of the law-as one not only of private but of great public interest in that it secures to the unfortunate debtor, who surrenders his prop erty for distribution, a new opportunity in life. Neal v. Clark, 95 U. S. 704, 709, 24 L. Ed. 586; Traer v. Clews, 115 U. S. 528, 541, 6 Sup. Ct. 155, 29 L. Ed. 467; Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 192, 22 Sup. Ct. 857, 46 L. Ed. 1113; Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U. S. 68, 77, 25 Sup. Ct. 172, 49 L. Ed. 390, 2 Ann. Cas. 265; Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 473, 33 Sup. Ct. 564, 57 L. Ed. 920, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 148. This feature of a bankruptcy law is wholly wanting in the Ohio statutes under consideration. Indeed, there is not now, any more than when Mayer v. Hellman, supra, was decided, any attempt in the Ohio laws to provide for the discharge of the debtor from his existing debts. If the Ohio statutes in the feature now under consideration be suspended, it would follow that a person in Ohio might successfully claim a part of the estate which is being administered in bankruptcy, although the conveyance under which the property is claimed is voidable under the laws of the state where it was made and the alleged right in the property secured. We think that Congress in the Bankruptcy Act did not intend any such result, but meant to permit the trustee in bankruptcy to have the benefit of state laws of this character which do not conflict with the aims and purposes of the federal law. And certainly, in view of the provisions of section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act, Congress did not intend to permit a conveyance such as is here involved to stand which creditors might attack and avoid under the state law for the benefit of general creditors of the estate. From what we have said it follows that questions A and B should be answered in the negative, and it is unnecessary to answer question C. So ordered. (245 U. S. 618) WEEKS v. UNITED STATES. On a trial for shipping from one state to another an article labeled "Special Lemon. leged, was misbranded, in that it was offered for Lemon Terpene and Citral," which, it was alsale as lemon oil, when in fact it was an imitation thereof, evidence that defendant's salesman, who solicited the order for the oil, represented that it was pure lemon oil, was admissible, as tending to prove that the order to fill which the shipment was made was obtained by offering the article for sale in the distinctive name of another article, and therefore that it was misbranded within the meaning of the statute. 4. CRIMINAL LAW 1086(14), 1144(16)—APPEAL-FAILURE TO OBJECT PRESUMPTIONS. On a trial for shipping an imitation of lemon oil, which it was claimed defendant's salesman misrepresented to be pure lemon oil, where the court told the jury that, in order to hold defendant responsible criminally by reason of such representations, it must appear beyond a reasonand the record did not show that defendant obable doubt that they were made by his authority, jected to the submission of the question in this way, and did not purport to contain all the evidence, the verdict must be taken as conclusively determining that the representations were made with defendant's sanction, and hence the question whether such sanction was necessary was not in the case, though the Circuit Court of Appeals expressed its opinion on such question. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Oscar J. Weeks was convicted of an offense, his conviction was affirmed in part by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (224 Fed. 64, 139 C. C. A. 626), and he brings certiorari. Affirmed. Mr. Walter Jeffreys Carlin, of New York City, for petitioner. Messrs. Solicitor General Davis and Assistant Attorney General Frierson, for the Unit ed States. • Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered⚫ the opinion of the Court. This was a prosecution under the Act of June 30, 1906, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, upon a (Submitted Jan. 2, 1918. Decided Feb. 4, 1918.) charge of shipping an article of food in in 1. COMMERCE 5 No. 109. POWERS OF CONGRESS SHIPMENT OF FOOD PRODUCTS. Act June 30, 1906, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (Comp. St. 1916, §§ 8717-8728), making it unlawful to ship or deliver for shipment in interstate commerce an article of food which is misbranded, in that it bears a false or misleading label, or is offered for sale under the distinctive name of another article, is a legitimate exercise of the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 2. COMMERCE 40(1) "INTERSTATE COMMERCE"-SALES OF GOODS. The negotiation of sales of goods which are in another state, for the purpose of introducing terstate commerce in circumstances making the shipment a violation of the act. The information contained two counts, both charging that the article was misbranded-one because it bore a false and misleading label, and the other because it was offered for sale as lemon oil when in truth it was an imitation thereof containing alcohol and citral derived from lemon grass. In the District Court there was a conviction upon both counts, and the Circuit Court of Appeals re versed the conviction as to the first count and affirmed it as to the second. 224 Fed. 64, 139 C. C. A. 626. The judgment upon the latter is all that is brought here for review. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes "That for the purposes of this act an article shall also be deemed to be misbranded: "In the case of drugs: * "In the case of food: The defendant was engaged in making and selling various articles of food used by bakers, confectioners and ice cream makers, including the article with which this prosecution is concerned. On the occasion in question he shipped from one state to another a quantity of this article labeled "Special Lem-ticle." on. Lemon Terpene and Citral." The printThis section contains other provisions reed record, although not purporting to con-lating to misbranding, but they are not ma tain all the evidence, shows that there was testimony tending to prove the following facts, among others: The shipment was made to fill an order solicited and taken by a traveling salesman in the defendant's em ploy. The salesman had been supplied by the defendant with a sample bottle of the article which was labeled simply "Special Lemon." In offering the article for sale and soliciting the order the salesman exhibited the sample and represented that the article was pure lemon oil obtained by a second pressing and that this pressing produced a good, if not the best, oil. In truth the article was not lemon oil, but an imitation thereof containing alcohol and citral made from lemon grass. Some of the elements of lemon oil were present in other than the usual proportions and others were entirely want ing. The testimony respecting the salesman's representations was admitted over the defendant's objection; and later the court denied a request on the part of the defendant that the jury be instructed that this testimony could not be considered, but only the statement appearing on the label when the article was shipped. In that connection the court told the jury that the defendant could not be held responsible criminally by reason of any representations made by the salesman unless it appeared beyond a reasonable doubt that the same were made by the defendant's authority. "First. If it be an imitation of or offered for sale under the distinctive name of another ar terial here, and need not be set forth or specially noticed. and defines at least two kinds of misbrandIt is apparent that the statute specifies ingone where the article bears a false or misleading label, and the other where it is offered for sale under the distinctive name of another article. The two are quite distinct, a deceptive label being an essential element of one, but not of the other. No doubt both involve a measure of deception, but they differ in respect of the mode in which it is practiced. Evidently each is intended to cover a field of its own, for otherwise there would be no occasion for specifying and defining both. That one article of food may be offered for sale in the distinctive name of another, and the offer accomplish its purpose, without the aid of a false or misleading label hardly needs statement. That [1, 2] The statute does not attempt to make either kind of misbranding unlawful in itself, but does, as before indicated, make it unlawful to ship or deliver for shipment from one state to another an article of food which is misbranded in either way. this is a legitimate exertion of the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is settled by our decisions. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 31 Sup. Ct. 364, 55 L. Ed. 364; McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115, 128, 33 Sup. Ct. 431, 57 L. Ed. 754, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 984, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 39; Seven Cases of Eckman's Alterative v. United States, 239 U. S. 510, 514, 36 Sup. Ct. The defendant, who is the petitioner here, complains of the admission and consideration of this testimony and insists that un-190, 60 L. Ed. 411, L. R. A. 1916D, 164. It der the statute the question whether an article is misbranded turns entirely upon how it is labeled when it is shipped, regardless of any representations made by a salesman, or even the vendor, in offering it for sale. also is settled by our decisions that "the negotiation of sales of goods which are in another state, for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiation is made, is interstate commerce." Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 497, 7 Sup. Ct. 592, 596 (30 L. Ed. 694); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389, 396, 33 Sup. Ct. 294, 57 L. Ed. 565. The statute, in its second section (Comp. St. 1916, § 8718), makes it unlawful to ship or deliver for shipment from one state to another "any article of food or drugs which is adulterated or misbranded, within the mean- [3] It follows that the testimony respecting of this act." In its eighth section (sec-ing the representations of the defendant's tion 8724) it declares: traveling salesman was rightly admitted in "That the term 'misbranded,' as used herein, evidence and submitted to the jury. It tendshall apply to all drugs, or articles of food, or ed to prove that the order, to fill which the articles which enter into the composition of food, shipment was made, was obtained by offerthe package or label of which shall bear any ing the article for sale in the distinctive statement, design, or device regarding such article, or the ingredients or substances contained name of another article, and therefore that therein which shall be false or misleading in any the article was misbranded within the meanparticular, and to any food or drug product ing of the statute. To have confined the which is falsely branded as to the state, territory, or country in which it is manufactured or produced. jury's attention to the label borne by the article when it was shipped, as was requested *622 023 by the defendant, would have been to disre, The District Court had expressly instructed gard the nature of the charge in the second the jury that to hold the defendant responcount and the distinction between the two sible criminally by reason of such representakinds of misbranding. tions it must appear, and appear beyond a reasonable doubt, that they were made by his authority. The record before us does not show that the defendant objected to the submission of this question to the jury in this way; neither does it purport to contain all the evidence. The verdict therefore must be taken as conclusively determining that the representations were made with the defendant's sanction. [4] In the Circuit Court of Appeals the view was expressed that intent was not an element of the offense charged in the second count and therefore that it was immaterial whether the representations of the salesman had the sanction of the defendant. Complaint is now made of this. But the question is not in the case, the view expressed by the Circuit Court of Appeals not being essential to an affirmance of the judgment. Judgment affirmed. MEMORANDUM DECISIONS Disposed of at October TERM, 1917 State of Texas. Messrs. Joseph M. Bryson, of St. Louis, Mo., and Alex. Britton and Evans Browne, both of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff in error. No. 84. STONEBRAKER-ZEA COMPANY, | ror to the County Court of Kauffman County, appellant, v. UNITED STATES. Jan. 28, 1918. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. For opinion below, see 220 Fed. 99, 135 C. C. A. 96. Mr. Henry B. Martin, of Tulsa, Okl., for appellant. The Attorney General, for the United States. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed upon the authority of McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 504, 514, 30 Sup. Ct. 386, 54 L. Ed. 590; Washington Securities Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 76, 78, 34 Sup. Ct. 725, 58 L. Ed. 1220; Wright-Blodgett Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 397, 402, 405, 35 Sup. Ct. 339, 59 L. Ed. 637; Causey v. United States, 240 U. S. 399, 401, 36 Sup. Ct. 365, 60 L. Ed. 711, and cause remanded to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Oklahoma. No. 153. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FÉ RAILWAY COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. Paul D. COLE. Jan. 28, 1918. In error to Supreme Court of the State of Kansas. For opinion below, see 97 Kan. 461, 155 P. 949. Mr. Robert Dunlap, of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Alfred M. Jackson, of Winfield, Kan., and Charles T. Atkinson, of Arkansas City, Kan., for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed with costs and 10 per cent damages upon the authority of Chicago Junction Railway Co. v. King, 222 U. S. 222, 32 Sup. Ct. 79, 56 L. Ed. 173; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Padgett, 236 U. S. 668, 35 Sup. Ct. 481, 59 L. Ed. 777; Great Northern Railway Co. v. Knapp, 240 U. S. 464, 36 Sup. Ct. 399, 60 L. Ed. 745; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Whitacre, 242 U. S. 169, 37 Sup. Ct. 33, 61 L. Ed. 228; Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 244 U. S. 571, 574, 37 Sup. Ct. 703, 61 L. Ed. 1321. PER CURIAM. Judgment reversed upon the authority of Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 26 Sup. Ct. 628, 50 L. Ed. 1011; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Albers Commission Co., 223 U. S. 573, 596-598, 32 Sup. Ct. 316, 56 L. Ed. 556; Illinois Central R. Ř. Co. v. Henderson Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 441, 33 Sup. Ct. 176, 57 L. Ed. 290; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 653, 33 Sup. Ct. 391, 57 L. Ed. 683. See Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 35 Sup. Ct. 494, 59 L. Ed. 853, L. R. A. 1915É, 665. No. 167. John E. ROLLER, plaintiff in error, v. Lindsay M. ARMENTROUT. Jan. 28, 1918. In error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia. For opinion below, see 118 Va. 173, 86 S. E. 906. Mr. John E. Roller, of Harrisonburg, Va., for plaintiff in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of: 1. Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co., 226 U. S. 102, 105, 33 Sup. Ct. 80, 57 L. Ed. 140; Consolidated Turnpike v. Norfolk, &c., Ry. Co., 228 U. S. 596, 600, 33 Sup. Ct. 605, 57 L. Ed. 982; Ennis Water Works v. Ennis, 233 U. S. 652, 658, 34 Sup. Ct. 767, 58 L. Ed. 1139; Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U. S. 14, 36 Sup. Ct. 15, 60 L. Ed. 120. 2. Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361, 14 Sup. Ct. 131, 37 L. Ed. 1111; Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U. S. 93, 28 Sup. Ct. 30, 52 L. Ed. 118; Holden Land Co. v. Inter-State Trading Co., 233 U. S. 536, 541, 34 Sup. Ct. 661, 58 L. Ed. 1083; Mellon Co. v McCafferty, 239 U. S. 134, 36 Sup. Ct. 94, 60 L. Ed. 181. No. 156. MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS RAILWAY COMPANY OF TEXAS, plaintiff in error, v. W. P. SCHNOUTZ and Texas Midland Railroad Company. Jan. 28, 1918. In er No. 581. STATE OF OHIO on the relation of HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. Alonzo J. DOUDS et al. Jan. 28, 1918. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio. Messrs. James C. Jones, of St. Louis, Mo., and Harry B. Arnold, of Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff in er ror. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237, Judicial Code Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156, as amended by the act of Congress of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. 1916, § 1214); Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Gilbert, 245 U. S. 162, 38 Sup. Ct. 58, 62 L. Ed. No. 702. Emma GOLDMAN et al., plaintiffs in error, v. UNITED STATES. Jan. 28, 1918. See, also, 245 U. S. 474, 38 Sup. Ct. 166, 62 L. Ed. -. Motion that mandate issue at once granted. No. 181. Bert WILLIAMS et al., plaintiffs in error, v. A. P. SANDLES et al. Jan. 31, 1918. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio. For opinion below, see 93 Ohio St. 92, 112 N. E. 206. Mr. F. S. Monnett, of Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. Edward C. Turner, of Columbus, Ohio, for defendants in error. Dismissed with costs, pursuant to the tenth rule. No. 369. EL PASO SASH & DOOR COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. E. M. CARRAWAY. Feb. 4, 1918. In error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Eighth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas. For opinion below, see 186 S. W. 363. Mr. Charles B. Braun, of Waco, Tex., for plaintiff in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of (1) McCorquodale v. Texas, 211 U. S. 432, 437, 29 Sup. Ct. 146, 53 L. Ed. 269; Waters Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 112, 118, 29 Sup. Ct. 227, 53 L. Ed. 431; Kansas City Star Co. v. Julian, 215 U.S. 589, 30 Sup. Ct. 406, 54 L. Ed. 340; St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Shepherd, 240 U. S. 240, 241, 36 Sup. Ct. 274, 60 L. Ed. 622. (2) Miller v. Cornwall R. R. Co., 168 U. S. 131, 134, 18 Sup. Ct. 34, 42 L. Ed. 409; Harding v. Illinois, 196 U. S. (246 U. S. 227) EGAN v. McDONALD. on writ of error under section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 321, 36 (Submitted Jan. 28, 1918. Argued March 4, Stat. 1156 [Comp. St. 1916, § 1214]). 1918.) No. 88. 1. INDIANS 15(1)—ALIENATION OF LANDS -REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS. Though under Act March 2, 1889, c. 405, § 11, 25 Stat. 891, and a trust patent issued thereunder to an Indian, the heirs of the Indian as well as the patentee were without power to convey title for 25 years, Congress had power to remove the restrictions imposed upon alienation by the heirs as was done by Act May 27, 1902, c. 888, § 7 (Comp. St. 1916, § 4223), authorizing the adult heirs of patentees to convey with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 2. INDIANS 15(2)-ALIENATION OF LANDS -CONDITIONS PRECEDENT. An adjudication of heirship by a federal court was not a condition precedent to a valid conveyance by heirs of an Indian allottee holding under a trust patent executed in 1908 and approved by the Secretary of the Interior in 1909; there being no provision of law at that time requiring that some federal court should first establish that the grantors were the heirs. 3. COURTS394(16)—REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF STATE COURTS-MATTERS REVIEWABLE. In an action by a purchaser of land to recover back an amount paid by him on the ground that the vendor's title was not merchantable, in which it appeared that the vendor's title depended on a deed approved by the Secretary of the Interior and purporting to be executed by persons who declared themselves to be the only heirs of an Indian allottee, a holding of the state court that the burden was on plaintiff to establish the fact that there were other heirs, and that the mere suggestion that there may have been additional heirs did not cast such a suspicion on the title as to render it unmerchantable, was a matter of state law, with which the federal Supreme Court has no con cern. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota. Action by George W. Egan against Charles S. McDonald. Judgment for defendant was affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Dakota (36 S. D. 92, 153 N. W. 915), and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. Mr. George W. Egan, of Sioux Falls, S. D., pro se. Messrs. Charles O. Bailey and John H. Voorhees, both of Sioux Falls, S. D., for defendant in error. Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court. Egan agreed to buy of McDonald a parcel of land in South Dakota and paid $1,000 to bind the bargain. McDonald agreed to furnish a merchantable title. After examining the abstract, Egan asserted that the title was not merchantable, demanded back his money, and, upon refusal, brought an action in a state court to recover it. Upon substantially undisputed facts judgment was entered for defendant and was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of South Dakota. 36 S. D. 92, 153 N. W. 915. The case comes here McDonald's title was this: (1) A 25-year trust patent dated December 12, 1895, for an Indian allotment issued to Weasel, under section 11 of Act of Congress March 2, 1889, c. 405 (25 Stat. 888, 891). (2) Deed to R. J. Huston dated October 9, 1998, from Plays and two others therein described as "sole and only heirs of Weasel, deceased, a Crow Creek Sioux Indian," approved by the Secretary of the Interior, March 2, 1909, and thereafter duly recorded in the Department* of the Interior and the Registry of Deeds. (3) A final decree of distribution of the estate of Weasel in the county court making distribution of the land to Plays and two others as only heirs. (4) Deed from Huston to McDonald, dated November 3, 1910. (5) A decree of the state circuit court entered in 1912 in a suit brought by McDonald to quiet title and declaring him to be the owner in fee of the land. Egan contends that this title was not merchantable, both because there was no power in the heirs of Weasel to alienate the property and because there had been no adjudication in any federal court that the three persons purporting to convey to Huston were the only heirs of Weasel. [1] First. As to the power of Weasel's heirs to convey: The trust patent was issued under section 11 of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1889. Under the provisions of that statute and the terms of the trust patent, the heirs, as well as Weasel, were without power to convey title before the expiration of the 25 years. But, by section 7 of the Act of Congress May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 275, 888 [Comp. St. 1916, § 4223]), adult heirs were given power to convey with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior; and it is declared that "such conveyances when so approved shall convey a full title to the purchaser, the same as if a final pathad been issued to the allottee." Congressent without restriction upon the alienation had, of course, power to remove the restrictions originally imposed upon alienation by heirs. Williams v. Johnson, 239 U. S. 414, 420, 36 Sup. Ct. 150, 60 L. Ed. 358. [2] Second. As to the lack of federal adjudication: Neither in 1908 when the deed to Huston was executed, nor in 1909 when it was approved by the Secretary of the Interior, was there any provision of law that heirs of an Indian allottee under a trust patent could make a valid conveyance only if some federal court should first have estab-, lished that they were the heirs. Nor was there then a provision, like that prescribed* by Act of June 25, 1910, c. 431 (36 Stat. 855 [Comp. St. 1916, § 4226]), that the Secretary of the Interior shall determine in such case who the legal heirs are. Hallowell v. Com For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests anć Indexes ⚫228 |