the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for | opinion below, see 244 Fed. 121. Petition for a the Second Circuit denied. No. 687. Florence McDONALD et al., petitioners, v. John F. RALSTON et al. Oct. 22, 1917. For opinion below, see 166 Pac. 405. Mr. F. A. Rittenhouse, of Chandler, Okl., for petitioners. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma denied. No. 691. Richard WATSON, master, etc., et al., petitioners, v. Mattie KRESZEWSKI, administratrix, etc., et al. Oct. 22, 1917. For opinion below, see The Student, 243 Fed. 807. Messrs. George Forbes and John Phelps, both of Baltimore, Md., for petitioners. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. No. 692. IOWA STATE TRAVELLING MEN'S ASSOCIATION v. Alma M. RUGE. Oct. 22, 1917. For opinion below, see 242 Fed. 762. Messrs. John B. Sullivan, of Des Moines, Iowa, and Robert A. Holland, Jr., Thomas G. Rutledge, and Jacob M. Lashly, all of St. Louis, Mo., for petitioner. Messrs. Jesse H. Schaper, of Washington, Mo., Hugo Muench, Lambert E. Walther, Julius Muench, and Muench, Walther & Muench, all of St. Louis, Mo., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. No. 698. P. D. CAMP et al., petitioners, v. Morgan V. GRESS. Oct. 22, 1917. For writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted. No. 707. BARNES-AMES COMPANY, petitioner, v. W. & C. T. JONES STEAMSHIP COMPANY (Ltd.). Oct. 22, 1917. For opinion below, see 244 Fed. 116. Messrs. Charles S. Haight and John W. Griffin, both of New York City, for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. No. 718. The CITY OF NEW ORLEANS et al., petitioners, v. PENN BRIDGE COMPANY. Oct. 22, 1917. For opinion below, see 241 Fed. 672. Messrs. Edgar H. Farrar, I. D. Moore, John F. C. Waldo, and H. Generes Dufour, all of New Orleans, La., for petitioners. Messrs. Grant & Grant and Foster, Milling, Saal & Milling, all of New Orleans, La. (Messrs. William Grant, Robert E. Milling, and Robert C. Milling, all of New Orleans, La., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for a writ of certio rari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. ED COLLIERIES COMPANY (Inc.), petiNo. 723. POCAHONTAS CONSOLIDATtioner, v. F. L. JOHNSON, administrator, etc. Oct. 22, 1917. For opinion below, see 244 Fed. 368. Messrs. S. C. Graham, of Tazewell, Va., E. M. Fulton, O. M. Vicars, and Edward L. Barr, all of Wise, Va., and Hugh R. Hawthorne, of Tazewell, Va., for petitioner. Peti. tion for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir cuit denied. (245 U. S. 82) Ex parte PARK & TILFORD. the Treasury in cases in which the importer certifies at the time of entry that the entered value is higher than the foreign market value (Argued Oct. 15, 16, 1917. Decided Nov. 5, and that the goods are so entered in order to 1. MANDAMUS 1917.) No. 24. 26-SUBJECTS OF RELIEF COMPELLING PARTICULAR DECISION. Where the Secretary of the Treasury refused to reliquidate entries of goods entered at a value higher than the foreign market value in order to meet advances by the appraiser in similar cases then pending on appeal for reappraisement, as permitted by Act Oct. 3, 1913, c. 16. § 3, par. I, 38 Stat. 184 (Comp. St. 1916, § 5527), on the ground that the final reappraised value was not as low as the value contended for by the importer, and, a protest having been overruled by the Board of General Appraisers, an appeal was taken to the Court of Customs Appeals, which took jurisdiction, but affirmed the decision of the Board on the ground that the assessment by the collector was right, in the absence of a direction to the contrary by the Secretary of the Treasury, and that neither such court nor the Board of General Appraisers could review the discretion lodged in the Secre tary, mandamus would not lie to compel that court to decide the case on the merits, as it had already decided it according to its interpretation of the statute, and mandamus will not issue to require a court to make a particular decision. 2. MANDAMUS 4(1) ABSENCE OF OTHER REMEDY-EFFECT. Original petition by Park & Tilford for a writ of mandamus. Rule discharged. meet advances by the appraiser in similar cases then pending on appeal for reappraisement, and the importer's contention shall subsequently be sustained by a final decision on reappraisement, and it shall appear that the action of the importer on entry was taken in good faith, after due diligence and inquiry on his part, and the Secretary of the Treasury shall accompany his directions with a statement of his conclusions and his reasons therefor." Comp. St. 1916, § 5527. The importers entered the goods upon an invoice which stated the gross price and allowed 15 per cent. deduction therefrom; at entry the importers advanced the value by reducing the deduction to 6 per cent. At the time of entry the importer, in each case, made an addition to the invoice value to make market value, stating the additions were made to meet advances in similar cases then pending upon appeal for reappraisement. On appeal for reappraisement the goods were appraised at a value which differed from the invoice value, being 2% per cent. more than invoice price of the goods, and 62 per cent. less than the entered value. The petitioner requested the Secretary of the Treasury to reliquidate the entries, this the Secretary refused to do, stating his rea sons as follows: "You are advised that in all cases where the importer has failed to make a specific contention Mr. Vincent P. Donihee, of New York City, as to market value, the department regards the for petitioner. contention as being for the invoice value; and where the final reappraised value is below the Mr. Assistant Attorney General Warren, entered value, but not as low as the value confor respondent. tended for by the importer, it is the practice of the department to decline to authorize a re *Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of duction of the entered value, on the ground that the Court. This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the Judges of the United States Court of Customs Appeals to take jurisdiction of a certain cause, and to consider and decide the same upon its merits. The rule to show cause having issued, the judges made return, and set forth the proceedings in the Court of Customs Appeals, and averred that the court had decided the case of the petitioner, and if the writ of mandamus issued, it would only require the court to do that which it had already done. From the return and the record attached to the petition it appears: Park & Tilford, petitioner, imported certain merchandise at the port of New York under the Tariff Act of 1913. The collector of customs assessed and liquidated the duties at the entered value. The importer claimed assessment at the value decided upon on final reappraisement, which was less than the amount of the entered value. This claim was made under paragraph I of section 3 of the act of 1913, which provides: "The duty shall not, however, be assessed in any case upon an amount less than the entered value, unless by direction of the Secretary of the importer's contention has not been sustain- In a subsequent letter the Secretary reiterated this view, the petitioner protested, and the protest was submitted to the Board of General Appraisers, and was overruled, and the importer appealed to the Court of Customs Appeals. An inspection of the opinion of the court, which accompanies the petition, makes it apparent that the court did take jurisdiction of the case and decided it, placing its decision upon the ground that the statute requires the assessment made by the collector in the absence of a direction of the Secretary of the Treasury to the contrary. The court held that the Secretary's refusal to so direct the collector was not reviewable by the Board of General Appraisers nor by the Court of Customs Appeals, that neither the board nor the court could control the discretion lodged by the For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes statute in the Secretary, and affirmed the [ these essential attributes of property are prodecision of the Board. tected by the Constitution. [1] It is elementary that the writ of mandamus will not issue to require the court to make a particular decision, and may only be invoked where the purpose is to require action of a court of competent jurisdiction, where such court has refused to exercise the [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Property.] 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 278(1)—MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 600 POLICE ORDINANCES-DUE PROCESS OF LAW. A municipal ordinance prohibiting any white ing as a residence or place of abode, or to esor colored person from moving into and occupytablish and maintain as a place of public assembly any house upon any block upon which a greater number of houses are occupied by perlaw in violation of Const. U. S. Amend. 14, as sons of the opposite race, denies due process of property owners are denied the right to dispose of their property by prohibiting the occupation cupy the premises as a place of residence. a person of a particular race intending to oc5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 215-DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF COLOR-PURCHASE AND ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY. power of decision with which it is invested by law. We think it clear that the Court of Customs Appeals did take jurisdiction of the case of the petitioner on appeal from the order of the Board of General Appraisers, and decided it according to its interpretation of the statutes of the United States. These facts warrant the statements of the respond-of it for the sole reason that the purchaser is ents in their return-that if the writ should issue, requiring a decision of the case, they could only repeat the decision which they have already made. [2] The fact that the law makes the decision of the United States Court of Customs Appeals final in this class of cases does not broaden the authority of this court to issue writs of the character now invoked; it follows that the rule must be discharged. And it is so ordered. Where specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate to a colored person, which provided that he should not be required to accept a deed unless he had a right under the laws of the state and the city to occupy the property as a residence, was denied because of the existence of an ordinance making it unlawful for any white or colored person to move into and occupy as a residence any house upon any block upon which a greater number of houses were occupied by persons of the opposite color, the vendor, though a white man, was entitled to attack the constitutionality of such ordinance notwithstanding the rule that only persons whose rights are directly affected may attack the constitutionality of a law or ordinance, as his right to sell his property was directly involved and necessarily impaired. 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -81-POLICE PowER-SCOPE AND EXTENT. Though the exercise of the police power is not to be interfered with where it is within the scope of legislative authority, and the means adopted reasonably tend to accomplish a lawful purpose, such power, broad as it is, cannot justify the passage of a law or ordinance running contrary to the limitations of the federal Constitution. 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 277(1)-DUE PRO"PROPERTY" AND RIGHTS CESS OF LAW Within Const. U. S. Amend. 14, protecting life, liberty, and property from invasion without due process of law, "property" is more than the mere thing which a person owns and includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it, and States, and have the right to purchase property Colored persons are citizens of the United and enjoy and use it without laws discriminating against them solely on account of color. In Error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky. Action by Charles H. Buchanan against William Warley. A decree for defendant was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky (165 Ky. 559, 177 S. W. 472, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 149), and plaintiff brings error. Reversed and remanded. Messrs. Clayton B. Blakey, of Louisville, Ky., and Moorfield Storey, of Boston, Mass., for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Pendleton Beckley and Stuart Chevalier, both of Louisville, Ky., for defendant in error. Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of* the Court. Buchanan, plaintiff in error, brought an action in the chancery branch of Jefferson circuit court of Kentucky for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of certain real estate situated in the city of Louisville at the corner of Thirty-seventh street and Pflanz avenue. The offer in writing to purchase the property contained a proviso: "It is understood that I am purchasing the above property for the purpose of having erected thereon a house which I propose to make my residence, and it is a distinct part of this agreement that I shall not be required to accept a deed to the above property or to pay for said property unless I have the right under the laws of the state of Kentucky and the city of Louisville to occupy said property as a residence." This offer was accepted by the plaintiff. To the action for specific performance the defendant by way of answer set up the condition above set forth, that he is a colored person, and that on the block of which the lot in controversy is a part, there are ten residences, eight of which at the time of the making of the contract were occupied by white people, and only two (those nearest For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes the lot in question) were occupied by colored [nance became effective, leased, rented, or people, and that under and by virtue of the occupied it as a residence, place of abode ordinance of the city of Louisville, approved or place of public assembly for colored perMay 11, 1914, he would not be allowed to sons, from continuing to rent, lease or ococcupy the lot as a place of residence. cupy such residence, place of abode or place In reply to this answer the plaintiff set up, of assembly for such persons, if the owner among other things, that the ordinance was shall so desire; but if such house should, in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment after the passage of the ordinance, be at to the Constitution of the United States, any time leased, rented or occupied as a resiand hence no defense to the action for specif-dence, place of abode or place of assembly ic performance of the contract. In the court of original jurisdiction in Kentucky, and in the Court of Appeals of that state, the case was made to turn upon the constitutional validity of the ordinance. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 165 Ky. 559, 177 S. W. 472, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 149, held the ordinance valid and of itself a complete defense to the action. The title of the ordinance is: "An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the white and colored races in the city of Louisville, and to preserve the public peace and promote the general welfare, by making reasonable provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the use of separate blocks, for residences, places of abode, and places of assembly by white and colored people respectively." By the first section of the ordinance it is made unlawful for any colored person to move into and occupy as a residence, place of abode, or to establish and maintain as a place of public assembly any house upon any block upon which a greater number of houses are occupied as residences, places of abode, or places of public assembly by white people than are occupied as residences, places of abode, or places of public assembly by colored people. Section 2 provides that it shall be unlawful for any white person to move into and occupy as a residence, place of abode, or to establish and maintain as a place of public assembly any house upon any block upon for white persons, it shall not thereafter be used for colored persons, if such occupation would then be a violation of section 1 of the ordinance; that nothing contained in the ordinance shall prevent the owner of any building, who when the ordinance became effective, leased, rented or occupied it as a residence, place of abode, or place of assembly for white persons from continuing to rent, lease or occupy such residence, place of abode or place of assembly for such purpose, if the owner shall so desire, but if such household, after the passage of the ordinance, be at any time leased, rented or occupied as a residence, place of abode or place of assembly for colored persons, then it shall not thereafter be used for white persons, if such occupation would then be a violation of section 2 thereof. The ordinance contains other sections and a violation of its provisions is made an offense. The assignments of error in this court attack the ordinance upon the ground that it violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that it abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States to acquire and enjoy property, takes property without due process of law, and denies equal protection of the laws. of error should be dismissed because the al[1] The objection is made that this writ leged denial of constitutional rights involves the plaintiff in error is a white person. This only the rights of colored persons, and court has frequently held that while an unconstitutional act is no law, attacks upon the validity of laws can only be entertained when made by those whose rights are directly affected by the law or ordinance in question. Only such persons, it has been settled can be heard to attack the constitutionality of the law or ordinance. But this case does not run counter to that principle. which a greater number of houses are occupied as residences, places of abode or places of public assembly by colored people than are occupied as residences, places of abode or places of public assembly by white people. Section 4 provides that nothing in the ordinance shall affect the location of residences, places of abode or places of assembly made previous to its approval; that nothing contained therein shall be construed so as to prevent the occupancy of residences, places of abode or places of assembly by white or The property here involved was sold by colored servants or employés of occupants the plaintiff*in error, a white man, on the* of such residences, places of abode or places terms stated, to a colored man; the action of public assembly on the block on which they for specific performance was entertained in are so employed, and that nothing therein the court below, and in both courts the plaincontained shall be construed to prevent any tiff's right to have the contract enforced was person who, at the date of the passage of denied solely because of the effect of the orthe ordinance, shall have acquired or pos- dinance making it illegal for a colored persessed the right to occupy any building as a son to occupy the lot sold. But for the ordiresidence, place of abode or place of assembly nance the state courts would have enforced from exercising such a right; that nothing the contract, and the defendant would have contained in the ordinance shall prevent the been compelled to pay the purchase price owner of any building, who when the ordi-and take a conveyance of the premises. The 38 SUP.CT.-2 right of the plaintiff in error to sell his property was directly involved and necessarily impaired because it was held in effect that he could not sell the lot to a person of color who was willing and ready to acquire the property, and had obligated himself to take it. This case does not come within the class wherein this court has held that where one seeks to avoid the enforcement of a law or ordinance he must present a grievance of his own, and not rest the attack upon the alleged violation of another's rights. In this case the property rights of the plaintiff in error are directly and necessarily involved. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 38, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283. We pass then to a consideration of the case upon its merits. This ordinance prevents the occupancy of a lot in the city of Louisville by a person of color in a block where the greater number of residences are occupied by white persons; where such a majority exists colored persons are excluded. This interdiction is based wholly upon color; simply that and nothing more. In effect, premises situated as are those in question in the so-called white block are effectively debarred from sale to persons of color, because if sold they cannot be occupied by the purchaser nor by him sold to another of the same color. This drastic measure is sought to be justified under the authority of the state in the exercise of the police power. It is said such legislation tends to promote the public peace by preventing racial conflicts; that it tends to maintain racial purity; that it prevents the deterioration of property owned and occupied by white people, which deterioration, it is contended, is sure to follow the occupancy of adjacent premises by persons of color. [2] The authority of the state to pass laws in the exercise of the police power, having for their object the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare is very broad as has been affirmed in numerous and recent decisions of this court. Furthermore the exercise of this power, embracing nearly all legislation of a local character is not to be interfered with by the courts where it is within the scope of legislative authority and the means adopted reasonably tend to accomplish a lawful purpose. But it is equally well established that the police power, broad as it is, cannot justify the passage of a law or ordinance which runs counter to the limitations of the federal Constitution; that principle has been so frequently affirmed in this court that we need not stop to cite the cases. It is the mere thing which a person owns. elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitu. tion protects these essential attributes of property. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 391, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780. Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person's acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land. 1 Blackstone's Commentaries (Cooley's Ed.) 127. True it is that dominion over property springing from ownership is not absolute and unqualified. The disposition and use of property may be controlled in the exercise of the police power in the interest of the public health, convenience, or welfare. Harmful occupations may be controlled and regulated. Legitimate business may also be regulated in the interest of the public. Certain uses of property may be confined to portions of the municipality other than the resident district, such as livery stables, brickyards and the like, because of the impairment of the health and comfort of the occupants of neighboring property. Many illustrations might be given from the decisions of this court, and other courts, of this principle, but these cases do not touch the one at bar. [4] The concrete question here is: May the occupancy, and, necessarily, the purchase and sale of property of which occupancy is an incident, be inhibited by the states, or by one of its municipalities, solely because of the color of the proposed occupant of the premises? That one may dispose of his property, subject only to the control of lawful enactments curtailing that right in the public interest, must be conceded. The question now presented makes it pertinent to inquire into the constitutional right of the white man to sell his property to a colored man, having in view the legal status of the purchaser and occupant. Following the Civil War certain amendments to the federal Constitution were adopted, which have become an integral part of that instrument, equally binding upon all the states and fixing certain fundamental rights which all are bound to respect. The Thir teenth Amendment abolished slavery in the United States and in all places subject to their jurisdiction, and gave Congress power to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation. The Fourteenth Amendment made all persons born or naturalized in the United States, citizens of the United States and of the states in which they reside, and provided that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, and that no state shall deprive any due process of law, nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws. [3] The federal Constitution and laws passed within its authority are by the ex-person of life, liberty, or property without press terms of that instrument made the supreme law of the land. The Fourteenth Amendment protects life, liberty, and property from invasion by the states without due process of law. Property is more than The effect of these amendments was first dealt with by this court in Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394. The rea |