of 2 cents per mile being prohibited by a statute of that state. On December 1, 1914, the rates between St. Louis and Keokuk, respectively, and points in Illinois were increased by the carriers to 22 cents per mile, plus bridge tolls, the parity theretofore existing being thereby broken. Following this increase the Business Men's League of St. Louis, a corporate body of that city engaged in foster ing its interests, filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission a petition against the carriers charging that the rates between St. Louis and points in Illinois were unreasonable in themselves, and, in connection with the lower intrastate rates, worked an unreasonable discrimination against St. Louis and in favor of Illinois cities, particularly East St. Louis and Chicago, and a like discrimination against interstate passenger traffic to and from St. Louis and in favor of intrastate passenger traffic to and from East St. Louis and Chicago. An association representing interests in Keokuk, Iowa, intervened and urged that any relief granted with respect to St. Louis be extended to Keokuk, The report refers to a plurality of points opso the former would not have an undue ad-posite Keokuk, but it suffices here to mention vantage over the latter. The state of Illi-Hamilton.

The Commission then made an order intended to result in the installation of rates not exceeding 2.4 cents per mile between St. Louis and Keokuk, respectively, and points in Illinois and to remove the discrimination shown in the report; but shortly thereafter the Commission recalled that order and filed a supplemental report (41 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 503) indicating that lawful inter

1 The report similarly speaks of other towns being here mentioned across the river from St. Louis, East St. Louis as representative of all.

*497

and John Barton Payne, all of Chicago, Ill., | first invited relate to the power of the Disfor Railroad Cos.

Messrs. George T. Buckingham, James H. Wilkerson, and Edward J. Brundage, all of Chicago, Ill., for State Public Utilities Commission.

trict Court in the Northern District of Illinois to entertain the suits and the cross-bills, in view of the jurisdictional provision in the Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 219, that a suit "to enforce, suspend or set aside.

Mr. Joseph W. Folk, of Washington, D. C., in whole or in part," an order of the Commisfor Interstate Commerce Commission.

Mr. Solicitor General Davis, of Washington, D. C., for the United States.

* Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the Court.

[1] The questions to which attention is

sion relating to transportation and made upon petition may be brought only in the district "wherein is the residence of the party or any of the parties upon whose petition the order was made.”

It was objected in the District Court that the suits were brought to enforce the Commission's order and therefore could be entertained only in the Eastern district of Missouri, which embraces the residence of the party upon whose petition the order was made. But the court sustained its jurisdiction, ruling that the suits were not of the nature indicated by the objection.

and required to establish and put in force on or before January 15, 1917, upon notice to this Commission and to the general public by not less than 30 days' filing and posting in the manner prescribed in section 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, and thereafter to maintain and apply to the transportation of passengers between St. Louis, Mo., and points in Illinois fares, the basis of which per mile, bridge tolls excepted, is not high-order of the Commission is one which seeks er than the basis per mile for fares contemporaneously maintained between Chicago and those same Illinois points.

"It is further ordered, that the above-named defendants, according as they participate in the transportation, be, and they are hereby, notified and required to establish and put in force on or before January 15, 1917, upon notice to this Commission and to the general public by not less than 30 days' filing and posting in the manner prescribed in section 6 of the Act to Regulate Com

merce, and thereafter to maintain and apply to
the transportation of passengers between Keokuk,
Iowa, and points in Illinois fares upon
not in excess of 2.4 cents per mile, bridge tolls

a basis

excepted, which basis has been found reasonable in the said report, nor in excess per mile of the fares between points in Illinois directly opposite to Keokuk and the same points by more than a

reasonable bridge toll; nor upon a higher basis per mile, bridge tolls excepted, than fares contemporaneously effective between Illinois points intermediate between Keokuk, Iowa, and points in

Illinois.

"It is further ordered, that the above-named defendants, according as they participate in the transportation, be, and they are hereby, notified and required to establish and put in force on or before January 15, 1917, upon notice to this Commission and to the general public by not less than 30 days' filing and posting in the manner prescribed in section 6 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, and thereafter to maintain and apply

In common acceptation a suit to enforce an

to compel the carrier to whom the order is directed to yield obedience to its command. Nothing in the jurisdictional provision suggests that this is not what is intended, and that it is shown by the provision in section 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended by Act June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 554, that, if an order respecting transportation be not obeyed by the carrier, the same may be enforced at the suit of the Commission, an injured party, or the United States, by an appropriate writ of process restraining the carrier from further disobedience and enjoining upon it due compliance with the order. A reading of both provisions leaves no room to doubt that the suit to enforce so clearly outlined in one is the suit intended by the other.

to the transportation of passengers between Keo-fendants, the state authorities, whereby obekuk, Iowa, and points in Illinois fares, the basis of which per mile, bridge tolls excepted, is not higher than the basis per mile for fares contempo

raneously maintained between Chicago and those same Illinois points.

"It is further ordered, that said defendants, according as they participate in the transportation, be, and they are hereby, notified and required to cease and desist, on or before January 15, 1917, and thereafter to abstain, from the undue preferences and the undue and unreasonable prejudices and disadvantages found in said report to result from the contemporaneous maintenance between Illinois points of passenger fares, which fares, in combination with other fares required or permitted by this order, would produce the discrimination against interstate commerce and the undue preferences in favor of intrastate commerce condemned in the report of the Commission. "And it is further ordered, that this order shall continue in force for a period of not less than two years from the date when it shall take effect."

dience on the part of the carriers would be obstructed and made the occasion for subjecting them to divers criminal proceedings, suits for penalties and the like. In other words, the suits were brought to prevent complete obedience by the carriers from being wrongfully obstructed and embarrassed, but not to enforce the order in the sense of the jurisdictional provision. Therefore that provision was not applicable to them. They properly came within the provision in section 1 of the Act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, repeated in Judicial Code, § 207, which preserves and continues the general jurisdiction of the District Courts over cases and proceedings not therein enumerated.

[3] At this point it will be convenient to