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seaman" on board the Mackinaw in the Port of San Francisco for some days, and on the voyage from San Francisco to Grays Harbor, Washington, and at Grays Harbor until the time of the commencement of this action.

The employment of the man to serve as a bona fide seaman on the Mackinaw is not questioned, and the allegations of the complaint negative any suspicion that the employment of him in China was a subterfuge adopted for the purpose of unlawfully securing his entry into the United States.

years ago, in Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226, to be, to arrest the bringing of an ignorant, servile class of foreign laborers into the United States, under contract to work at a low rate of wages, and thus reduce other laborers engaged in like occupations to the level of the assisted immigrant.

Having these terms of the statutes and this history in mind, can it with reason be said that the men shipped on the Mackinaw as “seamen" were "laborers," and that when employed upon that vessel in foreign commerce they were performing labor "in this country" within the meaning of the acts?

Basing his right upon the allegations of the complaint, which we have thus epitomized, the claim of the petitioner is, that by employing and bringing an alien laborer as a In familiar speech a "seaman" may be callseaman to San Francisco, in the manner de- ed a "sailor" or a "mariner," but he is never scribed, for the purpose of shipping him, fol- called a "laborer," although he doubtless perlowed by his actually being shipped, as a forms labor when assisting in the care and seaman on board a vessel of American regis- management of his ship; and a "seaman” is try, the defendants violated the Act of Con-defined, in the United States statutes appligress of February 20, 1907 (34 Stat. at Large, p. 898).

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cable to "Merchant Seamen," as being any person (masters and apprentices excepted)* The argument in support of this claim is who shall be employed to serve in any cathat the seaman, described in each count of pacity on board a vessel. R. S. § 4612. In the complaint, was an alien contract laborer; the shipping articles, which the United States that the steamship Mackinaw was a part of law requires shall be signed by members the territory of the United States, and that of the crews of ships of American registry therefore the contracting to bring such alien engaged in foreign commerce, the men are to San Francisco and to there employ him designated as “seamen" or "mariners." Thus, upon such a vessel was to knowingly assist neither in popular nor in technical legal language would the men employed on the Mackiand encourage the migration of an alien contract laborer into the United States, for the naw be called or classed as, "laborers," and such seamen are not brought "into this counpurpose of having him perform labor therein, in violation of the fourth and fifth sec-of its inhabitants, but they come to our try" to enter into competition with the labor

tions of the act.

The validity of this claim, and of the argument in support of it, calls for the construction of three short provisions of two statutes. Section 2 of the act of 1907, as amended in 1910 (36 Stat. at Large, p. 263), furnishes this definition of "contract laborers," which must be read into sections 4 and 5 of the act of 1907:

"Persons who have been induced or solicited to migrate to this country by offers or promises of employment or in consequence of agreements, oral, written or printed, express or implied, to perform labor in this country of any kind, skilled or unskilled."

shores only to sail away again in foreign commerce on the ship which brings them or on another, as soon as employment can be obtained.

Equally unallowable is the contention that a ship of American registry engaged in foreign commerce is a part of the territory of the United States in such a sense that men employed on it can be said to be laboring "in the United States" or "performing labor in this country." It is, of course, true that for the purposes of jurisdiction a ship, even on the high seas, is often said to be a part of the territory of the nation whose flag it flies. But in the physical sense this expression is obviously figurative (International Law Digest, Moore, vol. I, § 174), and to expand the doctrine to the extent of treating seamen emSection 5 imposes severe penalties for every violation of the act "by knowingly assisting, en-ployed on such a ship as working in the councouraging, or soliciting the migration or impor- try of its registry is quite impossible. Thus tation of any contract laborer into the United the seamen employed on the Mackinaw were States." not within either the spirit or the letter of the law on which the petitioner bases his action and in any point of view his contention is fanciful and unsound and must be denied.

Section 4 makes it a misdemeanor for any corporation to "in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration of any contract laborer or contract laborers into the United States."

Thus a contract laborer is one who under the conditions described in the first of these statutes comes "to perform labor in this country," and the penalties denounced by the sections of the other act are against persons who knowingly assist or induce the importation or migration of such laborer "into the United States."

The purpose of this alien labor legislation was declared by this court almost thirty

In the result thus reached we are adopting the construction given to another section of this act of Congress of 1907 in Taylor v. United States, 207 U. S. 120, 28 Sup. Ct. 53, 52 L. Ed. 130, and we are approving the construction placed upon the sections we are here considering of the act, and upon earlier acts

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relating to the immigration of alien laborers, | quire that some definite charge of evil or abuse in the long-standing decisions of many lower and some definite remedy be put into words by courts and of the Department of Justice, in some complainant, or by the Interstate Commerce Commission to authorize it to make an all of which it is held that seamen employed investigation as to whether expenditures by a in foreign commerce cannot be considered railroad company in political activities and to alien contract laborers within the terms of suppress competition have been charged to op the various statutes. United States v. San-erating or legal expenses.

drey (C. C.) 48 Fed. 550; United States v. Burke (C. C.) 99 Fed. 895; Moffitt v. United States, 128 Fed. 375, 63 C. C. A. 117; United States v. Jamieson (C. C.) 185 Fed. 165; Immigration-Deserting Seamen, 23 Opinions of the Attorney General, 521; Chinese SeamenTransfer of Crew-Alien Laborers, 24 Opinions of the Attorney General, 553. This construction of the act has also long been applied by the Department of Labor in its practical administration of the law. See Immigration Rules 1911, No. 10, subdivision 1, (a), (c),

and (d); subdivision 3.

[2] The fact that the aliens in this case were Chinese subjects is without significance. The suit is to enforce the highly penal provisions of acts of Congress which apply to all alien contract laborers without regard to their origin or nationality.

3. COMMERCE 87- INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION-INVESTIGATIONS-SCOPE AND EXTENT OF POWERS.

The United States Senate adopted a resolution, directing the Interstate Commerce Commission to investigate certain practices and financial relations of certain railroad companies, and as to the amount, if any, subscribed, expended, or contributed to prevent other railroads from entering their territory, for maintributing to political campaigns, or for creating taining political or legislative agents, for consentiment in favor of any of their plans. The Commission instituted a proceeding pursuant thereto with which, over two years after the passage of the resolution, it consolidated a complaint by L., the author of such resolution, as to an alleged improper issue of free passes. Held, that the contention that the investigation subject specified in the Senate resolution was by the Commission was strictly limited to the without merit, as it ascribed too much domi. nance to the resolution, put out of view or unduly subordinated the invocation of the powers of the Commission by L. and the interval of also the independent and inherent powers of the Commission.

It results that the judgment of the Court of two years between it and the resolution, and Appeals must be

Affirmed.

(245 U. S. 33)

SMITH V. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COM

MISSION.

4. COMMERCE 87-INTERSTATE COMMERCE
AND

COMMISSION-INVESTIGATIONS-SCOPE
EXTENT OF POWERS.

Conceding that an interstate carrier may attempt to mold or enlighten public opinion, its (Argued Oct. 2 and 3, 1917. Decided Nov. 5, conduct and the expenditures of its funds in

1917.) No. 337.

1. COMMERCE 87-INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION-INVESTIGATIONS - SCOPE AND EXTENT OF POWERS.

Under Interstate Commerce Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, § 12, 24 Stat. 383, as amended (Comp. St. 1916, § 8576), authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to inquire into the management of the business of carriers and keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which such business is conducted and

to obtain full and complete information from the carriers, section 13, as amended (section 8581), authorizing it to institute an inquiry on its own motion in any case and as to any matter or thing concerning which a complaint is authorized to be made to or before it, or concerning which any question may arise under any of the provisions of that act or relating to the enforcement of any of its provisions, and section 20, as amended (section 8592), authorizing the Commission to require detailed accounts of all expenditures and revenues and a complete exhibit of the financial obligations of carriers, and to prescribe forms of accounts, records, and memoranda, the Commission is authorized to make an investigation as to whether amounts subscribed or expended by railroad companies in political activities and efforts to suppress competition have been charged to operating or legal expenses, and where this was the purpose of an inquiry, questions as to the amount so subscribed or expended were not objectionable.

this connection are open to inquiry by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

* Petition by the Interstate Commerce Commission for an order requiring M. H. Smith to attend before it and answer certain questions. From an order requiring defendant to answer the questions, he appeals. Affirmed.

Petition of the Interstate Commerce Com

mission to require the attendance before it of appellant, president of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, an interstate carrier, to answer certain questions theretofore asked him in a proceeding then pending before the Commission.

The petition described the Commission as an administrative tribunal and recited the powers conferred upon it by sections 1, 15, 12, 13, 20 and 21 of the Act of Congress to regulate commerce, approved February 4, 1887, as subsequently amended (Comp. St. 1916, §§ 8563, 8576, 8581, 8583, 8592, 8594). That by a resolution of the United States Senate of November 6, 1913, the Commission was directed to investigate, take proof and report to the Senate as soon as practicable upon certain practices and financial relations 2. COMMERCE 87-INTERSTATE COMMERCE of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, the COMMISSION-INVESTIGATIONS-SCOPE AND Nashville, Chatanooga & St. Louis Railway Interstate Commerce Act 1887, 13, as and other carriers. The resolution was set amended (Comp. St. 1916, § 8581), does not re-out. Its twelfth paragraph is as follows:

EXTENT OF POWERS.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

those not now relevant. We number them for convenience of reference:

"What amount, if any, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway, the Nashville & Decatur 1. "I will ask you, Mr. Smith, if you know of Railroad, and the Lewisburg & Northern Railroad, all or any of them, have subscribed, ex- road expended in Tennessee for political camany funds of the Louisville & Nashville Railpended or contributed for the purpose of pre-paign purposes during the year 1915 and charg venting other railroads from entering any the territory served by any of these railroads, for maintaining political or legislative agents, for contributing to political campaigns, for creating sentiment in favor of any of the plans of any of said railroads."

The other paragraphs concern the relation of the railroads to one another, the control, if any, exercised by the Louisville & Nashville over the others, by stock ownership, leases or arrangements, and whether but for these the roads would be competitive and if through such means rates were fixed and maintained. The resolution is set out in full in United States v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 236 U. S. 318, 324, 35 Sup. Ct. 363, 59 L. Ed. 598.

ed upon the books of that carrier to operating expenses."

2. "Can you tell us what funds of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company were expended in the state of Alabama during the years 1912 and 1913 for political campaign purposes and charged on the books of that carrier to operating expenses or to construction account?"

3. "Can you tell us of your own knowledge whether these expenditures of the funds of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company for political purposes were charged in the operating expense account or construction account of either the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company or the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway? Can you tell us whether these expenditures were charged on the books of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad to legal expenses?"

4. "Among the vouchers in the files of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, found by the examiners of the Interstate Commerce Commission, there appears one, No. 2282, February, 1910, in favor of the Columbia Trust Company for $20,715.06 for special fees paid under the direction of the president. The examiners were refused all information regarding this voucher. Can you tell us what it was about and what the voucher was for?"

5. "Can you tell us why the entry in reference to this $20,000 voucher was made in such a way as to give no information as to the purpose of this expenditure?""'

That thereafter the Commission instituted a proceeding in pursuance of such resolution and it was ordered that the proceeding be set for hearing at such times and places and that such persons be required to appear and testify or to produce books, documents and papers as the Commission might thereafter direct, and that the investigation be carried on in the meantime by such other means and methods as might be deemed appropriate. A 6. "Among the vouchers found by the ac copy of the order was served on the Louis-countants for the Commission in the files of the ville & Nashville and other railroads. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, appears one numbered 391, dated May 5, 1907, in favor of the National Bank of Commerce, for $15,000 issued for certain expenditures authorized by the president. All further information was refused the accountants. The books give no further information. Can you advise us or enlighten us as to the purposes of this $15,000 voucher?" 7. "Did the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, through you or by your direction, expend approximately $34,800 in Alabama through the Johnson-Dallas Agency in a campaign against rate reductions as advocated by former Governor Comer, of that state?"

That subsequently, on March 20, 1916, the order of the Commission was amended by adding to the order the provision that after the hearings and investigations authorized the Commission might issue such order or orders in the matter as might be proper and necessary in the premises and that case No. 8488, Luke Lea v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. et al., be consolidated for hearing with the proceeding upon one record at such times and places as the Commission might direct. Copies of the order and original order were served on the railroads.

8. "Have you personal knowledge of any funds of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company expended in Alabama through the Johnson-Dallas Agency in a campaign against rate reductions?"

That pursuant to such orders a meeting was had April 27, 1916, and pursuant to ad- 9. "Is it the policy of the Louisville & Nashjournment resumed in the city of Washing-ville Railroad Company to make political campaign contributions, if you know?"

ton May 4, 1916. At such hearings appellant appeared in response to a subpoena and certain questions were addressed to him.

He testified that there was no connection between the reckless dissipation of the funds of a railroad in political campaigns and the adjustment of reasonable rates, even if the contribution was of the sum of $500,000 or $20,000,000, as the adjustment of rates is governed by conditions entirely independent of the revenues of a railroad. In illustration he adduced the adjustment of rates of bankrupt roads operated by receivers of courts which he testified are handled in the same way and arrived at in the same manner as they are by solvent roads.

The following questions were then asked him by counsel for the Commission, omitting

All of the questions the witness declined to answer upon the advice of counsel.

The answer of appellant to the petition challenged in general and in detail the power of the Commission and urged that the Commission is entirely a ministerial tribunal, having only the powers given it by act of Congress, and that those, with few exceptions, are confined to the enforcement of the act, and that the latter as amended "does not attempt to regulate the politics or the political activities of common carriers, nor the subject of their endeavoring to exclude competitors from their territories.",

That the object of the questions asked by the Commission "was to delve into questions purely political" and to ascertain whether

the witness or the company believed that a campaigns, for creating sentiment in favor railroad company had a right to engage in of any of the plans of any of said railroads." political campaigns and to make political [1] If, however, we advert to the questions contributions and whether it had been the we observe that the matters dwelt on by policy of the company to make contri- appellant are incidents only, having the purbutions of funds to such campaigns and pose, it may be, in one sense to ascertain whether the company had in the past en- the "amount, if any," subscribed or expended, gaged in such practices. It is asserted that but not having the purpose in the sense of the all such matters are outside of the jurisdic- questions, which is: whether the amount tion of the Commission. subscribed or expended was charged to operating or legal expenses. The latter purpose is more special than the other, and, we may say in passing, does not necessarily involve even a criticism of the other, involves only the display in the accounts of the carriers of the amount expended and its allocation. To this limitation the investigation is reduc ed, and the question is, being so reduced, Is it within the powers of the Commission?

That the proceeding is a consolidation of two proceedings, Nos. 6319 and 8488, that Luke Lea is the open and sole complainant in the latter and the instigator and real complainant in the other, which was instituted by the Commission without there being a nominal complainant, but pursuant to a resolution of the United States Senate introduced by Lea, then a member of the Senate and the complainant in No. 8488, which is confined to an alleged improper issue of free

passes.

Certain activities of Lea are stated and certain resentments and motives of his are urged as having actuated him and a want of power upon the part of the Commission is repeated and the refusal to answer the questions hence asserted to be justified.

The Commission moved to strike out certain portions of the answer, which was de

nied.

The court required appellant to answer the questions, and from its order this appeal is prosecuted.

Messrs. Helm Bruce and Edward S. Jouett, both of Louisville, Ky., for appellant. Mr. Joseph W. Folk, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Mr. Justice McKENNA, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Interstate Commerce Act confers upon the Commission powers of investigation in very broad language and this court has refused by construction to limit it so far as the business of the carriers is concerned and their relation to the public. And it would seem to be a necessary deduction from the cases that the investigating and supervising powers of the Commission extend to all of the activities of carriers and to all sums expended by them which could affect in any way their benefit or burden as agents of the public. If it be grasped thoroughly and kept in attention that they are public agents, we have at least the principle which should determine judgment in particular instances of regulation or investigation; and it is not far from true-it may be it is entirely true, as said by the Commission-that "there can be nothing private or confidential in the ac tivities and expenditures of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce."

Turning to the specialties of the Interstate The fundamental contention of appellant Commerce Act we find there that all charges is that the Interstate Commerce Commission and treatment of all passengers and property has no power to ask the questions in con- shall be just and reasonable, and there is a troversy and in emphasis of this he asserts specific prohibition of preferences and dis"the inquiry was confined exclusively to criminations in all the ways that they can supposed political activities and efforts to be executed, with corresponding regulatory suppress competition." And these, it is fur-power in the Commission. And authority ther asserted, "are not matters which the and means are given to enable it to perform Commission is legally entitled to investigate." The contention is attempted to be supported by the insistence that the investigation was provoked and prosecuted solely in obedience to the Senate resolution and neither in exercise of the judgment of the Commission nor in pursuance of a complaint made to it. And the twelfth paragraph of the resolution is dwelt upon as directing and controlling the inquiry as to what amount, if any, the railroads “have subscribed, expended or contributed for the purpose of preventing other railroads from entering any of the territory served by any of these railroads, for maintaining political or legislative agents, for contributing to political

its duty. By section 12 it is authorized to inquire into the management of the business of carriers and keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which the same is conducted, and has the right to obtain from It may (section 13) institute an inquiry of the carriers full and complete information. its own motion, and may (section 20) require

1 Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. Ed. 755; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 24 Sup. Ct. 563, 48 L. Ed. 860; portation Co., 224 U. S. 194, 32 Sup. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729; United States v. White Star Line, 224 U. S. 194, 32 Sup. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 88, 30 Sup. Ct. 651, 54 L. Ed. 946.

Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Trans

And they must necessarily be expressed in generalities. A precise specification of powers might work a limitation and all not enumerated be asserted to be withheld.

detailed accounts of all the expenditures | Commission v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., supra, and revenues of carriers and a complete ex- where it was said, at page 103 of 218 U. S., hibit of their financial operations and pre- at page 656 of 30 Sup. Ct. (54 L. Ed. 946): scribe the forms of accounts, records and "The outlook of the Commission and its powmemoranda to be kept. And it is required ers must be greater than the interest of the railto report to Congress all data collected by it. roads or of that which may affect those interests. It must be as comprehensive as the inIt would seem to be an idle work to point terest of the whole country. If the problems out the complete comprehensiveness of the which are presented to it therefore are complex language of these sections and we are not dis- and difficult, the means of solving them are as posed to spend any time to argue that it great and adequate as can be provided." necessarily includes the power to inquire into expenditures and their proper assignment in the accounts, and the questions under review, we have seen, go no further. They are incidental to an investigation as to the "manner and method" (section 12) in which the business of the carriers is conducted; they are in requisition of a detailed account of their expenditures and revenues and an exhibit of their financial operations (section 20), and the answers to them may be valuable as information to Congress (section 21). [2] A limitation, however, is deduced from section 13. It is said to be confined to cases where an inquiry is instituted "as to any matter or thing concerning which a complaint is authorized to be made, or concerning which any question may arise under any provisions" of the act "or relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions" of the act. In other words, that the inquiry is determined by the manner of procedure. The objection overlooks the practical and vigi

To sus

We find it difficult to treat counsel's argument as seriously as they urge it. The expenditures of the carriers essentially concern their business. Section 20 declares it and gives the Commission power to require a detail of them, and necessarily not only of their amount but purpose and how charged. And the Commission must have power to prevent evasion of its orders and detect in any formal compliance or in the assignment of expenses a "possible concealment of forbidden practices."

[3] It may be said that our comments are not applicable to questions numbered 7 and 8, which relate to the expenditure of money in Alabama "in a campaign against rate re

duction."

That is, those questions are not directed to "political activities" strictly so called, nor to the suppression of competition. lant function of the Commission. They are directed, however, to the use of tain it appellant seems to urge that there funds in a campaign against state legislative must be put into words by some complainant action. But this, appellant asserts, is at the or by the Commission, if it move of itself, farthest an attempt to "influence legislation some definite charge of evil or abuse, and or to mold public opinion" and that there is put into expression some definite remedy, nothing in the Interstate Commerce Act and that an inquiry must not transcend either "which forbids it or gives to the Commission charge or remedy. To so transcend, appel- any power to investigate the subject." And lant urges, would be an exercise of autocrat-it is besides urged, as it is urged against the ic power and is condemned in Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U. S. 407, 29 Sup. Ct. 115, 53 L. Ed. 253.

other questions, that they do not relate to "the subject under investigation," which is strictly defined by the Senate resolution, to Appellant presses that case beyond its prin- which, it is contended, the order of the Comciple. And we may observe that section 13 mission was responsive and subservient, and has been amended and broadened since the was to be and is confined to the efforts simply decision of that case.2 The inquiry in the "of the railroad companies in political matpresent case is more immediate to the func-ters and in attempts to suppress competition." tion of the Commission than the inquiry in that and comes within Interstate Commerce

Prior to the decision section 13 read as follows: "Said Commission shall in like manner investigate any complaint forwarded by the railroad commissioner or Railroad Commission of any state or territory, at the request of such commissioner or Commission, and may institute any inquiry on its own motion in the same manner and to the same effect

as though complaint had been made."

After the decision the section was amended to read

as follows: 118

Indeed, the servility of the Commission to the Senate's resolution is the basic and insistent contention of appellant and taints, he further contends, all that the Commission did.

The contention ascribes too much dominance to the resolution and puts out of view or unduly subordinates the invocation of the powers of the Commission by the complaint of Lea and the interval of two years between And the Interstate Commerce it and the resolution, and puts out of view Commission shall have full authority and power at besides the independent and inherent powers any time to institute an inquiry, on its own motion, of the Commission to which we have adin any case and as to any matter or thing concerning which a complaint is authorized to be made, to verted. or before said Commission by any provision of this [4] Abstractly speaking, we are not disposact, or concerning which any question may arise un-ed to say that a carrier may not attempt to der any of the provisions of this act, or relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions of this mold or enlighten public opinion, but we are act." Comp. St. 1916, § 8581. quite clear that its conduct and the expendi

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